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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS A SUSAN MILLER ) S Ct Civ No 2020 0007 Appellant/Plaintifl ) Re Super Ct Civ N0 O4I/2018 (STX) ) Consolidated Cases V ) s Ct Civ No 2020 0007 ) s Ct Civ No 2020 0008 V I WHEEL ESTATE LLC d/b/a ) PEPPERTREE TERRACE, ) Appellee/Defendant ) ) ) ) ) LYNELL HUGHES ) S Ct Civ No 2020 0008 Appellant/Plaintiffs ) Re Super Ct Civ No 033’2018(STX) v 3 Consolidated Cases S Ct Civ No 2020 0007 ) s c: Civ No 2020 0008 V I WHEEL ESTATE, LLC d/b/a ) PEPPERTREE TERRACE, ) Appellee/Defendant ) ) ) 0n Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St Croix Superior Court Judge Hon Douglas A Brady Considered November 19, 2020 Filed October 18 2021 BEFORE RHYS S HODGE, Chief Justice, MARIA M CABRET, Associate Justice, and IVE ARLINGTON SWAN Associate Justice APPEARANCES Vincent Colianni II, Esq Colianni & Colianni St Croix, U S V I Attorneyfor Appellants, Ryan C Stutzman, Esq Sanford, Amerling & Associates St Croix U S V I Attorneyfor Appellee OPINION OF THE COURT CABRET, Associate Justice 1| 1 A Susan Miller (“Miller”) and Lynell Hughes (“Hughes”) appeal from memorandum opinion and orders of the Superior Court entered on January 21, 2020, in their two separate negligence actions Mtller v V] Wheel Estate SX 18 CV 041 and Hughes v V I Wheel Estate SX 18 CV 033 which have since been consolidated for the purposes of this appeal The orders both granted summaryjudgment to V I Wheel Estate, LLC (“Peppertree”), the owner and operator of Peppertree Terrace, a mobile home park on St Croix The court found that proximate causation could only be determined through scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge, which an expert witness must testify to, and granted summary judgment in Peppertree’s favor because neither Miller nor Hughes presented any expert testimony We hold that the Superior Court committed no error in holding that expert testimony was required in Miller, but erred in finding that expert testimony was required in Hughes Therefore, we affinn summary judgment in leler and reverse in Hughes I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1] 2 These cases arise from the aftennath of Hurricane Maria, which, on September 19, 2017, tragically struck Saint Croix and Peppertree Terrace Peppertree leases empty lot spaces at Peppertree Terrace to mobile homeowners Peppertree also owns mobile homes, which it leases out to prospective tenants At the time of the hurricane, Miller and Hughes each resided in mobile home units on leased lot space in Peppertree Terrace Miller on lot 11 7, and Hughes on lot 7 2 Miller and Hughes allege that, during the storm, mobile home units owned by Peppertree on adjoining lots came loose from their foundations and crashed into their trailers, causing damage to their property The unit that caused the damages alleged by Miller was on lot 11 8, and the unit that caused the damages alleged by Hughes was on lot 7 1 Miller and Hughes contend that their damages were caused by Peppertree’s negligent failure to inspect and maintain the straps and anchors tethering these units, which were rusted, causing the trailers to be unsecured to their foundation and to fly loose during the storm During the storm, neither Miller nor Hughes were physically present in their respective trailers Miller and Hughes’ allegations are solely supported by testimony from lay witnesses 7 3 In Miller, Richard Gideon, a former long time Peppertree resident, viewed remnants ofthe straps lefiafter the hurricane that indicated to him that there had been no maintenance done on them, as “[t]hey were so rusted that they did not have the capability of doing their job,” ie , securing the mobile home unit to its foundation Peppertree maintenance worker Earl Mitchell testified that he installed the straps on the unit approximately 13 years before, around 2005, and that he occasionally checked them, believing the trailer was “still firm”, but that he never changed any straps between 2005 and the passage of Hurricane Maria in 2017 No witnesses in Miller observed the straps and anchors of unit 11 8 immediately before the hun‘icane 11 4 In Hughes, Lynell Hughes testified that the straps on Peppertree’s unit, 7 l, were so rusted and rotted that from the side of the road she could see that they had deteriorated off the unit and were no longer securing the home at all However, a worker for Peppertree, Henry Mason, testified that he had visually inspected unit 7 l a few months before the hurricane and had determined that there was no need to change any anchors or straps under the unit 1| 5 The Superior Court granted summaryjudgment, agreeing with Peppertree’s contention that the metallurgical properties of the straps and their attendant rusting and rotting are not within the common knowledge of laypersons and therefore expert testimony is required to make a prima facie case to show proximate cause as an element of negligence, and to avoid speculation by the trier of fact Miller and Hughes filed their notices of appeal in this Court on January 29, 2020 [I JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1! 