USVI Public Records

Document text

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST THOMAS AND ST JOHN PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS ) CASE NO ST 2022 CR 00076 ) Plaintiff ) vs ) ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED JAMARI GUMBS ) ) Defendant ) ) Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U MEMORANDUM OPINION 1ll THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Jamaxi Gumbs ( Gumbs or Defendant ) Motion to Suppress filed October 6 2022 The People of the Virgin Islands (‘ People )did not file a response This matter came on for hearing on March 14 2023 The People were represented by Assistant Attorney General Eugene James Connor, J1 Case agent Officer Joel Browne Connors, also appeared Defendant Gumbs appealed and was tepteaented by Adam G Christian, Esq For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion in part and deny it in pan BACKGROUND fill Defendant Gumbs is charged with three counts in a five count Information that lodges charges Gumbs and his codefenddm Emerson Nicolas I The three counts relative to Gumbs are Count Three, Unauthorized Possession of Firearm Ammunition, in Violation of V I CODE ANN ‘ The People charged Gumbs and former codetendant, Emerson Nicolas m a five Count Information, charging Nicola: in Counts One and Two, and Gumbs in Counts Three Four, and Five Former codcfcndaut Nicolas 15 now deceaaed People oflhe Vugm Islands \ Jamar! Gume Case No §T 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super IGU Memorandum Opinion tit 14 § 2256(a)(3)(4) 7 Count Four Unauthorized Ponaession 0f Malijuand with Intent to Distribute in violation ofVI CODE ANN tit 19 § 604(a)(1) and Count Five No VI Driver 3 License in violation ofVI CODE ANN tit 20 § 371(a) 1T3 Defendant Gumbs seeks to suppress the fruits of a vehicle search and statements Gumhs made at the scene ofthe incident At the suppression hearing, the People called one witness Virgin Islands Police Department ( VIPD ) Officer Joel Browne Connors ( Officer Connors )3 No exhibits were admitted FACTS 114 The Court gleaned the tollowing facts from Ottieer Connors testimony 115 On March 1] 2022, between 1 00AM and 2 00AM, Officer Connors and his partner Officer Joanna Stuart ( Officer Stuart ) were on patrol and noticed a blue Toyota Corolla (“Corolla ’ or “vehicle”), with dark tinted windows, failing to adhere to traffic laws Specifically, Officer Connors noticed the Corulld was stopped at a red light on Alton Adams Drive at the intersection near Barbe] Plaza, St Thomas, VI Officer Connors was stopped catty comer to the C01011a Connors was facing east and the Corolla was facing north Even though the C01011a had a green light, it did not proceed through the light Once Cannon light turned green he drove through Barbe] Plaza and pulled up behind the Corolla By that time the Corolla had a red light but it then drove through the red light, turning tight and heading east Officei Connors followed the Corolla and observed the Vehicle was dliving erratically crossing the double yellow traffic lines Offleer Connors followed the Corolla up Raphunc Hill Connors turned on his blue patrol 1 Defendant also tiled a Mution to Dismiss Count Three on October 14 2022 Which the Coun “ill address in due fgleZer Connnrs testified he has been employed by VIPD for a l|ttle ox er three (3) year: a: a patrol officer Peapze mm Virgin Island: t Jamal: (:11me Cage No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opinion Page 3 at 16 car lights while he st passing by the trash bins midway up Raphune Hill and the Corolla pulled over a bit further up the Hill right betore Al Cohen s mall 116 Connms stopped the vehicle for having excessive tint running a red light and because it had crossed the double yellow lines Connors spoke over his loudspeaker instructing the two occupants to exit the vehicle Officer Common said the passengers did not exit the Corolla, and he saw some mnvcmcnt in the back seat at the vehicle but he could not tell what the occupants were doing At that time Officers Connors and Stuart approached the Corolla with their weapons drawn because the uceupdnts had failed to fellow the initial command to step out ofthe car and because Connors saw movements in the vehicle when the occupants did not initially comply With the command to get out ot the vehicle 117 Two males exited the vehicle with their hands raised Gumbs exited the driver 5 side of the vehiele and the other passenger" exited ml the passenger’s side, and they said, “don’t shoot ” After the occupants exited the vehicle, Officer Connors asked the driver tor a driver’s license, registration, and insuianee However, Gumbs did not have any at those items Also, afier the occupants exited the Corolla, Officer Connors noticed a mason jar filled with a green, leafy substance located on the middle console of the vehicle in plain sight 5 The masonjar was in plain sight once Gumbs and the passenger exited the vehicle, because