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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 25x1C10b Next 11 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Pe avato mow Warr/alelares tener n tour aware March 1973 THE PANAMA CANAL ISSUE: FACT SHEET Background of Treaty Negotiations The United States operates, maintains and defends the Panama Canal under the terms of the Treaty of 1903, as amended in 1936 and 1955. This agreement granted in perpetuity "'all the rights, power and authority...which the U.S. would exercise if it were sovereign" in the Canal Zone. This aspect of the treaty has long been an emotional issue in Panama and an irritant in U.S. - Panama relations. The riots in Panama of January 1964 brought to a head this long-standing dissatisfaction and caused Panama to break diplomatic relations with the U.S. Less than four moths later, in April 1964, relations were reestablished and negotiations were undertaken to revise the treaty relationship. Three draft treaties were negotiated between 1964 and 1967. In part they would provide for the U.S. to relinquish its sovereighty over the Zone, for operation of the canal by a U.S. - Panamanian authority, for increased payments to Panama to come from tolls revenue and for political integration of the Zone with Panama. Another major provision would give the U.S. an option to build a new, larger, sea-level canal in Panama, and other pro- visions dealt with defense arrangements. Ratification of these treaties was pending when, in 1970, the Torrijos government formally rejected them. In October 1970, after a meeting between President Nixon and President Lakas of Panama, the White House reiterated that the U.S. was ready to discuss treaty relations whenever Panama was ready. These discussions began in late June 1971 and came to a standstill in March 1972. Importance of the Canal to Panama The canal is a prime source of revenue to Panama: approximately one-third of Panama's GNP (almost one billion dollars) is attributable to the canal, the Zone and other U.S. installations; almost fifty per cent of Panama's foreign exchange carnings from exports of goods and services derives from direct payments from these Same sources; nearly one-third of Panama's employment is attributable to the canal: Panama's per capita income of almost $700 iS the highest in Central America and-the fourth highest in Latin America. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Importance of the Canal to the U.S. As one of the world's most strategic waterways, it has been of vital importance to U.S. national defense. It has been used for rapid and flexible deployment of military forces and for accelerated transport of vital raw materials and military supplies. U.S. flag vessels make up more than one-sixth of the canal's commercial traffic and more than 70 per cent annually of all trans-Isthmian traffic either originates or terminates in U.S. ports. Panama Treaty Objectives Panama seeks categorical territorial sovereignty and legal jurisdiction over various activities in the Canal Zone. It also seeks substantial increase in its share of canal profits, as well as greater indirect benefits through the opening of the Canal Zone to Panamanian commerical enterprise, increased use of Panamanian products and services in the canal operation and employment of more Panamanian citizens at key managerial levels. U.S. Treaty Objectives The U.S. seeks continued control and defense of the canal under a treaty arrangement that will include: the right to administer , operate and defend the canal for an extended period of time; Clear provisions which would permit the expansion of the capacity of the canal to meet international shipping needs, either by the addition of third locks for the present canal or the con- struction of a second, sea-level canal; a treaty-binding guarantee that the canal will remain permanently open to all world shipping at reasonable tolls on a non-discriminatory basis; due consideration for U.S. security interests in negotiating the duration of a new treaty. 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 12 June 1972 A Modern Treaty for the Panama Canal Address by Ambassador David H. Ward} The story of the Panama Canal is well known to Americans, and it is one in which ! we rightly take considerable pride. The canal enabled ships to reduce the length of their voyages, sometimes by as much as 8,000 “miles, thereby appealing to our liking for ‘efficiency. Patriots were equally pleased by the construction episode. We conquered the jungle and the mosquito, where the French company had lost a fortune and 22,000 lives. The canal enterprise was, and remains, unique. While it affords us special benefits, it likewise presents special problems of a po- | litical nature. These problems must be ad- dressed constructively if a sound relationship with Panama is to continue and if we wish to keep alive the possibility of building a new canal in Panama in later years.. We would be unwise, and do not wish, to ignore legitimate nationalist aspirations in Latin America. For these reasons we are negotiating a new treaty with Panama. Any discussion of the problems we face today must begin, but by no means end, with a discussion of the convention of 1903. This treaty, although amended and reaffirmed in 1936 and 1955, governs the U.S. presence in Panama much as it did when the canal opened in 1914. The treaty is 69 years old, and no one need be reminded of the great changes in the 2Made before the Pan American Council at Chi- cago, Ill, on May 12 (press release 115). Ambassa- dor Ward is Special Representative of the United Pa for Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations. world generally, and in Latin America in particular, that have taken place since that time. In 1903, because of various problems a including those concerning health and sani- tation, it was judged necessary for the United States to hold a 10-mile-wide zone under its control for construction and opera- tion of the canal. Accordingly, the 1908 treaty provides that the United States can Zone it would possess if it were the sovereign and can exercise these rights in perpetuity. The treaty thus stops short of an explicit grant of sovereignty to the United States. The builders of the canal set out to create a community with the necessary government services and utilities in which the large labor force could live and work in good health and good order. This task was accomplished as part of the process of building the canal, and that community exists today. At present, we have the necessary stores, housing, power and water facilities, courts, police, post of- fices, schools, hospitals, and the like, all under U.S. ownership. The Canal Zone is thus in many ways in- ..-" dependent of Panama and outside of its legal control. This fact has caused friction with Panama. The physical aspects of the zone have also been a cause of difficulty. The zone bisects Panama, adjoins Panama’s two larg- est cities, Panama City and Coldn, and occu- pies land that Panama would like to use for urban expansion. The two deepwater ports of Panama are in the zone, and travelers from pproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 4 st dawned Bids ie tes an ti nate nner ara chee mT \ ! at exercise all rights and powers in the Canal J : | up A Ld 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : western Panama must pass through the zone to reach Panama City, which they are of course free to do. Panama is paid an annual annuity of about $2 million for the canal and received in- directly, through U.S. purchases and pay- ment of wages to Panamanians, about $167 million in 1971. This is about 65 percent of Panama’s total foreign exchange earnings and the basis for about 35 percent of its gross national product. The direct payment is con- sidered inadequate by Panama on the ground, among others, that tolls, which have never been raised, could be increased to finance a much greater payment. Canal Zone operations today are under the overall supervision of the Secretary of the Army. A major general in the Army Corps of Engineers serves in the zone in a civilian capacity as Governor of the zone and Presi- dent of the Canal Company. He is responsible . for the governmental functions in the zone, the operation of the canal, the management of the housing and commercial services pro- vided for the employees of the company, and the like. A U.S. court and a U.S. attorney also operate in the zone, About 12,000 Panamanians and 4,000 Americans work for the canal operation. Ap- proximately 7,500 Panamanians and 40,000 Americans live in the zone, and residence therein is limited to U.S. Government person- nel and their families. About 13,000 of the Americans are military personnel stationed in the zone, and they and their families share the schools and hospitals run by the Canal Company. This is the present situation. Panama be- lieves it to be outdated and is pressing for the right to govern the zone, for an end to the provision whereby the U.S. rights continue in perpetuity, for full ownership of a good part of the lands in the zone, for a greatly increased annuity, and for certain limitations on U.S. military rights. Panama is not, how- ever, seeking the right to operate the canal. These matters have been under discussion for some years, and in 1967 negotiators of CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001 -7 the United States and Panama reached agree-_ ment upon three draft treaties to replace the 1903 treaty. These treaties were never rati- fied by Panama and were consequently never submitted to the U.S. Senate. In 1971 negotiations resumed, and since the 1967 draft treaties were formally re- jected by Panama, a new basis for agrée- ment is being sought. , Broad Principles for Hemisphere Relations Before reviewing the approach which the United States is taking to some of the specif- . ic problems presented by the negotiations, it is worth noting that the Panama Canal, al- though in many respects unique, is not an isolated foreign policy problem. Instead the U.S. approach to the negotiations springs from broader principles which we apply to Panama generally and to our other relations in the inter-American system and in ‘the world. President Nixon, in this year’s foreign policy report to Congress, recognized that al- though our relations within the hemisphere have a special durability, it is time to lay the basis for a more mature political relation- ship.? He stated: “Henceforth a sense of hemisphere-wide community (can) be sus- tained only on a new, more realistic basis.” His report also observes that the problems in our Latin American relationships are ba- sically political and that the hemisphere is composed of nations increasingly assertive of their individual identities and less amenable to U.S. tutelage than in the past. Hence our policy is to eschew efforts to dominate and - instead seek a mature partnership with Latin American nations, recognizing the limits on our ability to solve every problem that arises in the hemisphere. This policy is exemplified by four major themes laid down by the Presi- dent. These find expression in our policy con- *The complete text of President Nixon's foreign policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9 appears in the BULLETIN of Mar. 13, 1972; the section entitled “Latin America” begins on p. 958. