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AD—AOD 0 1476 TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS CENTER CAMBRIDG€ MASS FIG 13/10 OFFSHORE VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGtMENT (OVTM) STUDY. VOLUME II . TEC—— ETC (UJ AUG 78 R 8LMC, R KALAFUS. R WISLEDER UNCLASSIFIED T5C—USCG—78—11—VOL—2 USCS—D—55—78—VOt—2 NL ~ ri~ _ _ __ _• n~rrJ._ _ __ __ _ _ -- _ _ E&IEflc luflt • _ -WI’ ~~~~~~ REPORT NO. CG-D-5 5-78 1: OFFSHORE VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (OVTM) STUDY Volume U — Technical Analyses U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANS PORTATION RE SEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAM S ADMIN I STRATION ~~~ Transportation Systems Center Cambridge MA 02142 Of TIt4~% SP4flS 0~ ED DC’ AUGUST 1978 FINAL REPORT OCT 30 1978 3 T A~~ DOCUMENT IS AVAILAB LE TO THE U.S. PUBLIC UJ THROUGH THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE. SPRINGFIELD. VIRGINIA 22161 C-, Prepared for U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION UNITED STATE S COAST GUARD Off ice of Ma rine Environ ment and Systems Wash ington DC 20590 ~ ~~ ~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ - NOTICE This technical study examines traffic management al ternatives as a means to reduce or eliminate casualties contributing to pollution of the marine environment . Nothing contained in this report should be construed as affecting or changing the Adm inistration ’s position on offshore cla ims In general or at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in particular. NOTICE This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U S. Department of Transportation Ifl the interest of information ~xchange . The United States Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof. NOTICE The United States Government does not endorse prod- ucts or manufacturers . Trade or manufactu rers ’ names appear herein solely because they are consid- ered essential to the objectives of this report. — — ~~-~~~~~‘ ~ —‘r~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘—- ~~ - ~~~~~ ‘~~~~~~~ -II~ - -~~ — .. ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ T.ch.lc.I ~~~~~ O.c...’.’I.. , P.1. I. 0.0.. ’ N.. — CC - D - 55 - 78 — G.,.u.. ,t Acc..e..a N.. 3. I.c~p...i.’s C.t.I.~ N.. ~~~luwe I~~~~’Tech~~~~~~~~~~ (ovTM ) fAug~~~~mu 78 F~ 4. T.d. s.d Swbe,’I. _ _ _ _ _ ~:: c.:[ “- ~ ~~~~~~ _ _ _ _ _ ~~. ~~~ L._i.~,, ~~~~~ ..QFFSHORE VESSEL _ _ _ _ ~~~ 0 cal ~~~aLyaes~ ~~~~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ P.,I...i,, Or s.éa.~i., R.t.., No. 4~ ~~~JBland , R.jKalafusrR.IWislederlet al. * D01 TSC CG 78 11, ~~~~~ 10. W..k Usis N.. (TEAlS) t ?_L Ji,g-S.._.i~~tL.. N____. __J ~~~~~~~ U . S. Department of Transportation CG8161R8007 Research and Spec ial Programs Administrati on 11 Cs. ~~ CiS~ 6•iO~ NS. Transpor tation Systems Center __________________________ Cambrid ge MA 02142 If ()~ J ~~~ 13. T ~~~~~~ Ro~i.d C0,.o~sd I 2. Sps..s. ~~~~ A0..c, N... sod Add ... ep~~t, U.S. Department of Transportat ion Aug~~~~~~7 ~~ ‘—~JunsU’~~ ?8 United Sta tes Coas t Guard _________________________ Office of Marine Env ironment and Sys tems ‘~ — 15. Su~~I..s.t.iy N•tsi Was hington DC 20590 ( Lupdpa! u. ~ilater, J. LoVecchio , and *F. Frankel , D. Prerau , R. W iseman / ~ . I ~ ‘)~‘~~j “ The objectives of the study w e r e : (1) to analyze the causes of tanker and other vessel casualties that could potentially result in oil pollution , and (Z) to evaluate various alternative vessel traffic management systems and techni ques for the preven- tion of oil-polluting casualties in the U.S. offshore waters. The geographical areas of interest are the waters from the U.S. coast out to 200 NM around the contiguous 48 states , Hawaii , Puerto Rico , the Virgin Islands and Alaska , except the area north H of the Aleutian Islands . Three types of casualties are addressed in the study: groundings , coil is ions , and rammings. Vessels included in the study are tank vessels (tankers and tank-barges) over 1000 gross tons. The analysis of the causes of tank vessel casualt ies is performed mainly with the Coast Guard Merchant Vessel Casualty Report (MVCR) data base covering the period from July 1971 to October 1977 . Other data sources surveyed include: the Lloy d’ s Weekly Casualty Reports , the Tanker Casualty Library of Marine Management Systems , Inc .. and the Coast Guard Pollution Incident Reporting System. The nature and char- acteristics of tank vessel casualties that occur in the U.S. off shore wat ers are descr ibed . Systems and techniques considered as alternatives for preventing these casualties are identified , evaluated against each casualty and given an overall rating of casualty prevention effectiveness based on criteria which are defined. The promising systems are selected and conceptual descriptions are presented includ- ing the operational features , techn ica l descr iption , cos t , staffing and training required , and legal implementation considerations. The report is organized in three volumes: V~~~~~ I - - Exec utive Summary, Volume 11 -- Technical Analyses, and Volume III -- Ap nd s.z.es — I& tl_ ik..N_ Out Ves~ Jr Tc if ic Management , Tanker , Tank-Barge , Oil Pollution , DOCUMINI SAVA ILA SLI ro rHI U.s.PUSLIC THOOUOH THE NATIONAL. TECHNICAL Oil Imports , Vessel Collisions , NpO~~UATION $E~~V,CLSP~~INOPIILD. Gr oundings , Strandings , Argo vImo,NIA 22161 Merchant, Oil Sp ills , Rammings ____________________________________ tO . kcv.Dy Cissoll . ~ ,ipsd) 3D. $SU$I~ Cl...if. of ~~ .. , .) 2I~ N.. of P~~• 22. P’~es Unclassified Unclass ified 248 P.rm DOT P 1700.7 (0-72) ftsp,.ójssis,, .0 .sspi,e.d pus. uwWi.rIs.d ~ j~ . . - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .— r—~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~— - - - — --- .-.-—..-_ —--- - PREFACE The Offshore Vessel Traffic Management (OVTM) Study was per- formed in response to Presidential Initiatives issued in March 1977 which were a resul t of the Argo Merchant oil sp ill and several other tanker casualties that occurred in the U.S. offshore waters during the winter of 1976-77. These initiatives called for the Secretary , U.S. Department of Transportation , to perform several studies and take other actions to prevent or reduce the effects of oil spills from tank vessel casual ti es in the U .S. offshore waters . The OVTM Study was referred to in the Presidential Initiatives as “a study of long range vessel surveillance and control systems .” The Trans- portation Systems Center performed this work in support of the U.S. Coas t Guard and the Office of the Secretary of Transportation . The study effor t was init iated in August 1977 and comple ted in June 1978., / This study was direc ted by the Coast Guard Port Safety and V Law Enforcemen t Div ision wi th specific guidance by the follow ing individuals: CAPT Richard A. Bauman , USCG; CDR Eugene J. Hickey , USCG; Mr. Don Ryan , and CDR John Bannan , USCG. Special recogni tion is given to the Coast Guard Project Manager , Don Ryan , for his many help ful contributions to , and close associa tion with , the TSC study team . Other contributors were: CAPT (Ret. USCG) Harold Lynch , CAPT Ar thur Knig ht and CAPT Will iam Mitchell , all of the Boston Mar ine Society; John Devanney of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Transportation Studies; and Patricia Concannon and Jeanette Collier of TSC . . 1 ’ a — 0 1~iCi~ ~ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - - - — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J ~a,i,,e Iii I ~I -I I IhIl UI! Iii It J !;! ~~: $ 1 ~Ia! I I ; I IO ~~.) 1.$, .1- 1_ _ _ i e U IS II N I I &~ ~ ~ i” I” r’ I’’ 0 1 0 1 1 H i ii m iiukti~udiiOi lii III) If ui ii~iiu iI~~IU~I0IIv~llIIIN w~ooThidimIiiiUio mi IIIIIWNII 0 II UI 101 ou lieu ‘ii ilibol N N t’~’i’ ~‘I’rr1~rI’I’j:’l’I’1~ s’li’~’i’I’I’1’I’ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I ‘~‘1’~~k 2 .2.. i 1 i _ - _ _ ~’,’~ .‘~ I.. -’ j fljl 11111 ~ ii II ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ti ‘~ i ~~ 11111 I11~ IhuitH I S a I ..‘i ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ iv — - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ L - —--- -- — --— ____________________________ - 4.. — - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~.ew - - ~ - - TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II Sec ti on Page 1. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMLNDATIONS 1-1 1.1 Introduction 1-1 1.2 Conclusions 1-1 1.3 Recommendations 1- 4 2 . INTRODUCT ION 2-1 2.1 Background 2-1 2.2 Objectives 2 - 2 2.3 Scope 2- 3 2.4 Definitions of Terms 2-S 3. STUDY APPROACH ~-1 3,1 Introduction 3.2 Descri pt ion of Tasks 3.3 Assumptions and Guidelines 4. CASUALTY ANALYSTS 4-1 4.1 Introduction 4-1 4.2 Casualty Data Bases 4- 1 4.3 Identification of Casualties of Interest . . . 4 5 4.4 Casual ty Characteristics 4-14 4 .5 Causal Analysis 4-41 4.6 Estimation of Foreign Flag Casualties M i s s i n g From the OVTM Data Base 4-45 4. 7 Casualty Projections 4-53 4.8 Impact of Proposed Regulations 4-56 S. SYSTEM ALTERNATIVES c- i 5.1 Introduction 5-1 5.2 Assessment of Promising S stems 5-S 5.3 Less Promising Systems 5-8t, 5.4 Summary of System Costs and Effectiveness. . . 5-95 6. BENEFITS ANALYSIS 6- I 6.1 Introduction 6-i 6.2 Spill Charac teristics in Offshore Wa ters of the U.S 6-i — 6.3 Projected Trends 6-10 6 .4 Sp ill Cost Considerations 6- 11 7. RECO?’ThiENDED SYSTEM ALTERNATIVES V 1! -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —. — .~ .-- ~ _ ~ _ ~~~ _ ~ __ _4. -~~~-~~~ -———~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - T ’ ~ — — ------ . --- - - ~ — -—-—------- ~ —--‘r~ TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) VOLUME II Section Page 7.1 Introduc tion 7-1 7.2 Major Recommendations 7-14 7.3 High Effectiveness Option 7- 18 7.4 Other Recommended Actions 7-22 7.5 Legal Considerations 7-27 8. BIBLIOGRAPHY 8- 1 9. GLOSSARY OF TERI4S 9-1 0 -~~~~~ ~~ vi - — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~ _4 -I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — -- — - -—--- .~~— — LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS VOLUME II F i gure Page 3-I OVTM Study Tasks 3-2 4-I Sample of Lloyd ’s Repor t 4-4 4- 2 Grounding Locations Map 4-23 4-3 Collision Locations Map 4-24 4-4 Ramming Locations Map 4 - 2 5 4- 5 Number of Casualties Versus Distance Offshore 4-28 4 - 6 Time of Day for Casualties 3-32 4-7 Seasonal Variation of Casualties 4-36 4-S Ocean Bottom Conditions for Groundings 4-38 4-9 Collisions by Encounter Type 4-39 5-I Vessel Passport System 5-11 5- 2 Automatic Monitoring System 5-28 5-3 DF Surveillance System 5-37 5-4 Satellite Surveillance System (After Marisat) S-42 5-5 Processor A ided Navigation Alert System 5-56 5-6 Depth Alert 5-60 Scanning Sounder 5-63 5- 8 Collision Avoidance Aid 5- 9 Radar Perimeter Detection Device S - 2 S-lU VHF/Transponder System 5-1’6 S-l i Interrogator/Transponder System 5-82 6-1 Groundings of Tank Vessels Loaded With Oil (FY 19~ 2 - FY 1977) 6-S 6-2 Spills Due to Groundings Versus Spill Size 6-7 V ii ~~~~~~~~ -- I— —. - - • ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ - —•• ~ • ~~ ---.-— ~-- ~~~~~~ -.•-- ••-.•- — • — • —‘ ~~ •. •- - ---• - • - • ~~ - - ‘ ~~ -- ~ ----- - 1’ I LIST OF ILLUSTRAT IONS (Continued ) Figure Page 6- 3 Collisions of Tank Vessels Loaded With Oil (FY 1972 - FY l9~~ ) 6- 9 ‘-I Cost Effectiveness of the Promising Systems 7~ 7 Tota l Cost (Present Value) of Each Strategy y~~ Casualties Prevented ~-13 ‘-3 implementat ion Schedule for Passport System 7- 19 -4 Implementation Schedule for Passport System options 7- 2 0 ‘-S Automatic Monitor ing System Implementation Sc hedule -25 I . ~~ viii 14 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘~~- - - ______ - ,~~,___~~~~~i,.,. r”e’~---—.-- •— - L I S T 01 ( AR(.L S \OI U’ft Ii 4 - I i)AI.\ P:\R\Mi l’t l~ V 1FSCRI PTOR’ U SIP FOR CONPU rFR SORIS • 4 - cs 4 2 TANK 11551 1 C A S U A I V U S IN U. S. ~ AITRS - BY \VV UR1 : OF CA S UA L TY i. FY 1 9~ . — El 197 ) 4 S 4 3 TAN K VlSSE i t~R0UNl)1Nt S IN 1) .5, 1~AVUR S — SCuff FNF 1~ FOR CAUS E AN D L OCA l I ON 4 - 9 3- 4 lANK VUSS1 I COlLIS IONS 1 N U. S . WATIRS SC R FFNFP t)~ ~‘~‘)fl ~ p~ \~i~; \ r 5 5 ~~ s i —~~ • ~~~~~~~~~~~~ - D I C~ 4~A 11 ON .1 - 11 . f— S tAN K Vl SSH .\Nfl O11~ F A C I l I T Y RAMMINCS iN — u .S . WAT ERS . SCREENI D FOR CAUS E ANII Sri C 1 IC NATU R 1~ 01 (‘ASIIAI. 11 4 - 1 2 4 —6 NUMBI: R OF INC I DEN US I DENU I F I ED FOR CAUSA l. ANALYSIS 4 - 1 4 .1 - NUMBER OF iNC I DUN VS BY VE SSE l TYI’F I Slot VEP 4 - 16 4 - 5 NUMBER 01: V ESS E lS I NV0l~~E1) IS OlIN PA IA B\SF CASUA l V IES RI Ft Ai~ 4 - 1 4 ~ NUMBER ~1’ \.j :55fl 5 INV IVED I N OVUM DAt A BASE I NC1 DEN US RI CROSS tON NAt~E 4 - 19 4-10 NUMBER OF lA N K 1R S 1511 FINK RARtfl~S IN 0111.1 DAlI BA SE I NC I DEN V S BY L ROSS I’ONNACF 4 — 2 4 — l i ~FN1RM. 1 OC.•\UIO N OF CASI rAL V IES (SIX lEA R I’OlAi 5) 4—21 4 — 1 5I’l C lEt t. FOCI VI ON 01 (‘-\St IAl V IES 3—22 . 1—13 FIU QUEN I’ I OCAV IONS flR ~~\Stj~~11’i1~S 4 - 14 CA S UA l illS V ERSUS P15 VINCi OFFSUOR 4- 4— 15 GROIIN1)i N~ S P15 VANCE OFFSHORE VERSUS lOCAl ION . . . 4—50 4-16 COt I IS IONS - DISFAN CE OFFS1iORI~ VE R SUS lOCA l ION . . . . 4 .3~ 4- 1 — RA*U \CS — DISTA NC E OFFSHOR E VE RSUS I OCA F ION 4— 31 4-IS CA SUA l V I E S ~~ VI S IRII Iii 4-33 ix • ~~~ _~~~~1 ~~~~~~~ - • • - — ~~ - • - ‘ — _ _ _ _ - - - -—-~~~~~ -~~~~~~~--- - - _______ • • - ~~~~~‘ ‘ — - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - LI ST OF TABL ES (Continued) Table Page 3-19 C.ASL rA L.TIL S BY TIME OF [lAY A Nt) VISIBILITY 4 3 5 4-20 CASUALTIES RI h A P 4-37 4- 11 OCEAN BOTTOMS ~T 1.OCAU IONS OF FREQUENT GROUNDINGS 4-38 4 - 2 2 AW AR ENESS OF OTHER VESSEL IN A COLLISION 4 - 4 0 4 - 2 3 CAUS ES OF GROIIN DINGS 4 - 4 2 4 - 2 4 SELECTEI) CAUSATIVE FACTORS FOR GROUNDINGS 4 - 4 4 4 - 2 5 CAUSES OF COLL iSIONS 4 - 4 5 4 - 2 6 SELECTE D CAUSAT IV E FACTORS FOR COLLISIONS 4 - 4 6 3 - 2 7 CAUS ES OF RAMM INGS 4 - 4 7 4- 25 CAUS AT IV E FACTORS FOR RAMM Z NGS 4 - 3 7 4-29 ANALYSIS OF LLOYD’S SORT 4-50 4 - 3 ( 1 151115 IS o F ELOY1) ’ S SORT - CASE TYPES 4-50 3 - 3 1 ESTIMATION OF MISSING TANKER GROUNL )ING CASES 4-51 - 1-3 2 ESTIMA TION OF MISSIN G TANKF :R COLLISION CASES 4-51 4-33 ESTIMATED TOTAl, OVTM CASUALTIES OF INTEREST 4-52 4 - 3 4 TRA FFI C PROJECTIONS - Nu MBER OF LOADED TANKER I’RI PS PER Y E A R 4 - 5 4 4-35 CASUALTY PROJECT IONS-CURR ENt ’ SY s IEM 4 - 5 5 4 - 3 6 CASUALTY PRO.IECT !ONS - BASELINE SYSTEM 4 - 5 7 S 1 OPERATIONAL FEATUR ES S _ S 5 -2 PROMISING SYSTEMS 5- 4 5- 3 VESS EL POPULATIONS USED FOR COST ESTIMATES 5-96 5-4 V ESSEL OWNER COSTS FOR EACH SYSTEM 5-97 S - S GOVERNMENT COSTS FOR EACH SYSTEM 5-98 x _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ j r ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — - - - - - ~~~~~ LIST OF TABLES (Continued) Table SUMMARY OF SYSTEM 1 FFECF!VLNE S S 5-100 6-1 SN LLS IN OFFSHOR E WA T ERS OF TI lE U .S (Fl 1972 — Fl 1977) 6 - 3 6 - 2 S1~~E OF SPILLS DUE TO GROIINI)1NGS IN U. S . OFFSHORE WATERS (Fl 1972 - FY 1977) 6-t I 6- 3 PROJECTED TREN DS IN TANK \‘ESSI1L TRAFFIC AND S I Z E IN U.S. WATERS 6- 11 6- 4 SUMMARY OF ARGO MERCHANT 011, SPILL COSTS 6- 12 7-1 COST AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SEV EN POSSIBLE STRATEGIE S 7 -1 2 Xi/X i i •‘ —-—---_ -~~—~~~~~~~~~~ ——--—— —•— ‘• -•—• • —•--_ - ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ -~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ - - — - - 1. