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Not For Publication IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS IN RE: PAUL M. MONTRONE REVOCABLE TRUST OF 2010, KEVIN COGAN, MICHELLE MONTRONE COGAN, PAUL M. MONTRONE, and RUTH ANN MAGNUSON, Petitioners. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) S. Ct. Civ. No. 2020-0115 Re: Super. Ct. Civ. No. 563/2016 (STT) On Petition for Writ of Mandamus Superior Court Judge: Hon. Kathleen Y. Mackay Considered and Filed: September 30, 2024 Cite as: 2024 VI 3U BEFORE: RHYS S. HODGE, Chief Justice; MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice; and HAROLD W.L. WILLOCKS, Associate Justice. APPEARANCES: Justin K. Holcombe, Esq. Lisa M. Komives Dudley Newman Feuerzeig LLP St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. Attorneys for Petitioners. OPINION OF THE COURT PER CURIAM. This matter is before the Court on a petition for writ of mandamus jointly filed by the Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust of 2010 (the “Trust”), Kevin Cogan, Michelle Montrone, Paul M. Montrone, and Ruth Ann Magnuson (collectively “Petitioners”), who are the plaintiffs and defendants in Paul M. Montrone Revocable Trust v. Cogan, Super. Ct. Civ. No. 563/2016 (STT). In their petition, the Petitioners maintain that the Superior Court judge assigned to the case (the “Nominal Respondent”) has failed to rule on numerous dispositive motions for a period of years. In re Paul M. Montrone Trust 2024 VI 3U S. Ct. Civ. No. 2020-0115 Opinion of the Court For the reasons that follow, we grant the petition and direct the Nominal Respondent to issue rulings on all pending motions in the underlying proceeding within 60 days or take other meaningful action to further disposition of the Montrone case in that period. I. BACKGROUND On September 21, 2016, the Trust filed a complaint in the Superior Court against Cogan stemming from his alleged failure to make timely payments on notes executed between him and the Trust for purposes of constructing a luxury home on Parcel Nos. D-13 and D-14 Consolidated, Estate Lovelund, No. 2 Great Northside Quarter, St. Thomas (the “property”). Cogan filed a counterclaim against the Trust, Montrone, and his then-wife Montrone Cogan (the “Trust Parties”), asserting that he had been deceived into signing the notes. After proceedings not related to this matter, including the issuance of a writ of attachment against the property, the Trust Parties moved for summary judgment on December 6, 2017, on its claims, as well as for partial summary judgment on Cogan’s counterclaims on January 19, 2018. Cogan opposed both motions. While these motions were pending, the Trust Parties filed a notice on March 27, 2018, advising that a state circuit court in New Hampshire issued an order in a divorce proceeding between Cogan and his wife directing that the property be sold and the proceeds of the sale held in escrow until resolution of the Superior Court case. Approximately 18 months later, on February 8, 2019, the Trust Parties filed an emergency motion requesting a ruling on the summary judgment motions. In the emergency motion, the Trust Parties represented that the Cogans were not properly maintaining the property—including failing to repair damage caused by Hurricanes Irma and Maria or to pay electricity bills—and that as a result the property was rapidly declining in value. On February 26, 2019, Cogan filed a reply that joined in the request for a ruling on the summary judgment motions, which also identified other In re Paul M. Montrone Trust 2024 VI 3U S. Ct. Civ. No. 2020-0115 Opinion of the Court motions that he believed the Nominal Respondent needed to address. The Nominal Respondent issued an order on May 14, 2019, scheduling a status conference for May 17, 2019. The day before the status conference, Magnuson moved for leave to intervene as a plaintiff, on grounds that the New Hampshire court had appointed her as a Real Estate Commissioner charged with listing the property for sale and soliciting offers. At the May 17, 2019 status conference, the Nominal Respondent stated that the sale of the property constituted the most pressing issue in the case and that the court would rule on the summary judgment and intervention motions at a later date. When three months elapsed without the Nominal Respondent issuing any rulings, the Trust Parties filed a renewed emergency motion for rulings or, in the alternative, an interlocutory order authorizing the sale of the property. On October 31, 2019, Cogan filed a reply which again joined the renewed emergency motion. The Nominal Respondent entered a November 6, 2019 order scheduling the case for a status conference on December 10, 2019, and later entered an opinion and order on November 22, 2019, which granted Magnuson’s motion to intervene, but did not act on either the emergency motion or the underlying summary judgment motions. On November 14, 2019, Cogan moved to reconsider the portion of the order scheduling a status conference, on grounds that the conference “would appear to be a waste of judicial resources” without a ruling on the summary judgment motions. On December 3, 2019, the Superior Court granted Cogan’s reconsideration motion and continued the status conference without date pending rulings on the dispositive motions. All the parties then jointly filed an “Emergency Motion for Ruling on Critical Pending Motions” on March 11, 2020. In their joint motion, the parties identified seven critical motions— chief among them the summary judgment motions—and urged immediate action because the In re Paul M. Montrone Trust 2024 VI 3U S. Ct. Civ. No. 2020-0115 Opinion of the Court prolonged pendency of those motions impaired the proceedings in the New Hampshire court and impaired the ability of several of the parties to comply with orders issued by that court. Ultimately, the parties jointly filed the instant petition for writ of mandamus with this Court. Although this Court entered an order permitting the Nominal Respondent to file an answer, the Nominal Respondent elected not to respond. The Superior Court record reflects that the summary judgment motions and the other motions identified in the March 11, 2020 joint emergency motion remain unresolved, along with an August 2, 2021 motion to approve the sale of the property filed by Magnuson, and that the Nominal Respondent