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* Ee ae * bn al pee Beet - L Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 we ~ EXECU aes ayhigdony, . OS CAPD/OIS: | 1-2 fet] BE : ie 7 i “L224 om iE] Sy Md 15] ce [- 6] | 8) x2 [10 | p11 | P12 13 | sis f. : —~— a N | Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 TOP SECRET UNCLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded or declassi- fied when filled in form is detached from controlled document. CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REGISTRY SOURCE CItA CONTROL NO. NSC - DD |78823167/F/1 boc. no. 90213 DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED ¢ a poc. pate 9 April 1982 10 April 1982 COPY NO. 2 LOGGED BY NUMBER OF PAGES 1. LS 4om wO4 1 ATTENTION. This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the ;CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date oj handling in the right-hand columns. NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS | REFERRED TO RECEIVED RELEASED SEEN BY OFFICE SIGNATURE DATE TIME DATE TIME SIGNATURE OFFICE/DIV. DATE oe - 2 NSSD J-¢2 lin NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed tn the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record. ER | | coer eae r DOWNGRADED : DESTROYED | DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO BY (Signature) To BY (Signature) WITNESSED BY (Signature) BY (Signature) OFFICE DATE OFFICE DATE FORM 26 use previous eniied eae: TOP SECRET (40) Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 TODCEF BCT Declassified and mppleved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA- RDP90B01013R000200210016- 6 vy NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL iit WASHINGTON, D.C, 20506 CONFIDENTIAL WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT April 9, 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR Le PAUL BREMER III Executive Secretary Department of State _ LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT P. MEEHAN Assistant for Interagency Matters Office of the Secretary of Defense - THOMAS B. CORMACK Executive Secretary Central Intelligence Agency COLONEL CHARLES F. STEBBINS Executive Assistant to the © 'Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff SUBJECT: 7 April 12 Interagency Review Group Meeting a on NSSD 1-82 OSD has asked that we circulate the attached dace of Part III, Section C (Regional Military Objectives) for discussion at ae Interagency Review Group meeting on April 12, 1982. n42.goaQe ichael 0. Wheeler Staff Secretary Attachment ; TS823167/F/1 as stated Cy 2 of 4 CONFIDENTIAL WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT Review April 9, 1988 | PRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA- RDP90B01013R000200210016- -6 SVSTEM TT Es. «BSE ees kee Tete Seen LU 2 DELUNEL : 5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA- RDP90B01013R000200210016- 6 e4 ae REGIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES - SUMMARY The US must plan for a successful defense in a global war. The Soviet Union must be prevented from forcing the US to choose between initiating nuclear war and accepting permanent loss of vital Western interests. The US will seek to limit the scope of any conflict, but will plan options for military actions in regions of clear US advantage. Such options will be a part of US strategy, but is not a substitute for military capa- bility to defend where threatened. Soviet options for like action and the linkage between geographical expansion and nuclear escalation must be considered. While recognizing that the political and military situation at the time of war will dictate strategy decisions, and that a US-Soviet conflict may well expand beyond one theater, the following priorities apply for global wartime planning: highest priority is North America, followed by NATO, and the supporting lines of communication (LOCs). .The next priority is ensuring access to the oil in Southwest Asia, followed by the defense of our Pacific allies, supporting LOCs and the defense of other friendly nations in Latin America and Africa. Peacetime priorities may not parallel wartime priors ties: Specific US regional objectives are keyed to this global context. In. contingencies not involving. direct Soviet secveee tad, our strategy is to rely on regional states to a extent possible. In Europe, our primary objective is to een NATO's capability to deter or | defeat a Soviet attack. In wartime, the US will support NATO strategy which requires forward defense with conventional forces supported by the possibility of nuclear escalation. In peacetime,.US objectives are to enhance deterrence through major improvements in NATO's conventional capabilities; to improve nuclear and chemical forces; and to obtain increased Allied defense contributions in Europe and Southwest Asia. In the Near East/Southwest Asia, our principal objectives are to prevent the spread of Soviet influence; to protect Western access to oil; to maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage; and to support moderate states against aggression and subversion. US military strategy is to deter Soviet aggression; if necessary, to combat the Soviets in the theater; and to. prepare for executing counteroffensives elsewhere. In the Far East, our wartime objectives are viewed primarily in the context of 4 global war. They are: to maintain control of Pacific LOCs; to protect US bases; to fulfill commitments to allies; in conjunction with regional states, to prevent the redeployment of Soviet forces from the Far East; and .to secure Japanese self-defense including long-range LOC protection. In peacetime, we seek a more active defense ' partnership with