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For Publication IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS GLENWOOD DAVID III, Appellant/Defendant, v. PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, Appellee/Plaintiff. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Re: Super. Ct. Crim. No. 122/2017 (STX) ) On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. Croix Superior Court Judge: Hon. Robert A. Molloy Argued: February 11, 2020 Filed: June 9, 2020 Cite as 2020 VI 8 BEFORE: RHYS S. HODGE, Chief Justice; MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; and IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice. APPEARANCES: Martial A. Webster, Sr., Esq. St. Croix, U.S.V.I. Attorney for Appellant, Ian S.A. Clement, Esq. Assistant Attorney General St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. Attorney for Appellee. OPINION OF THE COURT CABRET, Associate Justice. ¶ 1 Appellant Glenwood David III (“David”) appeals his convictions for negligent homicide by means of a motor vehicle in violation of 20 V.I.C. § 504 and operating a motor vehicle in a reckless manner in violation of 20 V.I.C. § 492. On appeal, David argues that the Superior Court David v. People 2020 VI 8 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Opinion of the Court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, motion for new trial, on both convictions based on insufficiency of the evidence and that the trial court further erred by not granting his request for a jury instruction concerning the contributory negligence of the decedent.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 On the night of October 16, 2016, Glenwood David was driving south in the southbound lane of Northside Road in Saint Croix, V.I. while Lanieus Cammie (“Cammie”) was traveling north in the northbound lane of Northside Road.2 At 8:01 p.m., Cammie and David’s cars crashed at the intersection of Northside Road and Midland Road in Estate Glynn, in front of a gasoline service station which was located at the corner of the intersection. David attempted to make a right- hand turn onto Midland Road from Northside Road, crossing in front of the northbound lane of traffic on Northside Road, resulting in the crash with Cammie’s vehicle in the northbound lane. Cammie was fatally injured and ultimately died as a result of the collision. ¶ 3 On April 25, 2017, David was charged in a three-count information with negligent homicide by means of a motor vehicle, involuntary manslaughter, and operating a motor vehicle in a reckless manner in relation to the October 16, 2016, automobile crash. The Superior Court held a jury trial in the case from November 13th to November 15th, 2018. At the trial, the prosecution and the defense each presented photographic and video evidence of the crash, as well as witness testimony, to prove their cases. David’s counsel moved for judgment of acquittal both 1 David also asserts in his brief on appeal that his rights were substantially affected by prejudicial surplusage contained in the Information, arguing that the phrase “‘causing [Cammie’s] death’ should have been stricken from Count Three of the Information as surplusage prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights….” However, David expressly abandoned this contention at oral argument, conceding that Count 3 of the Information in this case does not contain and such language and that Appellant’s counsel included this argument by mistake. 2 In the Virgin Islands, motorists drive on the left side of the road. See Galloway v. People, 57 V.I. 693, 697 n. 2 (V.I. 2012). David v. People 2020 VI 8 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Opinion of the Court at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief and again at the close of evidence. Following trial, the jury found David guilty on Count 1, negligent homicide by means of a motor vehicle, and Count 3, operating a vehicle in a reckless manner.3 The jury found David not guilty on Count 2, involuntary manslaughter, and the count was dismissed. David subsequently filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or in the alternative for a new trial, which the Superior Court denied. This appeal followed. II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 4 We have jurisdiction over this criminal appeal pursuant to Title 4, Section 32(a) of the Virgin Islands Code, which provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the Superior Court, or as otherwise provided by law.” Because the Superior Court’s March 21, 2019, judgment and sentence adjudicates all charges with a corresponding sentence or disposition for each offense, it is a final order within the meaning of 4 V.I.C. § 32(a). Williams v. People, 58 V.I. 341, 347 (V.I. 2013). We therefore have jurisdiction over this appeal. We review the denial of a motion for acquittal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence de novo, applying the same standard the Superior Court should have applied. Milligan v. People, 69 V.I. 779, 784 (V.I. 2018). Although we generally review jury instructions for abuse of discretion, where the party challenging the instruction on appeal fails to timely raise an objection before the Superior Court, we review only for plain error. Rodriguez v. People, 2019 VI 19, ¶ 22. 