6 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to title 4, section 32(a) ofthe Virgin Islands Code, which provides that ‘[t]he Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the Superior Court, or as otherwise provided by law ” “An order granting summary judgment on all claims in a case is a final order ” Simpson v Board ofDzrs ofSapphzre Bay Condos West 62 V I 728 731 (V I 2015) (citing Machado v Yacht Haven U S V] LLC 61 V I 373 379 (V I 2014)) Because the Superior Court 5 January 21, 2020, orders granting Peppertree’s motions for summary judgment adjudicated all the claims of each party, and dismissed the actions with prejudice, they are final orders within the meaning of section 32 Charles v Arcos Dorados USVI INC 71 VI 1146 1151 (VI 2019) 1| 7 “A review of the Superior Court’s award of summary judgment is plenary ” Id When reviewing an order granting summaryjudgment we apply the same test the Superior Court applies Kennedy Funding Inc v GB Props Ltd 2020 VI 5 I 13 The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ” V I R Civ P 56(c) “In applying this test, we do ‘not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses ”’ Charles, 71 V I at 1152 (quoting Perez v Ritz Carlton (Virgin Islands) Inc 59 VI 522 527 (V I 2013)) Instead we that party 3 favor Id (quoting Saldana v Kmart Corp 260 F 3d 228 232 (3d Cir 2001)) The movant may discharge their burden by pointing out to the court an absence ofevidence supporting the nonmoving party's case, Kennedy Fundmg Inc , 1| 14, including a lack ofexpert testimony when ‘ the issue(s) involve scientific technical, or specialized knowledge “Ifthe moving party meets this 1 burden, the non moving party then has the burden of setting out specific facts showing a genuine ‘ issue for trial Id 11] DISCUSSION 1 1] 8 Miller and Hughes argue that expert testimony is not required to make a prima facie showing of proximate causation as an element of their negligence causes of action because causation in these cases does not involve facts beyond a juror’s common understanding and experience and therefore summary judgment in favor ofPeppertree based on the plaintiffs’ failure to tender admissible expert opinion is improper A Proximate Causation T 9 “The foundational elements of a negligence cause of action are (1) a legal duty of care to the plaintiff (2) defendant's breach of that duty of care, (3) factual and legal [ofien referred to as ‘proximate’] causation, and (4) damages ” Aubam v Kazz Foods of VI Inc , 70 V I 943, 948 49 (V I 2019) “Proximate cause is established where the party who bears the burden shows that ‘an original act is wrongful or negligent and in a natural and continuous sequence produces a result 1 which would not have taken place without the act ’” Sealey Christian v Sunny Isle Shopping 1 Center Inc 52 VI 410 (V I 2009) overruled on other grounds by Machado 61 V I at 385 86 (quoting Clmger v Duncan 141 N E 2d 156 162 (Ohio 1957)) See Aubam 70 VI at 949 50 ‘ (“[F]oreseeability permeates every element of a negligence claim ” Because of this, “each 1 by which foreseeability is determined is that of looking to the natural and probable consequences of the act complained of ) (quoting Jeflords v Lesesne 541 S B 2d 847 851 (S C Ct App 2000)) “Proximate cause is ordinarily a question to be determined by the jury as a fact in view of i the attendant circumstances But if the evidence be so slight as not reasonably to warrant the ! inference of proximate cause, the court Will not leave the matter to the speculation of the jury ” L Taylor v Shreejz Swamz Inc 820 Fed Appx 174 175 76 (4th Cir 2020) (quoting Oxendme v ‘ Lowry 133 S B 2d 687 690 (N C 1963) and Conley v Pearce Young Angel Co 29 S E 2d 740 742 (N C 1944) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted» ; 1| 10 In order to plead a prima facie case on the issue of proximate cause, and thereby preclude ‘ the entry ofsummaryjudgment, Miller and Hughes were required to plead facts sufficient