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOM1~ENDATIONS 1.1 INTRODUCTION This study focuses on tank vessel grounding , collision , and • ramming casual ties which occur in waters offshore of th~ U.S. out to 200 NM and are potentially preventable by some type of offshore • vessel traffic management (OVTM) system . The term “s y s t e m” is used in a broad sense to include any combina tion of rules , pro- cedures , regula tions or equipment. Vessels of rimary interest to the study include tank ships and tank barges over 1000 gross tons. The major source of data used in the casualty analysis was the U.S. Coast Guard Merchant Vessel Casualty Reports covering the per iod from July 1971 through September 1977 . The study included two major tasks : a) the determination of the causes of oil polluting casualties in the offshore waters , and b) the assessment of al ternative sys tems for preven ting these casualties. An est imated 121 offshore tank vessel casualties occ urred during the period of interest ( FY72 - FY77) . Seventy-eight of these cases , which were documen ted by detailed casualty investi- gation repor ts , were analyzed for causal determination and assess- men t of system alternatives. 1.2 CONCLUSIONS The conclusions of the study are : a. The number of tank vessel collisions and ground ings that occur in U.S. offshore waters is approximately 9% of the total num- ber of these types of casualties in all U.S. waters. However , this f igure does not reflec t the propens it y for “mass ive” oil spills (over 1,000 ,000 gallons) in offshore waters . For example , in 1976 , • offs hore oil spillage reached forty percent of the total , almost entirely due to the grounding and subsequent breakup of the Argo Merc hant. L 1—1 - ~~~~ ~ . ‘~~~~ I ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — ——F—-— J’ ..~~ — —,————— --• —— —•‘-- —------ —• •— ~~ ~~~~ ._ —‘—- ~~ . _.., .:~ —~~~~~~~~~ ---. ~~ ‘ ,• • ~~~ .. . : ‘ h. Ground i ngs probab I y cons t I tut e the major t hi-eat o i~ pro - duc ing o i 1 sp i lls which may substant in 1 ly impact the publ Ic we ! fare and env i ronment because these casual t ies occur c lose to shore or I’ i shing a reas where oil spillage Potent ial ly causes the most damage. c . The casualt y that re sults in a ‘‘mass i ye ’’ o i l sp i 11 is rare . Onl y one’ • the Argo Merchant , occurred in U.S . offshore waters in the six - year period studied . Mass ive spi I is ~ltie to coil i - s ions , ground i ngs and ramni I ngs (of offshore oil product ion! trans ~~~ fac ii it it’s) have occurred worldwide at the average rate of three per ~‘ear . However , the potential for mass lye oil spills in IJ .5. ¶ offshore waters does ex i st and w i l l 1 1 kel y Increa se a long w i t h the proj cc ted inc reast’s in the’ volume of tanker t ff. Ic and in the s i ~es of tank vessels . - Measures a! reads’ I nit I ated which will lead to the Base! i ne svs tern (e . g . , dua l radars . LORAN— C , etc . 1 w i l l be helpful in reduc ing the potent Ia I for casual ties resu lt i h g in muss i ye oil spil lage . d . Costs incurred due to o Ii spills are highly dependent on t he locale and environmental conditions as well as t~’pe of oil and s p ill s i z e , and can i~un to several m ill i on dollars per inc iden t . e. Many of the factors that contribute to grounding s and ramm ing s are unique to the local area , while the factors involved in c o l l i s i o n s arc generally the same for all areas. 1. Th e ma jor it v (over 90 percent) of offshore casua It i es occur wit hin 50 NM of the shore; the greatest distance from sh or e of any casualty in the data base was 108 NM. Therefore , t here is l i t t le need I oi- any system to ~ roy ide surveillance cove rage to 200 NM. g. The occurrence of collisions shows strong correlation w ith weather and reduced v i s i b i l i t y , while ground i ngs and ramm I ngs do not show such a strong c o r r e l a t i o n . h. Rammings of offshore oil platforms rarely result in any oil sp ill , and very rarely, if ever (none in the data base’) cause a s p i l l a g e of o il from t he oil pla tform itself. • ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -~~~~-- -‘ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ I . Tra ff Ic delis it y is ilot a f a c t o i- in the large m a j o r i t y o t ca su alt ies . It is rare’ that a c o l l i s i o n in vol v es a third vessel except in ~ie case of tugs with barges . In 90% of the ground jugs onl the ves sel that grounded was involved in the events lead ing to the ’ inc idei~t . The’ rummin gs ( o f o i l pla t forms) inv olved only the vessel wh ich rammed the’ oil p1 at foz - m. H j . The major causes of’ ground ings are : 1) lack of ’ at t e nt ion - • to and misju dgment of the v ess e l ’ s locution and mov ement rel at lye to the water dep t h , 2) lac k of vigilance by the ci-ew in using al l av ai lable navigation information , 3) unsuitable sy stem for p i l ot hoarding of deep draft vessels , 4 ) lac k of know ledge of the presence of submerged obj ec t s and shoal s , 5) POolS nay I gut iOn! nianeuve r I ng j rac t ice ; and 6) inoperable or ma I func t ion lug nay i ga — t ion equipment . k. The ma jol- causes of c o l l i s i o n s are: 1) lack of’ estab- ii sh ing vesse l - to - vesse l coinmun i cat ions and agreeing Ofl il p1 an for p~ISS ing , 2) poor seamansh ii) , or what m i ght he ca lIed a ‘‘lack of defensive sailing ’’ , espec ial I under cond it ions of poor v l s i hi l i t v 3) lack of timel y assessment of the imminent danger of coil is ion, and 4 ) agree d upon , or standard pass lug maneuver is perfoi-med po or ly. 1 . Tugs with barges used in the t t-ansport of’ oil present a tIe f i n i t e risk of an o i l po1 lut ing inc ident occurring. There are ~~~~~ of t hese vessels cu r ry lug large quant it it’ s (over 100 ,000 gal ions) of oil or petroleu i products w i t h some vessels tr aveling long distanc e’ s , from t he Gulf of Mex ico to the northeastt’rn U.S. ports. These v e ss e ls lac k nay i gut loll equipment and stiff i c ient s t a f f 1mg, ce rt if icat ion and training of the crew for such voyages on the open ocean. Some of these newet- barges are larger (on the order of 15 ,000 GT) t han t he older t anke rs and have a draf t as much as 30 feet ; in spite of this , they are’ exempt from the equip- ment and c e r t i f i c a t i o n t-egulut ions placed on the tankers. • in. P i lot age t runs fer oporat ions in some areas are quite’ inadequate for t he need s of tank v e s s e l s navigating in hay and port entrances. (Examples are: Delaware Bay and G u a y a ni l l a Bay , P . R . ) I -~ — — — ‘ y~~. — - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ •;~.;~~~~ - - - _ -~~~~ _ . • - ,Iu~~ n. A navi gation aid equivalent to LORAN-C should be required equipment on seagoing petroleum carrying tank v e s s . I s down to 300 gross tons , because a ves sel of this size Ciiii p o t e n t i a l ly cause a major * o il spill if improperly navigate d. o. The resul ts of the study do not at this time indicat e a j u s t i f i cat i o n for either a satellite surv e ill ance ’ or satellite commun ications system as a cost - e f f e c t ive alt ernative foi- prevent - ing or reducing the risk of oil polluting c a s u a l t i e s in the 11 .5. of fshore waters. .3 RECOMMENDAT IONS ‘rhe recommendations result lug from the study are a. impl emen t a rule requiring all seagoing petroleum carrying vessels over 300 gross tons to he equi pped w ith LORAN-C , or ~~ equivalen t nav iga tion aid. b. Install RACONS on s c l e c t e d buoys or t o w e r s to posit iv e ’Iy ident ify the entranc e to ha rhoi- s , t r a f f ic lanes and fa i rway s and ot her hazardous , frequently traveled offshore areas. Example locat iOt~s arc : Delaware and Chesapeake Bays . and the ía i rw ayc in the t u l f of Mexico. c . Perform a study of p I lotage prac t I te s in Pt’ law art’ and Guayan li la Bays . Over f o r ty percent of all ground j ugs anal zed in the study occurred in these tuo bays. U. Assess the c o s t s and benefits of providing LORAN-C cov e r- age for the Puerto Rico and Virgin Hilands area . This aid-to • navigation would like lv have prevented one ground lug and poss I hI v have pt-cvente d others. e. Upgrade the requirements for I icens ing, licen se renewal and train ing of m a s t e r s and offic ers of tank vess e ls to Inc luck’ periodic t e s t s and demonstration of ’ pro ficienc y ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y eve ry five yea rs) In the nay i gut ion of deep dra ft yes St’ Is , in t he use anti operation of a LI navigation aids , and in t he knowl edge of ’ regula tions aad Rules of the Road. ‘K mi~1or oh spill is defined as greater than 1(1(1,000 gal b u s 1 -4 - ~~ ~~~~~~ • ~~~~ • ——-.— -________ - ~ - ~~~~ —- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~-*~~~ - ~~~~ -. —‘~‘-~~~— •- ‘ - - - 1 f. Implement t he “vessel passport” system descr ibed in Sect ion 5 .2 . 2 and 7 .2. The cos ts to the user and the Government would be low , assuming existing communications systems are used . This is a “cor e” sys tem that is expandable as the need develops. In approx ima tely three years a s tudy should be made to asses s the need , benef it s and cos ts of upgrading the capab ilit y of the “vessel passport” system . g. Conduc t a design and feasibility demonstration study of a low Cos t transponder system . The projected cost of a proposed VHF/T ransponder sys tem , descr ibed in Sec tion 5 .2. 17 , appea rs to he reasonable , but a design study is needed to establish more accu- ra tely the hardware Costs and feasibility of the system . h. Change the equ ipmen t , licensing and pilo tage require- ments for ocean-going tugs with barges that carry oil , petroleum produc ts and othe r haz ardous subs tance s to be comparabl e to thos e for tank shi ps. Such vessels should also be required to operate wit hin any offshore vessel traffic management system required of tank sh ips. i. Develop uniform p ilotage practices and licensing require- men ts for pilots in all U.S . coastal states and territories. j . Ma intain active involvement in the’ development of new techniques and systems . The Coast Guard should initiate more fea si b i l i ty design and demonstration programs of promising systems and techn iques in offshore nav ig ati on and co mmun i ca ti ons in order to con t inually upgrade t he ir capabili ty for reduc i ng t he po t en t ial for o il polluting vessel casualties and to provide valuable tech- nical inputs into national and international maritime safety programs. k. A study should he made of the applicability of the “recom- mended” sys tem alternatives proposed in this study to other Coast Guard mission areas. 1-5/1- 6 p - ‘ - --- - ~~~~‘--- .-—- ~~~~~‘~~~~~1•~~~ r — - — ‘.- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —~~~ ,~~~~~~~~ - 2. INTRODUCTION 2. I A s e r i e s of tan k vessel cas ualt it’s in the ~% Int e r of l9” t~—~~’. the most famous of which w a s the ground ing of the Argo Merchant in l)ecemh&’ r i 9’ n , has 11 I gh lighted t he need for i nip roy t’lnent s in mar inc sa fet V to prevent oil p01 lut ion o t~ t ile (I . S . offshore w a t e r s and the associ a ted damag e’ to va luable fishing areas , coast I umit ’ beaches , and other pa rts of tile CIIV I ronment . It has been suggest eel by govern - mnent leaders t hat a sho re— baset i syste m p’ o v id ing offshor e’ vessel t rul lic management se rv ices could 5 1 gn if i cant 1 y reduce the r I sk of tan k vesse l casualt ies by ass 1st j ug vessel s in det ect ing and avoIding Ila :ardous Si tuat ions. In t-ecognit ion of the potent ial environmental and ecological damage caused by tan k vessel c a s u a l t i e s , bot h the United S t a t e s and the I nt ergovernnlental Mar it inc Consultat lye Organ i zat ion ( IMCO) • • -~ recent lv considered and cont inue to cons icict sev e ral propos~ils for new requ i rement S , inc hid i ng prec is i Oil Ship boai-d nat’ igat ion equip — nient s , c o i l is ion avoidance system s , dual u-adat’ sys tems , vess el rout ing systems in hi gh t ra fl’ic a reas , fllOl’C St F ingent Ci•CW quiil i f i — cat ions , more ’ St 1’ 1 ngcnt ship const ruct ion standards , and inc teased re I jab l i l t v in ship steel’ i ng and propu is io n systems . In Feb ruar 19 ”8 an Int e rnational Conference adopted requirements on dual radar s ste ms . improved emergenc y steering and ship const ruct ion . :\nother conference , c- onc 1 uded in Jul v 1 9’ 8 . adop t ed pros’ I s I oiis for un I form crew quail f icat ions. These act ions largely stemmed from the March 19 ”’ P re s i d e n t i a l initiat ives to reduce maritime oil pollution. l’hcse in it i at ive’s a I so ca l led for i nimed late act i Oft Oil the part of the Secretar y of ‘iran spor tat ion to pe rio t-rn se~’era I in -depth stud i c’s and to take regul atory actions as ant hot i zed by law to preve nt Or reduce the occurrence of ca sual t i es invo lv ing tank v e s s e l s and ot het’ ha zardous cargo ca m -t iers. The problem of oil pol but iOtl due to vessel ca sual t it’s in offshore w a t e r s is characterized i-’v the infre quent occurrence , vet d e f i n i t e risk , of a large spill (greater than 100 ,000 gal lo mu s ) . An 2-I - ~~4 E — ‘- • - ~~~ -—‘ ~~ —- ~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~~— - - - - — ‘—- .- ~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ‘ - -. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ ‘- — —.-, ~~~~ example of t he r a r i t y of a large spill is that only 6 of 55 offshore ground ings analyzed in the period of Fl 72-77 resulted in a large sp i l l , and 88 percent of the volume spilled was due to the Ar go Merchan t incident. h owever , the potential for these large spills is l ikely to increase as the tank vessel traffic increases to handle the h i gher demand for oil impor ts to the United States . Th is stud y of Offshore Vessel Traff ic Managemen t w as one of the items ca lled for in t he Pres iden t ’s March 1977 i n i t i a t i v e s to the Depar tment of Transpor tat ion , spec i f i c a l l y referred to as “a study of long range vessel surveillance and control S stems ”. The Coas t Guard was gi ven t he respo ns i b i li ty for perfor mi n g t h e s tudy and t he Transportation Systems Center , in support of the Coast Guard , began work on t he s tudy in Augus t 1977 . The purpose of th i s stud y was to determine the causes of tank vessel casu alt I es and per - form an assessment of vessel traffic management alternatives for preven ti ng pollu ti ng inciden ts in wa ters offshore of the U. S. Th i s t echn ical s tudy exam ines traff ic managemen t alterna ti ve s as a means to reduce or eliminate casualties contributing to pollu- ti on of the mar ine env i ronme nt . No thing con tai ned in th is repor t should he cons trued as affecting or changing the Administration ’s position on offshore claims in general or at the Third United Nations Conference on t he Law of the Sea in particular. 2 . 