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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. CROIX PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, SX-15-CR-380 Plaintiff, CHARGE(s): UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF A FIREARM 14 V.LC. § 2253(a) Vv. POSSESSION OR SALE OF AMMUNITION 14 V.I.C. § 2256(a) FAILURE TO REPORT FIREARMS ; OBTAINED OUTSIDE OR BROUGHT INTO THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 23 V.LC. § 470(a) OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE LIONEL WOODLEY, WITHOUT A SAFETY BELT 20 V.LC. § 466(b) Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Lionel Woodley’s (hereinafter “Woodley”) Motion to Suppress filed September 27, 2016 (hereinafter “Motion”). The People of the Virgin Islands (hereinafter “the People”) filed an opposition on December 7, 2016 (hereinafter “Opposition”). Woodley filed a reply on December 14, 2016 (hereinafter “Reply”). The Court held a hearing on the Motion to Suppress on January 20, 2017 and continued the hearing to February 3, 2017 (hereinafter “Suppression Hearing”).! By Order entered February 3, 2017, the Court denied Woodley’s motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Officer Huertas.” Police Officer Nyeim France (hereinafter “Officer France”) and Police Officer Rolando Huertas (hereinafter “Officer Huertas”) both testified at the Suppression Hearing. Officer Orlando Benitez (hereinafter 1 At the Suppression Hearing, Attorney Howard Phillips represented Woodley, Public Defender Attorney Yolan Brow-Ross represented Williams and Assistant Attorney General R. Oliver David appeared on behalf of the People. 2 See Order entered February 3, 2017. People of the V.I. vs. Woodley SX-15-CR-380 MEMORANDUM OPINION “Officer Benitez”) was not available to testify. The Court granted the People’s motion to seal the internal affairs record of Police Officer Orlando Benitez. After the Suppression Hearing, the parties were granted leave to file supplemental briefs. On February 28, 2017, Woodley filed a supplementary brief. The People filed a response on March 15, 2017. Woodley’s Co-Defendant Darwin Williams (hereinafter “Williams”) entered into a plea agreement on May 8, 2017 in which he pled guilty to Count Three in Case No. SX-15-CR-380 Failure to Report a Firearm, in violation of 23 V.I.C. § 470(a). In exchange for Williams’ guilty plea, the People agreed to dismiss with prejudice the remaining counts in Case No. SX- 15-CR-380 and dismiss Case No. SX-16-CR-034 in its entirety; and therefore, he is not a party to this Motion.’ For the reasons elucidated below, Woodley’s Motion shall be denied. BACKGROUND On or about December 18, 2015, at approximately 2:25 a.m., Officer France, Officer Huertas and Officer Benitez were on mobile patrol on Highway 70 (hereinafter “Queen Mary Highway”) Anna’s Hope, in the vicinity of Gateway Service Station. Officer France and Officer Huertas testified that they were patrolling a blue Trail Blazer with Virgin Islands Police Department license plates looking for traffic infractions. Officer Huertas testified that the Department of Licensing and Consumer Affairs (hereinafter “DLCA”) was also patrolling the area. Both officers testified that they observed a silver Toyota 4 Runner with license plate number “CED 092” leaving Gateway Service Station. While the officers were traveling from west heading east, they observed the Defendants in CED 092 exiting the Gateway Service Station on the eastern side of the establishment. Both officers testified that they allowed the Defendants to pull out in front of them as the Defendants were leaving Gateway Service Station. Officer France testified that he observed that the 3 Williams joined Woodley’s Motion on October 18, 2016. See Notice of Joinder filed October 18, 2016 in Criminal No. SX- 15-CR-379. People of the V.I. vs. Woodley SX-15-CR-380 MEMORANDUM OPINION driver was not wearing his seat belt, but did not witness any criminal activity.4 The officers followed the vehicle, contacted emergency dispatch and then flashed the blue lights. Officer Huertas testified that the DLCA was the first to make contact with the vehicle, but he did not know if the DLCA spoke to the Defendants. Officers Huertas, France and Benitez stopped the vehicle in the vicinity of the Department of Human Services in Anna’s Hope, Christiansted near the shanty. All three officers exited the police vehicle during the traffic stop. Officer Huertas was the first to make contact with the driver of the vehicle, later identified as Williams. Williams inquired about the reason for the traffic stop. Officer Huertas advised Williams that he was stopped for failure to wear a seatbelt in violation of Virgin Islands traffic laws. Officer Huertas testified that he asked Williams to produce his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. Furthermore, Officer Huertas testified that while standing between the driver’s side door and the driver, he observed Williams sitting in the driver’s seat shuffling papers on his lap while searching for the requested documents. At this point, Williams was not yet ordered out of the vehicle. Both the driver’s side door and the passenger’s side door were open. Officer France testified that he was close to the rear driver’s side of the vehicle, somewhat behind Officer Huertas, talking to Woodley while Officer Benitez was walking around by the passenger’s side. While searching for the requested documents, Williams