the incident occurred in an 4168 lit with stieetlights, the interior light was on inside the Corolla, and the front windows were rolled down “’ lhe panenger wet: Gumbs former codetendantv later identified as Emermn Nicholas, who is now deceased 5 Officer Connor: tcaufied that the substance was field tested and [C:lcd poaitivc for marijuana Faane off the Vllgm Islam]: v lama“ Gumbs Case No SI 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opinion $18 Once Gumbs exited the vehicle, Officer Connors frisked him OtfiLer Connors did not recall whether Gumbs was handcuffed and stated that Gumbs was not yet under arrest at that time but that Gumbs was not tree to leave the area and was sitting on the nearby guard rail 19 When Office! Connors told Gumbs he was going to seaxeh the vehicle Gumbs objected but Officers Connors and Stuart perfumed the search anyway During the search Officer Connms fuund the following items (1) a tool bag holding a power grinder and battery tound on the floor of the passenger side front seat (2) a black pellet handgun found on the flow of the passenger side back seat; (3) a black Gucci bag containing empty magazines and one caltridge of ammunition found in the cab of the vehicle (4) a bag containing an identification card with someone else 5 name on it, fuund in the cab of the Vehicle; and (5) a black backpack containing seveial more mason jam6 filled with a green, leafy substance, some U S Lunency, and some Trinidad currency, found in the trunk of the Vehicle {[10 When asked about the items Gumbs and the passenger stated the backpack found in the trunk was our hag Further Gumbs and the passenger began discussing that the black Gucci bag was theils, but that it had been acquiied earlier in the day, seemingly implicating themselves in another crime that had occurred earlier that day Upon hearing that utteianee, Officei Connors read Gumbs and the passenger their Miranda rights but Comets did not have a term for them to formally waive their rights on the scene Officer Cannon did not ask Gumbs any questions after leading him his rights, and he did not ISLE!“ whether Gumbs made any furthei statements tollowing such leading After leading Gumbs and Nicolas their rights and putting them in the police unit, Gumbs and Nicolas kept talking hut Officer Connors does not recall what they said nor what " Officer Connors testified he was unsure exactly how many mason jars he found in the mmk ofthe Vehicle People 0/111; V17gm Aland“ Jammi Gumhs Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opinion statement either of them may have made But neither Connors nor the responding detectiveb made note ofwhat they may have said and VIPD took no official statement from Gumbs (or Nico1as) 1111 After the search of the vehicle Officer Connors arrested Gumbs and Gumbs was taken to the police station Gumbs was read his Miranda rights again once he was at the station, but Officer Connors did not ask any more questions LEGAL STANDARD 1112 In order to succeed in supple»ng evidence under the Fourth Amendment 01 a statement under the Fifth Amendment the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish a basis tor his motion Peoplm Roll No ST 17 CR 36 2017 WL 2980185 at*2 (V1 Super Ct June 29 2017) (citing People offlw Virgin Ivlamiv \ Hoyt! 2015 VI LEXIS 122 *6 (VI Super Ct Sept 29 2015)) see also Pcople \ AZ am No ST 16 CR 232 2017 WL 5514375 at *1 (VI Super Ct Nov 14 2017) Once the defendant shows a warrantless search or :eizure uccurred the burden shifts to the government to show that each individual act constituting a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment was reasonable R00 No ST 17 CR 36 2017 WL 2980185 at *2 Similarly in a motion to suppress a statement ofthe accused, once a defendant claims a violation omemn'u and “the accused alleges dets demonstrating that the accused was in Custody and subject to intcnngation the burden shifis to the People to prove by a preponderance ofthe evidence thdt the police complied with Muzmda and that the statement was voluntary Azzam No ST 16 CR 232 2017 WL 5514375 at *1 (citing COlUHldOI Connelly 479 U S 157 (1986)) Penp/e 0/1114 Vngm Islands \ Jnmwt Gtrmbs Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite a: 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum 0pmion Page 6 0f 16 DISCUSSION I The traffic stop, search of the Corolla, and ultimate arrest of Defendant did not violate Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, so the [runs of these actions will not be suppressed a Fourth Amendment Legal Standard 4113 The Fuurth Amendment to the U S Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures Peaple \ Waadley N0 SX 15 CR 380 2018 WL 3064404 at *3 (V1 Super Ct June 20 2018) U S CONST amend 1V 7 Genelally for a scatch or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it must be executed pursuant to a search wartant based on probable cause Peap/L \ Pemberton 2019 VI SUPER 118 1111 6 7 (citing, Nicholas v