2 OBJEC TIVP S The major objectives of the study were: a) to anal ze the causes of tanker casualties that could potentially result in oil pollution, and h) to define and evaluate various alternative vessel traffic management systems and techniques for prevention of oil pollut ing casualties in U.S. offshore waters. It was determined early in the stud y that an essential first step to developing feas- ible and effective alternative prevention S stem s was to thoroughl y unders tand the factors contributing to tank vesse l pollution inc i- den ts. Therefore , an important secondary objective was to invest i- gate all facets of the current total maritime env ironment , including the rules . regu la t ions , accep ted practices , aids to nav igat ion , 2.2 — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — .,- ‘-.-‘- —~——-. 3 ~~~~~ -’ ~ .’ —‘— ‘-,r~ --- to pography of the heavily traveled port and harbor entrances , pilot- age pra ctices , bridge discipline , international rules and require- ments , and sh ipboard and shore based equipment. These elem ents comprise the operating framework for the present day mariner. 2 .3 SCOPL The scope of the s tudy i s def ined by the geograp hical areas of interest , the typ os of casualties that are potentially prevent- able by some vessel tra ffic management system or techni que , and the sizes and types of 511 1 1)5 which cause oil polluting incid ents that result in significa nt damage to the shore and the env i ronmnent The geograp hical area of interest consists of the waters from the U.S. coastline out to 200 nautical miles around the conti guous 48 states , Hawaii , Puer to R ico , the Virgin Islands , and Alask a , excep t til e area north of the Aleutian Islands. f or the purpose s of t his report , reference to “of fshore waters ” includes the hig h seas and territorial seas adjacent to the U .S. coastline constituting appro aches to U.S. ports. Excluded from tile stud y are po rt s , harbors , and inland wate m -w a s. For purposes of t his stud y the boundary separating o f f s hore and inland waters was established as t he mouth Ol~ narrowest poin t in the harbor entrance approaching fro m the sea. Also , offshor e channels less than 1000 feot wide were excluded from cons ideration in the study. The casualties that occurred in L ong Island Sound were included in the analysis because t he distance between the island anti mainland was considered to precent navigation problems similar to those in the harbor entrance areas. Tank vessel casual ti es re su l ti n g in o i l sp i ll age are varied in na ture. Some involve malfunctions of such things as the eng ine! propulsion system , shi p ’ s structure , steer ing system , and the elec- t r i ca l power system . Ot hers are caused by cleaning of oil compart- men t s ( t rapped ga ses some t imes resul t in explosions) . Some casu- alties of these types cannot he reduced or prevented by a v e s s e l t r a f f i c management s~- st em; t he~’ were excluded from the stud . Casua lties which wei- e considered preventable by some vessel t r a f f i c 2 - 3 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - . - -~ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -~~~~~~~~~~ -~ ~~~~~~~~~ -—— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~~ --- - •- ---‘-~--- - -- - - ~‘?~ management system or technique include groundings , coll isions , and rammuings . Thi s study concentrates solely on these three types of casu alt ics for determining causes and assessing alternative systems for pr event ion. the terminology used here (groulldings , collisions , t-amm ings and vesse l t ra ffic management systems) is defined in Sect ion 2 .4 . Vt’sse 1 s i :t’s of interest in this s tudv include merchant vessels ov et- 1000 gross tons. t ’ I i li t ar v vessels and pleasure craft were not consi dered because tile number of these over 1000 gross tons tel at ive to the merc ham l t \ e s s e ’ 1 1’ 1 eet is s m a l l . However , it i s recognized that any operat ional imn p i ement at ion o t the vessel t ra fi ic management a 1 ternat ives coil s ide red for prevent ing coil is ions and rammings would of n e c e s s i t y require the cooperation of all v e s s e l s — inc lud ing these two groups. S 111cc the s udy addresses the preven- tion of oil pollut ing vessel casualties , til e anal y sis of ground i~ was directed pr imaril y at tank v essel casual t it’s , whereas the collisions analysis included all ships over 1001) gross toil s because — an~’ ship which nav i gates improperly can pot ent jail y coil ide w i t h a tanker and cause an oil sp ii i . In the zinal s i s of rarnmifl~ s of offshore oil product ion and trans icr f a c i l i t i e s , all vessels over 1(100 gross tons were COIl S idered willie the ana lvs is of ramm im ings of aids to navigation , ice and float ing ot- submerged o bj e c t s dealt oTll\’ wit h tank v e s s e l s . Tile C~ it e i- ia used in the select ion of casualt it’ s for detailed causat lye analys is are discussed in Sect ion 4 .3. In t he case of ramnm ings otil” those involv ing offshore oi 1 product ion anti transfer f a c i l i t i e s were selected for d e t a i l e d a n a ly s i s . The scope of tills study does not include any ana ly sis of other Coast (hmard mission areas (e.g., Searc h and Rescue , Fisheries Patrol , etc.) whic h may have need s similar to that of oil pollution preven t ion. — The approach taken ft-on the casualty analys is was to use actual case ’ record s of casualty inc idents to determine , to the’ exten t possible , til e causes of oil pollution casualties. Because of t he limited time for performing the study it was necessar y t o use a data base t hat al read y e x i s t e d , c onta illed tile most complete c a s e r e c o r d s and w a s read il v access ib le. Tile U.S . Coast Guard 2 - 4 - - — -.~w---_*__ ~~~~~~~~~~ — — ~~~~~~~~~ .- ‘.---- ~~~.- — ‘—~~~w -~~ -- ~ —.~~~~~~~~~~ -‘w-- — . , ~~.— — Merchant Vessel Casualt y f ile co~’ering t he pei-iod from Jul~’ l9~ i t hrough September l9”7 was selected as the primary data base for t he stud . A descri ption of t his data base is presented in Section 4 . 2 .1. Systems and tec hniques coii s idered within the scope of tile study as potent ial alternatives for prevent ing casualties include a ful 1 ramige’ of approache s from m inor chan ges in operat ing procedu t-es and regulat ions to add ing now shipboard electronics and s hore -based monitoring and control s t a t i o n s . 2 .4 DEFINITIONS OP TERMS Before proceeding w i t h the discussion of tilt’ approach and results of t he study, some of t ile more freq uen t l v used terms are defined . (Refer to Section 9 for ~i list ing of other terms. ) .\ ‘‘vessel ’’ is defined as an 511 i p . barge or boat i’egat-d I t’ss of si :e ’ funct ion or cargo ca r r led. The t erm ‘‘tan k vessel ’’ is used most frequent lv in tIllS repol- t and includes all tank sli l ps , h u l k cargo c a r r i e r s • anti barges that transport crude oil or pet i’ol eum Product s . Tank sit i ps . tankers and tank barges are vessel s t hat carr y only oil or pet roleum products. ila:artiotis cargo c;i t’r j et ’ s are ships and bar ges t hat carry cilem nicals and otiler substances ila:ardous to the eflv i ronmnent t he tei-m ‘‘s s t em’’ i s used in a broad sense to mean a group o i collec t I ye hotl y of t iii ngs organ i zed in some manner to accomp Ii sh a sing le purpose. Some ex~ mnples are: a) any comb i ml at io n of opet-at ing rules , regul at ions . j~i~oce~iLi i’e’s , shi pboa rd equ i pmn ent , marker buoys si gnal 1 ig ht s , and gOverntlleflt or industry hod i es wit i CII may be used independent lv or c o l l e c t ivel in ami~’ grouping to irov ide the means for safe passage of v e s s e l s amnong other vessels or na tural ha:ard s b) a set o f equipment which per~ o~-ms t ile funct iOn of providing navi - gat ion I nformat ion to the shill ’ s ca pta i tl , suc h as tile i OR.-\N - C sy stem . The casualty types (groundin gs , c o l l i s i o n s , and rammin gs ) addressed in the studs ’ are def imled accord imIg to terminology recom- mended by t he Coast Guard . The tel-tn “c o l l i s i o n” i-efers to the’ cot Lid ing of’ two s hips where one or both are underway. ••\ ‘‘gr ound 1115 ’’ is defined as an~’ s ituat lOfl in which a ship comes in contact with 2 - s — ,. ~~~~~~~ ~ ‘ - — —~~--~~ ,_~_ -~-:--~~L ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ‘~~~~~~~~ “~~~ ‘~~~~~~ - ‘~~~ i~~~~~—’- ~‘~~~- T ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ “~~~ the ocean bottom , t he coast land , a submerged roc k , or a reef. A stranding is treated as a grounding. A ‘‘r amming ’’ is defined as a ship colliding with a fixed , floa ting or submerged object. This term is not used in the sense of a shi p im l te n tiona l l ramming anot her ~h ip as in mill ta ry com bat T he term “Vessel Tra f f i c Management” refers to t he organi :at ion 4 of the movement of ships in an~’ given area for the purpose of i mpr ov - ing the s a f e t y of the vessel and the marine environment. This may he accomplished il a number of wa y s inc lud ing operat i ng rules and proced ures , nay I gat I Ofl a i..is and cotnmnun 1cM ions equ ipnm ent , and shore — based monitot- ing and surveillance sv stemns . It should be clearl y underst ood that tile vessel t r a f f i c management system s and techni ques developed i n tills study were based on tile P 1Ct1l ~~5t’ that the vess e l master a li~avs has the re~ pon s ii -~ iii tY and autilor i ty to ml11~’ i gate Ili s ship as he sees f i t for the safety of all ships concerned . In this cont ext , t ile responsibility ot’ a monitoring ot- surveillance sy stem is to: a) i rov ide addit ional imlform at ion (advisories) of hazardous condit ions to all shi ps , and b) detect any ship t hat is t’ l e a r l v he it~g nay I ga ted in an unsafe manner and ta ke app 1-op riM e’ act ion to ass 1st her to safety to pr i’cnt a casualty . — — - ~ -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~,i ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -w-’-w~.e.~ ~~~~~~r “‘ ~~~~,.. - ~i”- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ “~~~~ ~‘‘ ‘~~~~“ ‘ ~~~~~~~~‘~~~wi~ ” 3. STUDY APPROACH 3 . 1 1 NTROI1UCF ION i’he phi losop hv used throughout t his study was that a thorough understanding of all facets of the offshore oil sp illage problem and the mariner ‘ s env i m’onment was essent ial for the development of realistic and effective solutions, Ba sed Ofl t h i s , m a j o r attention was g iven to a mia lv:i ng actual detailed casualty reports of’ incidents t hat occ urred in U.S . w aters dur ing the past six years. Also , Li t e r a t u r e and studies on t his subject we t- c reyiewed , and protes- s tonal s in the mima r it inc t ransp ol-tat ion industry w e r e c o n s u l t e d . The c l a s s i c approach in a study of this type would he to con — H plete the a n a ly s i s of t he casualties and define the requirements befo re addressing the potential solutions. However , tile limited time available to perform this study made it necessary very earls’ in t he program , to init iate the second major task , which was tile def m i t ion of alt ernat ive svst ems and tec hniques appl icahi e to tile prevent ion of oil pollut ing casualt ic’ s in tJ .S. o f f s hore waters. This approach is hel ieveel valid because development of a gemlera l list of reasom lable alternative systems was based on a review of i~ert inent literature and t he use of engineet ing ludgement , w h i l e t he successive steps of evaluating and selecting tile prOmisiilg systems were based on t he casualty anal~’sis results. 3.2 [IESCRIP’F ION OF TASKS — l’hi s study is div ideti into two ma lo r t a s k s : Casualt y Anal vs is and A l t e r n a t i v e s A n a ly s i s . Several smaller tasks are included in these major tasks and are shown in Figure 3- 1. The major tasks are discus sed below. 5 . 2 . 1 Casualtv An al~’sis Tiil s task includes two parts: anal s is of cas ua lt it’s and a n al~’sis of t r a f f i c . The general approacil for both was to deter- m ine pas t trends and pattern s , and to projec t future t r a f f i c and 3-1 —-~~~ -,. ~~—— - ~~~ --- -- -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~ =-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - ~~~~~~~ -~~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —---- , ~~~~.‘ - -~---‘-,---- - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~~~ --“ - ----—-‘- ‘--- -‘--‘ - ~~ —-“ -------, ~ ---- - ca sua It i es us ing t’ St ima t c’s of growth in o 1 1 demand anti current! expe c ted changes imi the’ future marl t ime fi cc’ The pr m a rv ob ject I ye of’ the ca sua It v anal vs is was to o bta in sut t’ic iemi t Jet a i it ’d in forma t ton on past incid ents so as to tie t ermine the t a c t oi- s that cause or cont i’ i but t ’ to cas ua 1 t ics in the o f f s h o r e wat ers . .-\s t riLl icat ed in Sect ion 2 the types of ’ c a s u a l t i e s to he inc luded ill the stud y wer~’ 1 jm i t e ,,I to omi 1~ ’ those that some ty pe of v essel t r a f ’fic managemn e’nt tec hnique or sy stem could po tenti a i l v prevent , spec if ’ ic al lv: ground in gs , coil is ions , ami d ramm 11155 . The cas ua it v dat a sources tha t we re examin ed Inc lucled : the U. S . Coas t G u a r d Merchant \cssc’ I Casualt y Repor ts (,MV C R ) , the 1.1 ovd ‘ s l~c’c’k 1 y Casua it v Repor t s , and Mar i nL’ Managem ent Svst ems c’ontp ut en zed casua l ty f i l e s . The i ll c’ of Me rchant Vt’s se I Cas ua It v Reports cover - ing the pe riod f rom Jul y 197 1 through Sept ember 1977 was se 1cc t eel as the pri mar y data hast’ for determining the c a u s a t iv e f a c t o r s because of comp i c’t eness Iri tile’ Iii for m nat ion conc e m’n lug the cas ua It v situati on both from the mnar imic ’r ’s and the i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c i a l’ s ~ 0 m t of v j ew . I’he cases from this file were t rca ted as represent a — ive of ’ tile tank vessel casualt y problem. l)ata from the other two source s were used for s t a t i s t i c a l aria lvsis and ex a iflifl at ion of other f a c t o r s . l’ht’ output of the causat I ye aria I vs is was usetl to de rive pl’e — 1 in m ary requ irements for a vessel t r a f f i c management sy stem. The other s igni I ica nt input to t hest’ requirements came from the vessel t r a f f i c ’ p r oj e c t ions. Est m ates of future casualt y trend:’ wt’rt’ based on future t r a f f i c p r oj e c t i o n s and Past t r a f f i c ’ and c a s u a l t y pat t em s. Ihe deta I led casua 1 tv anal vs is was Ier formed by the ‘I’ ra~ispoi’ - tat ion S ystems Ce’nter s t a f f . Support was pr ov ided by til e Boston Mar inc Soc i et\’ and the Ma ssachuse’t ts Inst it ute of Fechno 1 OgV — Center for ‘i’ ran sportat ion Studies. The Bost on Marine Soc iet y pro - v ided the serv ices of profess jolla I imiar iners in aria lv: ing the casualt y causes and evaluating tile e f f e c t iv t ’ ne s s of sy stem feature s as pi’eventat ive measures. ‘l’he MIt’ effo i- t w as d irected toward two areas: the a n a l y s i s of c a s u a l t i e s on a worl dwide basis , arId tile’ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ ~~~~~ç- ~~~~~ . developmen t of estimates of future traffic trends and patterns in U.S. offshore waters . The purpose of the traffic analysis was first , to provide informa t ion for projecting future casualty trends , and second , to indicate the capabil ities mequiretl of alternative vessel t r a f f i c management systems in the future. ‘t’he approach used in projecting t r a f fi c trends was to take into account a n t i c i p a t e d changes in oil import volume and destination and vessel s iz e s . ‘this task is discus sed furt her ill Section 4 . 