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 at poet cerning the Panama Canal enterprise and Panama generally, and are as follows: -—First, a wider sharing of ideas and re- sponsibility in hemispheric collaboration. —Second, a mature U.S. response to politi- cal diversity and nationalism. ——Third, a practical and concrete U.S. con- tribution to economic and social development. ——Fourth, a humanitarian concern for the quality of life in the hemisphere. These broad principles of course require sharpening in the specific case. In particular, a careful assessment of our national interest in the canal must be a primary guide to the course of action to be followed. Traffic pass- ing through the canal continues to increase, and the U.S. portion of this traffic has been rising in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total. In 1970, 14 percent of total U.S. -oceanborne trade passed through the canal, as compared with 10 percent in 1950. The canal is also of considerable military signifi- cance and is used by all but our largest naval ships and for logistical purposes. Our most important national interest in the canal en- terprise is thus to insure that the canal re- mains available for our commercial and naval shipping. Panamanian Aspirations and ULS. Interests With these general and specific concerns in mind, the President has determined that a great deal can be done to meet legitimate Panamanian aspirations without jeopardy to our national interest in the canal. Referring again to the four themes of our Latin American policy, the first theme—a wider sharing of responsibility—is exempli- fied by the agreement of the United States to the assumption by Panama of greater and greater responsibility for the civil govern- ment of the Canal Zone. Supporting services _ such as grocery stores and restaurants would - be operated in the zone by Panamanian en- treprencurs, and Panama would make use of zone Jands in ways consistent with U.S. re- sponsibility for operation and defense of the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 canal. Panama would also play a greater role « in defense of the canal. The second point—a mature response to . nationalism—is also met by the proposed changes just mentioned and by our agree- ment to set a date in the next century when Panama would have an option to terminate the treaty if a satisfactory new arrangement could not then be negotiated. This will end the perpetuity provision, which has been 4 substantial cause of dispute over the years. Treaty provisions to insure the continued right of the United States to make use of the canal would of course survive any such termination. The third theme—a concrete contribution to economic and social development—is ex-— emplified by our willingness to turn over to Panama substantial zone land and port facilities which are no longer needed for operation or defense of the canal, to open up certain retained lands to Panamanian de-. velopment, and to raise the level of com-— pensation to Panama by a_ substantial amount. The fourth point—a concern for the qual- ity of life in the hemisphere—is served by almost all of the changes that we have pro- posed to make and by the new relationship which will result from a new treaty. The United States has, as does Panama, certain affirmative requirements of its own in the new relationship, and these spring generally from the national interest in the canal mentioned earlier. It is our position that a U.S. Government agency will continue the functions necessary to the actual oper- ation of the canal and the conduct of govern- mental activities that will eventually be assumed by the Government of Panama. Tolls would remain under the control of Congress. The transition from a U.S. government in the zone to one that is generally Panamanian should be an orderly and deliberate one, and , rights necessary to an effective operation of | the canal will be needed. The United States . must also retain the right to defend the canal. This will require the continued maintenance of military forces in the vicinity of the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001 -7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : canal. Finally, we seek a definitive option either to expand the existing canal by the construction of a new and larger lane of locks or to build a sea-level canal in Pan- ama. Further explanation of this latter point is appropriate. Future Increases in Facilities In 1970 the Presidential Commission head- ed by former Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson, who has since 1964 also been the chief negotiator in Panama treaty matters, concluded that the best site for a sea-level canal in Central America was about 10 miles west of the present canal. This site is outside the present Canal Zone, and new treaty rights would be required. The Commission recommended that a decision on the $3 billion canal be made at a date sometime in the fu- ture when the existing canal begins to show signs of becoming overburdened. The canal would have an initial capacity of 34,000 transits per year and could be expanded to accommodate in excess of 100,000 transits. This compares with the current annual usage of 14,000 transits and with the maximum capacity for the present canal of 26,000 tran- sits. The Commission recognized that the great cost of the canal might make full amor- tization of its expense impossible but con- cluded that it had considerable political and military advantages. There has been much discussion of danger to the ecology from a sea-level canal. The Commission concluded that the risk of ad- verse ecological consequences appeared to be acceptable but stated that long-term studies were needed and that tentative provisions should be made for a freshwater barrier in the midsection of the sea-level canal. Another possibility is expansion of the ex- isting canal by the addition of a third lane of larger locks. It appears unlikely, however, that this need to expand capacity will become pressing until around the end of this century. There is some concern on the part of the Government of Panama that construction of a sea-level canal would create serious eco- nomic dislocations—a long period of inflation Approved For Release 4999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A4000200070001-7 CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 during construction, followed by a drastic decline in employment and business activity in general when construction terminates and lock canal jobs are eliminated in the change- over to the sea-level canal. An exhaustive study of the potential eco- nomic impact of a sea-level canal by the Stanford Research Institute in 1969 con- cluded that this problem of adjustment is one of manageable proportions. Over the long run a sea-level canal would attract more traffic than the existing canal, and the phasedown in employment would thereby be lessened. The institute concluded that after the adjust- ment. period the growth of Panama’s econ- omy would continue at a higher level than would be true had the sea-level canal never been built. The sea-level canal would thus be a new and expanded facility to replace a lotk canal that will eventually become obsolete. When it is considered that more than a third of Panama’s gross national product flows from canal operations it is readily apparent why the creation of a new canal, with greater capacity, will be a tremendous long-term ben- efit to Panama. Our approach to our treaty relationship with Panama thus reflects the constructive and forthcoming attitude that the United States has taken toward Panama in other matters. Panama has long been one of the highest per capita recipients of U.S. develop- ment assistance in the hemisphere, and this assistance, together with benefits from Canal Zone goods and services, has helped sustain a record of economic growth over the past decade that is one of the highest in Latin America. Congress has recently increased Panama’s sugar quota and has provided $90 million in loans and grants for the construc- tion of the Pan American Highway through the Darien Gap. Both through our treaty policy and in these other programs the United States has sought to foster a relationship in which the proc- esses of change and national development can take place in an atmosphere of mutual respect and cooperation. We seek a mature and reasonable partnership with Panama sat THE SUN 18 February 1973 which will endure for the benefit of both par- | ties and world commerce. We recognize Pan- | ama’s aspirations to play a greater role in canal affairs and to assume responsibility Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 for the government of the Canal Zone. At _the same time we seek full recognition by Panama of the national interest of the United States in the reliable, safe, and effi- cient operation of the Panama Canal. U.o. and its clients: The U.N. will look. at the Canal iw LOURS TALASZ The new U.S. ambassador to the U.N,, John A. Scali, scheduled to present his. eredentials Tuesday, won't even have ‘imé to warm up the chair vacated by, George Bush before the hottest political — ootato seen here in years lands in his ‘ap. This is going to be a special six-day _ Seeurity Council session in mid-March ° a Panama City, designed by the Pana-— ‘nanians to put pressure on Washington” ‘or 2 new Canal Zone treaty. ‘the ostensible purpose of the meeting, ss deserihed by the Panamanian foreign aidister, Juan Antonio Tact, is “a con -‘deration of measures for the strength- ‘sp of international peace and secu- ity and the promotion of international ‘operation in Latin America.” In plain- “+ words, the invitation to the ULN.’S -sogt important body is to permit the ‘afin Americans an airing of their var- ‘wus complaints against the United » ates. Pressure ou U.S. “A Security Council meeting should W be conceived as a Means for bring- qi pressure on bilateral issues.” Mr. ash warned in the course of the Secu- y- Council meeting that approved of 3} Panamanian request for the special ssion, What he did not say, but U.S. gsion people admit in private, is that is type of pressure could only prove Phe only consolation for Americens tking in the U.S. mission here is con ated with the new Cuban-American hi- king agreement. Pcople here believe 4, President Nixon’s contention not- chstanding, this deal is only an Intro- ction to further changes in U.S. rela-. ag with Castro's Cuba, And if that is : ease, the Cubans will not be too eager exploit the anti-U.S. propaganda field Panama City. In fact, sources familiar h‘Latin American developments in the Ye speak of backedoor Cuban hints ht from the beginning that the. Pan- iw move had never.really been to Ha- na’s liking, =; ‘ The Panamanian project was carefully, “pared and exquisitely timed: The incil session will take place during only month when Panama’s ambas- lor to the U.N., Aquillino FE. Boyd, is ssident of the counajl. 3 Vhat the Panamanians will say was ide clear by Ambassador Boyd as f@ as nine years ago when, at the ie of the Canal Zone “flag riots,” he, . ke in a Security Council ‘session ” Ned to tackle the crisis. “The Ameri-- t-population [In the Canal Zone] has vays been characterized by its hostil-- -ctoward the nation and people of nama,” he cried, adding that “North nericans living in the Canal Zone lieve it is a fief of their own whict ac be handed down indefinitely from thers to sons, and who have a com- i spheric -countries - that fone... | Divides the country ‘for was he less indignant recently en he complained that the zone :.a real enclave which is foreign to + national jurisdiction and which di- les our territory into two parts,” thus sating “‘a dangerous and potentially dosive situation.” 3ven though the “Zonians”—~as Amer- ‘ns living in the. semi-exterritorial xa of the canal are calied—are known: for their discriminatory attitude toward * Panamanians and though there is a gencrally shared feeling here that the granting of a truly equitable new Canal Zone treaty by Washington has long been overdue, Mr. Bush valiantly . defended the process of ‘‘active bilateral negotiations” presumably in progress , between the U.S. and Panama and re- ,; futed the charge that the zone would be ; “a colonialist enclave.” : . Nevertheless, the echo of charges of ,, U.S. colonialism is likely to be loud in a Security Council whose composition this . year is the least friendly toward the ; United States in the history ‘of. thé ; United Nations. © : Most nations against U.S. The two Latin American countries on : _ the council, Panama and Peru, will not i only be joined. by most other hemi- : undoubtedly ; te RAB RYEG dr Reldage 199908702 "CARD P79-01 19ANHOOFOARTANEN ZT vie, Macs 5 gry Congress. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 support of the couneil’s African and Asian. members—Guinea, the Sudan, Kenya, India and, perhaps with less fervor, Indonesia. Likely Soviet and Chi- nese reactions do not leave much to imagination, while the Yugoslavs are fully expected to align themselves with the most fiery line the Third World could offer. The Austrians have. already made clear that their overall posture is that of lolal neutrality, Even though the | Australians’ have lately been making friendlier noises. toward Washington, -their support of the U.S. is no likely to be wholehearted under the new, leftist . Whitlam government. Thus the U.S. can only count on the support of Britain, and to a much lesser degree, on that of France. ; This picture is so potentially explosive that many Latin American delegates are . having private doubts about the advisa- bility of the whole idea, even though their group, speaking through the Co- lombian ambassador, Augusto Espinosa, formally expressed ‘sympathy and soli- darity” with the Panamanian request and unanimously agreed to support it. “So far we.only agreed to support the request for a special Security Council © meeting,’ said the Argentinian ambas- sador, Ortiz de Rozas, adding that there was no overall Latin American under- ‘standing about’ the specifies of the ses-. sion due in March. / ; This Latin American caution was un- derlined in a tacit way by the Peruvian ambassador, Javier Perez Cuellar, who, while representing one of Latin Ameri- ca’s “progressive’’—that is, new leftist —governments, nevertheless restricted himsclf to the contention that a Security Council session in Latin America “is not. a matter of disturbing the action of the regional organ.” OAS was omitted The reference was to the fact that the Ponamanian idea had not been pro- moted through the Organization — of American States whose headquarters —is in Washington and of which, of course, the United States is the most important member. — nee Ambassador Boyd does not kcep it secret that the omission of the OAS was . intentional, “The ‘realpolitik’ sense of Latin America did not recommend it ‘to Panama to present its case to the OAS, and we tried to avoid this channel,” he said in an interview. What he meant was rather plain: Since a Panamanian request would have been blocked by Washington in the OAS, he simply avoided going through it. “New York is 230 miles from Washington,” chuckled Mr. Boyd. “Just imagine how tt would be if OAS headquarters were in Paname City,” he added. In fact, one of the formal U.S. argu- ments against the Panamanian project is based on this avoidance of the GAS, which “represents a slap in the face of ‘Chapter 8 of the U.N. Charter,” regulat- ing regional arrangements, as one U.S. source remarked. Comparison is made with the Security Council’s special ses-, Sion last year in Africa in Addis Ababa, ° which had been arranged through that ‘continent's regional body, the Organiza- tion of African Unity. Keeping the lid on A Security Council committee set up. to deal with meetings away from head- quarters went into a two-week closed huddle right after the formal approval of the Panama City project to discuss and draw up the specific agenda’ that: should govern the forthcoming session. Latin American diplomats, working with. _their colleagues from other lands, are: ‘trying to sort out the many subjects that. they would, and the others they would not, like to talk about. The general hope is that by some kind of understanding the lid could be kept on and the explo- sive session gotten over with ‘so that U.S.-Latin American relations would not suffer a serious setback. Whether such a bottling up could be “ safely engineered is another question, and ‘many people here, aware of both: the Latin’ American complaints and emotionalism, doubt that it could. © As Ambassador Bush already pointed out ‘the prospect of the (Security Coun- cill meeting is stimulating a heated propaganda campaign in Panama.” If such ‘a heated atmosphere compels the Panamanian spokesmen to put of a | good show -for the benefit of the home audience ‘to get a kind of cmatianal satisfaction out of the tight-fisted Yan- kees, it is more than problematical whether representatives of other Latin American countries, nursing a great variety of hurts, both real and imagina- ' tive, could afford not to follow suit. Chats with ‘Latin American sourcés even on the most cursory examination’ ‘reveal a bewllderinig variety: of com- plaints. Some of these deal with directly “colonial” type of problems and. are certain to receive full African: and {ten- erally Third World sympathy. Thus, - are certain about is Venezuela could complain about the still ‘ colonial’ Dutch and French Guyanas; © _ Guatemala about British Honduras; Ar-+ gentina about the British Falkland Is- lands, or the black independent Carib. ~ bean countries about the French ter- ritories, The French can anyway be sure of coming under fire for their atomie om x tests. in the Pacific by the Andean ° seaboard nations of South America, * while the Soviet Union would probably be scored for: its refusal to ratify a Latin American denuclearization treaty. A most damaging accusation may be brought up by the Panamanians them- | _ Selves, who mutter that the U.S. ig . clandestinely transporting atomic weap- ons through the Panama Canal~—an ac- ; tion specifically prohibited by the treaty which it has ratified. ’ Control over natural resources But perhaps the most bothersome as- ~ “pect of a runaway council session in Panama, at least in U.S.-hemispheric : relations, would concern the Latin Amer-- jean claim for permanent soverensity . over natural resources, This is the cus- tomary U.N. jargon for charges of cco- nomic, “neocolonialist”’ exploitation ta which the Latin, Americans claim they are subjected at the hands of An-erican private companies. Chile’s President Salvador Allende already gave a food taste of this problem to the Generai Assembly last fall when he addressed it during his short New York stay in December, when he accused it and Kennicott Copper with both subversion and capitalistic exploitation, Such charges are likely to be joined * by Peru and Ecuador, who would voice their claims for national sovercignty _ over 200 miles of the coastal waters to protect their main food supply against alleged exhaustion by the American fishing fleet. And if, despite the hijacking deal, Cuba were in, lalking about {he U.S. mill- tary base on its soil in Guantanamo, or demanding independence for Puerto. Rico and the Virgin Islands from Amer- ican colonialism, the fur will really fly. These are the rather awesome pros- ‘pects of a special Security Council ses- * sion in Panama next March. It is impos- sible to gauge the political residues of the encounter and the impact it. may: wind up having on U.S,-hemispherie relations. The only thing observers here: that the show will be worth watching, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : C1A-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Il Globo Rome, 10 January 1973 Pittermann: The Dialogue between Socialists and Communists Plays into Soviet Hands Dr. Bruno Pittermann, President of the Socialist International, yesterday attacked the Kremlin for having suppressed political parties in communist bloc countries while appearing to promote _ socialist-commumist fronts in the West, as in the case of France, In his end-of-the-year speech regarding relationships between communism and socialism, Pittermann declared that "In the Soviet press, a dialogue is encouraged. The Socialist International has left to the individual parties the free choice of deciding if and with which communist parties they want to carry out such discussions, since these discussions are possible only in democratic countries, where the communist parties enjoy the same rights as the others." "In the countries whére only the commmist parties are in control there can be no discussion between the communist parties ‘ and the social democratic parties because the adherents of democratic socialism are oppressed and persecuted as enemies of the Statc. This situation makes unbelievable all communist statements that they grant legal equality to social democratic parties to represent the workers’ interests." _ "As long as this right is not also recognized in the countries under communist domination, this statement, which applies to democratic areas, can only be interpreted to mean that communists recognize the legal equality of democratic socialism only where they do not have the strength to rule unilaterally." Pittermann continued "If the CPSU allows the French Communist Party and other communist parties to pronounce themselves in favor of the multi-party democratic system, while in the USSR and allied countries the domination of the communist party alone is maintained, either the ideological base of the conmunist partics will no longer be shared, © or such statements are considered by the CPSU as tactics to facilitate the transition to the Soviet system." "Certainly, despite the differences in the political systems (recognition of the legal equality of parties in democratic countries and refusal to recognize this equality in the countries dominated by the communists), situations develop in which, even though the departure points differ, they lead to analogous conclusions: such as demands that the Vietnam war end or for the convocation of a European security conference." - "The differences in viewpoint", Pittermann added, "show up in Approved For Reléase 1989/05/03" CIRREP78-O1ISsA co 200 7687 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 of man and the sovereignty of all European states in particular. Here the USSR could provide convincing proof of the credibility of its” intentions, if it were to put an end to the occupation of Czechoslovakia. They remain incredible if the Soviets look for a scapegoat for a mistaken decision (Shclést) but continued to support the results of the mistaken policy. They remain non-credible if they recognize the legal equality of democratic socialism only where they do not at present have the power to impose a communist monopoly, but maintain it with an iron hand where they have such power." Pittermann: il dialogo: socialisti-comunisti fa il gioco sovietico Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 VIENNA, 9. — Ni dr. Bruno Pittermann, presidente dell'« In- ternazlonale Socialista », ha at- taccato feri.}l Cremlino per ave- re soppresso | partltl polilici nel . Paesi del blocco comunista men- tre sembra voler favorire fronti saclaleomunisti in Occidente, co- me avviene in Francia. Nella sua relazione di fine an- no sui rapporti fra comunismo e socialismo, Pitlermann dichiara che cnella stampa dell"URSS si invila alla discussione, L’inter- nazionale socialista ha lasciato ai propri partiti libera facolta di decidere se e con quali nartili comupistl voglinna condurre La: Yo discusaoal, potehd questa dl- scusdion! sono posibill soltante nei Paes! democraticl, dove 4 partiti comunisti hanno gli stes- | i diritti degli altri, Nei Paes! dove dominano i so- li partiti comunisti non pud esi- stero alcuna discussione tra par- titL comunisti e socialdemocra- ticl, poiché j fautori del socia- lismo democratico vengono op- pressi ¢ perseguitati come nemi- ci dello stato. Questa siluazio ~ ne rende non crebili tutte le dichiarazioni di parte comunil- sta, secondo cui 1 comunisti con- eedono l'uguaglianzn giuridica al partiti del socialismo democra- tico nella rappresentanzg degli interessi dei lavoratori, Sino a quando cid non verra riconosciuto anche nei Paesi po- sti sotto dominazione comunista, questa dichfarazione, che - vale per l'ambito della democrazta. pud essere intesa sollanto nol acnso che {| comunisti ricono- scono l'uguagianza giuridicn del seclalismo demecratico soltanto dove non hanno la forza di do- minare da soli», «Se i] PCUS -- ha continuate Pittermann -— permette al par- tito comunista francese e ad _al- tri partiti comunisti di profes. - sarsi per H sistema democrati- a di pid partiti, mentre_nel- e nei suoi Paesj alleati, viene mantenuta Ja- dominazio- ne del parlito unico comunista, allora, o la base idcologica def partiti comunisti_ non é pid co- mune, oppure tall dichiarazioni yengono considerate dal PCUS come manovre per facilitare il _passagdio al sistema sovictico ». «Certo, nonostante la diversl- t& dei sistemi (riconoscimento dell'uguagtanza = giuridica net Paesi democratict @ riflute di ricanoscere queatn udiiagtianza bet Paes! domtnath dat comuni- ali), si manifestano situaziont, in cui, pur essendo differenti 4 punti di partenza, vengono trat- te conclusion{ analoghe: come per la richiesta della fine della guerra nel Vietnam, o per la econvocazione dj una conferenza sulla sicurezza cttropea, differenze dei punti di vi- sta — ha detto ancora Pitler- mann — risultano nell'esecuzio- he, come, per esempio per quan- to concerne i] rispetto dei di- ritti dell’uomo e specialmente la sovranita di tutti gli stati euro- pei. Qui I'URSS potrebbe forni- re una prova convincente della eredibilitd delle sue intenziom, se ponesse