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TESTIMONY BEFORE THE LEGISLATURE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS Committee on Government Operations, Veterans Affairs, and Consumer Protection January 23, 2026 CAROLINE F. FAWKES SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS ELECTIONS SYSTEM OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS Introduction 1 Good morning, Honorable Chairman Avery L. Lewis, distinguished 2 members of the Committee, colleagues, members of the press, and 3 the public. I am Caroline F. Fawkes, Supervisor of Elections for the 4 Virgin Islands, a Certified Elections Registration Administrator 5 (CERA). 6 I appreciate this opportunity to provide testimony on Bill No. 36- 7 0187, which proposes amending Title 18, Virgin Islands Code, 8 Chapter 23, Section 622 to require the Board of Elections to count 9 by hand votes deposited in a ballot box. 10 Election integrity in the Virgin Islands depends on voting systems 11 that are scalable, secure, and defensible—hand counting is none of 12 those. 13 Core Election Principle 14 A comprehensive election integrity approach should strengthen 15 existing systems rather than replace them with less efficient 16 methods. 17 Elections rely on three components: people, processes, and 18 technology. When these elements work together, supported by audits 19 and transparency, they deliver accurate, timely, and trustworthy 20 2 results. Mandating hand counts as the primary method of tabulation 21 does not strengthen election integrity. It undermines it. 22 23 Key Risks of Hand-Counting Ballots 24 1. Accuracy Issues 25 • Human error: Fatigue, distraction, or bias can lead to 26 miscounts, especially when tallying thousands of ballots. 27 • Complex ballots: Modern elections often include multiple races 28 and propositions, making manual tallying prone to mistakes. 29 2. Time and Efficiency Problems 30 • Slow process: Counting by hand is far slower than using 31 certified machines, delaying results for days or weeks. 32 • Scalability limits: Hand counting ballots does not scale 33 effectively. As turnout increases or ballots become longer, the 34 time, staffing, space, and supervision required for hand counts 35 grow exponentially. 36 3. Transparency and Trust Concerns 37 • Inconsistent procedures: Without standardized methods, 38 different teams may interpret ballots differently, undermining 39 fairness. 40 3 • Public confidence risk: Errors or delays can fuel conspiracy 41 theories and reduce trust in election outcomes. 42 43 4. Resource Strain 44 • Labor-intensive: Hand counts require large numbers of trained 45 counters, often working long hours under pressure, while the 46 public and the candidates await Election night results. 47 • Costly logistics: Organizing secure facilities, supervision, and 48 recounts adds significant expense compared to machine 49 tabulation. 50 • Security Vulnerabilities: Increased handling of ballots raises 51 risks of tampering or accidental damage. 52 It is important to note that most hand counted ballots are from 53 recounts or ballots which a tabulator cannot read. 54 American Samoa is the only U.S. territory which hand count votes. 55 They only have three contests on their ballot (Governor/Lt. Governor, 56 Delegate to Congress, and Legislature) with a total average voter of 57 15,000. They finish counting their ballots by midnight on election 58 night. In March of 2025, they were coordinating with Election System 59 and Software (ESS) to purchase the DS200 Tabulator to improve the 60 4 process of canvassing. In the past, the Virgin Islands have had eight 61 (8) contests on a ballot, including a referendum. We have a total 62 average voter of 22, 244. We have 55,955 registered voters; we must 63 plan as if all 55,955 voters are going to participate in all elections. 64 Across the nation, the use of hand counting ballots is decreasing and 65 is considered the least effective way of counting ballots. 66 According to Mr. Charles Stewart III, who directs the MIT Election 67 Data and Science Lab, I quote “Computers – which ballot scanners 68 rely on are particularly good at tedious, repetitive tasks. Humans are 69 bad at them.” Close quote. 70 Real-world hand counts have produced error rates as high as 25 71 percent. Hand counts introduce variability in ballot interpretation 72 and increase the likelihood of challenges, delays, and litigation, 73 particularly in close or high-turnout elections. 74 The Proper Role of Hand Counts 75 Hand counting does have a legitimate role, but that role is audits and 76 recounts, not primary tabulation. 77 The Virgin Islands has conducted post-election audits since 2014. 