3 David’s conviction on Count 3 was vacated pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 104, as it arose from the same single act that formed the basis for Count 1. See note 5, infra. David v. People 2020 VI 8 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Opinion of the Court III. DISCUSSION ¶ 5 On appeal, David argues that the Superior Court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative for a new trial, because the prosecution failed to introduce sufficient evidence that David operated his vehicle in a reckless manner as required to support a verdict guilty on either Count 1 (negligent homicide) or Count 3 (reckless driving). David further argues that the trial court erred in failing to give a jury instruction concerning the contributory negligence of the decedent. Each argument will be addressed in turn. A. Mens Rea Requirement for Negligent Homicide by Means of a Motor Vehicle ¶ 6 As a threshold matter, David, argues that a defendant may be found guilty of negligent homicide by means of a motor vehicle under 20 V.I.C. § 504 in one of two ways: (1) operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or narcotic drugs; or (2) operating a vehicle in a reckless manner. David expressly argues that a conviction under this section may not be premised upon a finding that the defendant operated his vehicle in a negligent manner. We exercise plenary review over the Superior Court’s interpretation of the statute and disagree with David’s overly narrow interpretation of the relevant statutory language. See Prince v. People, 57 V.I. 399, 405 (V.I. 2012). ¶ 7 Section 504 reads in pertinent part: When the death of a person ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury received by the operation of a vehicle by any person while under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs or by the operation of any vehicle in a reckless manner or with disregard for the safety of others, the persons so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide by means of a motor vehicle. ¶ 8 Thus, the plain language of the statute establishes that to sustain a conviction for negligent homicide by means of a motor vehicle, the prosecution must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: that the defendant (1) operated a vehicle, either (a) while under the influence David v. People 2020 VI 8 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Opinion of the Court of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, (b) or in a reckless manner, (c) or with disregard for the safety of others; (2) proximately causing; (3) the death of a person within one year. ¶ 9 David argues that the statutory language providing for conviction based upon “disregard for the safety of others” is the equivalent of “recklessness,” arguing that, despite labeling the statute “Negligent Homicide by Means of a Motor Vehicle,” the “Legislature did not contemplate mere negligent driving in enacting this law.” David contends that “disregard for the safety of others,” in this context, must be interpreted as requiring that the defendant operated his vehicle in a manner “demonstrat[ing] a malicious and purposeful indifference,” citing the definition of recklessness we articulated in Milligan. However, the relevant statutory language—“by the operation of any vehicle in a reckless manner or with disregard for the safety of others”—is written in the disjunctive, clearly indicating the Legislature’s intent to provide for conviction under the statute based upon either operation of a vehicle in a reckless manner or operation of a vehicle in disregard for the safety of others. See Virgin Islands Taxi Ass’n v. Virgin Islands Port Auth., 67 V.I. 643, 679 (V.I. 2017) (“Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise”) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)). Moreover, David’s suggested interpretation, equating “disregard for the safety of others” with recklessness, would impermissibly render this statutory language superfluous and without effect. See Duggins v. People, 56 V.I. 295, 302 (V.I. 2012) (“When interpreting statutes, we must read the statute, to the extent possible, so that no one part makes any other portion ineffective.”) ¶ 10 Therefore, a defendant may be found guilty of negligent homicide by means of a motor vehicle by virtue of either operating a vehicle in a reckless manner or operating a vehicle with disregard for the safety of others. And, as we previously held in Milligan, the language of Section David v. People 2020 VI 8 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Opinion of the Court 504 allowing for conviction based upon operating a vehicle with disregard for the safety of others, requires proof of at least negligence on the part of the defendant. In Milligan, we noted that the “disregard for the safety of others” language of section 504 “does not specifically require a defendant to exhibit willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others, as does Section 492, because ‘ordinary negligence and willful and wanton misconduct are different in kind and character.’” Milligan, 69 V.I. at 787 (quoting Antonen v. Swanson, 48 N.W.2d 161, 166 (S.D. 1951)). We further explained that the willful and wanton conduct necessary for a finding of reckless driving is equivalent to the recklessness standard articulated in section 504, which constitutes a higher burden than the negligence standard embodied in the “disregard for the safety of others” language; either of which is sufficient to support a conviction under the statute. Id. at 787-88. ¶ 11 Thus, to the extent David argues that a conviction for negligent homicide under section 504 may not be supported by a showing that the defendant operated his vehicle in negligent, rather than reckless, disregard for the safety of others, this argument is foreclosed, both by our prior decision in Milligan and by the plain language of the statute itself. B. Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶ 12 In reviewing the Superior Court's denial of David’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence, “we apply a particularly deferential standard of review.” Stevens v. People, 52 V.I. 294, 304 (V.I. 2009) An appellant who seeks to overturn a conviction on insufficiency of the evidence grounds bears “a very heavy burden.” Ritter v. People, 51 V.I. 354, 359 (V.I. 2009) (quoting United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 1982). “Following a criminal conviction, we view the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the People. We will affirm a conviction if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential David v. People 2020 VI 8 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Opinion of the Court elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stevens, 52 V.I. at 304 (quoting Smith v. People, 51 V.I. 396, 397-98 (V.I. 2009)). A motion for new trial challenging a conviction based on the weight of the evidence permits a court to grant a new trial in the interest of justice, however, “such motions are not favored and should be ‘granted sparingly and only in exceptional cases.’” Stevens, 52 V.I. at 304-05 (quoting United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1005 (3d Cir. 2008)). ¶ 13 On appeal, David only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the mens rea element of each of the counts of which he was convicted. That is, David argues only that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he operated his vehicle in a reckless manner in violation of either section 504 or 492. Therefore, we need not address here whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s findings with respect to the remaining elements of the crimes charged. ¶ 14 Title 20 § 492 provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle in a reckless manner over and along the public highways of this Territory…” and further defines recklessness in this context as “the operation of a vehicle upon the public highways of this Territory in such a manner as to indicate either a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of person or property.” And, as discussed above, § 504 provides for conviction upon a finding of operating a vehicle “in a reckless manner” or in “disregard of the safety of others”—a less exacting standard. Thus, if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of recklessness as defined in § 492, it is necessarily sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement for a conviction of either reckless driving under § 492 or negligent homicide under § 504. See Milligan, 69 V.I. at 787. ¶ 15 At trial, the prosecution’s witness, Officer Cuthbert Cyril, a trained accident investigator who investigated the crash scene, testified that all of the debris from the collision of the vehicles was found in Cammie’s lane of travel, that the gouge marks in the pavement which indicate where David v. People 2020 VI 8 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Opinion of the Court the vehicles made contact and dipped down into the pavement were also found in Cammie’s lane, and that the skid marks which ended at the point of impact were in Cammie’s lane as well. He also testified that the concentration of the damages to David’s vehicle were on the left side of his vehicle, while the damage to Cammie’s vehicle was directly in the front of the vehicle. Officer Cyril further testified that, in his opinion, based upon his investigation of the crash, David turned into Cammie’s lane of travel and failed to stop and yield the right-of-way to Cammie, who was approaching the intersection in the opposite direction. ¶ 16 The evidence presented to the jury also included photographs of the scene and the vehicles, and the videos of the crash that were captured by cameras at the nearby service station. The video evidence demonstrated that the crash occurred at night, and that Cammie was driving with his headlights on at the time of the collision. Additionally, the photographic evidence showed that, from the angle from