fine all’occupazione ’ della Cecoslovacchia, Sj rimane non credibili se si cerca un ca- pro espiatorio per una decisione ‘sbagliata (Scelest: n.dir.) ma si continua q mantencre i risultall della politica: shagliata, Si ri- mane non ercdibill se si rico‘ nosce l'uguaglianza gluridica del sociallsmo democratica soltanto dove attualmente non si ha In forza di imporre ii monopolio del comunismo, ma lo si man tiene ferreamente dove se no ha la forza, a r NEW YORK TIMES 30 January 1973 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Western communists embarrassed - by letter ef jailed Czech’s wite By Richard Davy A challensing Iletrer from Czechoslovakia to the world communist movement has been distributed by Australian com- munists after the West European partics shied away fram it. Only the British Communist Party mentioned it briefly in the Morning Star on December 5. The Jeter is from Mrs Anna Sabatova, wife of Dr Jaroslav Sabata,.a leading Czechoslovak theoretician of the Dubcck re- farm period of 1968. Inthe wave of trials Jast year he was sen- tenced to.six and a half years’ imprisommnent. It is an-important letter and could) embarrass the Treuch Communist Party in the March elections. Apart from cxposing details of the trials and the sup- pression of dissent in Czcchosio- vakia it calls For a forny of com- ‘munism in which democratic rights would be assured not only for the working classes but itso for other sections of the population, Professor Sabata, a communist since the ape of 19, stood by these ideasiat his trial, maintain- ing that Marxism must adapt to the conditions af advanced in- dustrial socicties. that it must be based on democratic principles, and that Marxists must be will- ing to work with non-Marxists even after the struggle for power, The ncn rt Hanne unwillingness of the French conmiunists, amoor athers, to publish the Ictter shows their reluctance to Dring these questions out inta the open and tn challenge the doctrines of the Soviet Union, thus casting some doubt on thetr commitmicnt to a democratic alliance with the Socialists. The letter says, in part: Dear Comrades, After careful consideration TI ant starting to write this Icticr a few hours after; ibe court passed sen- tence on the hist member of ay family, miy 2{-vear-old daughter Anna. She-bas been sentenced by the Brno regional court to tleee and {a half years in prison. enees on my other children and on | my husband are also unconditioned i fterms. of iniprisonment. The seit. - ti may perhaps seem strange (at an individuas Czechusfova yamap presuunes to adi: Buch vb diaper: tant forum as the central cominit- tees and the membership of com- maust and workers’ — parlies throughout the world. {1 have decided jon: this step because ino my country, C2echo- slovakia, there are no official quarters at the present tinie to grant mea hearing... - f have seen all my children put, in prison... . 1 find myself as a mother ina unique and exceptional situation. Therefore in these the most grievous moments of nv per- sonal life, I am guided iu what T do by my maternal feclings, my honour as a citizen and by the firin corviction which has led me for 25 years fo work for sacialism in the ranks of the Communist Party Tam anforlinately aware of the tomplicatious which way arise for me, despite alf the: proclamations | about internationalism, as a result of this public statement, Trisk the possibility that t too, may be arrested as a result of this act. IT have nothing to fose, bawever. ... Atv husband, Dr Jaroslav Sabata, a communist since fhe ane of 19, was head of the psvchology depart- ment at the jf. E. Purkyne Unt- versity, Brno, until Spring 1968, then until the autumn of 1968 sccre- tary of the Brno freprfonal party commiltec. Sater, until his arrest on November 20, 1971, he was em- ployed as an iron worker with the firm. Tavenyvesko - Prumyslove Stavby. He has been sentenced to six and a half years In prison. This university Ceacher---a com- munist beloved by his studenis-— who for 13 years also lectured at the university on Marxism-Lenin- ism and prepared many of his students far joining the party, has now heen nine months in detention uider condiions which, out of consideration for the present hold- ers of power in Czechoslovakia, I will not describe in’ detail. I wiS! say only that my husband, against doctor's ordecs (in 1964 he stffered infarct mvocardia, and a8 a result he suffers: from chronic inflammation of thea stomach atid duodenal ulcers), had to do heavy manual Jabour up :-to his arrest because he could get no other job. In prison in May, 1972, he had a heart attack... - In this fetter I should like to describe some of the circumstances that arose during the court hear- ines which 7 attended personally. The building where the court was guarded as if the men on were a gang: of hardencd ~~ sat trial criminals. Relatives and friends iad to shew their ideutes cards hoth in the public corridor of tie regional court and outside. The atmosphere around all the trials held in Prague and Broo in the Summer months was marked by un éndeaveur to keep the procecd- jngs as secret as possible, although they were officially announced as public trials. That foreign journalists were not admitted will be known to you. But you probably do not know that admission to these public trials was pranted Lo only one close relative of cach defendant... . In fornial matters the bench followed the rules ; the defendants could speak as they considered necessary. AU who have been on trial are sincere supporters of the socialise order. Dr Wolf, the chairman of the bench, said in bis speech stating ihe grounds .for the verdict: “ Neither the bench as a body nor any individual member has formed the opinion that the men here con victed were enemies of socialism.” Thar is to say that these comma- nists were condemned for lelding different political views, which, by wards of mouth and in writing, they made known among them- Selves and to-a few dozen others of similar political persuasion. ... * My husband himself wrote some theoretical papers, for instance the, material for discussion known as’ the “* Little Action Programnic ’’, in which he tried to find common’ ground between communists and those socialists who do not hold; Marx views hut support the! socialist order in Czechoslovakia. | I would also point out that the! “Little Action Programme *. ex- presstv states that the action af hationalizatinon in] February, 1948, Was a Nevessary mod just act about which there can be mo discussion. It is not trac that my husband or any af the convicted communists favoured bourgeois democracy. All to a man are unequivocal sup- porters of socialist democracy based on the interests of the broad- est masses and also controlled by the masses. My husband has always Stressed as a matter of principle the need for control from below, that is by the will of the people. Many communist and similar parties of the left, trade unions, and people of democratic, ‘anti- imperialist opinion throughout the world, are justifiably concerned , about the series of trials in Czecho- slovakia, T am convinced that the communst and workers’ parties, individual communists and Mars- ists, and all other advocates of socialism have an inalienable right mn . as ot va fa speak ont-con matters concern. ing, convicted communists, sectal- Ist. and other citizens. ‘Phe same ticht belongs to democratic public opinton in tbe world concerned with upholding basic Inman rights. Che international communist and workers” movement must find a common platfornt based on the substance and not on the super- Gcial aspects of events in Czecho- slovakia, In ihis connexion one Must ask : why fs the armed entry by night of the allied troops om ta the territory of Czechoslovakia denoted as “International ald nh while disagreement among many commupist and left-wing parties is regarded by our authoritics as in- terlerence in oun internal affairs, which, as distinct from " inter- national afd °. is something in- appropriate and undesirable, Why can the people of Czecho- stovakia Jearn nothing of these expressions of disagreement from the legal press in this country ? And © put a farther question : Why were these trials kept secret if they were justified ? Vinally & would add: not only: can the proicsts. of. communtst and left-wing organizations, inchuding antieimperialist public opinion, alter the lard fate of the Czecho.- slovak prisoners, I am convinced that now more than ever before it is the task of the day to work cut and clarify political questions ona higher theoretical level, within the communist and workers® movement itself. We need especially to clarify haw the power won by the working class is to he Implemented further in the socialist countries. In my view, it is not logical to arguc that these are issues solely concerning the parties foverning in countries where power has been won by the working class under the Ieadership of the communist parties, Tt. is essential that commuantst parties and heir allies in countries . where the bourgeoisie still rule should be given prospects that will make socialism attractive to other strata and groups of the population beside the working class. One cannot take use of allies only during the fight for power and the first phase of building socialist society. In the interests of the. world communfst movement they must be assured of all democratic tights also in the later period, that is in the stupe of socialist develop. . ment which Czechoslovakia, for example, has now reached : and Jn such a manner that these rights “wi be ecnuincely, not mercly tor- tnally, exercised. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 3 Approved For Release 4999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 THURGAUER ZEITUNG, Frauenfeld 6 December 1972 ‘PRAGUE RELEASES JAROMIR MASARYK TO AUSTRIA Exactly 7? months to the day after his forcible removal from. Austria to Czechoslovakia, Jaromir Masaryk was given permission by | the Prague authorities last weekend to leave for Austria. With this case, small, neutral Austria showed how fearless stubborness can pay off, even against a stronger communist neighbor state. ; Here are the antecedents: at the beginning of May of this year, Masaryk, an exiled Czech, drove from Vienna to the Austro-Czechoslovak border, to pick up his wife, a native of Eng- land, who had visited Masaryk's mother in Brno. He himself could not enter Czechoslovak territory. Masaryk went on foot to the no-man's land between the Austrian and Czechslovak border guards. When a car with numerous Czechoslovak soldiers appeared there, he ran back, but was shot and seriously wounded. Masaryk was able to drag himself back into Austrian territory, but he was pursued. by Czechoslovak border soldiers, knocked down, and brought back ,to Czechoslovak territory. Various protest notes from the Austrian government against ‘this serious infringement and demands for Masaryk's immediate re- ilease were not heeded by Prague. Party chief Husak even described ‘this clear case of violation of sovereignty and kidnapping as a “completely legal act," and spoke of a “provocation and insult ‘to the socialist system. “ Now Vienna got tough. The Austrian government resolved to ‘restrict relations with the CSSR to an “absolutely necessary mini~- mum." The following weeks and months showed that this was not just tactical lip service: visits by ministers which had been planned before were cancelled, diplomatic and other contacts were ‘boycotted. At trade fairs held in the CSSR, no official Austrian ‘representatives appeared, cultural events were cancelled, the sports activity between the two neighbors as much as came to a ‘complete standstill, even tourism was limited -- voluntarily by ‘many Austrians. Various attempts at “reconciliation” from Prague -were rejected with the stereotyped statement: first reparations for the kidnapping and border violation by unconditional release ‘of Masaryk. Now Prague has at last given in. The clear success of the ‘line of firm principle taken in this case by Austria is particular- ly valued in diplomatic circles in Vienna, since Masaryk was not ‘even an Austrian citizen, but an emigrant from the CSSR with a iforeign passport. -_ Before Masaryk left Vienna on Tuesday with his wife, to ‘return to their adopted country of South Africa, he wrote to thank the Austrian government. The Viennese foreign ministry says it is now satisfied: “Only now are we ready to normalize our rela- tions with the CSSR again." Approved For Release 1999/09/92 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 pen ee ciemangmet see 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 WASHINGTON POST 18 February 1973 MOoOsCOW—The Soviat Union. is entering a ‘critical poclod of bitter cold with In- adequate snow cover to pro- tact a delicate winter wheat. erop that the country necds for agticulural recovery. The yerr that Communist Party laader Leonid T.. Broshnev has called decisive for {he itve-year plan scems off to a bad ntart, i There was na snow cover at ali by Jan, 1 in the Tikraine and the. central Rorsien black earth resi, where most of the nations 68 million acres af winler grain is planted, They eould not even serape . together enouch snow in Moscow to provide the traditional trois Ka vides during “Russian Goes of Saw Peenerrare semne- rapa a REE Soviet team By Frank Crencau Anteeinied Preas — wintor” celebrations that Tiark tim year's tun. Lack of snow wasn’t so bad with the unseasonably wari temperatures of No- vember and Derember. But now temperatures all along . the grain belt are plunging to from 5 abave to 22 de- frees below zero--and only about. two imehes of snow has fatien.