78 Election audits are a critical component of a secure and trustworthy 79 election system. They provide independent verification that election 80 5 results accurately reflect the votes cast by comparing machine 81 tabulation results with voter-marked paper ballots. Audits reinforce 82 public confidence by demonstrating that election outcomes are not 83 accepted on faith alone, but are confirmed through transparent, 84 documented review procedures conducted under established rules. 85 Audits also preserve the benefits of modern election technology while 86 maintaining accountability. Electronic tabulation allows for speed, 87 consistency, and efficiency on election night, while post-election 88 audits provide a safeguard against rare errors or anomalies before 89 certification. This balanced approach avoids unnecessary delays in 90 reporting results and reduces the risks associated with full hand 91 counts, such as increased costs, staffing burdens, and human error. 92 Importantly, audits are transparent, cost-effective, and legally 93 defensible. They are conducted in a manner open to observation and 94 are structured to expand if discrepancies are identified, providing a 95 clear corrective path when needed. Routine audits strengthen the 96 integrity of the electoral process, support continuous improvement 97 in election administration, and align with nationally recognized best 98 practices for accurate, secure, and credible elections. 99 6 This hybrid approach—electronic tabulating machines first, hand 100 counts when warranted is the national best practice. 101 102 Time of Ballot Counting 103 Bill No 36-0187 states “Ballots may not be counted before 8:00 p.m. 104 on the day of the election.” This Bill also restricts when counting 105 may begin on Election Day from 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Delaying 106 counting unnecessarily can increase skepticism and confusion, 107 rather than confidence. 108 Delaying the start of ballot counting from 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 109 introduces unnecessary inefficiencies into the election-night process 110 without providing any corresponding enhancement to election 111 security or integrity. This one-hour delay reduces available 112 tabulation time, pushes unofficial results later into the evening or 113 early morning, and compresses subsequent reconciliation and 114 canvassing activities. Even modest delays can compound across 115 precincts and districts, slowing the overall reporting process and 116 placing additional strain on election administration. 117 A delayed start also increases administrative and fiscal burdens. 118 Election workers are required to remain on duty longer, increasing 119 7 fatigue at a critical stage of the process and driving overtime and 120 staffing costs. Fatigue is a recognized risk factor for clerical and 121 reconciliation errors, particularly after an extended Election Day. 122 These risks are avoidable when tabulation is permitted to begin 123 promptly upon the close of polls. 124 Finally, delays in counting can negatively affect public confidence. In 125 modern elections, prolonged gaps between poll closure and reporting 126 often invite speculation, misinformation, and doubt, even when the 127 process is functioning properly. In close or high-profile contests, 128 delayed reporting may also increase the risk of legal challenges and 129 public controversy. Permitting timely tabulation supports 130 transparency, reduces unnecessary uncertainty, and strengthens 131 trust in the electoral process without compromising accuracy or 132 security. 133 The DS200 Precinct Tabulator 134 The DS200 tabulator strengthens transparency and does not replace 135 it. 136 Key features include: 137 • Voter-marked paper ballots retained as permanent records 138 • Secure ballot storage with tamper-evident seals 139 8 • Encrypted data and detailed audit logs 140 • Pre- and post-election testing 141 • Full federal certification under EAC standards 142 • By minimizing ballot handling and maximizing auditability, the 143 DS200 tabulator reduces risk and improves accuracy. 144 Prior to deployment, each DS200 tabulator is secured with tamper- 145 evident seals. At the close of polls at 7:00 p.m., the Presiding Judge 146 formally closes the voting center and begins the required closing 147 procedures for return to the Elections Office. The Judge removes the 148 encrypted removable media and the results tapes from the DS200 149 and places them into a sealed transport bag. The Judge is then 150 escorted by the Virgin Islands Police Department to the Elections 151 Office, maintaining documented chain-of-custody throughout 152 transport. 