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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. CROIX THE PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS Plaintiff) ) ) ) ) Defendant ) CASE NO. SX-09-CR-0000455 ACTION FOR: 14V.I.C.298 Vs. SHELDON SHALLOW TO: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF .MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ORDER BOOK LAW LIBRARY IT ERNEST E. MORRIS, ESQ. ATTORNEY GENERAL ALL MAGISTRATES STX-STT ALL LAW CLERKS STX-STT ALL JUDGES STX-STT Please take notice that on May 03, 2010 a(n) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER dated April 28, 2010 was entered by the Clerk in the above-entitled matter. Dated: May 03, 2010 Venetia H. Velazauez. Esa. CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT €1L^uz^lJ^~^^2a^%-^u>^ JANEEN MARANDA COURT CLERK FOR PUBLICATION IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. CROIX PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, Plaintiff, v. SHELDON SHALLOW, Defendant. CASE NO. SX-09-CR-455 ^-~ MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER — THIS MATTER comes before the Court due to the Defendant's demand through his counsel of record at his arraignment for a speedy jury trial. The criminal charge against the Defendant is Aggravated Assault and Battery/Domestic Violence. The arraignment was on January 27, 2010. However, therecord reflects that onJanuary 13, 2010 the People filed aMotion for A Bench Trial citing 14 V.I.C. § 4 as authority for therequest. On January 15, 2010, Defense Counsel filed an Opposition to Motion for Bench Trial. The Defendant summarizes his argument as follows: "In order to secure the rightto ajury trial, a defendant must simply demand the sameat arraignment. Once the defendant has properly made his demand, that right is secured and cannot be removed." Opposition to Motion for Bench Trial, p. 3. Accordingly, the Court must decide whether the Defendant will be tried by a jury or by the Court. 14 V. I.C. § 4 provides that "[i]n misdemeanor cases only, trial judges are authorized to limit the term of imprisonment to six months in prison - in which event, the Defendant may be tried by the Court, except in cases where a mandatory sentence is imposed." This statute was enacted by the Legislature of the Virgin Islands in March 1984 and has been routinely administered by this Courtandits predecessor for over twenty-six (26) years. People ofthe VIv. Shallow SX-09-CR-455 Order Page 2 of7 The Defendant argues that when Congress extended the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitutionto the Territory in 1968 it automatically entitled any criminal defendant, upon demand, to ajurytrial no matter what crime is charged. This Court disagrees with that contention and its refutation is found in the language usedby Congress in bequeathing jury trials to criminal defendants in this Territory by effectively amending Section 26 of the Revised Organic Act of 1954: Thefollowing provisions of andamendments to theConstitution of the United States are hereby extended to the Virgin Islands to the extentthat they havenot beenpreviously extended to the Territory and shall have the same force and effect there as in the United States or any State of the United States... the first to ninth amendments inclusive." Revised Organic Act of 1954, § 3. (emphasis added). The above language negates any special or extraordinary significance to the grant ofjury trials inthe Virgin Islands, but rather specified that its use here was to follow the traditional use of jury trials in the country's judicial system. Accordingly, areview ofthe Supreme Court ofthe United States' ("Supreme Court") treatment of the right to a jury trial is in order. The Sixth Amendment provides for, among other things, a right to trial byjury incriminal matters. However, the Supreme Court has long held that this right does not extend to every criminal defendant.1 This policy started with the founding of the United States, as American colonies retained theEnglish custom ofnon-jury adjudication ofpettyoffenses. 1SeeDuncan v. Louisiana, 391U.S. 145 (1968); Callan V. Wilson, 127U.S.540(1888). 