Peaple, 56 V1 718, 739 (V1 2012)) A warrantless search or sei/ure is per ye unreasonable unless an exception applies Thomas v People 63 V I 595 605 (V I 2015) (citing Kat \ Unlted Sizzle: 389 U S 347 357 (1967)) {114 The Fourth Amendment analysis typically proceeds in three Stages Peaplc 1 Joxeph 2022 VI SUPER 12 film First the Caut‘t determines whether a Fourth Amendment event, such as a search 01 a sei/ure has occurred Id see also Woodlay N0 SK 15 CR 380 2018 WL 3064404 at *3 Next, the Court considers whether that search or seizure was reasonable 1d Ifthe search or seizure was unreasonable, the Court mum then determine whothel the Lircumstances warrant suppression of the evidence Id “Reasonableness is an objective inquiry measured by examining the totality of the Lireumstanccs surrounding the search and the ndture of the search itself ” People 7 The fourth Amendment is apphcable in the Vlrgin Ialanda pulsuant to § 3 of the Renaed Organ“. Act of 1954 P201719 \ Atrmlrong 64 VI 528 530 n 1 (VI 2016) (citing Revtaed Organic Act0f1954 § 3 48 U S C s 1561 reprinted in V I CODE ANN Historical Documents Organic ALI: and U S Constitution at 87 88 (1995 & Supp 2013) (preeedmg VI CODE ANN tn 1) Penpie vflhz Vugm Island: L Jammz Gumb: Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite a: 2023 VI Super 1w Memorandum Opinion Page 7 0f 16 v Pemherton 2019 VI SUPER 1 18 {I 7 (quoting Prentlce v Peaplt 64 V I 79 89 (VI Super Ct 2016) b The traffic stop was a lawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment 1115 Detendant argues that it is unclear whether there was probable cause prior to the traffic stop and subsequent search at his vehicle to take such actions At the hearing Defendant teiterated he did not believe that the People carried their burden to pmvc the circumstances leading to the traffic stop wele supported by the Fourth Amendment, axguing Cannnrs’ testimony was convoluted The People countered that pursuant to Officer Connors testimony it is appalent that Detenddnt ran a red light and continued to (hive erratica1ly thereafter and thus VIPD had grounds to conduct a tratfic stop For the tollnwing reasons, the Court finds the traffic stop was a lawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment 1116 The Virgin Islands Superior Court has acknowledged that a traffic stop ia a Fourth Amendment event Waadlcy N0 SX 15 CR 380 2018 WL 3064404 at *4 For the duration of a traffic stop a police officer effectively seizes everyone in the vehicle, the driver and all passengers Id (quoting Arumm v Johnson, 555 U S 323 327 (2009)) (biting cases) (internal quotations omitted) Even though “the police do not need a warrant to stop an automobile and Londuct a brief investigation, the police must nonetheless have probable cause [or reasonable suspicion] to believe that a traffic violation has occurred betOIe stopping a vehicle " People v SammL 2019 VI SUPER 95 1112 (V 1 Super 2019) (quoting People \ Tories No SX 14 CR 457 2015 WL13579412 *3 2015VI LEXIS 96 *7 (Super Ct Aug 15 2015)) 1117 Under thejurisprudenee ofthe Fourth Amendment it is the defendant 5 burden to show he was seathed 0r seized without a warrant R00 No ST 17 CR 36 2017 WL 2980185 at *2 In People ofzhe Vugm [slandv v lama»; Gume Lass Nu ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opinion the instant matter, Gumbs has done so it is unquestioned that Officer Connors effectively seized Defendant without a warrant when he pulled over the Corolla following alleged traffic violations As such the burden shifis to the People to show they werejustified in such seizure and demonstrate VIPD had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe a traffic violation had occurred Id The Penple rely upon Officer Connors testimony at the suppression hearing that he and Otficer Stuart witnessed an excessively tinted vehicle run a red light and then continue to drive erratically, crossing the double yellow traffic lines The People argue this behavior provided probable cause for Officer Connors to turn on his blue patrol car lights indicating Defendant should pull over The People did not cite the specific traffic regulations Detenddnt allegedly violated t0 triggei Offlcet Connors to pull over the Corolla Howevel, the Virgin Islands Superiox Coun has previously stated that “mnning a red light would supply the officer with probable cause if the officer witnessed the inhaction Somme, 2019 VI SUPER 95 at $8 n 3 (citing Sum \ Wilson 574 S E 2d 93 97 98 (N C Ct App 2002) ( A tratfie stop made on the basis ofa readily observed tidffie Violation such as speeding or running a red light is govemed by probable cause )) $118 As such, the Court finds that Officer Connors had piebahle cause to believe a traffic Violation had occurred because he personally witnessed Defendant run through a red light and further witnessed eiiatic driving Accordingly the Court finds Officer Connors initial stop and effective seizure of Defendant was lawful under the appropriate