3 .2 . 2 A l t e r n a t i v e s Ana ly s i s The alternatives analysis includes severa l tasks which are closely related. The approach used was to divide the analysis into four parts: a. lde mlt if y and define: general s y s t e m types , severa l appli - c a b l e systems m’or eac h system type , and basic features of eaCil system; b. Perform d e t a i l e d ana lys is including e f f e c t i v e n e s s of featut-es , technic a l evaluation of systems , implementation consid era - H tions (cost , legal , s t a f f i n g , and operation and maintenance), and f e a s i b i l i t y assessment; C . Evaluate e f f e c t i v e n e s s and benefits of the most promising systems; and d. Select recommend ed systems or system comb m a t ions. Included in this task was an attem pt to thoroughl y reseat’cil tile literature and other sources to learn of the systems and techniques that had been examined or impleme nted in the P~1st and use that information where applicable. National and international proposals fot c hanges or addi t ions to either rules or equipment were evaluated for a p p l i c a b i l i t y to the requirements of off ’shore vessel tr a ffic management. The approach used in assessing systems was to first identif y a l l the “fea tures ” embodied in each alternative system or techni- que . (A system or technique may include one or more features. ) The effect iveness of each feature in preventing casualties was 3-4 _ ___ ___ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — - — ~~~~~~~~~ - -~~~~~~ -~~~~~ est imated against each casualt y in tile primary data base , amid , tite’ effec t iveness of each svsten t was then tier iveti from the t’eatures that make up a part i cul at’ system . lii i s approach w as used because fea t ures are s ign if i cant !” less complex than systems , and moi’ e readil y ev aluated and compareti . It also ma kes the eft ’ectiven es s assessment more cons i stent for all the casual tv cases. The spec jt’ic features are discussed in Sect ion 5. 3. 3 ASSUMPT IONS ANti GUI i)EL1 NES The assumptions amld guide I irles used in t ilt ’ study were estab- ii shed by the Coast G u a r d . i’he lot lowing i s a summnarv of these assumptions and guidelines. ‘t’he study cons idered onl y ships over 1000 g r o s s t o n s . In the anal y s i s ot grountiings , oiil~’ those involving tank v e s s e l s were coil - sidered . Colt i sion incidents invo lvi n g at least one tank vessel were included . The ex aminat ion of ’ ram nmni ngs of offshore oil product i on/t 1-ail s fey fac ii It ic’s I fi t’ I tided cases invol v i rig all vessels ov er 1000 gross toils. The a n a ly s i s of ’ other m-amnm in g incident s wa s 1 itnited to those involving olll\’ tank vesse ls , Harbors , bays , and other internal wat ct’ s wet’c cxc hid i’d f rom cons idei’a t j olt . Add it ion - all y , casua it ies occum’ r ing in i-est t’ i c ted channels of less than 1 000 feet were cxc luded , s ince these tvp it all y di Ifer in cause from other o ffshore casua It i cs. Ship—board equ i pmnen t , assumed to be 011 a l l sit i P’ ent em ’ i mtg II. S . nay i gab Ic vat ers and bound for a 11 ,5. port includes all present nay j gat ion ~fltl L.,.,~nlun icat ion gea r plus lOR ’t~” I’ om’ some comparabl e long range nay i g:i t on equ i pnrent and cltt Zt I radmi i’s Alt hough coil i sion avoidance equipment has been propose d as a requirement lot’ ships over 20 ,001) dead we ight tons * , t iii s wa s not cons idered an exi st ing re quiremen t for the purpose o I this s tudv Potential sharing of f a ciliti es of the Automated Mutual -assist a nc e Vessel Rescue (AMVER) system was to be examined for appi ic’at j olt im i a reporting/ monitoring s\ ’stc m. *Ofle dead wei ght ton equals approx imat ei~’ one- hal f gross to il , e.g . 20 ,000 PWT 10 ,000 GT. 3-s - h1 ___________ ~~~~~~~~~~ •1 - - ., - ~~~~~~~~~ - ,‘ - - - - — --——- “--‘-——----—-‘—--—----.—‘------————. - -~~ ‘— —.— - - ‘— —-— - ~~~~~~ — ._ - a’ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —p.— — - - — - - - - t ’u r r e’it t (1.5 . i e g u i a t ions api) ! it ab le to \‘e’5~~c’ i t 1.111 It lttaltiige’ — me’mit S V ~t emits or t ec hit I ques a t’e en f’o r c ea h Ic on f o r e i ~~ii f l ag vi’ s se 1 s OII I v In the U .S. nay ig.th Ic vat ers , tie I iited as those with iii 3 in ii c’s of f’shore’ , W hen bound f’or a LI . S. p01 ’t a l l fore i git yes set a m e requ i red to not I fv t he’ appl’opt’ i ate’ Coast (11a i’d Capt a lit of t lie I’oi’ t lt ’OIl’ ) of t h e i r planned entr y at le a st 2.1 it o tit s pm ’io i’ to a r m i v i i i . * Ami~ ’ ve ssel I m a I I’ i c management s s t em i nvo iv i ng silo I’d’’ based SLil’Vt ’ I I lanc e’ tuti st als o inc I ride t he tapab t 1 It v to cotttmuut ic a t e w i t h v e s s e l s . Hot Ii “act i ye ” and “p a s s t ye” approa c hes for ves se l t m.a f f 1 c lnanageme mit w e r e t o be’ exam i ned . (See Sect ion ~) fom di’ I in It i otis of thes e’ terms . ) A s s e s s m e n t of each alt erlt~tt iv e sy stem inc ludes cons idem ’at loll of: b e n e f i t s , c o s t s (de’ve io ptne mlt . i nv e s t m e n t co sts to vessel and t o gove’t’ ntnent amid opet’at ing and ma i mi te nami ce c O s t s I , legal I’equi t’e- ment s , 1M& ’O m n v o iv e n i e ’ m t t in acceptance , implementa l ion t inte , s t a f f - ing t equ I m ’emen t s , cii fom ’ceab ii it v , amid e f lee t i vem t e’ss iii pl’eve mt t i rig c~t su a t t tes. Flit’ assess it tem it of a l t e r m t a t ivt ’ sv s te rt is w a s to be pet’ - formed f’or each ty pe’ of ’ casual l v : ground ing s , c o i l is toll s , and t’ in ing s I st m t ions of ’ cas ti a It v I rends , assessit iem it of ’ l’eqtt i retitent 5 .iii d ~rQt ec I I ott ’~ of cys t em cap.t b ii it i es were to he madc’ for t’ i vi’ and t em i yea m’ s tn t o t lit’ Itt t ii m’e bet’ .iii se all” ma i 01’ new system ~etier ;t li v takes fi y e to seven ve am’ s to I trip 1 etnent , in add it ion t o R~ i) time. Iii assess i rig alt em ’nat i ye c y s t ems enip b y i rig shom ’ e — based men t or i rig or sri t~ e I ii al it C t t’c uni ques , it w a ’~ assumed that t h e ’ v e s s e l w o u l d commtt mi it - a t e ’ the i’oi l o w t t t ~ m i m i imnttmn i nto t - mn at ion : v e s s e l ideit- t I t V , pos I t tO l l , tout Sc’ and spe’c’d . The it’ I’ t’esh i’a t t’ t~ as t 0 be de te m ’mi m ied I rein the c .Isua it v amia I vs Is. Iii t O l l s ide m’i rig t hi’ ~~~ tent t a 1 lot’ o t 1 pol I ut ton in of’ f~ ho re w a t e r s , bunker f u e l c a t t i e d ~ v e s s e l s was h o t ilie’ lttclecl . The level of ’ pail It I P tl ion b~ ~ t’sse Is w ii I he d i i t’eremi t for voiunt.i m’ v amid mandator y “ \- ste ms , f o r tile’ purpose of t h i s stud y It wit s tassti me tl that the sy stem be i mig eva! nat ed wo n Id be m a n d a t o r y *~~ sf .;3( ’I:R I 24 . 10. 3-p I - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ T~~~~~~~’ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - T’” ~~~~~ - I 4. CASUALTY ANALYSIS -I. I IN I’lWiltit ’I’ I I ~~ liii’ “1 ttd ’ OPI) mo o c h de “c r i bed iii Sec t r on i etI t i t h e s icc c c ” t o hr st 01 i co I iCt o i’d 0 I me m c ho mit yes cc’ I c i ci mo It I c’s , l h t ’ I eve I ot di’ t o I and coiiipt’eheit s I e11C5 5 0 1 t lie i-cc o i- tic ri “ed hoc a d i rec heat’ in~z on the al i’d it V 0 I t he c ;ItIs:i I ;ii i ,i I v s t iii~I ci Icc I 1 vt’mtc ’ss eva luo t ion. I’iii’ iecom ’d s u sed mu st t’Ol er I n c ident s th a t occurred III t he pi’ m a i-v geog ra p ht l e’O I a m c i ” or t mit eicc I o f I hi i s i’c’riO Ft e . , t lit’ coo “t a I vat ‘m’~ of I lie tin it ed St i t c’s , \ to sko , Il;iva I i Pttei’ t o ~ I co , and t he V I t~ ’~ ~ri I londs . Iheci’ c oit” I d e io t i oti s led t o s e l e c t ioti of t he Ii. S . (‘oa st ~ (i;i i’d Mer c ha nt \‘ ec’; c’ 1 Ca s a t It V m’epo i t ” , cuit~pIemeiited b~ I Iovd ‘ t ’asumo It v t c ’~ oi’dc and n il ~ceI I t ric ’OtiS ‘— Olmlc ’ t ’ s of ’ dci a t I ed iii fo r n i t ion l ot - ‘re~ t it’ c O “(1,1 It icc the I o 1 ~~~ mig “ c c t t 0(1’’ c h c’ ” t i I hc’ t lie c 1 cii i It V ‘Ia to base Its ed in the ct tidy , t he I mihere ’mi t 1 1 11111 it t on’S o I t he ~- i r i oti s d a t a “ o u t c e s the met hod’; used to ext to e’ t I lie pert i tue mi t tnt o m m i t loll • t lie c’ho t i c er t ct I c c o t the c a cua I t m e~ 0 I in t crc’s t • t he triO I vs I s of t he c iii sot i V C ia c t o t s , a rid t he t Cc ’ hiri i qlic s it s ed I o r ma k itt ~ c 0 s ( i O it V proj et’t Ions , Iii sec t ion (~ , the quant I tv , effet’ t c and c o st of o t 1 sp illage are d i s c u s s e d in terms of the three t v pes of t’~~stiit l I ics studied and their ch~trac tet’ i st Ic ’S . 4.1 CA S (IAI l’\’ I1AT:\ HAS1 S 4 . . I U .S .Co~ st ;ti~ird M erchant \‘essel Ca cu a lt y Reports (MVt ’R) Ti t i e 4~ of t he II ,S , Code of Federal Re gu i la t b u s (Chapter I pat’t 4 ) reqtt l res the m asters of’ all v e s s e l s (11 ,5 . and t o r e I gii I’ I ag involved in casua l t h’s upon the n avig able w a t e r s 01’ the thu ted St a t t’s to ill e a w r i t ten report wi th t lie Of ’ t i cc’ i’ in Chit m’ge , Mit i - i tie tnsp ec tion , nearest the port of t’i i’st ai’ t’ I vii I . iti rt hei’ntot’e , ve ssel ma st ers of U.S. flag ve ssels are required to f i l e a repot’t for eac h ca~ ua It v regardless of the I ocim t Ion of ’ the i’asl ia I tv , A i’epol’ t i s required whenever the cnsu:l It v results In an~ one of’ t he fell owl rig L I I -“ ~~ ‘~~~~~‘ : _ — ~ -- ~~~~~~~~~ ~~ — — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _v, ‘~~ ‘ , ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -y ” -” ~~~” a . Ac tita I ph”s I t O l datri~tge to p i’o pe i’ t V ill t’ \ t c ’ 5 5 01 $1 , SOt), h. 9;i ten a I d am a g e at ’ fec t i h g t hue se~two1’ t hi ness or elf i - c iencv of a ~‘c’ssel c’ . St i’O tlti I tig 01’ g m’otiiid I ng ci . Loss of ’ I i Ic , om lii i tit ’V catts ihl g all y persons to i’etiia il l i m l ca pim t’ it ~t t e d for a neri ocl itl ext’ess of “2 iuotiis. A Coast Guard officer Investi gates eac h marine casualty rend) rt ed to Jet e i’m inc ca use , cv i deuce of ’ neg I i gt ’nc C , aiiil respon — s lb i 1 it v . I I’ d eemed a tmio i or ci sua It v , a M~ t m’ I tue Boo m~ci of I nvest I - got i on tria~’ be e oii ve net i to cotici ti c t a m ore ext etis IV i ’ ind i c t it ’ ” . ( iii t hi’ process of ’ amia l ~‘: I ng i tic i ilent s to de’t ertu liii ’ ca usa I lvi ’ fact o m s tilt’ m’epd) i’t of the ii ivi ’st i g o t i rig 01, 1’ i cci’ i~a c general Iv g I \i ’ It I he’ g i~eat est e recience . ‘lilt’ \eSSt ’ 1 tiiO St ci’ ’ s me rr o m’t v i 5 get iei i I I v f oum uci most t is et ’u I itt des c ’ rib ing the c I re’utn stonc ’’s at tlue t i ttie t he c~i sua it V occ iii’ i~e’ci . Vt’s cc i ma St em’ c~ t SIIO i t v rc’pot’t s anti i lives t i got i ng o f f ice r/ ‘ta r i rw Boa rd reports are kept oil i’ i i e at t o o ct (hia i’d hea dcium~t mt e is Washington , D.C. These repor ts have been transferred to microfilm beg inning with FY 1972 casualties , providing easy access to a multi tude of user s . Documen tati on perta i n ing to two of the ca sual t~’ incidents selected for evaluation in the study is included as Appendix A , wh ich illustrates the type of information availa b le from these reports. Se let ’ t cci inf ’ornio t I ott f’rom each ca stia It V me ’poi’ t is cod ed arid chI t erec l into a t’omput er I :ed dot a hose by Coast (u ~ m I’ d 1)e1’sonllt’ I I’hi’ in fot’itm;m t ion co n t’ nt of t t lls cia to ha cc’ is desc i’i bed in Appendix B. ) Computer to nes t’ont a iii lug ca sua it v info i’mat ion for i i Sc’~i l veoi ’s I ¶ 1 0 tli i’otmg iu 1 0 7 wt ’t’e iti~tdt’ a~ a i lab It ’ to tilt ’ St udy team . Co sua I t i es of tile’ to Ilow I ns~ 11:1 t cm i’e :1 i’C i mlc I udeci in the dot a ho se : c o I l i s ions vi til Vd’sse I s ; ramnm I rigs of’ f’i xeci ob~ e’c t s , float — i ng or submerged oH cc t s , i c e , ii I ci s to nov i got ion , or o t’f shot’e’ i’ igs; groulldiflgs; foundem ’ings , ca psi:ings and floodings; explo- s I oit s and Ii i_es ; ma te n i a 1 Ia ii it mc ’; heavy wea I her damage d’ai’go ci;imoge ; intl barge br e aka w a y -I — I -I,’ ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ - ______ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- - r--~ - - --.~ ‘~~~~T ~~~ T ~-3 - ~~~~ -- -r - ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ ~~ -.- Ihe cosu .m It ic ’s of g r e a t e s t impor tam ice to the studs’ are t lltlst’ wlu icli i.e I’ It ’d t c i i i m’ e’tl t t .miike I’ t i’ ,i I I tt ’ I i’c’hi cl5 lIlt1 t omikt’ m e’qu m ppage’ . am id i’c’e’eri t c h.imige s m u t lie ~i Id 5 t o ii~Iv m g.m I i OtI e t iv 1 FOil — hite’tl t (e’ .g . , I Og\N C) . i)cte to these ’ amid other cons I tlena t ions 511 t h O s In’ .ie’ c e ’5~~ hi I I t v o f ti ~ c m e t ’ I I iihe’d c’a sua It V report s hec~ I li l t I rig t~ it h H I 0 2 , t lit’ I’d’ l , i t Ii e’ I v t l imit’ consi min I rig lil ocec s of ’ oht ,i in i rig P I’ l Ot ’ V e’,I I’ ‘ S i t’c t ) id 5 I t oni t he’ 1 i’e’ I l l Vc ’S , a rid t he’ m m m ii It I Pl I c ’ It v of’ c’l lohi g e s to t he’ coin p im t c’i’ cod i n g in c’a rI I en ~ ea l’ s , 011 1 V flit ’ i- \ I 07. fl 19 7 i hit’ cic ’ii t 5 ,I t e I tic 1 tid ed iii t lii 5 st Lldl \ ’ -\np t o x int o t e I v 20 ,0(10 i tic i dent s a i’e t ’ecoi ’clt’cl i ll I lie’ comnput ci’ ~ iIi ’s fom t lii s s I x yea r pci’ i od . I’ lid’~~t’ inc Ic i e tl t s I tic l ittl e .111 t ~‘pes amid s i c’s o 1 til e’ t’e’ luant y es cc ’ I s , a I I no tune of ’ ca st ia It It’ s , alitt a 1 1 I eta t ions . ( l ilt’ St i’d’e’ll t r i g p i O t c’ S S u S e d to so m’t the dO t o tot ca su ,i i t t c’s of i mit enc ’ct to t he s t im ci v I s tlesc r i bed I tI Sec f t On ‘I . S . ‘file’ htiO l or clef I ci enc~’ of the Coast Guai’ el dat a base from t he poi i lt of v i e w of this study results from the fact that forei gn flag y ’e s s e’ls ore not required to file’ casualty reports if the c a s ci altv occ tins outs ide tlle 3-t n lie limit of the nov i g able wa tei ’s of tile tin I ted St ates . A5 a com~se q cmence , est im at ion of the belie f i t s of an t’)V iM s~’s t e m c o v c ’ n t m l g a d i s ti t nt ’e Up to 2(1 (1 tit I les offshore on the’ has is of the number of’ pm’i’venta hl e c:i suit it I es Ill tile MV (’R i’ec oi’dl becomes tenuous. However , other d a t a sources ttiav he used to e s t I - mate the numb er of’ f o r e i g n flag inc i dent s between 3 mini! 200 miles of fshore that arc m iss ing from the MV C R. Sect t Oll s 4 . 2 . 2 and 4 .2 .3 descr ibe Lloyd’ s Casualt y reports amld ot her casualt y data sources , re spe c t i v e ’lv , that were used to supp lem ei u t i n f o r m a t i o n ob tained from the’ Coast Guard ’s file s . 4. 