153 Upon arrival at the Elections Conference Room, the sealed bag is 154 opened by the Presiding Judge in full view of Board of Elections 155 members, election staff, candidates, members of the media, and the 156 public. The encrypted removable media is removed by the Judge and 157 handed directly to the Deputy Supervisor of Elections. The media is 158 then transferred to the Voting Technician, who inserts it into the 159 9 Electionware tabulation system for processing. The system tabulates 160 the results, generates reports, and securely transmits encrypted data 161 to St. Croix, where the Supervisor is assigned, through a secure 162 cloud-based connection, where the data is downloaded to a protected 163 computer. 164 Election results are then reviewed by election staff and the Board of 165 Elections prior to release. Once verified, the results are provided to 166 the Webmaster for posting on the official Elections System website 167 and are simultaneously made available to the media and the public. 168 This process ensures transparency, security, and public observation 169 at every stage, while preserving the integrity of the tabulation and 170 reporting process. 171 Legal and Statutory Foundation 172 Virgin Islands law already resolves this issue. 173 In Bryan v. Abramson (2010), the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands 174 held that the paper ballot system was expressly repealed by the 175 Election Reform Act of 1984, applying the long-standing last-in-time 176 rule of statutory interpretation. The Court concluded that electronic 177 voting systems lawfully replaced hand-counted paper ballots. 178 The Court further determined that: 179 10 There is no legal right to demand hand-counted paper ballots in lieu 180 of electronic systems. 181 The former paper ballot system was abolished as a matter of law, and 182 rules and regulations promulgated by the Supervisor of Elections and 183 the Joint Boards of Elections are fully authorized under Title 18. 184 That ruling remains controlling precedent. A copy of the Court Order 185 has been submitted along with my Testimony. 186 Additionally, Title 18, Section 524 expressly authorizes the Joint 187 Boards of Elections to adopt procedures that ensure correctness, 188 impartiality, and efficiency using electronic systems. To be sure, the 189 voters do have choices, they can vote by a paper ballot or an 190 activation card-electronic, however, they must all be “tabulated” by 191 the DS 200 Tabulator. 192 Statutory Conflicts and Implementation Timeline 193 If Bill No. 36-0187 were enacted, it would not operate in isolation. Its 194 requirements would conflict with multiple existing provisions of Title 195 18 of the Virgin Islands Code, as well as duly adopted rules and 196 regulations of the Joint Boards of Elections, all of which are 197 structured around electronic tabulation. 198 Passage of this bill would therefore necessitate: 199 11 Revisions to multiple sections of Title 18 governing ballot handling, 200 tabulation, canvassing, audits, and certification; 201 Amendments to Board of Elections regulations and procedures; 202 Revisions to election manuals, training protocols, and security 203 procedures; and 204 Procurement, staffing, and logistical changes to support a 205 fundamentally different counting system. 206 These changes cannot be implemented administratively alone. They 207 would require additional legislative action to ensure statutory 208 consistency and legal enforceability. 209 Importantly, election laws, rules, and procedures must be finalized 210 well in advance of an election. The statutory deadline for 211 implementing changes affecting the 2026 gubernatorial general 212 election cycle is April 12, 2026, because Early Voting begins on 213 October 12, 2026. Attempting to revise multiple interrelated laws and 214 operational systems within that period would pose a substantial risk 215 of confusion, inconsistent application, and legal challenge. 216 Response to Amendment No. 36-662 (Amendment in the Nature 217 of a Substitute to Bill No. 36-0187) received on January 21, 218 2026. 219 12 Amendment No. 36-662 would fundamentally alter the 220 administration of elections in the Virgin Islands by mandating voter- 221 requested paper ballots, segregated ballot boxes, and precinct-level 222 manual tabulation of those ballots. While framed as an expansion of 223 voter choice, the amendment introduces significant operational, 224 legal, and logistical risks that outweigh any asserted benefit. 225 First, the amendment creates a dual, parallel voting and tabulation 226 system at every polling place, requiring election officials to administer 227 electronic voting and manual hand counting simultaneously. This 228 disjointed process substantially increases complexity at the precinct 229 level, particularly during poll closing and results reporting. The 230 requirement that hand-marked paper ballots be manually counted at 231 the voting center immediately after polls close will delay reporting, 232 extend the workday for poll workers, and increase the likelihood of 233 errors caused by fatigue, time pressure, and inconsistent application 234 of voter-intent standards. 