Fourth Amendment standards 0 VIPD’s search ofDefendant’s vehicle was lawful 1119 In his written briefing, Defendant argues that it is unclear whether VIPD had probable cause to stop the Vehicle, and therefore it is unclear whether the subsequent search of the Vehicle was constitutional At the hearing, Defendant maintained this argument, stating that Connors’ People 0/1le Vugm [numb 1 Jamar: Gume Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opinion Page 9 M16 testimony was convoluted and the People have not met their burden to show the traffic stop was legal As has been discussed above, the Court finds the traffic stop was supported by piobable cause and was therefore a lawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment 1120 One widely recognized exception to the warrant requiiement is the plain view doctnne under which “the wariantless seizure of incriminating evidence is permissible when three canditions are met (1) the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly Viewed, (2) the item's ituriminating character must be immediately apparent and (3) the officer must have a lawful right of access to the object itself Peoplm Benjamin 2020 V1 SUPER 34 1114(quotinchnplc v Hunk 63 V I 80 93 (V l 2015) and Honor: t California 496 U S 128 136 137 (U S 1990)) The plain view doctrine has been applied wheie police are not searching for evidence but nonetheless inadvertently come across something incriminating People \ Berkley 2019 VI SUPER 73 11 51 (quuting Horton 496 U S at 135) (internal brackets omitted) The plain view doctrine is permitted where it is immediately apparent" to the police, based on experience, that they have incriminating evidence before them [(1 (citing People \ Santana 63 V I 25 31 (V I Super Ct 2014)) fill Defendant aigues that the law requiies VIPD have probable cause prior to the seizure and search Ufa vehicle, but it is unclear whether such probable cause existed when Connors sealched the vehicle Gumbs was operating As discussed above, Officer Connors” sei/uie 0fthe Corolla did not violate Gumbs F0u1th Amendment lights as Connors witnessed Defendant run a red light and diive eiratieally providing the requisite prohdble cause to pull over the vehicle Additionally Officer Connors testified that because the interior car lights were on, there was a Streetlight nearby, and the Corolla’s front windows were down, he had plain view at the mason jar on the vehicle’s People 0mg Vugm Islands t Jamal: 6mm Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 V1 Super 161} Memorandum Opinion Page 10 of16 center console Officer Connors further testified that, upon seeing the contents of the mason jar, he immediately believed it to be marijuana g The Court finds that Connors was not searching for contraband but merely saw the masonjar while he was directing Defendant to exit the vehicle As such pursuant to the standard articulated for the plain view doctrine (1) the Court finds that Officer Connurs wasjustified in being in the location, because he was lawfully conducting a traffic stop, (2) the mason jar with a gxeen leafy substance was in plain View , and (3) Officer Connors had the lawful right of access to the mason jar because he had seized the Vehicle for the traffiL stop Therefore, pursuant to the plain view doctrine, the Court finds that Officer Connors was justified in seizing the mason jai of green leafy substance, field tested to be marijuana $22 Another exception tn the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is the automobile exception under which law enforcement may search an automobile without a warrant if probable cause exists to believe it contains evidence ofcriminal activity Melmdez \ Vlrgm Islands, 56 V I 244 253 (2012) (citing Pennsyh (mun Labrorl 518 U S 938 940 (1996) Uniter/Smmm Burton 288 F 3d 91 l00 (3d Cir 2002)) The ratianale behind this automobile exception to the wanant lequirement is that ‘the ready mability of automobiles permits their search based only on probable cause Peaplev Lloyd N0 SX 14 CR 080 2015 WL 13579247 at *3 n 5 (V1 Super Ct Sept 29 2015) (quoting Umted States \ Polanco 48 VI 744 749 50 (D VI 2007) (citing (35505)) Probable cause to seaiLh a vehicle exists when, “viewing the totality 0fthe circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence at a crime will be found in a particular place ” Lluvd, N0 SK 14 CR 080 2015 WL 13579247 at *4 (quoting Crash \ Gadshall 170 Fed Appx 217 220 (3d Cir 2006)) 1 During closing arguments, Gumbs conceded that the mason jar with the green leaty substance was in open view People AZ/lhé’ Vugm mama t Jamalz 0“th Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Lite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opinion Page 11 m 16 {[23 After finding the masonjar filled with what he believed to be marijuana Officer Connors informed Gumbs he would be searching the rest of the vehicle as well Gumbs objected to the search and stated that he did not consent to the search, but