to create a triable issue for a jury on whether the damages they sustained were the natural and probable 1 consequence of, and part ofa natural and continuous sequence stemming from, Peppertree’s failure to secure the mobile homes to their foundations Kennedy Fundmg Inc , 1[ 14 See Charles, 71 V I ‘ at 1151 52 (“One ofthe principal purposes ofthe summaryjudgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses Importantly, ‘there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party ”’) 1 (quoting Celotex Corp v Catrett 477 U S 317 323 24 (1986) and Saldana 260 F 3d at 364 65)) { see also Island Tzle and Marble LLC v Bertrand 57 V I 596, 625 (V I 2012) ( The term prima facie evidence’ is a term of art, and means ‘evidence that will establish a fact or sustain a % judgment unless contradictory evidence is produced ”’) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 638 39 (9th ed 2009) (emphasis omitted» Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court , correctly found that the capability of the rusted straps and anchors to secure the homes to their whether it is “within the common experience of ordinary people in everyday life ” Aubam, 70 V I 1 1 at 955 “If the matter in issue is one within the knowledge of experts only and not within the 1 common knowledge of laymen, 1t 18 necessary for the plalnttff to Introduce expert testimony in order to establish a prima facie case ” Charles, 71 V I at 1155 (quoting Money v Manvzlle Corp , 596 A 2d 1372 1375 76 (Del 1987)) B Legal Standard for Scientific, Technical, or Specialized Knowledge 1 11 11 The Superior Court interpreted two provisions of the Virgin Islands Rules of Evidence, 1 V I R EVID 701, Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses,I and Rule 702, Testimony by Expert 1 Witnesses,2 as requiring expert testimony in these cases, finding that scientific, technical, or other 1 Specialized knowledge is needed to understand the subject matter, as it is outside of the common l knowledge of the average juror We exercise plenary review of the Superior Court’s legal interpretations of the Virgin Islands Rules of Evidence CdelllO v People, 59 V I 240, 254 (V I 2013), lelu v People, 57 V I 455, 461 (V I 2012) (‘ [O]ur review of the trial court's admission ‘ of evidence is only for abuse of discretion, unless the decision involves application of a legal 1 precept [in which circumstance] this Court exercises plenary review ”) 3 1 1 1 ' Rule 701 provides as follows ‘ If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is (a) rationally based on the witness's perception, (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness s testimony or to determining a fact in issue and 1 (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702 2 Rule 702 provides as follows A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience training or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier offact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, (1)) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, ‘ (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 1‘ (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case 1 3 See also Harris v J B Robinson Jewelers, 627 F 3d 235 240 (6th Cir 2010) (Utilizing the same standards “These standards are not in fact inconsistent, because it is an abuse ofdiscretion to make errors of law or clear errors offactual 1 ‘ 12 In parsing the sometimes thin distinction between issues requiring expert testimony to understand “scientific, technical, or other specialized ’ subject matter, versus those where lay i testimony will suffice, we note that “[nlumerous cases have acknowledged that the line between expert and lay testimony is easily blurred ” Burke v City ofSanta Monica, 20] 1 WL 13213593, at *20 (C D Cal 2011) (citing to Untted States v Pazva 892 F 2d 148 156 (lst Cir 1989) and United States v Figueroa Lopez 125 F 3d 1241 1246 (9th Cir 1997)) see United States v Perkms 470 F 3d 150 155 (4th Cir 2006) (analyzing federal analogs to Virgin Islands Rules l I “[T]he lme between lay opinion testimony under Rule 701 and expert testimony under Rule 702 is a fine one ”), Unwed States v Ayala Pzzarro, 407 F 3d 25 28 (lst Cir 2005) Indeed, it is difficult to apply a bright line test to our Rules Further, “[d]eciding what is within the knowledge 1 of a lay jury and what requires expert testimony depends on the particular facts of [each] case, 1 including the complexity and technical nature of the evidence to be presented and the trial judge's 1 understanding of a lay person 3 knowledge 4 Babb v Lee