2SeeFelix Frankfurter &Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty ofTrial by Jury, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917, 936 (1926) ("[A]ll the colonies... re-lived the experience ofthe mother country, and resorted tosummary jurisdiction for minor offenses with full loyalty totheir conception ofthe Englishman's right to trial by jury.) People ofthe VIv. Shallow SX-09-CR-455 Order Page 3 of7 When the United States Constitution was enacted, the concept of non-jury trials in petty offenses was incorporated into the Sixth Amendment, limiting the requirement of a jury trial to cases involving "serious offenses": If the language had remained "criminal offenses," it might have been contended that it meant all offenses of a criminal nature, petty as well as serious, but when the change was made from "criminal offenses" to "crimes," and made in the light of the popular understanding of the word "crimes," as stated by Blackstone, it is obvious that the intent was to exclude from the constitutional requirement of a jury the trial of petty criminal offenses. Schick v. UnitertStgtes, 195 U.S. 655J0 (1904) __ As the issuematured, the Supreme Courtcontinued to flesh out which circumstances give rise to a right to trial by jury, but continually did not set abright line rule.3 It was not until the caseof Baldwin v. New York thatthe Supreme Court heldthat statutory offenses witha penalty in excess of sixmonths' imprisonment automatically created therightto trialbyjury under the Sixth Amendment, because such offenses could not be deemed petty. 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). The Baldwin Court considered both the nature of the offense itself as well as the maximum potential sentence the defendant could face, as opposed to the sentence actually imposed, in making this determination. Id. The focus on the maximum sentence was reaffirmed in Lewis v. U.S., 518 U.S. 322 (1996). Here, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that all courts should look exclusively at the objective indications of seriousness with which society regards the offense. Id. at 326. In other words, thecourt should defer to the determination made by the legislature regarding terms of maximum penalty. See District ofColumbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937) (holding that severity of penalty continues tobe an important factor considered indetermining whether Sixth Amendment right totrial byjury attaches, butnodefinite rule was established.). People ofthe VIv. Shallow SX-09-CR-455 Order Page 4 of7 The issue of whether penalties of sixmonths or lesstriggered the same rightwas left open until Blanton v. City ofNorth Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989). While theSupreme Court declined to hold that such penalties were automatically petty, the Supreme Court did state that a penalty of sixmonths or less hada strong presumption ofbeing petty, cutting off Sixth Amendment rights to ajury trial. Id. at 543. Currently, federal rules deem that a misdemeanor, the penalty for which does notexceed six^months imprisonment and a fine of $5,000 or lessforanindividual or $10,000 for non-individuals#are deemed petty. See 18 U.S.C. § 1. The only way an offense with a maximum penalty oSix months or less could still merit a trial by jury is if "any additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a 'serious' one." Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543. When examining Supreme Court jurisprudence, the single most important factor cited on whether anoffense is deemed petty or serious bythecourts is thatofcommunity preferences: Doubts must be resolved, not subjectivelyby recourse ofthe judge to his ownsympathy andemotions, butby objective standards such as may be observed in the laws and practices of the community taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments. District of Columbia v. Calwans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937). Since the Calwans decision, the Supreme Court has often reiterated the community preference petty offense exception to the Sixth Amendment.4 The reasoning behind this principle, as some scholars have noted, is basic economics. The right to a jury trial becomes too expensive for the public to finance for every infraction, minor and major. Efficient allocation of the public's 4See Blanton v. City ofNorth Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989) ("In recent years, however wehave sought more 'objective indications ofthe seriousness with which society regards the offense'"); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) ("In deciding whether an offense is 'petty,' we have sought objective criteria reflecting the seriousness with which society regards the offense..."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) ("The penalty au&orized by the law ofthe locality may betaken 'as agauge ofits social and ethical judgments' ofthe crime inquestion.") People ofthe VIv. Shallow SX-09-CR-455 Order Page 5 of7 resources "demands that the right to jury trial be reserved for defendants accused of crimes 'serious' enough to merit expensive procedural safeguards." Petty Offenses, Serious Consequences: Multiple Petty Offenses andthe Sixth Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 872,875. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has frequently stated that the best way to measure community preferences concerning the severity of a particular offense is maximum penalty allowed by the legislature.5 The idea is that the legislature is in the best position to be able to determine what society prefers, and accordingly sets the maximum penalty according to this preference. Id. at 878. In 1970, Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion in Baldwin, made observations which succinctly described the status ofthetrial ofpetty offenses inthecountry inthat period: While all States exceptNew York provide for jury trials for crimes carrying sentences of six months or more, there is a good deal of diversity as to the numberofjurors and the stageat whichthe right to jury trial attaches." Baldwin 399 U.S. at 119. In his continuing discourse and the federal right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, he opined, "I think it appropriate to draw the line at six months in federal cases, although for reasons to follow, I wouldnot encumberthe Statesby this requirement." Id. at 120-121. The Court will turn now to a sister jurisdiction, the Territory of Guam, which like the Virgin Islands has an existing Organic Act. There, the case ofLamb v. Hoffman, 2008 WL 440233 (Guam Terr. Feb. 18, 2008) decided bythe Supreme Court ofGuam isparticularly instructive. The case began as a divorce action in Canada that led to a child support application and order by a 5See Baldwin, 399 U.S.at68("Wehave found themostrelevant... criteria [in determining howsociety viewsan offense] inthe severity ofthe maximum authorized penalty."); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159 ("[T]he penalty authorized for a particular crime isof major relevance indetermining whether it is serious ornot..."). People ofthe VIv. Shallow SX-09-CR-455 Order Page 6 of7 Child SupportReferee (akinto ourPaternityand ChildSupport Division) whichwas affirmed by a Judge of the Superior Court. One of the appellant's contentions was that he was deprived of his right to a jury trial under a contempt charge. This chargewas defined as a "petty misdemeanor... with a penalty not to exceed sixty (60) days." 7 G.C.A. 34102(b) and 9 G.C.A. 580.34(b). 7 G.C.A. § 22104 grants a right of jury trials to criminal defendants where the authorized punishment consistsrofxonfinement for more than sixty (60) days ora fine of five hundred dollars ($500). In holding!thatithe Appellant was not entitled to a jurytrial, the Guam Court cited with approval Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996) where the trial court denied defendant's motion for a jury triali)ut granted the government's request for a bench trial "because she [the court] wouldn't, under any circumstances, sentence petitioner to more than six months imprisonment." Id. at 324. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court of Guam quoted a caveat expressed by its supervisory Court of Appeals, to wit "a territorial court lacks the authority to interpret a federal statute orfederal constitutional provision contrary tothe interpretation the U. S. Supreme Court has given it." Guam v. Guerrero, 2901 F.3d. 1210, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2002). If Defendant'spositionis accepted requiringjury trials for all criminaloffenses, even petty ones, the realistic effect would be to erase the advantages gained by the Superior Court upon the implementation of the Magistrate Division. These new judicial additions have greatly eased the burden on Judges responsible for adjudicating a considerable back logof civil and criminal cases. Ifanunpredictable number oftrials ondemand bycriminal defendants facing nomore than six (6) months imprisonment should bemade the efficient and expedient administration ofjustice in the Territory may be seriously impaired. In sum, this Court concludes that 14 V.I.C. § 4 was and is a valid exercise of legislative authority in conferring upon trial judges of the Superior Court the power to limit the term of People ofthe VI v. Shallow SX-09-CR-455 Order Page 7 of7 imprisonment to a maximum of six (6) months and conduct a bench trial of defendants charged with misdemeanors. This legislatively created judicial process is certainly consistent with traditional American jurisprudence having earned the express approval of the highest court in our country. Based on the foregoing analysis it is hereby ORDERED thatDefendant's Opposition to People's Motion for Bench Trialis DENIED. It is further ORDERED that the People's Motion for a Bench Trial based on Title 14 V.I.C. § 4 is GRANTED. Dated: e^of £LO/<3 ATTEST: VENETIA H. VELAZQUEZ Clerk of the Court By: ChiefDeputy Clerk q \^A p Judge - CERTIFIEDTO BE ATRUE COPY Th\$Jk?Lday ofMk£-. 2CL&L VENETIA H. VELAZQUEZ, ESQ. [RKOF THE COURT /^^LA>i*4jCourt Clerk j^ -'/.