which David approached the intersection, David enjoyed an unobstructed line of sight down Cammie’s lane of travel for several hundred, if not one thousand, feet. Further, the defense’s own witness, Pablo Maldonado, testified that: “David was looking to make the corner, but he couldn’t make the corner. He had to stop the corner because the car was coming.” Maldonado was specifically asked by the court whether he saw “the car coming down the road” before the crash occurred, in reference to Cammie’s vehicle. Maldonado testified affirmatively, stating: “Yes, man…. Yes.” ¶ 17 Taken together, the jury could reasonably infer, based upon this evidence, that David operated his vehicle in a reckless manner—with willful and wanton indifference to persons or property—by seeing Cammie’s car approaching in the opposite direction, appreciating the risk in attempting to execute his intended turn across Cammie’s lane of travel, but nevertheless David v. People 2020 VI 8 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Opinion of the Court proceeding to execute the turn when he should have yielded the right of way to Cammie.4 Cf. Galloway v. People, 57 V.I. 693 (V.I. 2012) (holding that circumstantial evidence that the defendant ran a red light was sufficient to support a conviction for reckless driving); see also Porter v. Turner, 954 A.2d 308, 312 (Del. 2008) (holding that a jury could find that defendant’s conduct “constituted willful and wanton disregard of the safety of others” when he ran a red light); and Bautista v. State, 699 S.E.2d 392, 394 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that evidence indicating that the defendant driver pulled out into the decedent’s path and across his lane of travel when the decedent was so close to the intersection that he did not have time to apply his brakes before impact was “sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] drove his vehicle in such reckless disregard for the safety of others and that he caused the (decedent)’s death through such reckless driving”); and Ivie v. State, 260 S.E.2d 543 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (evidence that the defendant drove his vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of others by failing to yield the right-of-way to oncoming traffic was sufficient to convict the defendant of first-degree vehicular homicide predicated on reckless driving). Therefore, because the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that David operated his vehicle in a reckless manner, and because David does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the other elements of the crime of which he was convicted, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support David’s convictions on both Count 1 (negligent homicide) and Count 3 (reckless driving).5 Cascen v. People, 60 V.I. 392, 401 (V.I. 2014). Accordingly, the Superior Court did not err in denying 4 In fact, David did have the duty to stop and yield the right-of-way to Cammie, as it is incumbent upon drivers on Northside Road to yield to oncoming traffic before making a turn across their lane. See 20 V.I.C. § 495(e) (in St. Croix, Northside Road is a main street/main road for the purposes of this section) and 20 V.I.C. § 495(b) (traffic on main streets or main roads shall have the right of way). 5 We note that the Superior Court properly vacated David’s conviction on Count 3 (Reckless Driving) in accordance with 14 V.I.C. § 104 and our decision in Titre v. People, 70 V.I. 797 (V.I. 2019), as David’s convictions on both Count 1 (negligent homicide) and Count 3 (reckless driving) arose from the same single act. David v. People 2020 VI 8 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Opinion of the Court David’s motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial, and the Superior Court’s judgment is affirmed. C. Jury Instruction on Contributory Negligence ¶ 18 David also asserts that the Superior Court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the legal effect of the decedent’s own purported negligence in causing the collision, consistent with the District Court of the Virgin Islands’ opinion in Baumann v. Canton, 1968 WL 183265 (D.V.I. 1968), arguing that “a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” The thrust of David’s argument appears to be that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the decedent’s own negligence in traveling at an excessive rate of speed was the proximate cause of his death, and that the jury should therefore have been instructed that, as a matter of law, David could not be found guilty of negligent homicide if it concluded that the decedent’s own negligence was also a proximate cause of his death. However, while David, both before the Superior Court and again in his brief on appeal, repeatedly referred to various excerpts of language from the Baumann decision, David failed to identify precisely what instruction he contends should have been presented to the jury based on the language from Baumann.6 Accordingly, we review the Superior Court’s failure to give such an instruction only for plain error, examining