Cty Landfill SC LLC 747 S E 2d 468 481 (S C 2013) Therefore due to the fact intensive nature ofthese determinations, what qualifies as scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge requiring expert testimony under Virgin Islands Rules of Evidence 701(c) and 702(a) is within the discretion of the trial judge, to be I evaluated on a case by case basis Id I determination ) AKIB Constr Inc v Shipwash 582 S W 3d 791 802 (Tex App 2019)( Whether expert testimony l is necessary to prove a particular issue is a question of law that we consider de novo Whether expert testimony is ’ necessary is not an admissibility of the evidence question instead it is question ofwhat legal weight should be given f to non expert evidence in the record ’ ) (citing FFE Tramp Servs Inc v Fulgham, 154 S W 3d 84, 89 (Tex 2004)) 4 See Smith v Blythe Dev Co 665 S E 2d l54 155 (N C Ct App 2008) afl'd 678 S E 2d 657 (N C 2009) (per curiam) ( This Court has addressed the issue of whether expert testimony is required to establish the element of [ causation in flooding cases with differing results based upon the complexity of the facts presented ”) i C Specialized vs Common Knowledge Miller 11 13 Specialized knowledge and common knowledge lie on a factual continuum, with plainly obvious common knowledge issues at one end of the spectrum [for example a witness observing 1 rain] and plainly scientific, technical, and specialized matters at the other end [for example the 1 mechanisms involved in nuclear fission], with a “fine” line dividing them as issues draw closer to 1 the middle Perkms 470 F 3d at 155 See Jackson Flavzus v People 57 V I 716 732 (V I 2012) 1 (in distinguishing proper lay testimony from expert testimony, or, in essence, common knowledge 1 from specialized knowledge, courts have articulated that “lay testimony results from a process of ; reasoning familiar in everyday life whereas an expert's testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field”); State v Brown, 836 S W 2d 1 530 549 (Tenn 1992) Hams 627 F 3d at 240 US v Thompson 393 Fed Appx 852 858 (3d Cir 2010) State v Boothby 951 N W 2d 859 866 (Iowa 2020) The issue in Miller lies closer towards the middle of this continuum 11 14 Our case law on scientific, technical and specialized knowledge issues is sparse, and on 1 metallurgical issues, such as those in the present case, it is nonexistent Because of this, the 1 Superior Court relies heavily on two inapposite cases where expert testimony was required 1 Charles 71 VI 1146 amedical case and Davzsv Hovensa LLC 63 VI 475 (VI Super 2015) 1 3. Superior Court ruling dealing with the inner workings of a complex high pressure water blaster 5 1 We find this reliance is misplaced 1 1 1| 15 Charles does not aid us in delineating spec1alized knowledge from common knowledge as 1 required to decide leler Almost all medical cases require specialized knowledge and expert 1 1 1 1 testimony see generally In re Ltp1t0r 227 F Supp 3d 452 469 77 (D S C 2017) (collecting ‘ cases) afld, 892 F 3d 624 (4th Cir 2018) (“While the specific language used by courts vary to 1 some degree, all jurisdictions require expert testimony at least where the issues are medically 1 1 complex and outside common knowledge and lay experience ”), save for those cases where, for 1 example, “the surgeon saws off the wrong leg, or there is injury to a part of the body not w1thin the operative field Barton v Owen 139 Cal Rptr 494 499 (Cal Dist Ct App 1977) see also In re szztor, 227 F Supp 3d at 477 Like Charles, Hovensa also falls too far on the plainly scientific, technical, or specialized end ofthe continuum to be useful here, as it deals with the inner 1 1 1 mechanics of a complex piece of equipment and the effect of these inner mechanics on water 1 1 pressure surges 1 1 1| 16 A decision issued by this Court on the common knowledge side of the continuum, Aubain, 1 1 more closely resembles the present case than Charles 0r Hovensa There we held that “proffering 1 . . . . 