- Reports in provinelal pa- pers indicate that what snow has fallen was whipped off by high Winds. Farmeca wold like a good six inches of snuw to insulate the sprouted winter grain from killing frost And to provide moisture for next spring. Lack af snow cover plus penetralinge frosts last win- ter started the Soviet Union down (he road to the worst luevest sipnce:1969, Only 168 WASHINGTON POST 1 February, 1973 Li Poe rile ie AH MOSCOW, Jan. 3b (AP) — “Pravda said today thal lacka- daisival production of farm implements may jeopardize the crucial spring sowing and ‘announced dismissal of a top supply official for state’ discipline.” “violating acis of Machines Soviet Crop The spring field work is all {he more important (his year a disastrous fall good harvest. is waged not. only in the fields’. but in factovies and supply ‘organizations ag ‘well, It added that farmers will need 46000 ‘new tractorized sowers, 53.000 cultivators, 18, 500 fertilizer. spreaders and thousands” of other million tons of grain wera reaped, more than 20 million tons below plan. ; snow cowd yet Enough fall to hold the winter kill of grain to the normal 10 or 20 per cent. Last winter the ‘Russians had to reseed about one titivd of the erop. Winter grains normally ‘provide about 40 per cent of the Soviet grain crop. A ‘summer drought over vast -areas in 1972 seompleted what Soviet officials called. “once in a century” crop failure and Ied- to ‘purchase “of some $2 billion worth of — grain in the West, much of it from the United States. - In an effort to recoup, So. viet planners have set 1973 asricultural and grain tar- gets that most Western ex- perts consider unrealistic. because of harvest, which forced the So- viet Union-to buy nearly $2 Wheat Crop aces New Threat billion worth of grain, most of , it from the United States. Production of tractors andj fertilizer spreaders - is going i | 1 The 1973 plan ealls for a! 12.6 per cent imerease in gross agriculture produc tion, That follows two years in which tha percentage! showed a net deficit and compares with an annual average growth of 43 per” cent over 1971-78, : Yor grain this year, plan. ners call for 1974 million, tons, a figure never before. achieved and 10 million tons above the record harvest of: 1970. The planners need &. perfect year to achieve that goal. The chaog of the 1972 har vest and wheat weather set: back fall planning and best. estimates are that farmers planted. about 10 million acres Jess of winter eae than planned. and Riga, Pravda said, butl “the plan is jeopardized” by poor output of a factory in No- vosibirsk scheduled to pro duce 22,000 sowers this year. Tn a brief separate note on the back page, Pravda said a top supply official, Sergei V. had been re- “many Shevchenko, The Communist Party news- | paper observect ina front-page | article that “the strugele for a Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 fairly well at plants in Minsk, : ‘lieved of his post = for Kharkov, Chelyabinsk, Wee is picees of equipment for Vata ‘| Altai} “violating state discipline.” year’s spring planting. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER 13 February 1973 Erich Strauss, an expert on Soviet nericulture, on the latest grain. crisis (OB She ea Be A ey [ ierre ee We state of Soviet avriculture has 1 tain became a highly political subject. With rising living standards, consumers are clamouring for more ol the most valuable foods such as fruit and vegetables. ™meat, milk, butter, cheese and eggs, Following the dis tuissal of same important bul essenti- ally technical officials. the crisis has now elaimed the Minister of Agricul ture himself. The Minister, V. Vv. Maiskevich, was a veteran of many baliles im the past. Ue was .whrush- chev's) personal béfe noire and dis misced by hint in 1961, only to be reinstated within a few months of. Rhrushches’s fall. The fact that he has been replaced by D. Polvanski, a mem- her of the csoverning body of the Com swash parts, indieates Lhe Importance alfached by the top leadership to the sifuatiesy, : In the main European grain-growing areas of the Soviet Union a combina- fion of excessive winter frosts, summer drought and hart harvesting weather has cul wheat supplies and reduced the total grain harvest by 13 million fons below its 1971 Jevel which was ifself not particularly favourable. ‘The. Government was able to’ offset the whole shortfall in its home supplies by buying wheat on the world market but this depleted the Jarze siocks held in Canada and the United States and has had dramatic repercussions on world grain prices. The dollar price of American wheal in Rotterdam is more than half up on oa year ago, as dar as Britain is concerned. the inereuse was even slecncr because of the devaluation of sterling since June 1972. ‘The price of other types of erain, such as maize, has risen roughly in the same proportion, ; fn a country of the dimensions of the Seviet Union, with its extreme *eontinental’? climate, local crop failures are more the rule (han the exceplion, Usuaily they are olfset by under a h good harvests in other parts: cata. straphie conditions in all erain-crowing areas occur relatively rarely. The last time this happened was in 1963. Last year, the harvest suflered most in the main grain-growing areas of the Euro- pean Soviet Union and fairly good ctons vere obtained in Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Urals. The large fluctuations in weather con ditions and crops were one of the reasons why the Soviet planners chose five years as the time span for the original Five Year Plans, because good and bad harvests were expected to caneel ot over this period. Since the middle sixties, crop production targets have actually been set in the form of five-wear averages: in the plan period 1966-70. grain production just managed to beat its target of 167 milion tons for the period as a whole as the result of an exceptionally good crop in 1970. In the light of past experience. the targct for the current period 1971-5 was by no means over-ambitious: the average grain output of 194 million tons was about one sixth up on 1966-70, compared with an increase of well over a quarter between 1961-5 and 1966-70. As the crop in 1970 was 186 million tons, the target appeared well within reach. but £971 produced only 181 mil lion tons and last year's. official total was 168 million tons. With two years ‘out of five already cone. grain output during the next three years would have to average 209 million tons in order to fulfil the plan, This Inoks at the moment most unlikely. The last occasion when the Sovict Union fared a severe grain crisis was in £963. when output plummeted by “abnost a quarter to only 407} million tons, This disaster discrddited Khrushchev who was the acknowledged architect of the country’s agricultural reconstruction after the death of Stalin and contributed to his fall a year later. The immediate damage was minimised 2 by massive grain imports from. the. West but the expansion of livestock production was hampered for years: its 1962 level was not regained in total until 1965 and the national pis herd (which was most severely affected by the disaster) exceeded tts 1962 siza for the first time in 1971, The presen( setback is not nearty-so serious but Soviet agriculture still’ suffers from a relatively low volume of production per head of the population, generally accompanied by high cosis, periodical food diffienllies and Hniiled raw material supplies for important consumer industries, Th long years of neglect and exploifation af’ the land have created an enormous backlog of investment needs: during the past three years capital investment in aericniture was of tbe order of £22,000 millians, But output in 1971 was no higher than in 1970, and in 1972 it actually fell hy more than 4) per cent. Even though this was largely due to bad weather, it means that in spite of the inerease in capital investment Soviet azricullure remains far too dependent on a cans riclous and severe ¢limate. Yet. it is difficult to believe that the recent change of Ministers will lead (a a radical change in policies which have been pursued ever since Stalin's death twenty years ago. The Soviet Govern- Ment will probably continue to pour more resources into agriculture. even though the return may remain for some time depressingly low. In spite of the difficulties in the harvest field, supplics of most types of food through the public trade system (with the exception of vegetable off) have actu- ally gone up in 1972, though there is a substantial unsatisfied demand for some’ important foodstuffs. But the Soevict consumer, who has had to be patient for so long, will again have to accept jam tomorrow for some years longer than he could fairly have expected, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 9 February C Top Soviet e 7 pies _ ‘after last year's crop failure’ in Russia — has edged out heavy industry and. consumerism ‘ag the main. concert of Soviet : Approvittkak Relpaseck mad - BY Leo Giultow Staff correspondent of | The Christian Science Monitor, - : vr Miosdowd etonomists, : “Western obuervers placed the total cost of. : the harvest failure and its effect on the economy at 20 bu udu rubles ($24 billlon). This . id the equivalent of 1 ‘uble out of every 10 that wil be spent in Lhe Sovlet Union this yeari Now the weather threatens to repeat last. year’ 3 toll of the winter grain. High-ranking, Politburo member Dmitri 8. Polyansicy has’ been placed in charge of the Ministry of. Agriculture to’ cope ‘with the situation, ce ; : / : What steps can hé take? a ‘Goopraphy, weather, and sient account , for most of the trouble. Russia's population | ‘uded to be concentrated in a relatively fertile’: ‘wedge, narrowing from the. Ukraine and ‘Central European Russia toward the’ far tip Of the wedge at Vladivostok, . ji. | ‘This area produced prain surpluses when Russia had a smaller population to feed. But even this fertile region seemed subject to ‘drought at least once every decade, As the population increased, as it turned away from farming to Industry,, and as it spread into inhospitable northern areas (the Jatest: being the new Siberian oll and gas fields), it made greater food demands upon: the limited amount of fertile land in the south, Of all the many newly developed regions, hte one | —. the plaing of Kazakhstan in Central Asia — providell a substantial addi- [tion to the country's farniland. | ,Beyond the natural limitations of geogr a- iply, climate, and weather, however, Soviet agrictlture suffers manmade deficiencies. If ‘the Iremlin considers the problem buf-_ ficiently urgent. Mr. Polyansky may be able ‘to give agriculture a higher priority and shift ‘resources to correct the manmade dofli iciencies: : ‘The first item on the shane is to improve agriculture's mechanical equipment. Derplts great advances in supplying Soviet faryners with.:machinery, United States farmers haye almost 214 times the number of tractors and trucks used in Soviet agriculture, and. 36 percent more grain combines: ‘The average Soviet tractor haa to‘ serve more ‘than four times as much acreage as the Aad Hos wi a- C rierily: ° Rostov