235 Second, the amendment imposes strict segregation and 236 reconciliation requirements that are highly vulnerable to human 237 error. The detailed accounting mandated in subsection (i)including 238 issued ballots, spoiled ballots, replacements, counted ballots, and 239 13 unused ballots—adds multiple reconciliation points that must be 240 performed accurately under election-night conditions. Any 241 discrepancy, however minor, risks undermining confidence in results 242 and may invite litigation or challenges, even where no fraud or 243 misconduct has occurred. Electronic tabulation systems are 244 designed specifically to reduce these reconciliation risks through 245 automated controls; this amendment moves in the opposite direction. 246 Third, the prohibition on scanning or electronically tabulating voter- 247 requested paper ballots eliminates the ability to use existing certified 248 equipment for verification or redundancy. By mandating that hand- 249 marked paper ballots may only be counted manually, the amendment 250 removes an important safeguard against arithmetic mistakes and 251 inconsistent tallying. Manual tabulation is inherently less scalable, 252 less efficient, and more susceptible to variation between voting 253 centers, particularly in high-turnout elections or multi-page ballots 254 with numerous contests. 255 Fourth, the amendment significantly increases staffing, training, and 256 cost burdens. Requiring not fewer than three election officials to 257 conduct public manual tabulation at each polling place, in addition 258 to staff needed for standard voting operations, will strain an already 259 14 limited pool of trained poll workers. The Virgin Islands Elections 260 System would be required to recruit, train, and retain additional 261 personnel, revise procedures, redesign training materials, and 262 expand Election Day oversight, all without clear funding provisions 263 in the amendment. 264 Fifth, the amendment creates new legal and administrative exposure 265 for the Supervisor of Elections and the Board of Elections. Mandatory 266 public hand counting at the precinct level, combined with observer 267 access, increases the risk of disputes over voter intent, interruptions, 268 and allegations of irregularities. Even when conducted properly, 269 manual tabulation processes are more difficult to defend because 270 they rely heavily on subjective judgment rather than repeatable, 271 auditable system logic. This amendment therefore increases the 272 likelihood of post-election challenges rather than enhancing 273 confidence in outcomes. 274 Finally, the amendment does not identify any failure demonstrated 275 in the current electronic tabulation system that would justify such a 276 sweeping change. Existing electronic voting systems already provide 277 auditable records, established chain-of-custody procedures, and 278 post-election verification mechanisms. Replacing or supplementing 279 15 the electronic tabulating systems with mandatory hand counting 280 introduces risk without addressing a documented problem, contrary 281 to best practices in modern election administration. 282 Hand counting ballots will significantly degrade election night 283 reporting and public transparency. The current electronic tabulation 284 system produces immediate, verifiable precinct-level results, showing 285 exactly how many votes were cast at each Voting Center for each 286 candidate. Hand counting eliminates this capability, replacing timely 287 and standardized reporting with delayed, fragmented results that 288 undermine voter confidence and invite unnecessary disputes. 289 Moreover, although the bill references “election night,” it fails to 290 clarify whether hand counting would also apply to early voting 291 ballots, which are currently tabulated at 7:00 p.m. This lack of clarity 292 creates serious logistical, staffing, and cost burdens. Election officials 293 would be required to conduct prolonged manual counts after a 294 workday that begins as early as 5:00 a.m., while simultaneously 295 closing Voting Centers, securing ballots, transporting sensitive 296 materials, and maintaining strict chain-of-custody requirements. 297 This is not a minor adjustment—it is an operational overhaul that 298 strains personnel, increases the likelihood of human error, delays 299 16 final results, and places the orderly administration of elections at 300 risk. 301 This Proposal Creates Serious Legal Vulnerability by 302 Undermining the Secrecy of the Ballot. 