1 expert proof on an Issue as prosaic as the process of ordlnary wear and tear of filmlture— the 1 1 wooden connecting peg of a bench loosemng over tlme—was not requlred, as such matters are well within the common experience ofordinary people in everyday life ” 70 V I at 955 However, we are not fiJlly persuaded by this case, the facts differ materially from Miller, and the wear and tear of a bench’s wooden peg loosening over time and breaking is distinguishable from the wear and tear of metal straps and anchors securing a mobile home rusting over time and breaking, in part because the metal undergoes changes in its metallurgical properties and composition 6 1 1 6 See TravCo Ins Co v Ward 736 S E 2d 321, 328 (Va 2012) ( Rust is defined as the reddish porous brittle coating 1 that is fomied on iron especially when chemically attacked by moist air and that consists essentially ofhydrated ferric oxide but usually contains some ferrous oxide and sometimes iron carbonates and iron sulfates ”’) (quoting Websters Intl Diet at 1991) Matheson v C I R 18 B T A 674 676 (B T A 1930) (Salt moisture commg into contact 1 1] 17 Generally, “[t]echnical issues requiring expert testimony include ‘engineering, metallurgtcalL] and medical principles ” Willet v Johnson & Johnson, 465 F Supp 3d 895, 905 (S D Iowa 2020) (quoting Farm Bureau Properly & Casualty Insurance Company v CNH Industrzal Amerzca LLC 2018 WL 2077727 at *17 (N D Iowa 2018) (emphasis added» 7 In Miller, the capability of the rusted straps and anchors to secure unit 11 8 (and ultimately whether 7 7 their failure was a proximate cause ofMiller’s damages) is directly dependent on an understanding 7 7 of specific metallurgical principles The straps and anchors securing the home were 13 years old, 7 rusted, had never been changed and witnesses Gideon and Mitchell testified as to the straps’ 7 capability to secure the unit based solely on lay observations and opinion While it may seem to 7 7 be a common sense determination that worn and rusted straps are not as strong or firm as newer 7 7 straps, and are more likely to fail the trial court found that several questions related to the 7 metallurgical properties ofthe straps and anchors must be answered for a trier offact to understand 7 7 the evidence and determine the facts at issue without speculation,8 such as, for example “[W]hat 7 are the standards in the mobile home trailer industry for securing units of the size and weight of those at Peppertree to their foundations? What physical devi[c]es of what size, strength and 7 metallurglc composition are utilized for that purpose to withstand hurricane force winds? To what 7 7 extent did Peppertree's unit on lot 11 8 comply or fail to comply with those standards?” These 7 questions, and the metallurgical principles that underlie them, implicate the exact kind of 7 7 7 Cf Dunham v Midwest Truckmg& Transp Inc 2009 WL 3254468 at *3 (W D Mo 2009)( The real question is whether it takes scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge to be able to determine a piece of metal contains a weld This Court finds that it does not While most lay witnesses might not be qualified to offer testimony regarding proper welding techniques or processes, most witnesses likely would have little problem recognizing the distinct characteristics of a weld made in metal ‘) 3 “The purpose of expert opinion testimony is to avoid jury findings based on mere speculation or conjecture ” Lasley v Georgetown University, 688 A 2d 1381, 1384 (D C 1997) (quoting Washmgton v Washington Hosp Ctr , 579 “technical issues [that] requir[e] expert testimony ” Wzllet, 465 F Supp 3d at 905 See Asplundh 1 Mfg DIV v Benton Harbor Engg 57 F 3d 1190 1204 (3d Cir 1995)( Metal fatigue IS a technical 1 concept ”), Sthwash, 582 S W 3d at 802 (“While the ordinmy person may be able to detect 1 whether a visible bolt is rusty, determining when that rust is sufficient to create a danger ‘ requires specialized knowledge ”) (quoting Fulgham, 154 S W 3d at 91); In re Ford Tazlgateng , 2015 WL 7571772, at *1, 6 (N D Cal 2015) (opinions on corrosion and failure of metal ‘ components required special expertise, and even an expert qualified in other disciplines could not offer opinions on such matters without proper qualification), H/S Wzlson Outparcels LLC v Kroger Ltmzted Partnership 1 2017 WL 4293404 at *3 5 (E D N C 2017) (lay witness could testify as to observations of rust and water in roofing, but technical or specialized knowledge of expert required to create a triable issue of material fact as to whether roof was damaged beyond 1 repair and needed replacement) Cf. Fullmgton v Union Pac Fruit Exp Co Co , 1991 WL 1 126788, at *2 (D Kan 1991) (opinion on failure of rusted and cracked welded metal tendered by 1 plaintiff‘s expert on long term metal fatigue was sufficient to defeat summary judgment) 1 11 18 The court did not err in requiring Miller to prov1de expert testimony To create a triable ‘ issue of fact on whether the damages she sustained were the natural and probable consequence of 1 and part of a natural and continuous sequence stemming from, Peppertree’s failure to secure the 