allegedly asked for some light. In response, Officer Huertas and Officer Benitez shined their flashlights into the vehicle. Officer Benitez who was still standing by the passenger’s side, allegedly observed the pistol grip of a firearm protruding from under the passenger seat and yelled “Gun!” 4 In Officer France’s Probable Cause Fact Sheet, Officer France stated that both occupants of “CED 092” were observed not wearing their seatbelt. People of the V_I. vs. Woodley SX-15-CR-380 MEMORANDUM OPINION Officer France testified that when he heard Officer Benitez shout “Gun!” he could not see in or about the vehicle from his vantage point at the rear of the vehicle, with tinted back windows. However, Officer France testified that he walked over to the passenger’s side, shined his flashlight into the vehicle and observed a firearm under the passenger’s seat. Officer Huertas testified that for the officer’s safety, when Officer Benitez yelled gun, Williams and Woodley were ordered to step out of the vehicle. Both Williams and Woodley were detained. Officer Huertas testified that upon shining his flashlight under the driver’s seat, he also observed the handle of a firearm under the driver’s seat. When he walked around to the passenger’s side, Officer Huertas shined his flashlight into the vehicle and also observed a firearm under the passenger’s seat. The officers asked the Defendants whether they were licensed to possess a firearm. According to Officer France’s and Officer Huerta’s testimony, neither Defendant responded when asked whether they were licensed to possess a firearm or ammunition.° The officers called Firearms Custodian Karen Stout (hereinafter “Firearms Custodian Stout”) to perform a firearm record check. Firearms Custodian Stout confirmed that neither Defendant was licensed to carry a firearm or ammunition in the territory. Subsequently, the Defendants were arrested and transported to the Police Operations and Administrative Services Building. Forensic Detective M. Banuelos processed the scene and recovered a silver and black Ruger .40 caliber handgun, serial number 342-19332 with 12 live .40 caliber ammunition in the magazine and one live .40 caliber round in the chamber and a P2000 H&K .40 caliber black handgun with serial number 123084628 containing 12 live .40 caliber ammunition in the magazine and one live .40 caliber round in 5 According to the Probable Cause Fact sheet prepared by Officer France, “Mr. Darwin Williams Jr. and Lionel Woodley were asked if they both have a license to possess a firearm in the territory of the United States Virgin Islands, at which they both replied ‘No’.” People of the VI. vs. Woodley SX-15-CR-380 MEMORANDUM OPINION the chamber. Williams and Woodley were charged with Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 14 V.LC. § 2253(a); Possession or Sale of Ammunition, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2256(b); Failure to Report Firearms Obtained Outside or Brought into the Virgin Islands, in violation of 23 V.I.C. § 470(a) and Operating a Motor Vehicle Without a Seatbelt, in violation of 20 V.I.C. § 466(b). Woodley moves for both firearms to be suppressed. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Fourth Amendment, applicable in the Virgin Islands pursuant to Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act of 1954, as amended, guarantees the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.° Generally, for a search or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it must be effectuated with a warrant based on probable cause,’ unless it is justified by “a specifically established and well delineated exception to the warrant requirement.”® The burden of proof is on the defendant who seeks to suppress evidence.’ Once the defendant establishes a basis for his motion, the burden shifts to the government to show that each individual act constituting a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment was reasonable.!° The Fourth Amendment analysis typically proceeds in three stages. First, the Court determines whether a Fourth Amendment event, such as a search or a seizure, has occurred.!! Next, the Court 5 See Blyden v. People of the Virgin Islands, 53 V.1. 637, 647 n.5 (V.I. 2010) (internal quotations marks omitted) (The Fourth Amendment is applicable in the Virgin Islands pursuant to section 3 of the Revised Organic Act of 1954, as amended, 48 ULS.C. § 1561.). 7 See United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2012). 8 See Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). ° See United States v. Murray, 53 V.1. 831, 842, [WL] at *3 (D.V.I. 2010) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387(1978)). 10 See United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995). See United States v. Smith, 575 F.3d 308, 312-13 (3d Cir. 2009). People of the V.I. vs. Woodley SX-15-CR-380 MEMORANDUM OPINION considers whether that search or seizure was reasonable.!? If the search or seizure was unreasonable, the Court must then determine whether the circumstances warrant suppression of the evidence.” DISCUSSION Woodley asserts that he was targeted, surveilled and stopped because of a hunch that he would be armed because he was previously arrested for possession of a firearm.'* Woodley argues that the traffic stop for a seatbelt violation was a pretext as part of an ongoing investigation by a task force.!5 Additionally, Woodley argues that the “VIPD did not have probable cause to stop the Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV)...as required by the Fourth Amendment.”