has not taken any action in the case since entering the December 3, 2019 order continuing the status conference nearly five years ago. II. DISCUSSION This Court has jurisdiction over original proceedings for mandamus pursuant to title 4, section 32(b) of the Virgin Islands Code. “However, a writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy which should be granted only in extraordinary circumstances.” In re Morton, 56 V.I. 313, 319 (V.I. 2012). “To obtain a writ of mandamus, [the petitioner] must establish that his right to the writ is clear and indisputable and that he has no other adequate means to attain the desired relief.” In re Fleming, 56 V.I. 460, 464 (V.I. 2012). But “even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Moorhead v. Mapp, 62 V.I. 595, 600 (V.I. 2015) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004)). We conclude that the Petitioners have met their burden as to all three factors. “A party possesses a ‘clear and indisputable’ right when the relief sought constitutes a ‘specific, ministerial act, devoid of the exercise of judgment or discretion.’” Fleming, 56 V.I. at 464; Morton, 56 V.I. at In re Paul M. Montrone Trust 2024 VI 3U S. Ct. Civ. No. 2020-0115 Opinion of the Court 319; In re People of the V.I., 51 V.I. 374, 387 (V.I. 2009) (quoting Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 112 F.3d 1283, 1288 (5th Cir. 1997)). As this Court has previously explained, the failure of a Superior Court judge to issue a ruling in a timely manner may rise to the level of a breach of a ministerial duty: Because “the manner in which a court disposes of cases on its docket is within its discretion,” a trial court's delay in ruling on a motion will generally not warrant mandamus relief. In re Robinson, 336 Fed. Appx. 171, 172 (3d Cir. 2009). “Nonetheless, mandamus may be warranted when a [trial] [c]ourt’s ‘undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir.1982)). In other words, “[w]hile it is a basic premise that an appellate court lacks the power to compel a trial judge to do a particular act involving or requiring discretion on his part, this Court is empowered to order a trial judge to exercise his discretion in some manner.” O’Donniley v. Golden, 860 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. App. 1993). In re Elliot, 54 V.I. 423, 429 (2010). This Court has already held that the failure of a Superior Court judge to take substantive action for 18 months or longer may constitute a breach of the ministerial duty to issue a ruling in a timely manner. See In re Riley, 2024 VI 1U; In re Gillette, 64 V.I. 440, 444 (V.I. 2016); Fleming, 56 V.I. at 466; Elliot, 54 V.I. at 430-31. We recognize, of course, that in certain circumstances such a lengthy delay may be excused if there is a legitimate reason for the delay, such as when the parties file “a flurry of complex or frivolous motions.” Fleming, 56 V.I. at 466. Here, the parties certainly filed numerous motions in the case; this, however, cannot excuse the complete failure of the Nominal Respondent to issue any order at all for nearly five years. This is particularly true when, as here, the parties have designated specific motions—most notably the summary judgment motions—as important and advised that their disposition may resolve not just the instant proceeding but the New Hampshire case as well. In re Paul M. Montrone Trust 2024 VI 3U S. Ct. Civ. No. 2020-0115 Opinion of the Court We also agree with the Petitioners that they lack any other adequate means of obtaining the relief sought other than mandamus relief from this Court. The breach of ministerial duty that the Petitioners alleges—a failure to rule—is one that this Court cannot review on direct appeal, given that the Nominal Respondent’s continued failure to rule precludes entry of an appealable final judgment. Fleming, 56 V.I. at 466 (citing Elliot, 54 V.I. at 425). And because the Nominal Respondent has not issued any order for nearly five years, despite the filing of multiple motions requesting a hearing, there are no practical avenues for attaining relief that have been untried. See In re People of the V.I., 55 V.I. 851, 858 (V.I. 2011). Finally, we conclude that issuance of a writ of mandamus is appropriate under the circumstances. “To determine whether a writ of mandamus is appropriate under the circumstances, we consider factors including, but not limited to, the public interest, the importance or unimportance of the question presented, and equity and justice.” In re People, 51 V.I. at 393 (collecting cases). The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to a speedy trial even in civil cases. United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. 555, 564 (1983). Moreover, the complete failure of courts to rule on dispositive motions for years necessarily causes the public to lose confidence in the Judicial Branch and its ability to dispense fair and impartial justice in a timely manner. In addition, “ensuring comity between courts” is a “serious” interest, see Simon v. Joseph, 59 V.I. 611, 629 (V.I. 2013), and the failure to issue rulings on the summary judgment and other critical motions impairs the ability of the New Hampshire circuit court to conclude the case before it. Consequently, granting mandamus relief in this se would not simply further the Petitioners’ private interests, but would “assist[] in the administration of justice.” Elliot, 54 V.I. at 432. In re Paul M. Montrone Trust 2024 VI 3U S. Ct. Civ. No. 2020-0115 Opinion of the Court III. CONCLUSION We find that the Petitioners have a clear and indisputable right to have the Nominal Respondent rule on the pending motions in the underlying civil case since we cannot find any legitimate excuse for the years of inaction. Furthermore, the Petitioners lack an adequate alternate means of obtaining redress. Accordingly, since the public interest and other considerations strongly support mandamus relief, this Court shall issue a writ of mandamus directing the Nominal Respondent to issue rulings on the summary judgment motions and all other dispositive motions within 60 days of the date of this Opinion or take other meaningful action to further the disposition of the Montrone case in that period. Dated this 30th day of September, 2024. ATTEST: VERONICA J. HANDY, ESQ. Clerk of the Court By: /s/ Reisha Corneiro Deputy Clerk II Dated: September 30, 2024