tells how lack of & few pounds of sparc parts stalled 160 heavy tractors lest autumn. Farm-repair-shop workers complain of lack of lifts and other tools. ; Otders have already gone out to step up the supply of spare parts for farm machinery, ' The head of the Russian ‘Republic farm-. machinéry supply association was dismissed for ‘violation of stata diselpline” — a grave charer ~ even hefore Mr’ Polvone ty took over the farm ministry. And it is obvious that: Mr. Polyancky {s putting on the heat to correct troubles that have plagued farm- machine operators for years, Mineral : fertilizer problems also demand attention. Output has grown rapidly qua- drupling in a decade, though still only about 75 percent of the amount spread on American fields. Thé trouble is not 30 much quantity as quality, however, The farms receive too little: phosphate in ratio to nitrates -- sometimes. ‘only half the desired proportion, — ; But the most urgent need, as Western observers here see it, is for incentives. j » Soviet ideologists talk of. bringing the i; countryside up to the urban level ~ another. way of saying that the farmer is low man on ithe totem pole, *. Much has been done to false his living standard. Television sets, radios, washing machines, nurseries, a guaranteed minimum wage, and old-age pension plans have greatly improved the peasants’ lot, . Nevertheless, the collective farmer still earns only about 75 rubles a month (about $1,000 a year), compared with the average nationwide wage of over 180 rubles monthly ($1,900 a year). - State and collective farmers ‘augment their earnings with income from their small. private garden plots and Hmited private lMvestock raising. Westerners cite the higher’ efficiency of this restricted private farming — another tribute to incentives, for the: farmer can charge whatever he can get for his privately raised produce. If this private farming were allowed to grow substantailly, however, if would bring about a sharp rise in prices of farm products, which the cities could not afford. Even {f it were so inclined, the Kremlin could not take this line without imperiling the economy. The problem, therefore, is to raise state rewards for the farmer in hope that this would pay off in! higher’ productivity. In the past, when the government has raised collec- - tive-farm payments — as it did in 1965 when it RESO LAANDO 20007000 HF z Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 The difficulty is that the country has little to offer the farmer at a time when the economy is slowing down after the crop failure, Some kind of pump-priming incentive | may be called for, Whether it can be afforded : at this time ts doubtful, ai One reform already under way and de-. signed ‘to free famers’ initiative:is the so-: called “Zyeno” system. The ‘‘Zveno" (lter- ; ally: link), smaller than the brigade which is+ the most common unit in farm work, is also. called an “unassigned mechanizedteam.” The team is given.a plot of land, ma-; chinery, and general goals, and left largely to: ‘work on its own initiative. Whereas brigade’ workers are paid by the job and the time put - in, the ‘zveno’' is paid according to. the: Mr. Polyansky has been considered an advocate of the unasslimed-teams, which up to now has been introduced gradually, halt- ingly, and experimentally. A ': Finally, with the need to develop feed crops for the livestock which may be depleted in the wake of the low harvest last year, the Agriculture Ministry seems to be paying more attention to high-protein feeds. . - Corn, which former Premier Nikita 8.; Khrushchev, Infroduced'on.a wide scale, 1s. getting more prominence, although It ‘1s’ unHkely that Mr. Polyansky will repeat Mr.: Khrushchev's mistake ‘of spreading it into regions climatically unsulted. ee ‘The American farmer Roswell Garst has interested the Agriculture Ministry in devel- harvest results obtained, usually ‘celling on earnings. . TIME MAGAZINE 19 February 1973 Agriculture Scapegoats The U.S.S.R.’s perennial agricultur- al crisis has once again taken its toll in fall guys. This time the Kremlin abrupt- ly removed Vladimir Matskevich. 63, as Minister of Agriculture. A two-time loser, Matskevich had been fired from the same job in 1960 for “mismanage- ment,” then shunted off to be chairman of Nikita Khrushchev’s much criticized “virgin lands” project before being re- stored to the agriculture ministry five years later. Earlier this month /zvestia reported that Sergei Shevchenko, the ministry official in charge of farm ma- chinery, had also been discharged for “violating state discipline”—Soviet jar- gon for quarreling with the boss or gross incompetence. Sovietologists predicted other top agriculture officials would also lose their jobs. ; a5 ; Although the Soviet Union’s capri- cious weather and its inefficient collec- tive farm system are the basic causes without a), for crop failures, such scapegoats as “Matskevich and Shevchenko serve handily to divert public discontent away from top Kremlin leaders. And short- ages in 1972 of basic foodstuffs pro- vided ample grounds for discontent, as citizens queued for bread in major So- viet cities last fall (TIME, Oct. 30). A re- cent Soviet statistical report showed that grain production fell 30 million tons below expectations in 1972, while the potato crop was down 14.5 million tons. That disaster forced the Soviets to contract for $2 billion worth of ag- ricultural products from the U.S., Can- ada and other countries, temporarily re- Hieving shortages. Prospects for the 1973 harvest look _ almost as dismal. A virtually snowless winter has deprived huge areas in cen- tral and western Russia of the snow cover that ordinarily protects grain from killing frost. Massive planting this spring is scarcely expected to make in for the damage to winter wheat, oping sorghum! plantings, and other feed crops will be introduced on a wider scale also, which might force the Kremlin to turn to the West again for heavy imports of grain. Matskevich’s successor turned out to be First Deputy Premier Dmitri Po- lyansky, 55, who has had overall policy charge of agriculture for several years in the Politburo, but now assumes dai- ly operational control of the Soviet Union's $100 billion investment in farms. Some specialists view his ap- pointment as a demotion. They spec- ulate that it may be a canny move to unseat him from the Politburo altogeth- er, reflecting an obscure Kremlin power struggle. “If Polyansky accomplishes any- thing,” says a top U.S. State Depart- ment expert, “it will have taken a mir- acle.” English Kremlinologist Robert Conquest thinks that Polyansky, a for- mer protégé of Khrushchev’s, has been maneuvered into a position of “succeed or else,” Says Conquest: “Since he can't succeed, he will be the next fall guy.” Approved For Release 1999/09/024 CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 THE TIMES, Londen 5 December 1972 eae | After tha Soviet Union's bed harvest. this year one is forced ta conclude that the, world cannot afford Russian commu- nism much Jonger, What the Russians do to themselves is their own affair, with or with- out the fire principles of peace- ful coexistence. but the contin- uing inefficiency of their <ide- ological agriculture could have ‘ serious consequences for -the rest of mankind. ~ One is the almost inevitable iger easc.in ithe price of. bread tf this dountry due to- their recent Jw#rae: grain’ purchases overseas. fo that extent the housewife in to subsidize ciency. + The could be calamitous, In spite of the so-called green revolution, the ghost of. Malthus could once ; aguin be raised. the reasons are plain to see, In ‘the thirties, western Europe and other deficiency areas were fed from three geographical tegtons, Carin Ameri€a and castern Europe including -the Soviet Union. "Latin Ametica Jed with abour 9 million metric tons of zrain a year, and North America and eastern Europe cach exported about 5 million tons, Today, for Malthusian rea- -sons, Latin America is bareiy “self-sufficient. . The Soviet Union. and much of castern Europe. must now uport vast quantities of grain from time to time rot so much because of poor weather but because of the adverse influence ‘of Marx- ist thought on agriculture. This was the contlusion of Mr Orville. Freeman when he Russian incfti- Britain will have ° long: term camsequences America, North” , Wan : expects cee gear ane nas masini oy Ab eta Dre TAS NEN ot 1] Artin -~ epye ease an ue dla HEA a was the United Staves Steretary of Agriculture. Any reader who doubts this should Took at the much improved North Améeri- can performance. Grain exports have been increased 12 times and more in Jess than four decades, and in spite.of greater heme consumptign. As Mr Freeman wrote in Foreign Affairs Quorterly five years ago, there has heen no contest in agriculture. “The United States, with’ scarcely 6 per cent of its people still on the farm, is feeding 200 million Americans. 60 million Indians and the equivalent .of at least another 1€0 million people. in other parts of the world. “The Soviets, by contrast, with close to half of their Jabour force sti] tied to agri- culture, are importing grain to provide bread for their people. Tl we were as far ahead of the Russians in the space ruce ws we are in agriculture, we would by now be. runuing a_ shuttle service to the moon.” Mr Free- was hardly. exaggerating. The United States this vear to harvest. about 260 million tons of maize and wheat compared to the Soviet harvest of 167 miljion tons. The world has been saved from periodic famine not much by the free market econ- omy as the freedom: of -\meri- can science and native shrewd. ness which the system cncour- ages. The Homestead Act of 1362, “the Hatch Act of 1887, the research of Land Grant Col- lezes and the Department of Agriculture, the Extension Ser- vice and price supports have creed an Americau cornuco- a} ‘Nth has been surpassed by realitv. and to such an extent so - Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 ae aycre at pte adie te 3 a ial eo ParSreKss that the increasing surpluses has adjusted to crises, although became politicaliy embarrassing © the cost in) human terms: has for a time. eens Of TAOS ot nor been ‘calcwlated. excess grains were held in cx- This is oe pensive storage, and sowing sect Hisar centr oe was cut back, but in the sixties igen longer afford Russ : the embarrassment shecame it contmunisin, vo wile ce ee blessing when the Indian mon. ‘ological straitiacket ae in a soon again failed. Altogether tinues to paralyse Rus cy ee President Jehnson provided etilaire: ace Russian agri- nearly 135 million tons. But what can be. done ? The Since then world consump — Soviet Union is fa super power, tion has gradually increased, and while it can divert ‘suffi. and not only because of lareer cient- foreign ‘exchanee From populations. The high-protein other urgent requirements witl diet’ of North Americans re- presumably depend-upon Nort quires about one ton of grain 4 American grams to* maintain person a year. nfost of Was the ideolngical purity of sts cattle and poultry fecd. Euro- farmers, es pean and japanese DEER: . Yet the Rusgian leaders must be embarrassed by He dilemma. Ther have sought for-. eigen help in industre. ‘and . misht now be prepared te admit that Marx after all was < citY boy who knew nothing about. farming. They wight jusr be persucded to import Ameri+ can ~ agricultural know-how ee than grain. . “have a suggestion shoule \his prove to be the case. The ments have also risen. “But as Mr. Freeman warned as long ago as 1967, it has become much more difficult for the United States to achieve ‘any abrupt increases in produc- tion to meet additional demand. LAt that time Mr Lester Brown, ‘an economist in the US Depart- ment of Agriculture. calculated that the foreseeable North ‘American grain surplus was all that stood “hetween an expand. .ing world and starvation. “vest time the Ufitited haere coi Ss a erain deal. it - stralia and New Zealand "Nesotates a st ; h: a Scan secondary 7 sup. should quietly make a condi- pliers. The green revolution has tion, as it did with India, that a- helped. Nevertheless, ‘hecause iba ae Ea A to im- of Malthus and Marx much of Prove se aS the world still depends upon Lvery grat shipment 1 { could tthe North American bread be uccampanied by one of the basket. a situation of potential 10,000 _ agronomists. cntomolo- | dauger. pists. plant SC erieiats