Japan, a more durable US-PRC relationship, and continued stability on the Korean Peninsula. In phe mesbern Hemisphere, our primary wartime objective is the security of the North American Continent, the Caribbean Basin and the Panama Canal. In peacetime, our objectives are to modernize North America's strategic air defense system; to reverse Communist: gains in Latin America; and to increase US military presence. In Africa, our Gezeind objectives are to neutralize hostile forces in strategic locations and to protect Western access to the region's mineral resources. US peacetime objectives are to obtain additional facilities access and transmit rights, and to assist countries resisting Soviet-sponsored subversion. TOP SECRET End of Summary TAN ACNAALT SCD classified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 ee” Pol VLUIli | Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 a e - —- -~F Scodiemdmntiinateiibmeabar toenail 4 Ot er et ele ed dh a : MILITARY OBJECTIVES sae Global A. Introduction The wartime strategy of the U.S. is to employ military force to achieve our political objectives and secure early war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. In doing so, the U.S. must plan, in conjunction with allies, for a successful defense in a global war against the Soviet Union and its allies. At the same time, the U.S. will seek to limit the scope of a U.S.-Soviet conflict to the extent commensurate with protecting U.S. vital interests. Contingency planning should, however, include options for military actions in regions of clear U.S. advantage to dissuade the Soviets from continuing their attack. In this context, the threat of counteroffensives elsewhere is an , essential element of U.S. strategy, but is not a substitute for adequate military capability to defend U.S. interests in the area in which they are threatened. Moreover, a decision to expand a war geographically must take account of the facts that the Soviet Union enjoys options of attacking on other fronts at least as attractive as ours, and that geographic expansion and nuclear escalation considerations are linked. o a In contingencies involving direct Soviet aggression, the U.S. would expect to play a major role in defending U.S. and allies interests. .In lower order, non-Soviet contingencies, we plan to rely on regional states and other friends and allies to the extent possible to deter or counter threats to common interests. 5; B. Priorities for Wartime Resource Allocation me reee A tOCation Due to the global military capabilities of the Soviet Union and the interrelationship of strategic theaters, - the likelihood that any U.S.-Soviet conflict would expand beyond one theater to other theaters must be recognized and planned for. This does not mean that we must have the capability to successfully engage Soviet forces simultaneously. on all fronts. Rather, this means procuring balanced forces and establishing priorities for sequential operations among theaters to ensure that we, in conjunction with our allies, apply our military power-in the most effective way. This includes preventing the Soviet Union from being able to force the U.S. to choose between initiating nuclear war and accepting the loss of vital Western interests. While recognizing that the political and Military situations at the time of war will. bear heavilv on strategic decisions, the following priorities will apply for wartime planning: TOP SECRET . Review April 7, 2002 . OV anes os nA in Ae Se a *+" Déclassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 - CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 _ wv se SDURE Se An TH Mi Declassified and ee For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA- RDPS0B0 10130002002 10016- 6 et ee ee ee - The highest Peisetey is the defense of North America (including Hawaii, Alaska and Caribbean SLOCs), followed by the NATO areas and the LOCs leading there to. ~ The next priority is ensuring access-.to the ' oil in Southwest Asia, followed by defense of U.S. Pacific allies and the LOCs for the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the defense of other friendly nations in Latin America and Africa. In areas other than: NATO ana eeenwese Asia, U.S. actions -will be designed to protect essential U.S. interests, take advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities, and divert Soviet attention and forces: oo Europe and Southwest Asia. Priorities for pedeetias resource allocation may not always correlate to the above wartime priorities since special .. emphasis on specific capabilities may be required. Ce Equitable Burdensharing. Many nations with living standards equal to the U.S. contribute markedly less to the common defense. In 1982 and beyond, U.S. "quiet diplomacy" must be much firmer in insisting upon increased defense efforts by affluent nations which possess the poccottas to do more in the defense realm.. EE. Regional Objectives In the event of war with the Soviet Union, regional objecti ives provide only rough guidelines and must be viewed ‘ina global perspective. . A. Europe The Secastee of Burope is closely linked to that - of the ‘United States. The unprecedented challenges to Western security, coupled with a continuing growth in -economic interdependence, mandate a firm commitment by nations on both sides of- the Atlantic to the coalition warfare strategy of NATO. While intra-Alliance problems such as burdensharing and anti-nuclear movements exist, it will remain important that we continue to recognize that the defense of Europe is vital to the national security of the United States. “NATO strategy MCL4/3 stresses defense yisae the forward edge of NATO territory, supported