2 ,2 Lloyd’ s Cas ualty Reports Since t he Coast Guard Merchan t Vessel Casualt y Reports da t a base , by t he regulation s governing reporting, doe s not require forei gn flag vessels involv e d In a ca s ua l ty over 3 miles offshore to file a repor t , other data sources were consulted . Lloyd ’s 4 - 3 - ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~, ~—-—— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ _ _ _ _ _ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~ - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~----- ~~~ --- i~ec’k lv Cost ta 1 t~ i’e’port c pub ) i SliCtI by Ii e~’d ‘ c of ’ l ondon Press , I I dl. ho~ short r ’pom’ t s of woi ’ldwith ’ ma rine casum :t i t it’s . l’Ii c ~ource~ of’ dot 0 tot ’ t i o y c i ’ S I ilC 1 tItIc’ tiew~ s t’ i’v I c t ’ s , c I a ss if ’ Ic ’ o t I on soc i c (It’s Olit ) I lisiil ’ ;iile ’e t’Oflt~~it1l~’ l’epnt’Seiltiit ives \ c amump ii’ o I L Ie~’d’ c report i 5 slioi~iu ill l I giml’ e -f 1 . i h d ’~~e’ i-epo i- t s u ms u m a I Iv in hide flit ’ yes sc 1 ‘ s flOitiC amid f l :Ig , I he do t e of t he c O sii; t it v • flic t ‘pc of ca s u m i m 1 t v and the p m c ’ s e n t st at us of ’ t lie yes Sc’ I htowc vt ’ t’ , the y of t e n hi t ’ I ttdc no mitore th ou a gctic ra I Jest’ ii ~~ loll o f~ tl ut’ lo cO t iou of I lit’ t itt’ icien t arid usua liv sa~ - I it t ie or mlot h iil g about (lie c: i il ’ s t ’ . I’huls • ott oti:u l y 5 1 s 0 f t lie I I O\’dI s dot a ecu Id he u s e d to ~Ie tertn i iie cei ’taitt i’Iiat ’oc tei ’i ct icc of’ shi ps th at hove c’~~ Ual t i~~ di ~t rt bitt ion hv I’ I ;iu~ 1 • hu t cot t i d iiO t he tIS e’cI t O al l ot v t’ wlu~t t c’~tutsec1 t In’ c’~u sc m m i It ’ . Sec t ion -I . (~ Jest’ t i hes how tii is dot a hose w a s tm sed I o c’s I i m ate fort ’ I gn t’Iog c’asu ~u I t it’s ml ss i mug t’roiii t he \fV~’R CL ~UflE CONWAY ( Pa n,iirr,l U I ,t ii ‘ ~ — NeW ‘rork • Pi’c 11 — — “1 earn tanker Cl ,iudc’ otiw.t v eroundu’d ‘-1 x ‘illu ’ I otio Island ~~iitid a I I ~00 fli’c it ) , V~ ssi’) i’c’t 1o~tt ed ,it .‘l 10, Pt’ & 10; en rou t ,‘ to Moi’thnoi ’t , ligu m t - e I — I . SAMI ’I I OL 1,10111’S RFPOR’l’ -I ..’ . 5 Ot Iue~’ - t ’O c t l O I Iv Dat a So urces liii’ i’oo’.t ( t m ; mrl ma i n t. i h n ~ a I’oI h i t j olt Inc ident Repoi’t lu g 5’” - t ern i, Pt R S) t’or I lie imi’po’~’ of ’ i’ecoi’d i lug di s t’h~ t’gcs of ’ ci I or ha Z ;m ,‘Jous cu b s I .mmmcc ’ s h i t o liii aittl ot’ t Oil S to I i~o tc’i’c of ’ the (In i t c d St a t e s . Dur mug the st tid y an at t e mp t was mode to cou ’ u’ e’ l it c I tic m dent s from t he P1 RS I’ m Ic’ for the per iod 10 72- 1 ¶i ”~’ ( t he y e a rs ‘~ i t hi t i i c’ tilo S t e’cllulp i t ’ t e d;t to .m ya I I ~th Ic’ 1 v i Hi those (to rn the ‘tere’iiatt t V e ss e l t ’OSUO It v l~epoi’ t f t it’ • vi thu flit ’ ~h j c’c’ t I ye of idem l t t tv t rig ,tdd it i Ot lO I c ;tsual t te s of i m i t e’i’ e’ s t I’lue l’I RS I lit ’ w 0 ~ scarc heil for tnnkc ,‘ or t otu k ha m’gc ’ gretuu ud iilgs ~nd i O 11 t s en’— in co astal w a t e r s t’e sum it i tu g iiu on i t t ito I spi 11 in e x c e s s of’ .t~, 0((0 go lions , -\ to tal of eig ht e’ ; i s c ’ s w as fou ti ld hv tli s 4 - 4 r ~I - ~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ proec ’s s . I’ht’ only pa m’attie’t e’rs Colts i s teti t 1” c’ O tlitutOil to hot h liii ’ s a I’e’ t he date ~itt cl hotl y of wa te t ’ wh ere t ite i tic i dent occurred , amid tot ’ (I .S . f’ lag vessels , the o f f ica 1 nuittihe t- . Furthermore , for til e dot e’, t he Merchant Vessel Casualty file only records montll and ye a r . A s a consequence, it was necessary to exa m iti e numerous casua lty r e p o r t s to f i n d til e one that corresponded to each selected PIRS case . li i s procedure proved t oo t ime consuming to cons i~Ier its use for ot ll er PIRS inciden ts with lesser vol imme a ctua l spil l s or for those PIRS incidents w ith potential spills. The single additional inci demi t Identified by this pr o c ess was t he Argo Merchant grounding off Nantucket l~~land in December l97~~. One of t u e reasons for selecting PIRS cases , w here large sp ills actuall y occurred , was the probability of f ind ing adequate docu mentation for use in casualty anal y sis . In the case of the Argo Merc hant , an IMCO Marine Safety Commit tee report was used as t he primal’\’ cas ualty data source. 4 , 3 IDENTIFICATION OF CASUALTIES OF INTEREST The approach selected for casualty analysis required screen- ing of t he Merchant Ve ssel Casualt~’ report f ile to identify the inciden t s pe rt inen t to the study ob ,iecti~’es. To create a data base of the casualties of interest , a se iies of computer data sor ts were made . In line wit h the assumptio ml s anti guidelines described in Sec tion 3.3 , da ta par ame t ers for iden t if ~’ing the c a sualties of i n t e r e s t a r e : n a t u r e o f casualty , tY pe of vessel , gi-oss tonnage , body of w a t e r where casualty occurred , and spec it’ic location of casua l ty (refer to Appent l ix B ) . Table 4 - I s umntau’i:es t u e tlesci’ip- tors used to program sorts of the computeri zeci data base for these d ata p a r a m e t e r s . The hoti~’ of water and s p e c i f i c location descrip- t ors are in consonance with tiuc spec I fiecl are as of interest off F tiu c U .S . coas t , Alaska , Hawaii , Ptter to Rico , and t he Vir g in I s la nd s . The types of vessels and gross tonnage are in consonance w i t h the selection of cas ualties with potentiall y si zeable oil spillage . The na ture of casualt y de ’scr ip tors were screene d! to exc lude t hose - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ - - - - — ----,-‘ ‘--—-- - - ~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~ —‘- — I . ~~. ~~~~~~ ~~~ - ‘ ‘~~ - ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- - - 1) 0 ) C o 0~~~ 4~ ‘~~~~ 4 1 D ~ CA ‘-‘ 0 ~~ ‘ t ~~~~~~ CA 4) ~ 1 . 4 (1~ ‘~~~~~E~~~~~~~ 4 ’ -~ U t i ‘ ‘-4 4) CA 4J E 0) ‘V 4) 4 ) 0 va .-. I . — C ~~~ cO E E a ~~. 0 ‘ t o 0 0 ) 0 ) 0 co Co Co U) . ~1 ) E cc cst tI~ ~~ (A ‘~~~0 ‘ C”) CO “4 “‘4 t) U) ‘-‘ 0 . 4 4 - c •~~~~ -.5 4. ‘.‘C ’ C U - ‘ 4) ._J__ ,-• ‘-‘- . . . r u -~~~c to co~~-. 0 ’-. C x —~~ “ to ’— c LI’ 4 ” ’ ~“4 .-‘ C4 ‘4’. ~~~ 0 4J U O) 4) 4) 4) 0 I C O ~~~~~~~~~~~ a E E ~~~~ i~~ .,.0 Co Co to 0 — 0 ‘— ~ 4 U) Cl) Ci) 1—’ ~o t o’ - . co~~-. t. o —. .-. 4) .-4 ).. Ut 0~~~~ 0~~~~~~~ Co — e C e o .~~ - CO — -~ ‘I CO C ,, “ I,),, ~~~~ ,, C A C O C C C’ C ~~~ 0 0 C’ 0 C ~ . ~~ 4 . 0 C’ C C C 0 LI’ — .-, — CO ,—~ I- ~( A A A (A >~ — ,—, CO CA Co (0 4’. 4- 4.. 4) 4) 4) 4) I-. — — , ~~ , ~~ , ~~ • 4) 0 0 0 CA (0 (0 CO N W CA (-C ‘,~~~~ ‘-~ t-’ J ‘V —‘ ( 0 4 1 0 —‘ —S .-- DC 04’ CO tA CO ‘ti O C.. 4) — ‘-~ 4) .-l 4) .-4 0 ‘.‘4 Co 0 C o 0 C I’.~ Cob C I~ CA 0f I~. Co 4’. 0. 4’. 0 4 - 0 4 . . 4 1 4 ) 4) •. 4~~~ O~~~~ •. ‘ 4 t o 0 .-‘ ‘ . 4 C o 0 I’-’ ~~. .0 0 ) 00 .0 0 ) 0 0 —4 . 0 0 ) 0 4 ’ 0.0 >, Co “4 Co “4 “~ 4) “-4 ~ -‘ )J ~~ I— ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ . — 0 0 4 . 0 0 5 . . 0 0 4’ . ( 0 ( 0 0 CO I0 O C A C A O (-‘ (-‘ 4-. t- (-’ I” ~‘4 O CO (A I-’. C - .-_ U 0 0 ’4 ~. to ,-, .0 .0 L~ I- 0 ‘0 4) 4J 4) U) ~0 C o W ( O • 04’ 0 ‘-4 CO 5-’ DC C O X O ) -: • to 00 ~ (0 0 4) 0 “‘4 “'‘ E --‘ -~~~~~ .0 i.’. C o C o U’ to 0 tO (A 00 (4 ‘ V E t’ . (0 0 4’. 00 --4 .,~ > 0) ~~ .0 U “ . 4 - ~ 0 ‘~~~~~ CA )-‘. ‘~~~~‘t~ ~- O CO O) 0) W C o to ‘-4 0 ( 0 4 ) o ) 4 ) 0 0 .0 0 C o~~~~~ - ‘ 0 4’. O o ‘V ‘4’. ,o .“ . 0 o - ~~ ~~ 0 ~ I 4 ) 0 0 0) .0 ‘0 CA 4) ‘-4 0 )00 o to 0 4 ) 4) ~~ X~~~~l. ‘4” 0 V ’ 0 4’. I I I ‘.‘. .-. u -. - — ‘—4 0 ‘~~ CA 4) C’ U. — C) C,) ‘a 00 0 . , C CO 0 0 Co Z “‘4 “4 00 ‘0 Cl) C ‘, . . ‘.-. Co # % E ‘I) ‘~~C’~ 0 — to 4’~ 4’. 0 (0 0 C,, U Z 4-b ti- . ~~~ - -, _ . ~~~~~~.-—. — _~~ 4 ’ W~~~~~~.~~~~~~)’ —~~~~~~~~~~‘~~~LU~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~ “T0 C-”~~?4Z~~~ ~~ L ”— - “ ~~~~~~~~ ~~ “ ‘ ~~~~- - - - no t controllable by vessel t r a f f i c management techniques , vi :., collisions while docking /undockin g , minor bumps (t ug and vessel) , explosions and fires , foundering /capsizing /flooding , heav~’ weather damage , cargo damage , and ma terial failure . A number of preliminary sor ts were made to determine how the tot al number of app licable inciden t s was reduced by imposing t he st udy assump t ions and guidelines. The firs t sor t ~‘ielded the number of inciden ts involving tankers , tank barges , and foreign flag tankers grea ter than 1000 gross tons tha t occurred in the loca t ions of in teres t to the study , ca tegorized by nature of casual ty. Table 4-2 lists the number of incidents in each of these nature-of-casualty categories . The table shows a split be tween incidents occurring in inland and international waters . These areas are defined by the regions of applicabilit y of the two s e t s of rules of the road: Inland Rules of the Road and Inter- na tional Rules of the Road . Of the 20 ,047 inciden ts in the total casualty file for the period FY 1972 through FY 1977 , approximately 11 percen t involved tank vessels grea ter than 1 000 gross tons in U .S. wa ters. A pproxi - mately 15 percen t of these tank vessel casualties (325) occurred seaward of the inland rules of the road boundary lines , Eliminat- ing those nature-of-casualty descrip tors not controllable b~’ vessel traffic management (VTM) techni ques yields a to t al of 1 507 inciden ts tha t mig ht be of in terest to the study , a s shown in Table 4-2. This total is made up of 722 ground ings , 260 collisions (elimina ting the 135 not controllable by VTM techniques), and 52 5 rammings . 4,3.1 Groundings In addi t ion to a “ nature of casual ty ” descrip tor , each m ci- dent in the computerized data bas e has a coded “cause ” (e.g. , adverse wea ther) and “ f a c t o r ” ( e . g . , gale f o r c e winds). The 722 groundings were subjec ted to further screening by sorting through the compu terized data base to eliminate incidents coded with a cause /factor not controllable/preventable by vessel traffic 4-7 4. a 0 - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ _±~ - ‘ ~~ ---- - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ‘ TABLE 4 - 2 . TANK VESSEL CASUALTI ES IN U.S. t~ATERS - BY — NATURE OF CASUALTY (FY 197 2 - Fl 1 9 7 7 ) Number of Incidents~~~ \.Iture ot’ Casua I tV I tu 1 ~tnd I nteu•nat j On :I I ‘lot a I ( I’O lIfltI i ug s ~ I th damage 2-1 8 1 261 — 1\ it bout damage - 131 50 4t~ I I O t~ ( 1 4 3 ( ‘o i l is ions - ~tet ’t in g/ c l’o s s in g/ o v t ’r t; Ik in t~ 22 119 - :\nchorett 11)” 12 II 9 - ¶)oc k ing/tindot -k i ng (1) 41 1 -12 Fot~ 18 4 22 - ‘tinoi ~ humps , tug and vcssei~~~ - to tal 33” 58 595 1~~InII1I t fl t~ S - Ot t si uo i ’ i.’ i’ I d~5 (1 1 1 - Fl~~ It ing or stthnte t’~z tnJ oh iec ts 5-I II) 64 Ice 16 2 is — -\ ids to na\’ igat ion 60 5 - Fixed o bj e c t s 3’~l l ot a l Rainmin~ s 50! 24 S2 ,S xp~~~~ions/ lirt ’s~ 1) 69 13 83 1•otu ude r I n~ s ‘ Caps i I n~ s i lood i rugs Ii ) 22 10 32 h eavy ‘\eat her 0;Ini;I~~e~ 1 ) 6 4 2 (‘a Ft~O 1~anL(~~C On lv u i 9 Mat ci’ ic I i- a ii nrc - \ e ss e I - st i’ (Ic t II r’e (11 II I 8 59 - Mach I f lC I’V 1eqtI i r~ment t 1) 152 112 2 o-1 Ot her ~ 1) 3” 4 51 TOT—\ L 33~ 538 GRANI) TOTAL 1855 325 2180 _ 453 ( 1) ~~~(l) _ _ _ _ 1402 105 1507 Ni) t i’s (1) Not cont rollable by VTM Tec ques. ~2) Tank vesse ls ‘ ~ 1000 gross tin 4-8 ‘a ~~~- -~~~~ -—~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ - — — - ~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - -..- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ management tec hniques . Cause categories oxc luded were storms ! heavy weather , unus LIa 1 curt-en t s , sheer/ suc t ion/hank cushion t’es t r icted maneuvering room , struc tural t’a i lure , unseawort hv/ improper ma i ntenanc e , and ins uftic i ent horsepower/ inadequate tug ass i s ta nce ire fer’ to •-\ppendi x B) . Table 4 - 3 s umma i-i :es the ground - rigs eliminated by cause us ing this add it iona 1 computer sort F 4 — 3 , F-\\ K \ ‘ISSEL CROUNI )l N (5 I N U. S . l~,-\’l’ERS - SCRI .Nt P FOR I,’ -\IISF A NI ’~ lOC-\ 1’ I ON ta nkers , Tank Ba rges , F o r e i gn Flag I’ankci’ s ~I000 (~T No . 0 i~ Inc ident s N i t (I i’e 0 !’ i_ a si,n~ i t’ I n I,i li ii In ei’j ia jOn ,) 1 l o t i C r’orrnd I n~ — ~\ I t 11 t; 1% it hou t iL1T’i~l ‘ -1 5 - I 1111 ( 1 n a t cd l~o i- c airs c - 104 -5 - 112 ~ io I I inn I na t ed due t o I .‘c,i t ion — S-I n — I S — Stt 4 1 -In Casualty reports for’ the ~l () rena in i rig grotlndi rig inc i dents as ident I fled by the computer sorts * were rev j ewed to isc’,’rta in t heir locations . :\ppi’ O Xilfla t el\ ’ 95 1~ercen t of the ground ings in inland waters occurred in luarbors , channels , or rest r i c te d water- was less than 1000 feet wide . Groundings in na u’row i’h~inu nie1 s a r e p r i m a r ily due to problems in uuaneu\’er lug vessels in rest r icted w a t e r w a y s . Prevention of casualties of this nature is not con- s ider ed i’e teva nt to the purpose of this studs’ . Approximately 50 percent of the groundings in j ut ei’nat lona I w at ers were found to have occurred either in international waters i’evond 30(1 m iU- s o Nshore , in foreign waters or in r e s t r i c t e d w a t e r w a y s . • The ne t re sult of this sc reening process w a s the ident i t’icat ion of 4~ tank ves sel grounding inc id e nts in the six year period of Fl 1972 - 11 I 9 7 that are considered pote n tially pre~-en tal)1e by 4~~9 I - ~~~~~~~~~~ — - ~~~~“ ~~~~~ ~~~~~—=~:—--: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - some type of of fshore vessel t r a f f i c management s y s t e m . As dis - cussed in Sect ion 4.2 . 3 , the gro unding of the A rgo Merchant was identified fro m t he PI RS d at a file , makin g a tot a l of 4” tan k v es sel gr oundings . To expand the data base to be used for d e r i v i n g c a s u a l t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (Sect ion 4 .4) , analy:ing c a u s a t i v e factors ( Se ct ion 4 . S1 • Ind a ss~,’s s i rug t h e t’ ff ec t I’ . eruess of s’.s t en u t emi t t ~ves (Sect ion 5) , the i J su.u It’.’ f i l e i~a s s e arched to r’ g round ings o t’ non - t anu ker ’s 1 t r’gei’ than 5000 g r’o ss toll s . No n— t anker v e s s e l 5 in t ii j ~ 5 j ~‘ c,i tego I - ’.- were po st iu l at ed to have nu,u~ I ga t ion equ iflinen t and c row cha ra¼ ’ tel ’ I st Ic s s i:~ i Ian ’ to t anike rs. Ca sua It I es won’ t’ sc reened in the sam e manner as desc n’ ibed for’ tank v e s s e l ~ r o u n d i rigs This computer sort resulted in the identification of 8 additional groundings for a grand total of 55 . -1 .5 .2 CoIl i s ion s flue 3t,() co 1 1 is ions ident i t ’ led in Sect ion 4 . S Inc I ude Incid e nuts be tw e e n ta n k v e s s e l s a n’ger’ tha n 1099 gross tons and other vessels r’e~ ,un’j less o t si :e . In acc o rdance i~ i t h s t ud~ assuiiip t ion :~ (Section 5. 3) * at I t’a st one o t~ the other’ ie s s e ls I nvo I veil in a c o I l is I on i~ it h ,I t ink v e s s e l pius t he la n er than I 000 gross t oru s . l ab Ic -1 - -I s that screen i tii~ out the s m a l l en’ v e s s e l s resti I ted in ident i fv ing 145 c o l l i s i o n s . these rema m u rig I 15 co lii s ons wet- c sub jected to fun’ t hen’ sc reenin~ b’. ci in’u iiuat in t h e same cause c a t e g o r i e s excluded for’ groundings. As indicated in Table 4 _ 7 , this leaves 128 collision inciden ts . Ca sui It” r’epo r’t s t’o r- these remain I nu~ co 11 is ions were rev i ew e - .I to det t’ n-i Inc t ~ie ii’ I oca t r o~is . \s in the case o I’ i~rotrni d I rugs a’ nrox ima te lv ~)5 per’cent of the c o l l i s i o n s in inland w a t e r s occurred i harbo rs • channels • on’ rest n’ tctt’d wat en’wav s less than 1000 feet u~ ide. lie n e ~‘a in , prevent ion of co ills ions in loca t I onus ot’ this na t ure ar e con s idered ou ts ide the scope of this study . Over one- halt ’ of the colli s ion s in in t erna t ional wa t ers were fount! to have occurred in in t erna t io nal wa ter s beyond 200 miles offshore , in forei gn wa ters , or in restricted wate r -wa y s. 4-10 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ , : FABLE 4— 4 . 