and’: i ' other experts emp oved by the AJC wk, ipstance, what would tied States Deparment of failures coincided with Indian: Agriculture. Given the oppor- tunity. they should surely make - it possible for the. awest to live | with the Soviet Union as it is ew Tearning to do in other ficlds. : famines? One can argue that. the Malthusiait chost has been raised many tines, and that the world sill survives, Certainly Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : GIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA, Calcutte 25 December HE SOVIET UNION'S porfarmance on the ag: ricultural front this year, as also on umpteen occasions in the past, smacks of doctri~ naire policies yielding tad harvest. The onus of ratian« alising the bad performance is on the authorities at the Kremlin, but it is certainly nef on Marx or his Das Kapi- tal. It is surprising, however, that some sophisticated poli- 1972 Ideological Asriculture after the Soviet Union’s bad harvest this year “one is forced to conclude that the world cannot afford Russian communism much longer.” ‘Isn't it the same kind of simplistic observation, also often made by others, that after, what America has done to Vietnam it would be ‘dificult for the world to afford capitalism much lon- ger? scientists and managers’ have been perpetuating their ine efficiency. And by continuing inefliciency of their “ideolo- gical agriculiure” the men af affairs at the Kremlin are only allowing their embar- rassment to pile up. The embarrassment would, more- over, be matched hy world resentment owing to the in~ evitable otttcome of a'l this. that housewives in other! The price of bread in England and ‘sdtie other countries is already higher than in the recent past and the import of foodgrains from the West by the USSR is bound te be on the inerease for any length of time in the frture, Sovict imports of foodgraing, by having this unpalatable impact on, say, British bread price, would exasperate 4 whole range of countries the observers facile have mace conclusion that In the name of Marxism er Communism, the Soviet Sdise AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA, Calcutta 9 January 1973 countries would have to sube Russian inefficiency. to ignore. F LETTERS TO THE EDITOR. 5 : Sin—Your thicd editorial un- der the caption ‘Ideological Agcleulture’ (December: 25-26) makes both amusing and inte- resling reading, particularly the flinching attempt to redeem the Marxian doctrines on poasaniry and his disciples’ interpretation and application of same into practice. Sovict Union's bad harvest is not entirely attribu- table to the vagarics of weather and it is easy’ to make a scape~ gout of: the scientists and ma- narerg, as indeed Stalin used to make and, I presume, the Sovict rulers still continue to make, —~ in spite of dcStalinization — for it eminently suits the ‘ideo- maniac’ rulers of the Soviet Sinte to lay the entire blame at the door of “burcaucrats” in or- der to save the pristine purity, of their ideology and the infalli- bility of the party. The king can do no wrong and the party cannot commit any misiake. Soviet ideological agriculture has been chronically sick ever since the ill-conceived “coltectiviza- tion? was forced upon the pca- santiry. ; adn fact, the started disaster ‘with ‘RH Broved For Releas First Five-year Plan some forty- five years azo when Stalin, be- ing inspired by the theoretition’s and founder’s dogmatic zeal, de- cided to turn the peasants into State-controlled proletarians. To gauge the magnitude of the agra- rian tragedy, one must look again at the monstrous costs of coliectivization. “Of all Soviet innovations”, observed Eugene Lyons in his famous book ‘Wor-- kers' Paradise Lost’, “this is the one for which the pcople paid most and received least” «page: 202). Stalin himself told Chur- chill that collectivization took more lives than the war. Farming is a ercative process, calling for deep interest and lov- ing care. But the peasants have never resigned themselvces to their communized fate, They work for the slate as little and as indifferently as they can. In 1965, Sovict Russia farmed 175 per cent more crop Jand~ than the USA, using four times as many farm wrokets, and produ- eed less than half gtain, for a population nearly 20 per cent larger. More than 40 per cent of the labour force of the USSR is on land, com- dems are those as much e 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0119 060200070001 -7 CULTURE IN USSR i ee AACR a d.. pared with about 7 per cent In the USA, But the Soviet prob- of deficits, the those of surpluses. Grain production in the USSR. per inhabitant 1s at about the 1910-1914 average. John Strohm, an American specialist who studied the prob!em on the spot in the USSR, wrote in 1964: “A&A good Iior's farmer can work ten times the acreage, feed twenty times as many hogs, take care of thirty times as many chickens as Russian collective farmcrs. One U.S. farmer fecds himself and twenty-seven others with a high protein diet; one Soviet farmer fecds himself and four others with a 75 per cent starchy dict." : : American A few years ago the Soviet economic journal ‘Voprosy Eko- nomiki? calculated an annual loss of 250 million man-hours throngh absentccism by some 700,000 collective farmers, This does not decidedJy imply that Russians are hopelessly inferior farmers. Before the revolution, scratching the soil with primi- tive plonghs, they fed the coun- try and generated huge exports. Even now, in the “private sec- goodwill and confidence whom the USSR can ill afford Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 tor’ — the conecssion made by Stalin, unwiftingly to provide a: sort of Inboratory test of tho - validity of private against pub- . He farm ~ ihe farmers have ' oulproduced the. collective flelds * on a spectacular scale. The pea- sanis who perform wretchedly on the publile land perform ama- zingly well on their own plots, mand they derive more cording to the awn fignres CVoprosy Ekonomill, 1966), private plots with a mere: 3 per. cent. of the. nation's sown - mereafe accounted for 30 per cent of the ross than grain: 40 per cent Income . from it In the open market. Ac-. Government's | hatvest other . of all « caltle-breediog, 60 pe eent of the country’s pdlato crops, 40 Yer ecnt.of allo veretables and milk and 68 per cent of ‘all meat ‘products. And the peasant family dvaws ils fodd ~- 90% of potan tons, 80%, o£ vejctables, almost al of its milk, eggs and meat, not fram -the socialized farms but from its own plot. Tho debacle of communistie expcriment in agriculture is by now too wall-kmown to bear repetition of further analysis. Iluman nature and economie jaws hardly conform to the tdeo- logical grailsjacket, The incifi- cieney to which you attribule oviet had harvest is built into o U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 11 December 1972 the slrueture of ideological agri- cullure.or for the matter of that ideological economy Utsclf. It foreign, policy can afford to ig- nore ideology, it is imperative for an economy to eschew it. — Finally, the only feasible solu- tion for the arricultural disas- ‘ter, as the Icaders. know fully well, wonld be to return to some form of private farming. This they will not,. because they dare not, underiake. Totalitarianu industry and political life, they ‘have ample.:.2essett toes halicve,.- could not survive side by side with a. free agricultute ! NOW A RISING THREAT DF WI ‘ rie Drought, flood, war halted a promising growth in food pro- duction. Also, people are in- ‘creasing faster than crops. Up- shot: want.instead of plenty. World food production, which ap- pearcd healthy and growing only a few months ago, has suddenly shrunk close to the point of global crisis. No mass starvation iis reported—but there is widespread hunger, with belts being tightencd in many countrics. Au- thoritics warn that another poor crop year in 1973 could be disastrous. Behind this development are atrocious weather, political disruption and evi- dence of governmental bungling. In many areas the setback has canceled gains of the “green revolution” that used new seeds and modem equipment to bring a sharp increase in agricultural output. Result: Food production in many poor countries did not improve enough this year even to keep pace with the rise in population, let alone raise the quality of substandard diets. ; After a decade in which the world’s supply of grain rose twice as fast as the population grew, per capita grain pro- duction in 1972 dropped about 6 per cont. Approved Por Reease details. ESPREAD The unexpected decline in crop yields is stepping up demands on agricultural stockpiles held by the United States, which has managed to escape serious losses in the rapid reversal of farming fortunes. “Worst in 100 years.” Russia was hit first when a vicious cycle of insuffi- cient snow cover, a late spring, drought and autumn rains slashed grain produc- tion to some 30 million metric tons short of target. Soviet officials call it “the worst harvest in 100 years,” Rather than reduce food consumption as it has in the past, Russia chose to buy an estimated 27 million tons of grain from the West—most of it from the U.S. Experts suspect China also may be having farm troubles this year, American agricultural officials. say a reported drought in corn and wheat fields of North China and a similar Jack of rain in rice arcas of South China are bound to reduce output. Visitors to China report the people look better fed than ever, but appear- ances can be deceiving. A U.S. farm expert observed: “Any crop shortfall is a serious matter in China, because their population in- creases something like 12 to 15 million people a year. They have to keep pro- ducing more food just to stay even,” For about 12 years, China has relied largely on Canada and Australia for grain bobs pfo2 Ot RDF 4 * lion tons a year. 7 HUNGER But this year, China also has pure chased 400,000 tons of wheat and 300,- 000 tons of corn from the U. S.—the first such trade between the two countries in 23 years. Market rumors abound that Peking is secking more American grain if the price is right. india: poor crops. India is another country believed to be headed soon for the world grain market to replace food- stuffs lost in a poor crop year. When 1972 began, Indian officials proudly announced that they had built up reserves of more than 9 million tons of food grains. Henceforth, they asserted, India no longer would need the cut-rate “food for peace” shipments from the U.S. on which the country had relied for many years, & India, like several other underdevel- oped nations, was delighted at increased production from new “miracle seeds” that multiplied rice and wheat yields. Nature, however, crossed up both the Government and farmers. The summer monsoons came to India some weeks late, and rainfall was lighter than nor-. mal. Grain yields could fall as much as 20 million tons short of needs, and reserve stocks already have been halved. Experts point out that India was duo for a bad crop year, since the country’s traditional “famine cycle” runs five years, and food production had risen ey- 44000200070001 -7 Riots and hoarding. Power shortages, breakdown of some key irrigation fa- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 cilitics and bureaucratic errors have further worsened India’s food situation. Riots over food prices and hoarding al- ready have broken out in at least two States. International grain traders say that India will have no choice but to come to tho U.S for wheat to feed a popula- tion growing at nearly 3 per cent a year. Reports persist that India will need at least 2 million tons of grain. Some top Indian officials, however, vow that they would rather starve than “beg” from the U.S. Relations between the two countries have been strained ever since the Indian-Pakistani war over Bangladesh. A shortage of food is rated the most critical of many problems plaguing Bang- Indesh, which has received some 925 mil- lion dollars in foreign aid this year, about one third of it from Uhe U.S. Authorities fear that as many as 200,- 000 people may starve this winter in Afghanistan due to drought and Gov- ernment neglect. Cases of starvation have been reported in Indonesia, where the rice crop is ex- pected to fall about 425,000 tons’ short of demand of 12 million tons. Cambodia, which once exported rice, is forced to import half a million tons of