by the possible NATO . initiation of nuclear escalation if NATO is losing conventionally. This nuclear linkage -- and uncertainty -- is important to deterrence... -But the Europeans must not be permitted to use TOP SECRET a es ee a r ry; cr ee LCCIASSified and epiied For Release noe CIA Gel ere rer 6 Pp. SECRET = Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA- RDP90B01013R000200210016- 6 nuclear linkage as an excuse for not funding conventional | defense forces. Our policy should be to support MC14/3, while stressing that nuclear parity means a strong con- ventional defense is necessary for deterrence as well as for defense. While improvements are required across the full spectrum of the Alliance's military capabilities, a major increase over current efforts is especially required from all other members with regard to conventional capability. | _ Without such an increase the nuclear threshold could be | . lowered and the Allies become more vulnerable to nuclear | threats as the Soviets continue increasing their capabilities. Additionally, NATO should enhance deterrence through closer Allied coherence, and clearer expression of per eeaeeh, will. Within the context outlined above, the following are the specific U.S. military. objectives for the BureReee region: Wartime Objectives - To protect the territorial integrity of Western _ _ Europe. To defeat a Warsaw Pact conventional attack with conventional forces'in a forward defense, and to deter Soviet, use of chemical or nuclear weapons in accordance with current NATO strategy. To fully engage all NATO members in the conflict. To be able to sustain a war at least - as long as the Warsaw Pact can. To weaken the Warsaw Pact's ability to wage war by engaging Pact: forces on their own territory, disrupting their: LOCs, and fragmenting | the cohesion of the Pact ei iiaice. os To establish and maintain control of Atlantic LOCs. - . Peacetime Military Objectives - To enhance deterrence through improvements in ‘NATO's conventional defense capabilities while. . also improving nuclear: and chemical forces. - . To achieve increased Alliea contributions to the defense of Western Europe and from Allies capable of doing so increased contributions in other areas of mutual benefit, to include Southwest Asia. TOP SECRET TAD CECOEST Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA- RDP90B01013R000200210016- 6 ae. Bre hes Ur OLCONRE Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 - To secure a more effective division of ‘labor within NATO through cooverative efforts, such as ‘Host Nation Support Agreements. ; B. Near East/Southwest Asia. The United States has two primary national security interests in the region. The first-is to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring political- - military hegemony in the region. This requires that the U.S. support the sovereignty of regional states friendly to the U.S. The second is to maintain continued access to Persian Gulf oil. This means that the U.s., in- concert with intra-.and extraregional allies and friends must be prepared to meet threats of any magnitude, from internal subversion to large scale. Soviet aggression.. Ss In this context, defense policy has three overriding objectives: a Deter Soviet overt military aggression and protect Western access to oil. To do this, U.S. defense planning has three tiers. First, we must Plan for and |. demonstrate our ability to project the RDJTF -- Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force -~ quickly into the region to prevent a | Soviet fait accompli. Additional support from intra- and extraregional allies and friends must be obtained to support RDJTF requirements. Our private pressure upon them for realistic.combined planning must be unremitting. Second, if deterrence fails, we must plan to combat the Soviets-in the theater to dissuade them from continued aggression. The third tier of Defense planning is to prepare for executing counter-offensives on other fronts where the U.S.. has advantages. Throughout this planning process, the potential for this conflict to become global must be recognized and planned for. 2% Maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage over any realistic combination of Arab foes. The latest SNIE concludes that Israel's military superiority is much stronger today than at.the time of the 1973 war and projects that it will be much stronger in FY 87 than today. As the most militarily powerful state in the region, Israel's assistance would be of considerable benefit in the course of a conflict with the Soviets, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, as augmentation for the Southern Flank, a Sie Support moderate states against external aggression and subversion. This requires U.S. arms sales to help strengthen substantially the self-defense capabilities of key states in the region. - To accomplish these objectives for the region, the U.S. expects regional states to contribute to the extent possible to their own defense as well as assisting in supporting the employment of U.S. forces. -Allies will-be expected to offer their facilities for the deployment of U.S. forces to Southwest Asia. Additionally, they should be encouraged to TOP SECRET : ~TND CECQLT dif 233 | Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 :, | Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 contribute militarily to meeting specific threats if such participation would not substantially reduce their war : fighting capability in their home region and would provide a beneficial contribution to the conflict. Within the context. Sue thea- above, the following are the specific U. S. military objectives for the Near