303 By permitting hand counting in low-turnout precincts, this bill 304 invites constitutional challenge. When only one or two ballots exist 305 for a precinct, ballot secrecy is effectively eliminated. Election officials 306 can reasonably infer how an identifiable voter cast their ballot. That 307 condition violates the fundamental right to a secret ballot and creates 308 an evidentiary trail that can be exploited in election contests, public 309 records requests, and court proceedings. The Virgin Islands would be 310 defending a system that structurally enables vote disclosure—an 311 indefensible legal position. The risk is not speculative; it is inherent 312 in the structure of precinct-level hand counting with minimal 313 participation. 314 This Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to Bill No. 36- 315 increases complexity, cost, delay, and legal exposure, while reducing 316 efficiency, scalability, and consistency in election administration. 317 Rather than strengthening election integrity, it creates additional 318 17 points of failure and undermines timely, reliable, and professionally 319 administered elections in the Virgin Islands. 320 Media – Sample Ballot. Request media to show – the Sample Ballot. 321 Every Early Voting and Election Day ballot is annotated with a 322 Precinct name where the “Provisional” wording is. When a voter 323 checks in, election officials know the voter’s identity and which 324 Precinct ballot is issued. After voting concludes, Request Media to 325 show the Precinct Reports. (Media – Four Pages). Precinct Reports 326 are produced that list the Precinct name and the total number of 327 ballots cast. In low-turnout precincts or voting centers, the 328 combination of check-in records, Precinct-identified ballots, and 329 publicly available Precinct Reports creates a risk that individual 330 ballots can be correlated back to specific voters. While ballots do not 331 display voter names, this practice raises concerns about whether full 332 ballot secrecy is preserved in all voting locations. 333 Conclusion 334 Mandating hand counting of ballots will fundamentally disrupt 335 election night operations, erode transparency, and delay reliable 336 results. Electronic tabulation currently provides immediate, 337 precinct-level reporting that clearly shows how many votes were cast 338 18 at each Voting Center for each candidate—information the public 339 expects and relies upon. Hand counting eliminates this capability, 340 replacing it with delayed, labor-intensive processes that increase the 341 risk of human error and invite confusion and dispute. Compounding 342 these risks, the bill fails to clarify whether hand counting applies to 343 early voting ballots, which are presently tabulated at 7:00 p.m., 344 creating serious logistical, staffing, and cost burdens. Election 345 officials would be forced to conduct extended manual counts after 346 workdays beginning as early as 5:00 a.m., while simultaneously 347 closing Voting Centers, securing ballots, transporting sensitive 348 materials, and preserving chain-of-custody. This is not a simple 349 policy change—it is an operational strain that jeopardizes accuracy, 350 efficiency, and public confidence in the election process. 351 Any electoral process that makes it possible to deduce how an 352 individual voted is not merely flawed—it is legally vulnerable and 353 exposes the Virgin Islands to avoidable litigation and loss of public 354 trust. 355 The experience of election officials nationwide is clear: hand counts 356 introduce critical disadvantages compared to automated tabulation. 357 The evidence is compelling and overwhelming. 358 19 Electronic tabulation, paired with voter-verified paper ballots, robust 359 audits, and transparency provides the best balance of accuracy, 360 security, efficiency, and public confidence. 361 As electronic voting systems continue to evolve, they hold the 362 potential to shape the future of democracy by fostering greater 363 participation and trust in electoral processes. Audit strengthen 364 elections by verifying results without slowing them down, enhancing 365 transparency without increasing risk, and building public confidence 366 without unnecessary cost. 367 Taken together, the operational demands, legal vulnerabilities, and 368 administrative realities of conducting elections in the Virgin Islands 369 require systems that are consistent, scalable, and defensible. 370 Election laws in the Virgin Islands must be grounded in how elections 371 are administered in practice, not in theory. For these reasons, hand 372 counting is not a practical or sustainable election practice for the 373 Territory. 374 For these reasons, the Office of the Supervisor of Elections strongly 375 and fully supports continued use of electronic tabulation of all ballots 376 in the Virgin Islands. 377 Thank you. I am prepared to answer any questions. 378 20 “An election process that cannot be administered consistently across 379 all districts of the Virgin Islands is not an election reform—it is an 380 operational failure waiting to happen.” 381