!® Furthermore, Woodley argues that the plain view exception is not applicable because the firearms were not in plain view since it was not immediately apparent that the firearms were contraband. Woodley asserts that he was “immediately arrested prior to any determination by the police that [he was] unlicensed to possess a firearm.”! As a result, “the arrest was unreasonable given the totality of the circumstances because the police had no probable cause and no information that the defendants were involved in criminal activity prior to or during the traffic stop.”!® Hence, Woodley argues that the warrantless search of the vehicle was unreasonable and cannot be justified under any exception.!? Consequently, Woodley moves to suppress the first firearm as a fruit of an unlawful search and also moves to exclude the second firearm as tainted fruit.2° 12 lad. 13 See People of the V.I v. Schulterbrandt, 2016 V.I. LEXIS 121, *6 (V.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2016) (citing United States v Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 730 (3d Cir. 2010)) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 14 Mot. to Suppress at 4, 7. 5 Id. at 4-5. 16 Td. at 4. Defs.’ Supplemental Mot. to Suppress at 2. 17 Defs.’ Supplemental Mot. to Suppress at 1. 18 Iq. at 1-2. 19 Td. at 11-17. 20 Reply at 3. People of the VI. vs. Woodley SX-15-CR-380 MEMORANDUM OPINION The People counter argue that the vehicle was lawfully stopped because of a traffic violation and that the seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view exception.”! The question before the Court is whether Woodley’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. A. The Traffic Stop Was Lawful. A traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment event.”” “A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation.” “For the duration of a traffic stop ...a police officer effectively seizes ‘everyone in the vehicle,’ the driver and all passengers.””* Both the driver and the passenger have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the traffic stop.” In the case at bar, Defendants Woodley and Williams both have standing to chalienge the legality of the traffic stop. “[A] relatively brief encounter, a routine traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ ... than to a formal arrest.””° A Terry stop is a brief seizure by police officers that falls short of a traditional arrest.”’ “In a ‘traffic-stop’ setting, the Terry condition of a lawful investigatory stop is met whenever it is lawful for the police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation.””* “Police need not have cause to believe that any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity.””° “Generally, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the 21 Opp’n at 1, 2, 5. People’s Resp. to Defs.’ Supplemental Mot. to Suppress at 2. 22 See id. Cf. United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2006) (“When police make a traffic stop, a passenger in the car, like the driver, is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and so may challenge the stop's constitutionality.”). 33 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009). 24 See id. at 327 (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007)); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, (1979) (It is settled law that a traffic stop is a seizure of everyone in the stopped vehicle). See also People of the Virgin Islands v. Ambrose, 2013 V.I. LEXIS 60, *8 (V.1. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2013); see also Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ali, 45 V.1. 164 (Terr. Ct. 2003). 25 Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 256-259. See also Johnson, 555 U.S. at 332. 26 See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (collecting cases). 27 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 28-31 (1968) (a police officer may stop a suspect on the street and conduct a limited search, i.e. a frisk, of the suspect without probable cause). 28 See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781, 784, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009). 29 Johnson, supra. People of the VI. vs. Woodley SX-15-CR-380 MEMORANDUM OPINION police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”°° “[A]ny technical violation of a traffic code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop is merely pretext for an investigation of some other crime.’””?! Pursuant to Title 20, Section 466(b) of the Virgin Islands Code, the operator of a motor vehicle and any passenger in the front seat of the motor vehicle must wear a seatbelt.>? In the instant matter, the officers stopped CED 092 after observing Williams committing a traffic infraction by not wearing his seatbelt in violation of Section 466(b).*? Although Woodley argues that the traffic stop was merely a pretext as part of an ongoing investigation by a “task force... to search the vehicle for firearms,” the officers’ observation of the traffic infraction was sufficient justification for the traffic stop. Ergo, the traffic stop was constitutional. B. The Officers’ Observations Using a Flashlight is Not a Search and Does Not Violate the Fourth Amendment. Traffic stops involve an increased risk of danger to police officers.