1’ANK VESSEL COLt IS I ONS I N [1 .5. WAtE RS — SCRI ENIl) FOR COLL 1 FlING \ ‘ lSSEL SI F , i_’-\ IISF , -\Ni) LOC-\ lION II 19 2 - F \ l 9 ’ (T .Inuken’s , l ank Barges , F o r e i gru Flag Tankers ) >1000 GT Number of Incidents \,i t iur e o f Ca sua It V lii i and I rut en’nuat i ona 1 l’ota 1 Co I l l s ions ~k’e t i rug ‘cross u ng/o’. ertak irig 3 2 2 ~‘- ~ 2”O tic h o red,’ to O t h e r ’ v e s s el ‘~ l0~ i Cl -2. - I IS 1 2 9 In 1-1 5 1 1 urnnna t ed t’or cause - i S - -1 - I~ u n 12 l2’~ F I in I nat e~ ) due to Ioi’at ion - il l - “ - I l ~ S 5 tO The net r ’es u lt of this scu’eenint~ proce ss wa s the ident ifica - tio n of 10 tank vessel collision incidents in the (-‘-year per iod Fl l9 ”2 -FY 19”? that are considered preventable by some type of o f f s h o r e vessel traffic management system. A nalogous to t he discuss ion of groundings , ex pansion of the dat .u base was sought by cons idering coil I s ion inc iden ut s involving non- tanker’s la rger tha n 5000 gross tons . Sort ing of the cas ua It v f i l e on this basis resulted in the i d e n t i f ic a t io n of additional col u s to ni incidents for a grand total of 1” , 4. 3 .3 Ramm i ngs \s shown in Tab le 4—1 , the ramm ir-ugs 01’ interest to the stud include ca~ L la1 ti e~ involving offshore oil ri gs , floating or’ sub- merged oh i e c t s , i c e , aids to navigation , and fixed objects. The 525 ramntn gs identif ied in ,Sec t~ on 4 .3 Inc l Ude all tank v e s s e l s l,n r~ ei’ tha n 1000 gros s tons involved in these types of ramm ing in cident s for the period Fl 1 9 2 - El l 9~~~ 4- i l _ _ _ - - - -— =-- ‘ -‘- L~1~ ‘- ~~~~ _ _ _ _ - ‘~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ -~~. - ~~t ’ ’ t ? — - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ ~~ _~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ -~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~“. ~~~“‘ _ ‘ “ The following sections discu ss the findings of the study with respec t to the number of applicable rammings of each type . 4 . 3 ,3 . 1 Ramm ings of Offshore Oil Rj R~ - In accordance with stud>’ assumpt ions (Section 3,3) , rammings of structures , pipelines , and f a c i l i t i e s involved w i t h oil production and transfer by all vessels larger t han-u 1000 gross tons are to be con s idered. Consequent ly, add itional sorts of the computerized data base were made to iden t ify offshore ri g ram min g s by non-tank v e s s e l s . From Table 4 - 5 it is seen that 16 n ’amrning s of offshore rigs by non-tank vessels were found. These are in additio n to the one t ank ves sel inciden t shown in Table 4-2. TABLE 4 - 5 , ‘l ANK VESSEL AND OIL FACILITY RAMMINGS IN U .S. WATERS - SCREENED FOR CAUSE ANI) SPECIFIC NATURE OF CASUALTY El 1972-Fl 1977 Number of Inc idents Nature of Ca stun It v in! and International Total ‘~ainnm I rigs of Offshore Rigs — Tank v e s s e l s >1(1’)’) CI’ 0 1 I - Non-tank v e s s e l s >l00() GT + +16 9 8 l” - El iri in ated fo r’ cause --2 - 2 -1 6 I S - — E li nn I nun ted b r sne~’ iii c -j na ture of t’as ua It’ .’ -0 o 6 6 The 17 ramm ings of off slu ore rigs were screened by eliminating the same cause ca tegories excluded for groundings (Section 4 . 3 . 1) . As shown in Table 4-8 , this leaves 13 incidents , 4- 12 t -~~~~~~~ ‘ ‘ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -.--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Wr” —~~~~~~~~, , ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - Casualt y reports for these rema i n i n g incident s w e r e revi ewed to determine their a p p l i c a b i l i t y to the stud y . All inland cases were found to involve non—oil product ion t’ac iii ties and were th er e fore elimin a ted . All internationa l cases were found to he v a l i d for the purpo ses of th i s st udy, leai’ I r~g ~ i x u’amrnn i tug case ~ fo r’ ann lvs is The other 524 r amm ings involving tank v e s s e l s are discuss ed in the following sections. 4 , 3 ,3 ,2 Ramm lngs of Floating or Suhm~~,g~~~ Ohj ects - Inc idet uts coded i’. i thu thu 1 s run tnIre -~ 1’ en sun it v dese r’I ~ t on’ we n-c rev r ewes! t o dcter’rn i rue i f the i’amm I ns~ i nvo 1 ~e~1 a known snrbm en’ged o bj e c t s u c h :n~ a shipwreck or oi I p ine 1 I tue . Tb is tvne of os,- cnin ’ r’encc could he prev e rutab I e b~ vesso I t n’a if i~ ’ m a n a g e m en t t ccliii ioucs , Sm nec in a 1 I s,’~~i s e s the submerged o bj e c t w as c i t lien’ o 1’ unk nown i de nt n t ’ . or 1 oc ;m t ion • o r- both , thi i s c u t i r ’e en tcgot’ v i~~;i s e I I m’n i nat ed f r o m fur r the i’ e o n s i tie n’a t ion 4 . 3. 3. 3 Ramr-ii nt~s 01 Icc — ‘l’hc I S ~-a sun I tv report s i dcii t i lied as t anu ken ’ r’amm mu gs f~ ice wer’c rev i ewes! to a see i t a iii I t . \ c~ se 1 t r’a I I i s, man agemen t t eclun I qut es ml g lut he use Int l in n- ’ n’cve n t tri g s ,n ~ua It I es of thu is natu r’e. it w a ’-~ b onn ! that each et ’ the true i dcn t s could be chi n rni’t er- i zed as a ~~~-i I k - in In ted r i s k i nasm nncii as prior’ knowledge o I t lue prese nce o I’ the I k- c t ’ let d hid cx i ted . l’hen’ s,’ fore . rio t’ur’t hen- cons i dera t ion wa s g i ron to t h u I ‘~ t v pc s s I’ ~a sun It’ s -1 .3 ,3. -I Rj rm rninj~~~oI \ i d s to Nnvi ~~n t i on h~ev j ew of t hut’ cn ~~ ir;I i t ’ . re p o r ts regard I rug r’amn i rue s of :m i u s to m i I ,~n I ion r’evea led th at the ~e i ni’ r dents oct -m i red wh i Ic ve ’ -~ ‘—c’ I s wen ’e manu’nr\’er I rug in ha r’bei’ ibock i nuu ~ areas on - u~ hu i Ic t rav e n’s i rug h i t h e r ’ cut r-ant ’c u-Ira rime I s . o b s e rv e d in the case of m u a n ! ground i rugs ( S e c t ion -I . 3. I 1 en cnn 1 ti e s i nucurr ’red h’ ve~ sc 1 s maneu rve i’m rug in i’ec t r’ Ic It’d n’.n tcru ’,nv s :1 n-c not rd evnr u t to thu is stud ’.’, (‘ofl seqnrc nt I ‘.- , no l’un’t hucr ’ s,-oru s I tIer -a t ion w a s g I t’err to c a s u a l t i e s 01’ t h i s tin trnre. 4 1 ~ — ,-.--- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -,~~~~~ ~~~ r~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ . ‘~~-‘ ~ ~~~‘~~~‘ I ~ ~~~ ~‘ — ~~~ 4 • 3. 3 . 5 RaimiI~~~ s o f Fix e ul_ O bj ec t s - Ca sun 1 t v repo i•t s coded as ramnnnn itugs of t’ i xed object s wer e’ fount! to I nvu ’slvu’ docks • ~~ier’ ~~ , bri dges , and locks. A’~ in th u e’ case of other iruc iden ts occurring in rest r I c ted i iulanuul wa ten’ s , t luese cases were d i sun ssed as I rr’e le— i’ant to the study 4 . 3 .4 Sumnmmru u n o I Casuna it ies of lint eres i’’ue var ioun s comput u’r sorts amid m ’ev I ews 01 casu~I it y reports descr ihed iii the pn’ect’u li rug sect lo in s pr oulum ccul a dat a bas e of c a s u a l t i e s of interest to the stud” (0V I’~st dat a base ) . T a ble 4 - Cu summin i’ I :es the number o t’ i tic I ulent s by rim flIrt’ of cas um li v ~ ppc tit1tx C is an index of the sele c ted cases containing c a s u a l ty ident i t’iers , \ ‘CSS u’ 1/cargo chum rae te n ’ 1 st Ic , I oc at ion ui esc r i ~t 01’ s arid cnv lrom um t’ rita l factors TABL E 4—6 . NI1M1tE ’~ 01 1 Ni~’ I l’i iN l5 Ii l i N I’ I U l i r i 104 t’AlIS ,\I, A N \ l ”t 515 Number’ of inc jd en ts Na tu r e lank \‘esst’ I / Non — Fan k ot ( a s t l a It ’s’ Ot ’ t’s luon’ e Rig \‘ esse 1 Iota I LIa s ic l)a ta Ba se) (Ix tended tin t a Base ) ; round i rig -1 8 55 t o l l i S ion 10 4amm’m I rug 6 N -\ Cu Iot a I nS IS 4 .4 CA SUAl TY CIIARACTERI STI CS This secti on u describ es the characteristics ot ’ the’ t an k vessu’ l/ off shore i’ i g casu ni It it ’s iule nt j t ’i ed above . Of the ~S cases in t’ab le 4 — 9 , t he 63 cast ’s involving tank vessels ( i . e . , t ankers and tank barges) and/or oil r i gs t’ornu t he ‘‘has Ic ’’ OV’I’M dat a base . l’he rema i ruing IS cases a i’t’ the non— ta n-uk \‘t’S se I cases addeul to j i lt’ r’ease causal tnform ru t ion. T h e data bas e Inc ludimug these 15 add It 10mm 1 cast ’ s is ref erred to as the “ cx t er ud eul OV’I’M data has i’ H .1 - 1 4 -‘ —: •~I -‘~~~~~ ‘ -~~~~~~~~ - ‘ ~‘-i -~~~~~ -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ;-. -. ~~~~~ ~r-t ~ -- ~~~~~~~~~ ‘- - -•., . ~~ i’he fol towing di scuss ions of cas ualt d i m rae t e r is t i c s w i l l center around the tank vessel and o il ri g cas es which form the’ ‘‘has ic ’’ data base • s n rice these are t he cases whu i cii haul t hue poten - t in 1 (It ’ the tank ye s se 1 was carr y tr ig o i l ) to produc e oil p o l 1 ii - t tori . ‘i’he econom ic arid cmiv i ronmenut at im pact of the ‘‘has ic dat a base casu n It it’ s is s,! I seusseul in Sect ion Cu I t is import~n iu t to keep m u mind thin t tiu is rest n’ Ic ted se t 01’ cas un It it ’s of inter’es t to this s tn~I~’ , obta i ned by app l vi rig the data sor ’tS ul es cu’i be d i tu Sect Ion 4 ,3 , r’elur’esenu ts less than S percent ot ’ lue tot a I number of I rut’ Ident s I mu the Coast (‘ anai’d data base (UI l 9’2 — El 19~~” 1 i nv o l ~ ’lnug tank ves sels greaten’ than 10(111 gross toil s ‘1. 1 ,1 Casualt ies by Ves s el (‘ ha r r re t e r i s t i e s t a b l e 4— sinows a bi ’cakdownu of t hu e basic da ta base c a s u a l t i e s b’s yes ccl t ~‘pe i n v o l v e d . No C e thin t whu le tank ha n’gt’s and t a nu ke u-s a n- u’ n mi vo 1 yes,! i mu about thu t -’ sante nuirmunhien’ o t~ u- o il i s lori s • t inke us aec ou nru t fon’ a limo s t 90 percent of’ total tank \-ess e I grow ul tugs -\ Iso , ml though a ll tar u k barges involveu! iii tr ue iden t s a re ur iu let ’ II • S . I’ lag, a trio s t SO pei’cent 01’ the tanker gu ’ounu di rugs arid t ;mnuke r’ ~ol l is louis i t uvo lve for- cig nu tankers . l abl e 4—8 shows the ’ flag of the vessel s inuvo Iveul in da t a ba s e u’,rsua It n e c . l’hu i s inc- I tides a II ~‘es se is involved iii has ic tIn Ia base t rue id et uts : ta n ker’ s , t ar uk barges , tugs , fre i ghter’s , e t c . About two ’ tiu l rul s of the vessels involved ar e unde n’ 11 .5. flag. One ma non’ reason for’ th u is is th ua t thu e Coa st (~ua i-d MVCR is incomp lete vi thu r’ega rd to i tic i dents I ruvo lvi rug fore i gnu flag vessel s that ou~u inn ’ mnmor ’e thuaru three ml ics offshore (see Sec t i onu 4 ,t,) . -\lso co ru tr ’ l huu t 1mg to the hi 1gb pr’opor’ t ion of 11 .5. vessels is t h e (net that n i l tugs and tank barges i nvo I vet! I mu date ha su’ c a s u a l t i e s n rc ruudcr 11 ,5 flag ( (sure i gn flag tank ha rges 1 n U.S. waters are V mi - ir ma I l ’ s nonu-exi s t enu t l 01’ thu e to re igru t’la g tankers i nvolved i mi en s u a l t Icc • about one- lual I’ are l i b e ria t u . \ total of seven foreign flags are rcp n ’e semu ted rnmnno ng t he t aruker s 4-IS - —--—-- —-‘-- . -‘----- --—-‘- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — —•‘----‘ ~-_—__ r,w,-..,,__,--,_ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - _- “ - - _ ‘ _ -‘ ~ - — - - --~ -~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ 5.. ‘-.4 Q) 0’s FI) m-~~ — —s o c ~ -— ~~~~~~~ —o ~ , I-. ~~~~ j) .~~~,) — u-. i i i t’ ~~~ t— LU ‘~~~~ t’-l ~~‘ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~ ;m ~~~~~~ I-’ o -—~~~~~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >z — — (~~~~U’s LU ~~ a. ti .w SN I — — ~~ )- U —~~~ ‘0’ L/) LU vu (/1 LU> ~~O I’,) C~ 5.. - - ~~ t_~~— c ~ >‘• ‘.-l 0 ~~~ .“ ,L~ -l Si) ~~~~~ C-z ~~~ LU — ~~ Si) ~~ ~~O LI) ~o ~~ 0 ‘0 ‘ c ~~~~~ ~~ t1)~~~~ ~~~~ C - C~ U ~ ; i : - ‘-‘ -~~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — _ ‘ 0 ~o ‘0 (I’S • 0 ~ --‘ ~~~~~~~~~ O LI’S ‘0 ~~~ ‘0 ‘01.. LU U ‘-s C— ’0 -‘4 ~~ z SI’S — 5— -~~ 0 0 ‘0’ — LI) ‘0: C- I- ‘0~~~ ) I— ~~~ ‘0 4’~~~U’S -t ,“4 ‘0 o ’ 0 >,, L~ ~~‘ ~~ -, -4 -~ s/i C- ~~~ ‘~ ~~~ c~ ~~~ ‘-~ ~~~ C’~:’ 0 -s~ U U U c~ 4- 16 -~4~4~ - - ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ _________________ -‘ , ~~ — ,,,,~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ‘L”~~~ -~~ WI- -~~~~~ a - I) 4 - ‘—‘ 0’ sO so s i .0 .0 SN ‘.-t — ‘1 I -~~ — I S~i U ..t• — — — — - — — — — — — - —— -Sa: - ‘ C C C~ .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 0’ .0 — .0 — vua: 5- -‘n s/i C < 5’-. 0 0 LO a: — C - — -0’ 0’ 0’ ‘—‘ 1 0’ 0’ c- 0’ 0 I-”i ‘ :2’S -~‘S ,—-. 5- — a: o - ~~ U C 5— --4 -~~ .0 C 0’ -~~ 0’ t’-i .0 .0 0’ 1 ‘ .—‘ ‘ VS C—I r i ‘, t:~. C- —— — - . — -“S ‘-‘ — .—‘ .-‘ - 1 ‘—, — SN 5 ,-, ‘-~ 5 25 4—S ‘—5 (~~l -0 .0 0 0 C ‘—-5 0’ ‘— - ‘—s ‘- -. ‘,) C 0’ 5 VS - , - vua: o a: -a s, 1’, LI’ s — C a: —4 --5 0 sO C — —4 SN 0 0’ -0’ ‘—‘ -~~ I- ~ ‘‘ 1,5,.. (/5 - ‘--.. o — .5) — a: 0 a: U a: 0’ .0 -0 0’ 0’ 0’ - 4 ‘t ,-, 25 I- ’ SN a’S — — I- _ i • C ‘0’ 5’-. U a’S 5- a: X 5-’ a: -, .5’ s—s _, a: 1-. “ “: a: ~.: — - ‘ a. -~~ a, -~: C ‘‘ - ~ .2 a: ‘~ .-.- - ‘ :2 . -1 -2 4 . -s~~~0 ’ , a : a: ~~ vu o -‘ ~ - - .7 a ~~~ -~ — - ‘ • --: •—. C . s’S. ,~5’n i, ~ ~J L. — - —S - 0. LI) I’- . 5 52 4-i ~ r~i’~”—” - .____ ~~,. .s-s~-~ -.-0’ ’~~~~~~~~’_ -- Tables 4- 9 and 4-10 show the gross tonnage of the vessels involved in OVTM da ta base incidents. Almost one-half of the tankers invo lved fall into the 15 ,000 to 30 ,000 gross ton range. Tankers of this tonnage normally have a capaci ty of about 30 ,000 to 60 ,000 tons of oil. The largest tanke r in the data base is 129 ,300 gross tons , but only 2 of 50 are over 75 ,000 tons , For comparison , the Argo Merchan t was about 15 ,000 gross tons . Most of the tank barges were small , only 2 of 13 are grea ter than 5000 gross tons . In summary , da ta base groundings are primaril y tanker groundings , bu t both tankers and tank barges are involved in about the same number of collisions . All tank barges in the data base are under U.S. flag , while the tankers include 7 foreign flags (led by Liberia) . Almos t all tankers are under 75 ,000 gross tons , and almos t all tank barges are below 5000 gross tons . 4.4.2 Casua l ty Locations This sec tion examines the geographic loca t ions and dis tances offshore of the casualties in the OVTM data base. The general loca tions of the data base casualties are shown in Table 4-11. The Eas t Coast , the Gulf Coast , and Puer to Rico are the si tes of the vas t majori ty of all incidents; i.e., 44 per- cen t , 25 percen t , and 19 percen t , respec tively. Just over SO per- S cen t of the groundings occurred off the East Coast , while abou t 25 percen t occurred off Puerto Rico. Collisions are almost evenly split be tween the East and Gulf Coasts. Rammings , as would be expected , were all found to occur in the Gulf , where the oil plat- forms are primarily loca ted. 4-18 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --- - - - -- - -..——- - - 5’ ‘5—’, .~~~~ - . i ~~~~~~~~~ r~~~~f l__ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ - K r - — - LUU a: z Z 5-. SN C’s C’s 0 0 LI) SN C- C- vu = = = = = vu 0’ 0 U SN 0’ 0’ SN 0’ >.. 0’ -4 vu — — — — — C- Z LU0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ — vu Uz — — — -4 5-’ vu LU ~~ ~~ vu I vu 0’ 0’ vu 0 0’ C- vu 0’ C- 0’ 0’ o vu 0’ SN — . ~~ 0’ LU 0 <~~~~ Z VS Z Z I C SN 0’ SN — 0 0’ — 0’ 5- SN — — vu vu C a: 0 0 ç~ u 5-- VS 0 0 U LI’S z — -4 — — vu vu a: LU sQ -4 ,.4 00 vu 0’ vu LU 0 U. ~~ — ‘ 0’ SN 0 vu LU vu 00 C’s NJ 0) .0z _ _ _ _ — — vu 00 SN vu U Z LU _ z a: — U a: 0’ vu Z .0 >~‘ v u C - ‘X 0 ~1 0’ U Li IX C- 4- 19 ‘ ‘4’ , - - — -/ “: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘~a.