Officer Connors nonetheless performed the search The Court finds that the subsequent search 0fthe remainder ofthe Vehicle was justified under the citeumstances pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement Officer Connors had plainly viewed what he believed to be marijuana, and he testified that seeing marijuana in the ear led him to believe a crime was being or had been committed Additionally, Officer Connors had Just witnessed Defendant and his passenger rummaging in the backseat 0f the Corolla and refusing to exit the vehicle upon the officer 5 first request The Court finds Officer Connors’ decision to search the remaindei 0fthe vehicle was reasonable under the circumstances finding what he believed to be marijuana as well as witnessing the behavior ofthe Dctcndant and his passenger gave Connors probable cause to search the remainder 0fthe vehicle 1124 For these reasons, the Court finds Officer Connors’ search of the vehicle was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, pursuant to the plain view doctrine and the automobile exception to the wan ant requirement d Defendant’s arrest was lawful under the Fourth Amendment $125 In his wtitten biiefing Defendant argues that it is unclear whether VIPD had the requisite probable wuss, Lonsidering all pertinent circumstances, that he committed an identifiable Crime As such Defendant argues that the arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights {[26 Probable cause exists when, at the moment an arrest is made, oifieeis have “facts and circumstances within their knowledge and ofwhich they have reasonably trustworthy infomatiou that would sufficiently warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspeLt had committed or was People 0/2112 V11gm Islands 1 lmmm 0mm Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cue as 2023 VI Super lfiU Memorandum Opinion committing an offense Matthew 55 V I at 393 (quoting Back v Ohm 379 U S 89 91 (1964) (internal quotations omitted» This flexible commonsense probable pause standard rests on whether a ‘mdn of reasonable caution’ would believe that the accused has committed a slime, it does not require that this beliet be correct or more likely true than false Id (quoting Tam: v Brown, 460 U S 730, 742 (1983)) Piobahle cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the otfieer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a 1easunable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the peison to be arrested Id (citing Unzted States v Cm. 910 F 2d 1072 1076 (3rd Cir 1990)) $27 The Court finds that Officer Connors discovery 0t 11 masonjar filled with what he believed to be marijudndjustified the following search ofthe entile vehicle The Court further finds that the items found during the search at the Vehiclejustified Officer Connors in arresting Gumbs, because a reasonable officer would believe a crime had been committed upon finding multiple masonjars filled with a green leafy substance, a pellet gun, a round at ammunition, and a large amount of Cunency As such, the Court finds Officer Connors had pxobable pause to search and Subsequently arrest Gumbs, and these anions were not taken in violation of Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights [1 Officer Connols had Defendant in custody and failed to Mirandtze Defendant prior to interrogating him, in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, so the statements made at the scene must be suppressed a Fifth Amendment Legal Standard 1|29 The Fiflh Amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived oflife, People 0/1116 VHglVl Islandsi Jnmzm Gum!» Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 V1 Super 1611 Memorandum Opinion liberty 01 piopeny without due process 01 law U S CONST amend V ’Mmmda warnings are required for custodial intenogations See CflSllllo v People 59 V I 240 264 (V I 2013) (citing Mmmda v Arlzurla 384 U S 436, 444 (1966)) A suspect is in custody when he has been deprived of freedom of action in any signifisant way Ramirez \ People 56 V I 409 419 (VI 2012) (citing Untied Slam ‘ Thompson 496 F 3d 807 810 (7th Cir 2007)) A suspeet is subject to an “intenogation” when “the Defendant responds to express questioning or its functional equivalent words or actions reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response ” 142217111, No ST 16 CR 232 2017 WL 5514375 at *1 b VIPD’s custodial interrogation of Gumhs Was a Violation ofhis Fifth Amendment rights 1130 Defendant argues that it is unclear whether Gumbs Was Advised of his rights, and, if so, whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived those lights At the suppression heaiiiig, Defendant argued that VIPD asked questions 1hout the items they found while searehing the car while Defendant was not free to leave Defendant claims any statements made prior to Officer Connors reading Defendant his rights must be suppressed because the government tai1ed to prove the statements were made knowingly