*> As a result, after “a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver”*® as well as any passengers?” “to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's 30 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). 31 See United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir.2012) (citing United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006). 32 “No person may operate a motor vehicle unless the operator and any passenger in the front seat of the vehicle are restrained by a lap and shoulder restraint where provided by the vehicle manufacturer which crosses over the hip and pelvis.” 20 V.LC. §466 (b). 33 20 V.L.C. §466 (b). 34 Mot. to Suppress at 4. 35 See Mich. v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983). See also Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413 (traffic stops may be dangerous encounters). 36 See Pa. v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977). 37 See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415. People of the V.I. vs. Woodley SX-15-CR-380 MEMORANDUM OPINION proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.”>* “The government's ‘legitimate and weighty’ interest in officer safety, outweighs the ‘de minimis’ additional intrusion of requiring a driver, already lawfully stopped, to exit the vehicle.”°? A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation.*” Terry articulated a well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement that permits an officer to “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”*' “[O]nce a valid traffic stop is initiated, an officer who develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity may expand the scope of an inquiry beyond the reason for the stop and detain the vehicle and its occupants for further investigation.” “Fourth Amendment protection is dependent ‘upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.’”*? “The defendant bears the burden of proving that he or she possesses a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or object searched.’“4 “[A] reasonable expectation of privacy has two elements: first, the defendant must actually have a subjective expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and second, the circumstances of this expectation must be such that society accepts them as reasonable.” “There is no legitimate expectation 38 Mimms, supra. See also Wilson, 519 U.S. at 412 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) ("this Court determined in [Mimms] that passengers in automobiles have no Fourth Amendment right not to be ordered from their vehicle, once a proper stop is made”). Cf Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (reasoning that a stop to check a driver's license and registration is constitutional when it is based on an articulable and reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant has violated the law). 3° See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 331 (citations omitted). 40 See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. 41 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). # See United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir.2003) (citation omitted). “3 See Simmonds v. People of the V.I., 53 V.I. 549, 575 (2010) (citations omitted). 44 Td. at 574. 45 Id. (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n. 12 (Expectation of privacy “by definition means more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered.”)). People of the V.I. vs. Woodley SX-15-CR-380 MEMORANDUM OPINION of privacy,”* shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers.”*” “Official conduct that does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.”** Courts have consistently held that the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area such as a flashlight does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth Amendment protection.” In Gumbs, the officer's initial stop of defendant’s vehicle was valid, and officer’s actions in shining his flashlight into the car and changing his position to see what was inside did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.*° As mentioned above, CED 092 was lawfully stopped. Subsequently, Williams was asked to produce his driver’s license, registration and proof of insurance. The traffic stop occurred around 2:25 a.m. when it was dark outside. Williams asked for a light while searching for the documents. In order to assist Williams, the officers illuminated the interior of the vehicle with their flashlights. While shining their flashlights into the vehicle, the officers observed the pistol grip of a firearm protruding from underneath the driver’s seat and the passenger’s seat. Woodley’s argument that the interior lights in the vehicle were inoperable is a red herring and has no bearing on the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis. Even if the interior car lights were operational, and the interior of the car was fully illuminated by the interior lights, the officers would still have full view of the vehicle’s interior. 46 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-745 (1979). “7 See Brown, supra. Cf. Simmonds, supra (the issue of a lack of ‘expectation of privacy’ has been extended to the open windows or transparent windows of vehicles that allow a person to view what is inside the vehicle, without conducting a search). 48 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (internal quotations omitted). 49 See Brown, 460 U.S. at 740 (collecting cases) (quotations omitted). 5° See Gumbs v. People of the V.1., 64 V.1. 