East, Southwest and South Asia region: qereimacaa Crisis Objectives - . To secure the oil fields, transshipment points and sea lines of communications essential-to Western security. (This includes threats. of all magnitude. from internal subversion to Soviet aggES=E1OR: ) - To preserve the independence of Israel. - To engage ‘friendly regional states, Western Allies and other extra-regional states in the execution of our strategy. Peacetime Military Objectives To prevent Soviet negenange and extension of sel uence.: To acquire, by the end of ene decade, sufficient capability to have reasonable assurance of achieving U.S. wartime objectives in Southwest Asia while seeking to limit the likelihood of expansion of the conflict beyond the region and its supporting lines of communication (LOCs). To maintain Israel's qualitative military Sov aEradS over any coments of Arab foes. fas To support moderate states against external aoeeaee en and subversion. To ensure access to a network of “area facilities in the region for the rapid introduction and sustainment of sizable U.S. forces, = To obtain overflight, landing, bunkering and — access to enroute facilities for the deployment and support of U.S. combat forces... To obtain military contributions (including agreements for combat forces) from selected Allies in support of U.S. objectives in the region. TOP SECRET aaa One 7. ' Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 - CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 iw? ean ee IP NFILREI a +. Declassified and PEPreNes For Release 2013/02/28 - CIA- RDP90B01013R000200210016- 6 a To maintain a strong naval presence in the area, together with as substantial a presence on land as can be managed given regional sensitivities and political constraints. - 'To increase peacetime planning with regional states for wartime contingencies, including host nation support, prepostttoning and coupe note? . for indigenous forces. Cs. Far East. Gas, Horencet peacetime objective in the Far East is, in conjunction with our allies and other friends in the region, to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its influence in East Asia and the Pacific. Asian security relationships are fundamental to offsetting success- fully Soviet global ambitions. U.S. strategy in East Asia and the Pacific is predicated on the stabilizing relationship between two security anchors. One anchor in Northeast Asia © depends on cooperation among the U.S., Korea, and Japan, as well as. the U.S. relationship with China. The other anchor in the Pacific Basin binds the U.S. to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the somewhat more loosely to the remainder of ASEAN. Continued U.S. and allied force improvements and | strengthened U.S. security relationships are required to. | establish and maintain an effective defensive network secured at hoth ends of the region. A direct U.S.-Soviet conflict in Asia is unlikely except in the context of a global war. Therefore, although other contingencies in the region could involve U.S. forces in hostilities short of U.S.-Soviet conflict, regional wartime objectives in Asia listed below are those supportive of global wartime objectives. Wartime Objectives ; - To maintain control of the Pacific lines of | communication, including those to the Indian Ocean, and the bases needed to SUpPOre the global strategy. - | To fulfill commitments to the Asian allies, given | particular emphasis to protection of U.S. bases in the region, obtain allied support in the conflict, and seek to preclude a Soviet decision to redeploy — ‘forces for use against NATO. - fo have Japan provide for its own defense, including ' SLOC and air protection to 1,000 miles, and if possible, contribute more: broadly to regional defense efforts. To have the PRC maintain military initiatives that would fix Soviet ground, air and naval forces in the USSR's Far Eastern territories. TOP_ SECRET nD SECRET 3] of if | Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 ? UP” SHLURGL 7 an’ =. | TAN arenrr | os os Declassified and PPRIONG? For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 pA *iigeeey obicce aes = To transform our relationship with Japan into an active defense partnership in. which Japan significantly increases its own defense capabilities and, over. time, contributes more broadly to regional defense. - To continue to develop our relationship with the PRC in ways which maintain the PRC as a counterweight © to the Soviet Union, enhance the durability of U.S.-PRC ties, and lay the foundation for closer future cooperation as appropriate. = To maintain sufficient U.S. and allied strength on the Korean Peninsula to ensure stability there, and, if deterrence fails, assist the ROK in defeating hostile forces. Enhance deterrence, primarily by assisting the ROK. to become increasingly self-sufficient in its defense capabilities. - To increase peacetime Planning with our allies for ' wartime contingencies. - To have other regional states assume a greater share of the responsibility for the common defense. and assist them in improving their capabilities to fulfill it. | - To improve the support of regional states for U.S. ne power projection from the “Nestern Pacific to the ' Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. ; _ : - To prevent the Soviet Union or Vietnam from = achieving a dominant presence in Southeast Asia | aoe -. £rom which to foster actions inimical to our _ interests and those of our allies. D. Western Hemisphere The defense of North America is this nation's primary security concern. Since World War II, defense of the Western Hemisphere has meant that the U.S. would maintain —§- strategic. nuclear