~~I’5 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~f ,...,~~~~..sw X~ -~~ “ -‘ ‘5”— 5’ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘S’~~ Z(~ a: U .- z — 0 I- -5- vu 5- SN 5—, — 0’ C -t vu 5-; ‘-‘ 4 ‘-4 0’ 0’ ‘-4 ‘-4 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ U. LI) 0 — — — — — vu VS ‘-4 0’ ‘0’ .0 0’ 0 0 0’ -‘ Vi 54.1 — a. -S >- o ~~- 5- — .- U -‘ U Z I Z 0 5- ‘0. — “-‘ U C- — --s U o vu Z a: 0’ sf’S Z 54.1 C- -~ — — .-s < z s--. .- a: ._‘n .0 —5 Z < .0 .0 —‘S ~~~ -~~ C- Cl) U U U U U ~~ C- LI _ _ 4-2 0 L . - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~ -. ~~~~~~~~~~ — - -‘ 0”-~~’I’~~2, -- - - S 1’ABLE 4- 1 1 . GENERAL LOCATION OF CASUALTIES (SIX-Y EAR TOT .\LS) Location ~n’ounding Coflisior u Ramming Total Last Coast 4 4 0 28 - West Coast 1 1 0 2 Gulf Coast S S l t-s Off Alas ka 2 0 0 2 ~tf t’ h awaii 0 0 (1 1) Of t ’ Puerto Rico 12 1) 0 12 i~)ff V i r g in islands 3 () 0 5 Total 4 7 10 Table 4- 12 shows the breakdown of these casualties by specific location . This is show n grap hicall y in the maps of Figures 4 -2 to 4-4. Table 4-1 3 shows the ‘5hot spots ,’5 i.e., loca t ion s where large percen tages of the data base casualties occurred . Note that 20 of 47 groundings (43 perce nt ) occur red in onl y two loca t ions , Guayan ill a Bay (Puerto Rico ) and Delaware Ba y . (Tallaboa Bay which ab ut s Guayanilla Bay is included in t he Guayani ll a area.) Over 60 percen t of the gro unding s occ urred in only four loca tions: Delaware Bay , Gu ay anill a Bay , Long ls~ and Sound , and Chesapeake Bay . Sixty percent of the collisions occurred in onl y t wo loca t ions , in the Gulf of Mexico off Louisiana and in Long Island Sound , however , this breakdown by location is based upon a very small sample (10 tank vessels). Ranumings occurred primarily off the Louisiana Coas t , with one off Mississippi. The dis tances from shore of the data base casualties are sh own in Table 4-14 and Figure 4-5. Over 50 percen t of all grounding s occurred wi thin 3 miles of shore , over 75 percen t wi thin S m ile s , and over 95 percen t within 25 miles. Fift y percent of the 4- 21 ~ a ~~~,54 ~~~ s - - - -— - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - - ~~‘- - CC 44 — .-4 -~~ C— — 0’ vu .‘-4 — N) 4 ,..4 — 4 4 — ..4 ‘-4 0 .-I —-s VS VS o — .-4 - ‘0 C- DC “.4 C 0 0 0 0 0 C O C 0 — v u s O c C C C C C C C vu 544 -4 I-’ — a: .0 Cl) U ~0 5) . . ‘-4 0 U’S 0’ 0’ 0’ 5-4 ,-4 0’ .‘-4 0’ 0’ — 0’ ‘0’ 0’ 0’ — Cs 0’ 0 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ - - ‘5,4 -4 z — 0 — — 0 I-’ U U0 a: U LU 0(5 0. ~~ vu -s‘0 — — — vu 00 ~~~ .- ~ ~~~ ,- ~~0’ (N .-4 -4 0 .-s .‘-4 .-4 C ,—4 — VS C-’- — ,-4 ‘ 0’ NJ 0 .4 I . . I U - - ‘~~ a: 00 — . 1 : 5- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CC US ‘-4 5 < V 9~~-. — (51 CC 0 Z 00 V 4~ 0. (5) 5-. 0 0 s-s 00 V - o v u .~~ -4 .0 .0 CC CC 0 .0 . ~~ V CC CC “.4 . , 5.. C’s 5- (/5 5/5 5-, “4 0 I J )’0~~~ .S . (5) ~. ( / 5 C C 5!) 50 CC ‘.. c o us 0 50 CC~~~~ O ocC p. s.’ tfl- V 5 0 X~~ 4J 5 0 5 . s CC ~~ X O 4 4 s0 5-~~~~ CC”4 vu 5- ’ U S 0 51) V 0 . 4 V Q . CC - - 0 ~.‘ ~~~~~ V — C C i~~~~E 4.’ CC 5lS ’-l ’.4 0 4-’ ‘ ‘ >-..-4 U .-s~~~ — V o U’S -s-s .5,~~ US~~~~,-4 V CC CC U S 0 0 ) ~~~~. 0 5 0 U S U .< c 0 C ’ - 4 ’-s 0(5US US (5) -I 5(5 0 (5) V .0 ’.’4 ’0 CC “ s O C C S . . CC . . 0 0-~ ~~ 4-I ~ 4.5 o V~~~~~ Z 0 ’ U Z - 4 0 CC~~’.~ Cl) -< 0 vu .-s C~~ 4-’ CC LI ‘4s US 44 00 I.. U 0. LI CC ‘0.~G 0 5-CS. 0’ 0 (5) LI s-4 US 0 09.4 9.4 4.4 4.i 0 E 4.s (4.4 “4s ~-s 4.4 *44 ,5~ •_4 0 s.’ CC ~ .,~ s E — o ~.‘ CC 0 4’4 4.4 5’4.4 4~4 .~ 4 ‘s-s CC ‘4’s (4.4 i’S’S ~4.4 4.~ 444 ~4.4 US 0 0 5.. ~ CC ‘-4 0 ‘ .4 CC a: u ’ S U~~~Za : Q 0 0 0 U .-.i 5-0 00 O ‘15 00 m ULl (5) U 5 - i. a: ‘s~s CC V ‘ 0 1,24 U 0. 5- 5- 4-22 - - -- ~~~~~~~~~~~ — - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .~~~~~ ‘:- “ T~~~~~~~~~ ’. ~~~’ ~~ - -- - - - 5 ’ ’ ~~~~’!~~~~~~~~~ , - - - - - ~~~~ ‘—... / y’’~rj~ S : I ‘ :~ I S 4 - 2 3 - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~‘ - - --‘-- — - . ~ - :~~~~ :- ‘ - -- - _ 1~~~ ‘ t I L,, / , I -- I I L - ~~~~~~~~~~~~ — — — —- _- - ~r I”—~~~ ” ” ~L ~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘~~~,_ T,” — -— ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ !‘ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ,- ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~5.” - - — 4 -’ _ _ _ _ _ ‘~ ‘ ~~~,‘ 4 ‘ ~~~~~~~~~‘ ~4 C dIP” r~ ( ‘ç’~ I ‘ ~~~~ - Ls441r ~~~~~ I ~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ _rI~ ~-----\ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ • yr1. ~~_~~4_ , ‘r ~~~ -~J 4’.• • • Ir J ’~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ j’~ .3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ - — ‘- - -‘— -‘. —5 —— ‘.~~~~~~ .. ~~~~~~~~~ ‘ ‘ “~~.7 ” — -— ~~ _ ‘ — - - ‘ % “ ~5~~ ‘ , ‘..‘wza~~.,’. -”~~~~—. FW’ s - - 5 - - ~ _-‘t - -,__ ~~~_ ti’s0 4,.5 50 — ‘—4 .—I C-s 0 0 50 4.’ N) N) — ‘0’ N) 00 5 — V 0 UC- V0. vu LU 4-. ‘-4 .0 vu -~ ‘44 (4’S U 0 4 ” 50 0:5 5-. dJ - ‘ 0 V ’0 0’ 0’ u’S t -t N) ifS (3. .C) ”.l s—i — E U vu ‘-“ i--s 0 4-. LI0 a: 5 4— LU.00’ CC CC 1,(. 50 50 50 CC 50 -~~~ “4 ‘s-S • 0 • ‘1 ‘1) “4 ‘.4 ‘.4 #4 ‘ 50 0. 0 0 ‘0’ U ‘-‘- a: a: 0 LU a: CC to-s “s‘s a: V ~~. 00 ‘ 0 I.. ’0 CC 0 ’ 0 0 50 5 0 0 0 CC 4-. CC CC 0 0 5 - 0 4 5 0 0 C) V C C v ’ S .~ U s,) U 0. (5) 0 0 CC ‘.‘s ‘.4 4-. ‘ 0 4 ) C- C C * ( 5 5 0 0 . 4 ) 5 0 V 5 0 ( 0 X CC 5- ((5 ” s (IS s--I #4 U — ‘-4 ‘15 V ~~~ ‘#4 (IS ~4.4 -4 Z 4) 0 . 0 0 0 ’-’ 0 CC — 0 5 0 U — 0’ 5- 00 vu 444 ~~ ~~ ‘4’s II ’S Z 4.4 50 50 44’s — 50 4_s 4-4 ((5 .0 ‘4’s Q ’#-i .4 ~ 0 Z ~ U 0 0 U a: 0 a: 52 a: ~ U a -~~ U U 4 - 2 6 - It ~~ I’ : ~~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — - ‘ ——— ‘-‘- ‘--~~~- —-- —~~~ ‘ ‘-5- - - - —~~~~~~~~ - ‘-‘ --- - - - -~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — — - ~~--~~ , ; - - - — - 4- I C- -. - VS -f s--i C’ - - c - I - ‘- - C C C ‘-I C — C -4 LL4 (IS C- ,-, s--I 1 U V ,5•_ — irS -r, ‘-4 - - 5- ______________ H U) — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — — s-S LI’S a CC t U 0’ — — &‘S ‘-4 C .0 4,4 ~~ vu _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~~~ CC — — 54 z c 5— ~~~ (—5 C-- t’~ I/’S (1) V vu LU I-. ~~~ —. 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 5- .cS — — (/5 irS -1’, 4~4-s I~~i —~ (‘-~5 ‘--- I- :) 4,4 L1~ 0 IS) U — — CC CC ,-~ in .-. 0’ 4.5 s--s (/5 in I ‘.4 ~r — “5 0’ c~I 0’ 55_s - 4 -4 —‘S I—- 00 _________________ VS C’ S ,- 0’ 0’ I 4-4 s—i C- 0’ C’S S I ,‘l ,—-4 IS)0. :5., - 50 4-— ’ C 0 - -, - ‘-I :-s1 - ‘0 50 —s — ~ — 50 co 5I5 0 — 50 #4 4-. - so o U U a~ 54U 4 2 ” ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ “~~ IL * ö 5 .4.* - - _____ _______ -- - — — —— ‘~ — - - - C C- - C — C C C 4 0’ ‘- C’ ~1~ • - C C . r Si’ Sf -S - - -- C Sr i’ - If • ‘ 5 U ’ , U , - I • ‘- • U C • U -. r ~t ~4 i ~I ~U’,I4\ 4-28 “ ~4~~ I” a~~4~~~s’ _, ~ ~,, -~ -5 -5 ’- — — - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -‘~~~~ ‘C~~~~Z~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~ . ~~~~~~~~~“ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ “ - - ~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -“I-T~~~~”4-~~5I~”fW~~. ~~-‘-~~~~~ - S” ~ colli s ion s occurred 110 more t h a n S mi les from shore , sin~l 80 pci’ - cent occurred with in 25 n i l es of sI’o s’e . .\l I i’aISIITI i lIgS a S’C p1 a c e d , 1 between 12 and 100 miles from shore . Note t h a t s2 c a s u a l t i e s 01’ the (s3 in th e data base (98 pes~ c e n t ) occurred less than 100 n i l es o f f s h o r e , aiitl t h a t 59 ~ the (‘3 ~~(5U ~I I t ics (94 p e r c e n t ) occurred w i t h in 50 m i l e s o I’ shore. l’a b l e 4 — 1 5 to 4—1 ‘I’ sh ow the d i s t an c e s o t t shor e of the c a su— a l t i e s at sp e c ili c l o c a t i o n s . In summary , da t a ba se groundings p r i m a r i lv occur o f t ’ the East t o a s t , (u1 I L oas t and Puerto Rico ~espec j ail ~ oft’ Ftc I aware and t,~u a v a n i 1 la I~a v s ) and l e ss than S m i les fro sts shore . D ata ba se H cot I i s ions pr m a r i lv occurred o f t ’ the l a s t and (~u 1 I’ (‘oa s ts and less than 25 suites o f f s h o r e . Dat a ba se i’aInmint~s occurred in the tu l I’ of ~I~’x j co b ets%e en 12 and 100 miles from siso i.e . Ni net V - t o u r percent o I’ at I the c a sualties occurred with in 50 nii les ot’ shore. 4 , 4 , 3 ( l i t i o i t s r s l 5 ‘I’)i i s sect ion c o n s i d e r s the cond i t ions under wh i cii the casua l - t les of ’ 1st crest occurred . In c l u d e d ar e the f j ~~~~‘ o I 5Iav • v i s i — b i i i tv , t inc of ~‘~‘a r , and \‘ear. Uo r two in c i dent ty p e s , a dd i t osial LOU d t ions w i i i he i n c l u d e d : t’or ground i ti~~s , the t vpe 01’ ocean hot torn ; and lot’ co l i i s ions , ia ) the t vpc s)t e n c o u n t e r based upon n-s t a t i ~~~~ h e a r i n g , and I, H t h e amoun t ot ’ t ime be I’~i re the ‘,-o l i i c ion that the vessels are aware 01’ each o the r . -\ms e x a m i n a t i o n of the t i m e of ~ia~’ in w h i c h ca~~ua It i es o~’curi’ed is shown in I i gure 4- (s , More th an one-ha It ’ of a l l t ~‘pes o f inc i d e n t s occurred at n i g h t , t h e ra t i o o I’ iii g ist - to - day i tic i d e n t s being 2 to I for ground ings and r a mming s and 3 to 2 for colli sions . the V i s b i i i tv wh en th e casua it i e~ occurred i s shown in labi e -I — 18 . Vi sib i i i t V Is mor~’ of a t’a c t o r in col i i s ions (4 0 ~~‘ r— cen t of the cot Ii s ions occ tti’red during pool’ vi ~ lb i i i tv cond i t i 0555 ) tha n i t was in ground i ngs ( 1 3 percent ) or s’amrn i ngs (0 p erc ent ) . 4-2 0 S _ i - - ‘ - _ ~~~ - — _ ~ ~~~~~~~~~ S — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ________ -- ‘~~ -- ‘ s” S , ~ ” ‘ 1i~~ I’S ‘1 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ C) 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ C 0’ 0’ 0’ C 0’ 0’ D -4 ‘—S Z US ~ 0 V 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ C’S 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ 4_I s - 4 1 F—. .~~i D ‘CU0~~~ -~ CC — U 4-,) .0 4.) vu ~~~ (~ itS C C s-IC) C) 0’ 0’ 0’ C — CS 0’ C C) C 0’ 0’ CJ N) LU Z I ~~ ‘S LU V 4’. 0 0~~~~_ 5,50 VS US L1_ 4.4 4-), if) o o -~ 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ IfS 0’ 0’ C’ 0’ — 0’ C C -C C 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ LU V ‘I U U ‘4 z ~ -~~ CC F-’ (I) US — ‘_I 0’ 0 -1 I -I ‘—I 0’ C) — s-Q V’S 0’ s-—I “-s 0’ s--s C) C C s—I 0’ C) 0’ 0’ irS vu ~) 52 0’ Z.00 “S C — C -I s-I C’ C C) C’s-i ,-‘s — C ) C’ s--s — VS sO 52 — N) if) -4 V so LU US 0 “I ‘0 ( / 5( 0 00 C C v s CC (0 5< CC .‘5 ~~~~ s--4~~~~ US 5 < 4 ) 5’. — V 4-’ 5 00 s-, 4-~ (1~~~f-. 0 — ~ C) s - o V S so — cu t— .o CC CC ‘0 ,~~ H-. 00 so 5-. I—’ US US >‘, •~~I 5 0u ’ , 0 s o 4’. CO -U ’ S a ‘—~,, c 0 U S ‘0 cC (0~~~~ 5 0 0 0 4 ) #4 ‘ — V C C = 4J ( 0 4 - 5 0 5 0 0 0 ~~‘ 0# J c0 .~ -— vu H, (/5 50 I/5 C) 0 - 4 4 ) 0 . . CC 50 #4 V S 4 ) V C C E #4 #4 ‘ H -’ U s - 4~~~ — V o US ),-I .~~~U ’ 5 m, . V a s O VS .‘~‘ 5 4 5 0 - — - .‘s~~~~~ VS (I’S (5) — -a 0 > ’, U — s O 0.’— -C so 0 5 0 5 ’ s’ 50 • 0 0 — o 5 0 5 ’- aj — 4- 44 Q 4)~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Q s o —~ V) ’i 0 . ~S ( 0 ( 0~~~ 4.5 CC ~~ 4-s II) 44 oo so i~ 5-’ U’ 0. U Cu ‘0 .~~ 0 H-. C~. ~ 50 (5) — VS 50 5 0 — 4) 4-4 0 50 ~s’s ”4 ~+s ~.-‘ . ~~ — 0 ~~ CO V ‘-i E — 0 ‘s- a~~~~~ CC 0 V . C C -.-- s- ’~-. 50 ),-,(’s 4-~ # 4 4 - s US 0 0 5’. ~~~ cC --4 ~ - ‘ 5 0 4 - ~~ ,T Z - ’ S 0 ’ UC U s-”i f—~~~QQ 51) C so U’U V 5 2 — 5 -- 5’. ~~~ 44 54 V — 0 --. 0 52 .‘s 0. I- 4-30 “ - 4~C’W! 5~~~~~~’ C - - Tz~~~~~T ~~~ ‘i~~ -~~~~~ - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ‘~~~~~ - ,~~~~~—w —.- ---~~ -.--~~~ 0’ C) 0’ 0’ C s-I C) 5- 4 I C) C’ I 0’ 0’ 0’ 0’ -4 O 0’ — 0’ — ‘ C’ US 0’ VS C) C) 0’ 0’ C) — C)t — C- ~ — 0’ ‘~~ •1’ I — -4 I L — C) H’ , C’ 0 - If) . 1’, ~~‘ irS -~ 0 — VS — — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __S ~~ — .0 (3 5/) .-, 4.) If) 0’ ‘(S CC ii’) I C) 0’ 0’ 0’ C) CII C 54-5 ~~,‘ I s-—I r 41 ti’S if ) ,,, , vu x s-i 0 (5) ~~~ ~,, o — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0 ~~~~~~~~~ .50 5— .50 S “ US VS C’ .~~, “4 if) .s. i t’) (34 (‘-3 0 ~~~~~~~ N) U ‘ 0 .-I C) 0’ C s--i C’ I I 0’ -, — (“-1 u-S (5) (-5 U — C- Si) ~-r —‘ CC — f~~’ 4.) — u-S ~~ I — 0’ 0’ c-I (‘-4 VS — C’ C’ C’ C’ — .-‘ — Sf) — 0’ Cl C -C VS V’S -“S — :~‘ — —S0 ‘-‘~ U Sf) VS I N) 0’ ‘-‘ s--i C’ 0’ 0’ VS I -~~ 0’ 0’ C’ C) ‘C C— -5 —— _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -4 — — 4-14 LU ‘-‘S 1-. 00 0 00 -~~ ‘0 . 0 4-. 5 0 4 - C) r-’ 0 C C r ~. ‘s-i 0 C LI’S 0 (0 .0 C CC 50 5-. -- . 50 ‘0 5’ . 0 ((5 (5 VS 50 5 0 0V 0 - - i = VS - - s CO S— ,5~~~~’S~ ‘, ~.‘1) -s 11) 50 ~- 1— C O O cO --s e” • 50 4” US --’ o 54 VS~~~~ 4 ) O US~~~~~~0 US LI-. 0 VS ‘iS j 0 ( 0 --“ 4” ~~ ~~ CC 0 (0 ,-S 0 VS 4” 0 ~~‘ .-‘S -a LS~ 4-50 1) V U 0.. U CC U U I 50 ’~ C) 0, E s.. 4-4s ‘-4 L’S ‘. - (‘-i - -, 0 4’~ 0 ‘-‘. 0 CC ‘-i’s sO 4-s 4-’ ‘4-i CC 0 t~ ’ -‘~ -s-s CC _4 Lfl -.SC UU .-4 C-O U S O #4 ‘.-‘S ‘— ‘ 0 0 ” ‘ 0 V 0 0 C’ 5.9 52 ‘.X C- SC s— 4 -3 1 L ~~ -- - , ~~ - - ~~~~~~~ ‘ -- - .~~~~ - - - -,~~~s~~ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —- -— - _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ r — — — - - - ~~~,C” — - ,~~~“ :‘~~~~~~~A ”.’.’_~~~ - ¶ ( j ~(il I\I )JN1~ iw 1 COi I~1 S1ON ~ I~-\’I~’ I \CS Fl GI,JRI’ 4 — c~ . FIME csi [)M FOR C-~SU-~I, ’I’t FS 4 - 3 2 It s - ~~~~—-~~ - - ~~~~ _~~‘ . ~~~~~ s - - - - -‘-- — ---- —-‘.----- — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- aT ~~~ ’ ~~~~~~ ~~~± ‘ -~ TP~ ’ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - —-S ‘~~~ ‘s-’~-~,’ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I ’ C’ ‘0 V’ C -c .-‘ ‘C 0’ 0’ 4-, -~~~ c-i - c s-s 4-) _. _ — 5--. — — - \ 50 - ~~~ = — ~~‘ ‘— — — -~,., (5 __ ~~s U (I’S 4” -— 0 CC .‘. ~~~~ 0’ ( - 5 (‘5 z , — c-I — it) :--- H-. — ‘5-4 — — - 5-I -5-4 5’. ~~~ US ”’ ~~~~. ~~~ ~~~ — C — ,,‘s I I -~ — 5- a-S 5- 5-. ‘0 t 0’ 0’ “2 — 4-’ 50 50 0 “s-i -i ‘~~‘ ~0 O ‘0 VS 50 50 -- -- V 0 — C 5-. 0 — L —s 0 I”. 0 a CO 52 U ~~- 4-’ -~~ C- 4-33 _ _ ‘-‘ -5- -- - -- -- - ~~~~~~ - - - -- - F” —- s~-~~’.~~~~~ ,--’-,-’-a ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~- r - - ~~~~ ‘~~~~s.~’~rs- ~~“ - ‘r s-~~ ’ ’-’ - ‘.