491, 508-09 (2016). People of the V.I. vs. Woodley SX-15-CR-380 MEMORANDUM OPINION Woodley did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Both the driver’s side door and passenger’s side door were open exposing the vehicle’s interior. There was nothing to preclude the officers or an inquisitive passerby from seeing the pistol grip protruding from underneath the driver’s seat and the passenger’s seat with the aid of a flashlight. The use of a flashlight to aid the officer’s natural vision is not a Fourth Amendment search. Consequently, there was no Fourth Amendment violation by the officers shining their flashlights into the vehicle. C. The Seizure of the Firearms was Constitutional “The plain-view doctrine provides grounds for a warrantless seizure of a suspicious item when the officer's access to the item has some prior justification under the Fourth Amendment.”>! “Under the plain-view doctrine, an officer ‘may make a warrantless seizure of any item that he or she has viewed from a place or position in which he or she was lawfully entitled to be, provided it is immediately apparent that the item observed is evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.’”>? The “immediately apparent” language does not require that a police officer "know" that certain items are contraband or evidence of a crime.*? “The Supreme Court of the United States explicitly stated that where ‘an article is already in plain-view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy.’”™4 » 53 “Virgin Islands law “It is not necessarily a crime to possess a firearm in the Virgin Islands. expressly authorizes law enforcement officers to investigate a person's possession of a firearm and — if a firearm is discovered and the suspect is unable to provide proof of license to carry under 23 V.L.C. § 51 See Brown, 460 U.S. at 732. %2 See Gumbs, 64 V.I. at 508 (citing Thomas v. People, 63 V.1. 595, 606 n.4 (citing Brown, supra, at 741; Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465. 33 Brown, supra. 54 See Simmonds, 53 V.I. at 575. 3 See U.S. v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. V.I. 2000). People of the V_I. vs. Woodley SX-15-CR-380 MEMORANDUM OPINION 454 upon the officer's demand — to seize the weapon and arrest the person without having to first obtain a warrant.”°° In the instant matter, both firearms were discovered by the officers during a lawful traffic stop. Both the driver’s side door and the passenger’s side door were open allowing the officers to see from their position outside of the vehicle the handle of a firearm protruding from underneath the passenger’s seat and underneath the driver’s seat. As mentioned supra, shining a flashlight to illuminate an area is not a search and does not trigger the Fourth Amendment. The firearms were discovered inadvertently during a lawful traffic stop without conducting a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. After lawfully discovering the firearms, the officers asked the Defendants whether they were licensed to possess a firearm. At the Suppression Hearing, the officers testified that the Defendants did not respond. At the scene of the traffic stop, the officers were able to verify that the Defendants were not authorized to carry a firearm or ammunition in the Virgin Islands. Subsequently, the Defendants were placed under arrest.°7 As his case in chief, Woodley relies on this Court’s decision in People of the Virgin Islands v. Samuel. Significantly, this matter is distinguished from Samuel because here, the Defendants were arrested after the officers confirmed that the Defendants were not licensed to lawfully possess a firearm. In Samuel, the defendants were arrested before the officers verified if they were licensed to possess a firearm. Furthermore, in the instant matter, the firearms were discovered inadvertently after a lawful traffic stop for a traffic infraction. The officers were not conducting a search when they saw the firearms °° See People of the Virgin Islands v. Samuel, 2010 V.I. LEXIS 80, *17 (V.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2010). See 23 V.LC. §488. 57 In the event that the officer discovers the person to be wearing, carrying, or transporting a firearm, he may demand that the person produce evidence that he is entitled to so wear, carry, transport the firearm pursuant to section 454 of this title. If the person is unable to produce such evidence, the officer may then seize the firearm and arrest the person. See 23 V.LC. § 488(b). 58 Samuel, supra. People of the VI. vs. Woodley SX-15-CR-380 MEMORANDUM OPINION in plain-view. Woodley has failed to prove that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Therefore, the firearms will not be suppressed. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing analysis, Woodley’s Motion will be denied. The traffic stop was lawful. The firearms were discovered inadvertently during a lawful traffic stop without conducting a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Before arresting Woodley, the officers verified that he did not have a license to lawfully possess a firearm in the Virgin Islands. Woodley’s Fourth Amendment Rights were not violated. Woodley failed to meet his burden to prove that the firearms should be suppressed. Therefore, the firearms will not be suppressed. The Court will issue an Order consistent with this Opinion. DATED this Oday Cah , 2018. ATTEST: a7 Estrella George AROLD W. L. WILLOCKS De ¢ = Mee ry