and voluntarily, Defendant was in custody and not free to leave, and he was responding to questions asked by VIPD The People counter that Defendant s statements iegarding potential involvement in an incident eailier that day were voluntary and spontaneous utterances Further the People note Oificer Connors did read Dctendant his rights at the scene " The Fifth Amendmenl IS applicable in the Virgin Islands pursuant [0 § 3 of the Revised Organie Act of 1954 Simmonds \ People 59 V I 480 491 (VI 2013) (citing Revi<ed Organic Au of 1954 $93 48 U S C § 1561) Ptap/L u/the V17gm Island: 1 Jamar: (711me Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 V1 Super 16U Memorandum Opinion Page 14 01 16 fl31 Based upon the testimony at the suppression hearing the Court finds Officer Connors advised Defendant of his rights after he had asked Defendant numerous questions about the items found inside the vehicle and after Defendant made a potentially incriminating statement about a crime committed earlier that day Further Officer Connors testified that while he was unsure whether Defendant was handcuffed Gumbs would not have felt free to leave the scene during the vehicle search As such, the Court finds that Defendant was in Custody and Officer Connors interrogated him, pi ior t0 advi>ing Defendant ofhis Miranda rights Accordingly, the butden shifis to the People to prove they appropriately provided Defendant his Mnanda rights or that Defendant s statements were vo1untary Azzam N0 ST 16 CR 232 2017 WL 5514375 at *1 1132 During the suppression hearing Officer Connors stated that Defendant s statements were in response to questions he asked, but that the statements were voluntary and that the statement regarding the incident earlier in the day was a “spontaneous utterance ” Funher, Officer Connors stated that he did not ask Defendant any questions after reading Defendant his rights although he could hear Defendant and Emerson Nico1as conversing in the p01iee cruiser During argument, the People reiterated that the statements were voluntary and the reference to the earlier incident was a spontaneous utterance $133 [I]t is we1l established that a spontaneous utterance not prompted by a police interrogation, made by a suspect who is plainly in custody is admissib1e even ifthe suspect has not waived his Mnanda rights People v Rfljlm N0 ST 17 CR 278 2018 WL 4352113 at *5 (V 1 Super Ct May 31 2018) (quoting Blyden 1 People of the Vz/gm Islands 53 V I 637 662 (V I 2010)) But in the instant matter, it is apparent that Gumbs made the statements in response to questions from VIPD While the detail included may have been outside the scope 0t Officer People afl/xe Vugm Ivlzmrli \ lama” Gumb: Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super th Memorandum Opinion Page 15 of16 Connurs‘ question, this does not minimize the fact that Connors was interrogating Gumbs prior to reading him his Miranda rights As such, the Court finds the statement was not a spontaneous utterance, as it was prompted by questioning tram VIPD Further, since Gumbs had not yet been advised of his Miranda rights when he made these statements, he cannot be said to have knowingly and voluntarily waived Such lights As such the Court finds that the People failed to ean'y their burden to prove the statements were voluntary Accordingly the Court finds VIPD questioned Gumbs in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights and any statements Dctendant made priur t0 Officer Connors reading Defendant his lights must be suppressed CONCLUSION 134 The Court finds that VIPD did not violate Gumbs Fourth Amendment rights The traffic stop wasjustified by probable cause because Officer Connors personally witnessed multiple tiaffie infractions Further, Officer Connors having observed the masonjar with a green leafy substance, the search of the vehicle was constitutional pursuant to the plain view doctrine The automobile exception to the warrant requirement gave Officer Connors auth01ity to search the vehicle after he observed in plain view the masonjar filled with a green leafy substance VIPD s arrest of Gumbs was constitutional, as they had probable cause of wrongdoing based upon the contraband discovered duiing the search of the vehicle Accordingly the fruits 0fthe search 0fthe vehicle will not be suppressed Howevei the Coutt finds that VIPD violated Gumbs Fifth Amendment rights When Offieer Connors performed a custodial interrogation prior to reading him his Mzrandtz rights Aeeordingly, the Court finds that any statements Gumbs provided prior to receiving his Miranda rights must be suppressed Peaple 0mg mg”. Island: v Jamar: 6mm Case No ST 2022 (.R 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opmion Page 16 of16 An order consistent herewith will immediately follow DATED April /g 2023 Z éfé ZQJM‘E Kathleen Mackay Judge of the Supenor Coun ATTEST 0fthe Virgin Islands TAMARA CHARLES Clerk of the Court BY @— -co/LATOYA CAMACHO Court Clerk Supewisor g/fl/éi