deterrence, develop closer relations with : Canada and Mexico, and foster collective security arrangements among Latin American countries. It is becoming increasingly clear that a secure hemisphere is no longer a foregone conclusion. The U.S. must continue to.build on interests | : shared with Canada and Mexico, while viewing Latin America | ' -. not as a Third World area removed from the traditional focus of U.S. strategy, but as a contiguous region whose future bears directly on the security of the hemisphere as a whole. TOP SECRET | [ge gepary Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA- Pare eae Ri, -6 ste Nt es Maat heed Meet ct Sethe whe, eprint meen esa “4 Declassified and Apaves For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01018R000200210016-6 Latin America, and especially the Caribbean/Central American region, is an area with which we are closely : associated by virtue of our Gulf Coast and Mexican borders, our dependence in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, -and the critical Panama Canal waterway. Nearly half of our trade and two-thirds of our imported oil pass through the. Caribbean. Moreover, in event of war, half of NATO's supplies would transit by sea from Gulf ports ree the | Caribbean to Europe. The South maeetaae continent is also a eocus of major U.S. -interests. Though strategically less pivotal to. us than the Caribbean, South America includes several. _Mations with which we enjoy long-standing close relations and which are among our most important trade partners. In addition, the east coast of South America faces the South Atlantic sea routes which represent a major petroleum lifeline for Europe and the United States. — Wartime and Crisis Objectives: ~ To defend North America (inelading Hawaid, Alaska and the continguous Caribbean Basin). - To neutralize Soviet and SeReE hostile forces in , the Caribbean Basin. - To control LOCs in the Caribbean, South Atlantic, ‘and South Pacific including the Panama Canal. To prevent further aggression and subversion against regional states by forces hostile to U.S. interests. iE Sy a i oe eee Peacetime Military Objectives - To modernize the Bo naeg s air defense system for North America. - To reverse Communist gains in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Grenada and other - areas in Latin America. - | To proadea® eagional military-to-military contacts _ . and seek the active military cooperation of key countries in regional territorial defense, in the security of Caribbean Basin, South Atlantic and South Pacific sea lines of communication ane in ‘facilitating air at ocean movement. TOP SECRET TA 9 SEpaey - dees i hur ocbnd | Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : an RDP90B01013R000200210016- 6 oe er Cer eee "a SIU REP UET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 - To maintain, or acquire as needed, base and facilities access, logistical support, and operating, — transit, and overflight rights. - To increase the level and exercise tempo of U.S. military presence in the region. E. Africa. Africa's mineral resources (including oil), plus its strategic location astride the-sea lanes from the Persian Gulf, make it of prime importance in economic (and therefore political) terms: the Military requirement for the West is essentially preemptive: to deny the Soviets (and Libya) control over key African states and territory _ from which they could interdict the supply of minerals and oil from Africa and the Middle Fast. In case of a military... struggle for control of the Middle East, Africa is important as a strategic territory for the movement of major Western forces to the area via the- Mediterranean, across North Africa, or across Central Africa. It is also equally _important,- as a base for facilities from which both air and naval forces could operate to destroy Soviet naval threats to the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, around the Cape, and the south Atlantic. | In peacetime, in addition to: being a major source’ for minerals important to U.S., West European, and Japanese industry, Africa remains an important area for the political contest of Western and Soviet Bloc values in the Third World. The West must counter, and the U.S. must play a larger role in meeting, the Soviet/proxy challenge. Principal elements currently available are economic, security assistance, and special operations. Successful implementation of a a. = counter-Soviet strategy in Africa will also require the development of a climate of supportive Congressional and public opinion, and the restoration of substantial "internal security" and covert action capabilities. Wartime and Crisis Objectives - ‘To employ air and naval forces to neutralize Soviet or other hostile forces (especially Libya) in strategic locations in the region and adjacent - waters. vie ee. To protect access to and deny Soviet use of the region's mineral resources, key facilities, and - LOcCs. : : TOP SECRET POCT ELE i? core i "| iG? § Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 ¢ We) mo f ¢ TOP SECRET = — pe TO MID CLPOCT -, .\ 4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6 Peacetime military Objectives - To gain. base access and transit rights in pro- Western African states for the deployment and subsequent support of U.S. forces to Africa, ~ Southwest Asia, South Atlantic,:and contiguous areas and work to deny the Soviets similar access. -— To assist countries throughout Africa that are the targets. of Soviet proxy, Libyan and Ethiopian ‘aggressive, subversive or terrorist actions. TOP SECRET iat ‘ <a 3 x | Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/28 : CIA- RU BaaHb deen oeeseontoote: -6