whether David has established that this failure constitutes “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects 6 During a conference after the second day of trial, the judge asked if the parties had any objections to the jury instructions, (JA 310-318), stating that he would not take any objections the next day unless those objections were based upon clear, blatant violations of the law, and that “this [was] the time to make an objection.” At that time, the Appellant did not raise Baumann at all, nor did he object to the lack of an instruction premised upon Baumann. However, the following day, just before closing arguments on the third day of trial, David did raise his concerns with respect to the Baumann decision, and discussed tracking some language stating that there exists a statutory right of way that is not absolute, and that drivers must exercise due care despite having the right of way. After this discussion, the judge informed the lawyers that the court would “stand by its prior decision not to include any language from [Baumann] in the jury instructions….” (emphasis added). David v. People 2020 VI 8 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Opinion of the Court substantial rights,” and if so, whether that error seriously affects the “fairness, integrity, or public perception of the proceedings.” See V.I. R. CRIM. P. 30(d) (stating that “[a] party who objects to any portion of the instructions or to a failure to give a requested instruction must inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for the objection” and providing that “failure to object in accordance with this rule precludes appellate review,” except for plain error); see also Willis v. People, 2019 VI 25, ¶ 26 (outlining standard for plain error review). For the following reasons, we reject David’s argument that he is entitled to such a jury instruction in this case. ¶ 19 First, and most obviously, the Baumann case concerned contributory negligence in a civil action for negligence,7 while David was, in this criminal matter, convicted on charges of negligent homicide and reckless driving. And, unlike civil matters, “[t]he rule as to contributory negligence, applicable to actions for damages, is not applicable in prosecutions for criminal homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.” 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 1676. Thus, while “[t]he conduct of the deceased may be a circumstance to be considered in determining the guilt of accused and whether his or her acts were the proximate cause of the death,” in general, “the contributory negligence of the deceased is not a defense to a prosecution for a homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle and does not excuse an act of negligence or malfeasance on the part of the driver that proximately causes the death.” Id. ¶ 20 As summarized in American Jurisprudence: Criminal liability will attach for a homicide even if the defendant's conduct is not the sole cause of death, if the actions were a sufficiently direct cause of the ensuing death. As long as a particular act of negligence by a defendant is proved to have been a substantial factor in causing a death by contributing materially to producing 7 Baumann applied the doctrine of contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery in a civil action in accordance with the law in force at that time. 7 V.I. at 72. However, in 1973 the Legislature abolished the common law doctrine of contributory negligence, adopting instead the current comparative negligence statute, 5 V.I.C § 1451, providing for the apportionment of fault between plaintiffs and defendants. See Machado v. Yacht Haven U.S.V.I, LLC, 61 V.I. 373, 395 (V.I. 2014). David v. People 2020 VI 8 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Opinion of the Court it, the state need not disprove that any other cause was also a proximate cause of the death. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 13. ¶ 21 In addition to these general common law principles concerning proximate causation in criminal homicide cases, our conclusion is confirmed by the relevant language of the statute itself. The plain language of 14 V.I.C. § 504 requires only that the prosecution prove that “the death of a person ensue[d] within one year as a proximate result of injury received.” (emphasis added). It does not require that the People prove that the defendant’s actions were the proximate cause, or the sole proximate cause of the decedent’s death. Nor would a finding of negligence on the part of a decedent driver necessarily negate any essential element of the offense of negligent driving as outlined in the statute. See Williams v. Baugh, 154 P.3d 373, 377 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that “neither a defense of contributory negligence nor comparative fault principles deny an essential allegation of the criminal offense of which the defendant was adjudicated guilty”). In short, there is no basis in the statute or in the common law of proximate causation to support David’s argument that a finding that a decedent’s negligence was