it in 1972 because of bad weather and disruptions by military operations. In Burma, the rice crop dropped by ‘an estimated 30 per cent. this year. In addition ta poor weather, observers blame inept distribution and low farm prices scl by the Government, U.S. food shipments to South Vietnam have doubled this year, but local de- liveries still are erratic because of poor transportation equipment and Commu- nist success in cutting supply lines. Laos has an annual rice deficit up- ‘ward of 100,000 tons, even though 60 per cent of the population grows its own food. The U.S. has pumped in about 25 million dollars in foodstuffs in the last five years. Floods in Philippines, While farm- ers in’ some countrics had to contend with war or drought, the Philippine Is- lands were struck this year by the worst floods in their recorded weather history. Damage is estimated at 450 million dol- Jars, including the loss of 75,000 tons of stored rice. On top of the flooding, Filipino farm- ers began experiencing trouble with new types of rice which had_ promised to make the country self-sufficient in that crop, In 1971, the Philippines had to im- port rice for the first time in three years —some 450,000 tons. Imports are ex- pected to be almost doubled this year. - Nations of the Western [femisphere have not been cxempt from crop prob- Jems in 1972, cither. Drought and other weather setbacks are expected to cut Brazil’s wheat crop to half this year, forcing a sharp in- crease in imports. The same factor is caus- ing Uruguay to raise its grain imports by some 25 per cent. In Chile, just about every type of food is scarce. Production on farms and ranches has plummeted while extremists seize land, destroy crops and kill live- stock. Some of the produce that does come off farms rots in warehouses, be- cause the transportation and distribu- tion networks break down. Observers belicve that Chile has enough food to maintain its people on spartan diets until next spring. Reports from Santiago say that unless the Marx- jst-edominated Government — straightens things out by then, widespread hunger will become a serious possibility. While countries short of food resort to imports for survival, some nations that traditionally produce surplus crops are having problems of their own. Australia, one of the world’s major wheat shippers, has been undergoing a drought that has cut production by nearly one third. Reserves are the lowest in several years, and grain traders specu- late that Australia may have trouble filling all its export orders. Same as 197}, Canada, another big grower, expects 1972 wheat production to be the same as 1971 despite a 10 per cent rise in planted acreage. Canadian wheat stocks are declining for the fourth straight year as part of an intentional cutback, but added acreage should raise production again in 1973. Canadian authorities also are buying luge new railroad cars and upgrading tracks to carry heavier grain loads for export. Officials are reported consider- ing adding storage facihties in Vancou- ver, the nation’s main port, to handle shipments to Russia and the Orient. Although not hurt to the extent of many countries, U.S, farmers also are having weather trouble. Prolonged au- tumn rain and snow have delayed har- vest of corn, soybeans and grain sorghums jn several States, causing losses estimated as high as a million dollars a day. Strong U.S. position. Despite these problems, however, the U.S. finds itself in a strong position to meet growing ex- port demand for food. ee This country’s grain production for the marketing year ending next June 30 is expected to drop by 16 million tons from = The U.N. Jast year’s record of 235 million tons, largely because of reduced acreage. carry-overs, American farmers have about 170 million acres in food and feed grains and still have another ,60 million “acres ‘they could use for produe- tion if necded. . The U.S. Department of Agriculture was expected to announce its 1973 feed- grain program in early December. In- formed sources said the program ‘would be designed to permit farmers to expand planting of crops in biggest demand— with the twin aims of raising farm in- come and trimming part of the 4-bil, lion-dollar cost of the Government farm program, = Increasing calls for grain are expected to cut world wheat stocks from this summer's 50 million tons to less than 34 million tons by next July. That would. be the slimmest reserve in seven years. As shown by the chart on this paro, rising demand for wheat has brought sharp increases in prices. Total U.S. agri- cultural exports are expected to reach neatly 10 billion dollars this marketing year, far above the old record of 8 bil- lion dollars in the preceding year. This country’s net farm‘ income for 1972 is projected close to 19 billion dollars—another record. Gloomy U.N. report. But while Amcrican farmers prosper, a report from a United Nations agency shows that many people elsewhere are short of food. The U.N ’s Food and Agricultural Organization says that, for the sccond consecutive year, the world’s underde- veloped countries are falling behind ina the race to match food output with grow- ing populations. : These less-developed nations, surveys show, inercased their fond production this year by only about 1 per cent while 4 per cent growth is needed to feed the population and upgrade diets a little. “This is extremely serious,” declared Addeke EH. Boerma, director general of the Food and Agricultural Organization. “One can regard the failure of a single year as exceptional, But two failures in successive years... cannot be shrugged off as a temporary misfortune.” U.N. experts estimate that roughly the.same number of people remain un- dernourishcd today as there were 10 years ago—between 300 million and 500 million. Up to one third of the people in the less-developed countries suffer from malnutzition, authorities repgrt, .. ~. Principal victims: children under the age of 5, whose physical and mental growth can be retarded by lack of essen- tial protein and calories. investigation disclosed that, on.a global: basis, avetage daily consump- Total tion of calories and proteins changed supplies, however, are up because of big Little between 1965 and 1970. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : GIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 * Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 An. average American, the study showed, still reccives 86 per cent more protein and 90° per cent more calories per day than people in some countrics PE Asian gy cage Need for upgrading. International agricultural experts say farming prac- tices in, underdeveloped countrics must be upgraded quickly. They especially urge land reform to provide production incentives, plus a big infusion of modem technology and equipment. In parts of Asia, it still takes about 70 pcople to match the output of a single American farmer. ty Agricultural-exporting nations such as the U.5., Canada, Australia and Argen- tina cannot meet world food needs for- ever, U.N. authorities warm; * Officials assert that if 1973 brings ‘crop reversals on the scale of 1972, the result could. be mass famine. {END}, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 9 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 ‘Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-011944000200070001-7 THE FUTURE OF COMMUNIST POWER, (Book) by Brian Crozier, London 1970 WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION (WIDF) The WIDF has never been as effective as some other front organizations, for it has been under communist control from the start, and no non-communist body of any standing has ever joined it. It was founded in Paris in December 1945 at a com- munist-convened Congress of Women. The WIDF was expelled by the French government in January..1951 dnd MOVEd, 16.106 csp marsecsmaamaaiets aun Soviet sector in Berlin, ‘ INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF JOURNALISTS Of) Founded in June 1946 at a Congress in Copenhagen, the IOJ initially represented nearly all unionized journalists of the world. As usual, the Communists captured the key posts, and by 1950 all non-communist unions had withdrawn. In 1952, the non- communists re-created the International Federation of Journalists (EJ) which had merged with the IOJ in 1946. The original headquarters were in London; now they are in Prague. WORLD FEDERATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS (WFSW) The headquarters arc in London, although the Secretary- General works from an office in Paris. The WFSW was founded in 1946 at a conference in London, organized by the British Association of Scientific Workers. Most of the official posts are _ held by Communists. : Seen INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS TADL) Many non-communist lawyers were among, those who attended the inaugural meetings of the Association in October 1946 in Paris. ‘Ihe association was expelled from France in 1950 and set up headquarters in Brussels. * INTERNATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION ORGANIZATION (OIRT) She last of the 1946 crop, the OIRT was founded at a con- ference in Brussels. It has since transferred its headquarters to Pracuc. In 1950 the British Broadcasting Corporation set up a tival body, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) which all Icading non-coramunist organizations have since joined, having desetted the OIRT. In effect, the Organization is now a semi- _ governmental onc, since most of its affiliates are radio and television centtes in the communist countrics, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS (FIR) ‘he FIR incorporates an carlier organization founded in Paris in 1947, the International Federation of Former Political Prisoners of tlascism vena . The earlier body was founded in Vienna in Approved For Release .1899/ 2ardd lA-RDRKQ-01 494A060200070001-7 Vienna—the founding place—in 1952. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1973 NOTEWORTHY EVENTS March 10 Czechoslovakia The 25th anniversary of the death of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk. Masaryk was found dead below his office window and the communists claimed he had committed suicide. During the 1968 "Prague Spring" the un-. censored Czech press pre- sented a considerable amount .Of evidence that he had been murdered at the Soviets! behest. March 15-21 Panama UN Security Council Meeting. Panama is host to a meeting which is billed as an effort "to strengthen peace and security in Latin America in accordance with the UN Charter." Panama has been actively seeking international support for its position in Canal treaty negotiations with the United States, and is therefore expected to raise the issue during the meeting. April 3 USSR "Doctors' Piot"’ explodes, 1953. Pravda announced the release of nine doctors (six Jewish) who had been arrested and charged in January 1953 with the deaths of Andrei Zhadanov and other Soviet luminaries. Stalin's death on March 5th saved them from execution and saved Soviet Jews from another pogrom. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 April 4, 1972 April 9-14 April 13 USSR Norway USSR-Japan Soviet officials in Stockholm refused to issue a visa to a Swedish Academy representative for travel to Moscow to present the 1970 Nobel Prize for Literature to Alexander Solzhenitsyn. On 9 April the author issued a state- ment to a group of Swedish correspondents that the refusal put "an irreversible and final ban against any kind of presentation of the Nobel Prize on the territory of my homeland.'' Solzhenitsyn, unable to collect his prize money or royaltiés, or to publish in the USSR, is now surviving through the charity of his friends. Recently a number of Western authors offered to give him their uncollected Russian royalties, but Soviet authorities have turned down such offers saying Solzhenitsyn is a "rich man." World Conference for Support of Victims of Apartheid and Colonialism. About 200 participants are expected at this UN-OAU sponsored Conference. In 1941 the Soviet Union and Japan concluded neutrality treaty which was in force until USSR declared war on August 8, 1945, six days before Japan surrendered. USSR asserted its sovereignty over the Kuriles and Sakhalin Islands. The Soviet Union has not signed a peace treaty with Japan and still holds the Northern Territories. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7