1 mobile homes to their foundation, expert testimony was required More specifically, whether the 1 failure of the rusted straps was a cause of damage attributable to Peppertree required technical 1 knowledge, and therefore an expert was necessary for Miller to set out facts specific enough to ‘ show a genuine issue for trial Therefore we find that the Superior Court correctly granted 1 summary judgment to Peppertree in Miller’s case 1 1 D Specialized vs Common Knowledge Hughes I 11 19 In evaluating the particular facts ofHughes, including the complexity and technical nature 1 of the evidence, we are compelled to reach a different conclusion than that in leler Babb, 747 1 S E 2d at 481 Smith 665 S E 2d at 155 afld 678 S E 2d 657 11 20 Here, unlike leler, Hughes testified that the straps on unit 7 1 were so rusted and rotted that they had deteriorated all the way ofi"the unit, and they were no longer securing the home at all before the hurricane We do not weigh this evidence nor make credibility determinations regarding ‘ it, and we must accept Hughes’ allegations, as the nonmoving party as true ifproperly supported 9 i Chestnut v Goodman, 59 VI 467, 474 (VI 2013) Therefore, even though Hughes is a lay 11 witness, her observation that the rusty straps under the trailer were completely broken off indicates 1 1 that the straps were physically incapable of securing the mobile home, whether they were rusted ‘ or not Thus, unlike the circumstances present in the Miller case, their metallurgical properties are 1 not at issue We conclude that a lay jury could clearly understand this kind of testimony without 1 1 expert assistance See Hanley v W Virgmta Cent & P Ry Co 53 S E 625 628 (W Va 1906) 1 (“The condition of a piece of metal as to rust holes, etc , and the appearance of stays or bolts as to recent break, are matters not of expert but common knowledge ”) Here, the proof related to causation is sufficiently obvious so as to lie within the common knowledge of the average juror 1 See Lasley, 688 A 2d at 1384 (“Expert testimony is not required if the issue of causation can be 1 resolved wholly within the realm of ordinary human knowledge and experience, or if the proof is 1 1 9 Hughes’ allegations are supported by proper proofs’ if her evidence amounts to “more than a scintilla, but [it] may amount to less (in evaluation of the court) than a preponderance ” Williams v United Corp 50 V I 191 195 (V I 2008) A scintilla is defined as very slight evidence Sprmgs v Cay ofCharlotte 704 S E 2:! 319 323 (N C Ct App 2011), or “the least particle of evidence—evidence which without further evidence, is a mere trifle ” Territory v Legaspz 39 Haw 660, 664 (Haw 1953) Hughes direct testimonial evidence amounts to more than a scintilla under ‘ so obvious as to lie within the ken of the average lay juror ”) (citations omitted); see also Harris, 627 F 3d at 240 ’ 1| 21 “Therefore, the Superior Court should have identified the discrepancies in [the competing] , testimony [of Hughes and Henry Mason] as evidence creating a triable issue of fact ” Aubam, 70 V I at 955 Because there is a triable issue of material fact in dispute, the Superior Court erred in l granting summaryjudgment for Peppertree in Hughes’ case, and we reverse and remand for further 1 proceedings i IV CONCLUSION 1| 22 Whether scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge is required under our Rules of Evidence turns on the particular facts of each case The Superior Court correctly found that . rusted metal straps breaking apart due to a hurricane requires expert testimony about the straps’ % metallurgical properties The court correctly required Miller to tender expert testimony on this i issue to preclude summary judgment, but erred by requiring Hughes to present expert testimony ii on the very different issue presented by the total absence ofsuch straps in her case By examining f the facts of each case, due to Hughes’ testimony that the straps were not connected, the conflict ‘ between Hughes’ and Henry Mason’s lay testimony created genuine dispute as to a material fact, i precluding summary judgment Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s order granting ‘ summary judgment in Miller, and reverse the Superior Court’s order granting it in Hughes We 1 remand Hughes for further proceedings consistent with this opinion i i i Dated this 18‘” day of October, 2021 ’ BY THE COURT ‘ J / 1 A M C i sociate Ju ATTEST: 9' } VERONICA J HANDY, ESQ Clerk of e Court By 1 Deputy Clerk ‘ Dated 80 ‘8 Si! 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