a proximate cause of his or her own death “legally excuse[s] Appellant’s failure to yield the right of way.” ¶ 22 Indeed, jurisdictions across the nation have nearly universally reached the same conclusion in interpreting their own criminal statutes. See, e.g., Williams, 154 P.3d at 377 (“The defense of contributory negligence generally is not recognized as a defense to criminal conduct.”); Prezzi v. United States, 62 A.2d 196, 198 (D.C. 1948) (“From appellant's argument at the hearing it would seem that he takes the position that he could not be held guilty unless the jury found that his acts were not only the proximate cause of the death but also the sole cause, and that the jury should have been instructed that if the driver of the other vehicle was negligent and such negligence was a contributing or concurring cause of the accident then appellant was not guilty. This position is David v. People 2020 VI 8 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Opinion of the Court not well taken. There may have been more than one proximate cause of the accident, but if appellant drove at an immoderate rate of speed and such act was a proximate or direct cause of the accident, appellant is not relieved from responsibility because the negligence of another concurred in producing the result.”); People v. Tims, 534 N.W.2d 675, 681 n.6 (Mich. 1995) (In regard to contributory negligence not being a defense to criminal culpability: “This longstanding Michigan rule is no aberration. It appears to be the universal rule.” (Collecting cases from: Alaska, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island); State v. Hanahan, 96 S.E. 667, 672 (S.C. 1918) (“In no event is contributory negligence a defense to an indictment for murder or manslaughter or any criminal offense.”); State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, (Tenn. 2001) (“[A] victim's contributory negligence does not relieve a defendant of criminal liability for his or her own criminally negligent conduct.”) (quoting Fine v. State, 246 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Tenn. 1952)); State v. Lohmeier, 556 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Wis. 1996) (“It is widely recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense in criminal prosecution.”).8 ¶ 23 Thus, we do not hesitate to reject David’s argument and conclude that contributory negligence on the part of a decedent driver does not constitute a recognized defense to a charge of negligent homicide under 14 V.I.C. § 504. Accordingly, David was not entitled to a jury instruction 8 See also Broxton v. State, 171 So. 390, 392 (Ala. Crim. App. 1936); Bowen v. State, 140 S.W. 28, 29 (Ark. 1911); Hazzard v. State, 456 A.2d 796, 797-98 (Del. 1983); Lin Qi Si, 194 A.3d at 1274; Filmon v. State, 336 So. 2d 586, 591 (Fla. 1976); Belk v. People, 17 N.E. 744, 745-46 (Ill. 1888); Embry v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.2d 979, 981 (Ky. Ct. App. 1930); State v. Desoto, 6 So. 3d 141, 148 (La. 2009); Commonwealth v. Boston & L.R. Corp, 134 Mass. 211, 213 (Mass. 1882); State v. Budge, 137 A. 244, 247 (Me. 1927); State v. Rotella, 246 N.W. 2d 74, 76 (Neb. 1976); Williams v. State, 50 P.3d 1116, 1125 (Nev. 2002); State v. Diamond, 83 A.2d 799, 803 (N.J. App. Div. 1951); State v. Munoz, 970 P.2d 143, 148 (N.M. 1998); People v. Grogan, 183 N.E. 273, 277 (N.Y. 1932); State v. Steele, 211 N.W.2d 855, 865 (N.D. 1975); State v. Smith, 85 N.E.3d 304, 308 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2017); State v. Simmons, 580 P.2d 564, 566 (Or. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Nuzum, 234 N.W. 665, 668 (S.D. 1931); Fox v. State, 165 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. Crim. App 1942); State v. Busby, 131 P.2d 510, 511-12 (Utah 1942); Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 413 S.E.2d 875, 882 (Va. 1992); State v. Dodge, 567 A.2d 1143, 1144 (Vt. 1989); State v. Judge, 675 P.2d 219, 226 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); State v. Nester, 336 S.E.2d 187, 189 (W.Va. 1985); Allen v. State, 43 P.3d 551, 566 (Wyo. 2002). David v. People 2020 VI 8 S. Ct. Crim. No. 2019-0036 Opinion of the Court on this purported defense and the Superior Court did not err, let alone plainly err, in refusing to give such an instruction to the jury. IV. CONCLUSION ¶ 24 Because the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict of guilty on both Count 1 (negligent homicide) and Count 3 (reckless driving), the Superior Court did not err in denying David’s motion for judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative for a new trial. Additionally, because contributory negligence is not a recognized defense to a charge of negligent homicide, the Superior Court did not err in refusing to give the jury an instruction concerning the decedent’s purported contributory negligence. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s March 21, 2019 judgment is affirmed. Dated this 9th day of June, 2020. BY THE COURT: /s/ Maria M. Cabret____ MARIA M. CABRET Associate Justice ATTEST: VERONICA J. HANDY, ESQ. Clerk of the Court