--~~-‘—-- ‘s’r’a’-’s- -C ” - Table 4- 19 shows the combined effect of the degree of darkness and the visibility on the OVTM casualties . Note that 69 percen t of the groundings , 88 percent of the collisions , and 67 percen t of the rammings occurred either at night or in poor v i s i b i l i t y , or bo th. Fi gure 4-7 shows the seasonal variation of casualties. Gro u ndings a re f a i r l y u n ifor m , peaking in sprin g . C o l l i s i o n s p eak strongly in spring and fall. Rammings tend to occur most of ten in spring , with 5 out of 6 rammings occurring then. Overall , spring clea rly predominates as the season for casua l ties. To consider the po ssibilit y of long-term trends in casualties , the yearly number of each type of casualty has been determined , and is shown in Table 4-20 . During the f i v e calendar years 1 972-1 97b for which the data base includes complete data , t here see ms to be no clear long- term t rends . The ocean bo ttom s for OVTM da ta ba se ground i ngs a re shown in Figure 4- 8. About one-third of the groundings are on mud or sand bo ttoms . For the leadin g grounding locations , Table 4- 2 1 shows the ocean bottom distribution . For the Gu a y a n i l l a Bay area , Lon g Isl a nd Sound and t he Che seapeake Ba~’ area , almost all groundings are on hard and rocky bo ttoms , Off Delaware Ba~’ , the majority of grounding s are on mud and sand bottoms . For colli s ions , two items of interest are (a) the type of enco un ter ba sed upon r e l a t i v e hearing, and (h) the time before the collision that the vessels are aware of each other. Figure 4-9 shows t he type of encoun ter , i.e . , meeting, crossing , or over- taking. (None of the “basic ” da ta base collisions invo l ve one v e ssel havin g be en a t anchor , ano ther type of collision encounter.) A s can he seen , 50 percen t of the collisions involved a meeting situation. Table 4 - 2 2 shows the time before a collision that the vessels are aware of each o ther. In over 60 percent of the known cases , both are aware of each other for more than 10 minutes before c o l l i s ion and /or are in radio con tac t . 4-34 — _ - - — .-..~~~~~~~~~ ,. - - -.- - - - - ~~~~~~~~~~ - - - - - ‘ - s - -‘----- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ “ ~~~ (-‘ ‘ P _ 5 - — CO 4-5 LI’) NI C) ‘~~ C) so NI C) 0’ — NI 0’ 0 — Sf) t”j ~~- 5- 50 0 50 0 C’ NI 0’ C’ C 0 0’ 0 0’ 0 NI 50 >- C- ~~~ Il) - ‘ V ri’S — 50 — .. ~~~~~— ~~ C) ~~ 0’ C) ~~ ‘ NI C’ -C so C NI - ‘ 5 0 — — SC CC ‘ ~~~ — U .5.. 4-’0 • CC -~~~ Z Cs - 0 C,, s., — 0 NI NI I’S — 0’ i-i 0’ CI V’S V’S NI Os C’ ‘ 0 — — 4,5 -5 - .5-4 — 5— .54 .0 >- ‘-I ‘~~ ‘ ~~ - - if) 0’ Sf) 0’ C C C’ C’ — LI’) 0’ ‘(0’ ((I —‘ -‘~55 5-. U — 0 5 C’ i ‘ Sf) C’ — C C’ CI C Sf) ‘. ‘ O0. 0) — — -4 ~~~ 4 1 C C E0’ >- — I--. — — 5 - >- ‘- C- H-. 5 — H —“S ,~ C) — C) <~~~~~ 52 --5 ,~ - C) ~~~‘— C C - .5- ~~~~ H SC u-~~~C - Z ,C SC SC 0 I’-’ —— H-’ #4 -4 CC0 VS (5U 00 50 50 0 Li,,, ,-. .‘. 0 ‘0 US 50 50 ,,-, -— V 0 —‘ 50 5-. 0 — 50 — 0 5-. 0 (5 CC #4 52 U 4.5 CC 0 SC C- 4-3 5 5 ---’—— — — ‘-—.—-.--‘- -- — --— ——---—---- -- - -‘-.— S • - . — ~~~‘ ‘ ‘‘._‘ ‘~~~~‘~~~~~~~~~~1,’5~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ -- — L GROUNI )1NGS COl I,I S I ONS R.-\M~ I I N(S - - F IGURE 4 - - . SF5\SON5\L VA R I AT ION OF CASUALT I l~S - ~~~ --__-— -- - ., ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1- t- - C .2 V’s o —c ‘0 = = — V’S C’ V’S ‘C C Sn I — — LI’) 5- -- V~ NI c--I — 5-’. — C, — 5--’ a —5- — NI C ‘Sn S-f) i — — Sn 5-.’ 0’ NI (‘-5 C’. ‘— — — 5 - — 4” 50. 1-- — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — 0 ’-’ — L’S — ‘0 — — NI C’ S-f) 5 0 5 0 I - -— 0 CO 4-’ — 5 0 5 - - — — — 0-0’ 4-I ri 0 5--’ 5—’ 4-) — US ’S’-. -‘ 4-) a O S ) 1) 0 4” C) C C) C 0 5,,. -,-, - _ 0 2 o ‘0 ‘iS C C ) ’-. 5) — 0 (5 C’ — C — 0 5-- 0 a a C) 0 C C s-s ‘C) ‘C) 4” ~~~~ -: 2 4-37 —-- ‘ ‘ ‘ 5 - - ~-w~~~’- ~a~~ 5-’S.T’- ~?=~~~~=“ ~~~ ‘ : ~~~‘ ~~~ ‘ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ - ~~~‘“ ‘5-” ~~~~~~~ - - ~~~~~~~ - I)’ — 11 — 10 — S — Ii - ‘nIH S \NI ) s ’s)R ‘0 Ii \RI) ROCKY ~) ( ‘~ \\ H~ 1 F IGUR1 ~ 4— S . OCFAN BOT-roM CONDITIONS FOR GROUNDINGS ‘fABI ~F 4 - 2 1 - OCEAN 130i’rOMS AT LOCATI ONS OF FRE Q U EN T GROUN D I NGS L o c a t i o n Mud Sand Cot-a l I-lard Rocky Unknown Total Off Del awa i-c Ba~’ 2 4 0 3 0 1 10 Gua v an i 1 Ia Ba~’ 1 0 1 1 (-s 1 10 - long I s l a n d Sound 0 0 0 2 3 0 5 - Oft ’ Chesapeake Bay 1 0 0 5 0 0 4 - ~ 4 -38 -- . 1’ - —‘— —- ,- --—‘---.- ~~~ ,— - --“-‘------ ~~~ - —-‘—5--- -a- ~~~~~~~~~’- 5-~ 2’S TT~~~ ~~—_,, , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - ‘5-’~~~~~~~. ‘ — ~~~~~~~~ - ~~‘“ ~~~~‘ S ” 5 - I ~~~~ ~~‘ _.._,_ ‘ ~~~ - 5— _ - [I - L MITT! NG CROSS I NG O\’ERTAK I NC FIGURE 4-9 . COLLISI O NS BY ENCO U NTER TYPE - - S I ~~~~~~~ r - ‘ ‘- - - — —-— ~~~~~ — _— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — ~~~~ —~~wrJ~~iS-.rv~~ 5- ‘ “ “~~~ ‘-5 S’W”5r~~’~~~~ cc-~~~~~ ‘-I CO 4-5 L/’S .—4 ~~5 (‘ 5 0’ I — ‘Si) — 00 -5 - 5 0 C)0 5) S-f) C C) C’ S-f) U S— ri ---- 4--I SC, 50 — 0 H ~ il- S — • Sn — C) 0 ,___5 U ~‘O 50 ~rS Li- - ‘- C) 0 VS = US C’ ~~1 0’ — NI H 5. 0 o 5—U ‘-5, 50 0 0 SC ‘SI’S Sn — _____________ _ _ _ _ C) SC -‘S’S 00 50 4,5 5) ( ‘ 1 C) NI ‘—4 Ii’S (‘ I 51) NI -r C) 4-4 0 I . V _~_ . __: - _ - J F’ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -- _ ,_ --~~~~~ ,,~~ r’s_ -- - In summary , casua It ie s in the data base , e s p e c i a l Iv c o i l is ions . occurred most Iv at n i gh t or i it j~ot~i’ v is iI ~ i i I t ~- con d it i i st i s , or both - Spring is the primary season for casualties , especially rammings. No c l e a r y e a r l y trend in casualties has been found - Most ground— ing s are in areas w i t h coral , hard , or rocky bottoms . O n e - h a l f of the coil ision s i n v o l v e a meeting s i t u a t i o n , and in most collisions , the vessels arc aware of each other ’s presence a t l ea s t 10 minutes bef ore c o l l i d i n g , -1 . ~ CAl lS-U , AN5 \LY SI S An an a lv s is of the causes ot’ the c a s u a l t i e s is di scussed • The ex te nded d ata base 01’ S incidents w i l l be used in the dis- cuss ion of causes s i n c e the 15 addi t iona I cases have been chosen • as involving vessels similar to t a n k e r s in such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as s i ze , nay i gat ion equipment , c t’ew makeup , etc . , thus having many of the same causative f a c t o r s . 4.5.1 Causes of Groundin g s Man ’s’ di I ferent c au sa t i ~ - e t a c t o t’ s c On t ri but e to gi-ound ing s Table - 1—2 3 i d e n t i f i e s the p r im a r y causes for the SS groundin gs included in the extend ed data base. Of the 29 di f f e re nt causes found , many are s i m i l a r or have the same c a u s a t i v e f a c t o rs • I-low- ever • each one of these 29 causes is d i s t i n c t from a l l the o t h e r s . S N ote t h a t to group the 55 groundings under as many as 29 causes s t i l l rcqui re’s grouping t o g et h e r some cases in which secondary f a c t o r s are d i f f e t - e n t . l ooking at the case records and at Table 4— , 3 , soni c pre v a lent causat i ye factors inv olv ed in the gr~ u n d in g s arc apparent . The’s are shown in Table - 1- 24 . Note that some groundings involv e more than one of the f a c t o r s l i s t e d and some are s p e c i a l cases which do not i n v o l v e an of the l i s t e d f a c t o r s to a lar g e degree . Of the - ‘ SS ground i ngs , 40 i nvo I ye a navi gation error (1 - • , poor know I edge ot ’ position ), including 21 that can he a t t r i b u t e d d i r e c t l y to poor n a v i g a t i o n p r a c t i c e . Seven cases i nv o l v e v e s s e l s f a i l i n g to w a i t for a p i l o t to ho ard b efore e n t e r i n g the h arb or area , or v essel s 4- 41 — - — -÷ ~~~~~ - - - - , - ‘ -— - — - -‘ - - 5- -s - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~, - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - TABLE 4 - 2 3 . CAUSES OF CROUND IN GS Number Primary Cause(s) of Grounding )f Groundings 1. Didn ’t keep informed of p o s i t i o n a l t h o u g h naviga tion aids were available. 8 2. Determined erroneous position/course althoug h naviga tion aids were available. 3. Erroneous position. Conning Officer not fully licensed . Didn ’t use a v a i l a b l e n a v i g a t i o n aids I 4. Didn ’t keep informed of p o s i t i o n , then turned on wrong buoy . N a v i g a t i o n aids were a v a i l a b l e . 2 5. Misjudged set , thus didn ’t know pos it ion. On watch over 8 hours. N a v i g a t i o n aids were available. 1 6. Inaccurate position in poor v i s i b i l i t y 2 Couldn ’ t determine position due to aids to naviga t ion f a i l u r e . Didn ’t wait for pilot. 1 8 . Didn ’t k eep informed of posi tion , Gyro failed . 9. Inaccurate position in poor visibilit y . Radar f a i l e d/ u n r e l i a b l e 2 10. Radar failure. 3 ii , Radar unreliable due to weather conditions 1 12 . Gyro or gyro repeater error . 2 13. M i s i n t e r p r e t e d l i g h t s seen. 1 1-1 , Water level below normal. 1 15. Read chart soundings in fathom s instead of feet I its . Used buoys to n a v i g a t e . Failed to enter buoy changes on c h a r t s . 2 l ’ . Lacked proper c h a r t s for area. 1 18. I-lad less d e t a i l e d chart than needed. 1 19, Lacked proper c h a r t s . Didn ’t w a i t for p i l o t . 1 4-42 - ~~~~~~~ ,~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ • ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘r!5- i~~~’~~ “ - TABI ,E 4 — 23 . CAUSES OP (‘.RO UNI ) I NGS ( C~~ t i nued 1 Niiml s e r Primar y C a u s e ( s ) of G r o u n d i n g Of Grou nd i ngs 2 1 . Informed incot -rect lv by p i l o t t h a t buoy was o f f - s t a t i o n . Used i t to n a v i g a t e . I 21 - Didn ’t w a i t for r~ i lot in s af e a rca - Na~ i ~‘a - t i o n aids were a v a i l a b l e . -I 22. l) i dn ’t w a i t for p i l o t in s a f e area . Mis- j udged s e t . N a v i g a t i o n a i d s a v a i l a h l e I 23. Misjudged set or dri ft in a maneuver. 24 - Bridge unat tended , then wi-ong manetive r - 25. Maneuvered too close to edge of wide p a s s a g e . Navigation aids were availab le. 26 . Made turn too close to edge of w i d e passage and barge sheered. Navigation a iLl S available - Uncharted shoal. S 2 S . Inaccurate pos it ion in a Id i ng vessel - 29 , Anchored in u n s a f e at -ca . 4 . 4 3 - -—‘-~~~-- ‘ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______________________________________ - ‘ --~~ ~~~~~~55~~ v~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~-~~~ •~~- _—- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~~~~~~~ -‘-- ‘—: - i-- - ” — “—‘-I’-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ i ’ABIl 1- 2 4 . Sil ECFE L) CA U SA IIVE I - ACtORS FOR t ; Rt ’ S uNl ’I\ ( ; S Nu mt~e i’ o t~ Pc icoil t 01 ~ i-o uiid I ng s ii Vo t a I i, iouitd 1 ngs wit i cit P act or in wi t cit l a c tot ’ Caus ative Factor is itivol ~~cd is i n v o l v e d N ay i gat ion F ri’o i- (e . g . , erroneous posi t i o n ) — a II causes 10 Na ’s igat ion F ri’o r — ~~~ r nay j ga — t i o n p~~ ct ice 21 55 Na v i ga ion Fr t-o F — I nope rah Ic or ma! I’u tic t i on I rig eq ti i ~~~iflC flt 9 1 (~ Na ’s it ~si t ion E r r o i Lack o I’ ~‘harts 5 Ii ( ‘t ’ Sn ni n g E r r o r (i_ c ., poor maneuver i tig ) — a I I causes 10 15 Conning E rror - mis judged set 0 II I) idn ‘t W~~I it lot ’ P lb t o t d i Jn ‘t t\;I i t in 551 Ic a rea I -~ Note: Some cases inv o lve more t h a n one o t~ t iu’ s~’ fat to rs , and ‘some t a sos i nvo I ye tin i que t’,i c t e t s n ot I i s ted ,i ho~ c wa it i ng for a p i l o t in an unsafe a i-ca where the grounding occur red - l’en grounding s i nvolve conning e r r o r s . 4 . S. 2 Causes of Co L i i si Oti s The 1 ‘‘extended ” data base c o i l is ions ar e an al ~ -:- ed for causes . A hr j et’ descr ipt ion 01 the pr iin a t-v causes ot ’ these col 1 i - s i o n s is shown i n ‘l’abl e 4 - 2 5 . For the l c o l l i s i o n s , 12 d i f f e r e n t p r i m a r y causes are found. Aga in . some of these causes are similar to others • but a l l ar e d i s t i n c t - Also , i t i s n e c e s s a r y to i gnore second ;irv t e at u r e s to group the F collis i ons under a~ fct~ a~ 12 causes. Based upon the case r ecords and Table 4 - 25 , some common cau sa - t lye fa c t o rs can he found (or t h e c o i l js ions - The ’s’ are shown in Table ~1 - 2ts • Of the 1 c c l i i s ions • — i nv ol ye lack of agreement as to p assing. Tb I s is the class I c meet i ng pi’ob 1cm ( Devann cv • I 9 8 , where each vessel knows of the other ’ s pi .escn~’ t’ • hut one reads t he 4 4 4 -.~~~~~ ~~~~~~ *- _~~~~~ - ~~~~ j — ~ -- ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ - ~ ———-—w- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .~~~~~~~~!r” ’~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ ‘~~-- I, Vt 1-. 0 C) -— .0 U) Li’s .—4 — — •-4 ‘ • — — — — — ‘-4 ~ —0 U 0 --4 ~~ 4-’ C) Ci CC CC 4.1 4-~ ) U 0. .0 - 0. ‘-‘ E ~C U m E C) . CC C) ~~ 4-’ ~~ 4-’ C) -— ~- E ~.‘ 0 E CC - ‘-I 4.’ Ci • CC (I) ~~ 0 4-’ - .0 1-. Ci 0, Z 0 U -~~ cli 4-~ b~ C) ~~~ -~-4 •~~ o - — 4.) U .0 .0 ‘- .0 U) 0 0 --4 DC 0 tr, ,~ m I/I ‘—‘ Z ~~ ~ ‘ .0 DC — — ~~ ~- ..‘ n s-. ~ — 0 0 C) ‘-4 —~ 0 - E C-, l- • • ‘-4 .0 Cli o U 4-’ 4-’ 0 ~J C) l- 4..’ CC 4’~ ~ U .0 .0 U C) . ~~ CC C DC DC DC ~~ C) 4.’ 0 DC 0 -— ‘-4 0 cli ,—~ - .w n S o I- ~- --4 4—’ ~- U n o •— _ _ - ‘Ci 0 E ‘‘ DC V) Vt ‘ ~~ ~~ CC ~ 0. -— 0 CC 0 — C) C) 1— “0 * C) ~~ U ~~ 4-4 C) c/I Vt .,.4 ~~~ C) Vt Vt Vt 0 “0 .~ C) C) -‘-4 “0 ~ cli CC Z 4.’ • 0, .-4 Vt C) U cli 0, 0, 4.’ 4-’ C) 0 “-‘ VI U ~ E - 4-’ l- .0 4-’ ~ Ci C) • .0 0 ~ CC 0, - >-, ~ ~ 4-’ “0 -i Li’s l- 0 0 U ‘4-4 - “.‘~ ~ 4-’ “0 4-’ 0 CC CC DC Vt ‘0 0 “ -.4 E 4-’ ~~~ DC 0 CC C) ‘0 - 4 4—’ 4-’ ~~ - 0 “ — ~ ‘ 4--’ I- cli 4-. • 0 tIc .,-4 l- C) I— U 0. C) U tIc 4.’ VI ‘-~ ‘ 0 ’ ‘-4 -~~ O CC CC- 4 VI 0 CC U C) 4-) ‘ 4 1— 0. U --’ C) -— E E~~ C)~~~ - -~~ ‘0 ‘0 k-’ cli ‘— 0 ~~- ~- - te~ E 0 ‘-4 E 4-’ I-’ C) C ) C l i ‘0 C C V t 0 0 C C .~~ ‘-~~E ~ Vt V t U cli 0 ~~~ C) “0 U C C 4.’ “-~~O (li O 0 Vt Vt ’-’ l- El- C) ‘,-4~~~ C) 0 ‘4.’ U ~~ cli CC~~ ‘0 E C ) ~ E “0 1— ) - 4 0 0 ~~ C) O~~~ C) C) CC C) l - O 0 E — C) U ‘0 E C ) ‘-‘ ~ “0C) CC --’ — C) C )E E .0 “-4 CC ‘0~~ ~~ ~~~ O cli DC 0 0 ~~ 0 k-’ CC 0 Cli Cli 0 C C U ~U ~~ ~~ U 0 ~~ Z -o -e C) C) DC DC DC DC I.. 0 0 0 O DO DC ’- - ‘-4 ‘-4 ‘-‘ .0 .0 - DO DC DC DC 0 0 ,~~ ~~ ~~ U U V t C ) 0 0 0 0 --4 --~ CC cli CC CC 0—’ 0 ’-’ 0. -— -~-4 “-4 “-‘ 4 U) Vt 4.’ 4.’ 4-’ 4.’ “~~ C) s1 C) — >‘-_ 4-) 4.’ 4.’ 4.’ VI U) I- l- ci) Vt ‘-‘ E-- C) C) C) 0) 0 0 Ci Ci C) C) 4-) Vt o C) C) C) 0) 1’ l- ~~. ~~. ~~- ~~- - C ) “-c C) U X X X X U U C C C C ~~~~ — r’-J P~) ~~ LO ~0 C 00 C~ 0 — ~ 1 — — — 4-45 - - - -~~- - r — — - — - ~~ —— — I s i tuat ion as t ’cqu i i i rig a standard poi-t - to - pot- I pass ing and the other reads the s i t u a t i o n as r e q u i r i n g a starboard-to-starboard passing. lit 3 co Il is ions , p a s s i n g was e i t h e r agreed upon or c l e a r l y involved standard procedure based upon the rules of the road , but a coil 1 s ion occurred due to pool- exe cut ion of the p as sing . In 4 c o l l i s ions , ve ssels e i t h e r lost ti-ack of , or did not know the l o c a t i o n of the other vessel - It is i n t e r e s t ing to note , howe ver , t h a t in almost a l l cases , both vessels are aware of each other ’ s presence. TABLE 4-2 6. SELECTED CAUSATIVE FACTORS FOR COLLISIONS Number of Percent of’ C o l l i s io n s in l’otal C o l l i s i o n s which Fa ctor in w h i c h i: ac t o r Causative Factor is Involve d is i nv o lved Lack of agreement as to passing . 7 41 Didn ’t know l o c a t i o n of the other vessel. 4 24 Agreed upon or standard passing . Poorly performed, 3 18 H Note: Sonic cases involve uni que t’actors not l i s t e d above . 4 . 5 . 3 Causes of Rammin~ s As for the groundings and collisions , the six ramming cases have been anal y zed for cause. Brief descrip tions of the causes found are shown in Table 4-27 . Four differen t primary causes have been found for the six cases. Six cases wi th four different primary causes is a small sample to find common causa tive factors , bu t Table 4-28 shows tha t t he failure to maintain a proper lookout is involved in 50 percent of rammings - 4-46 -- * -~~~~~ ------~~~~--~~~~ I k W~ ,W ~~ “—‘~‘ — —~~~~~~~~-‘~~~~~~~~ — _--_- L— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Z~~~~~’~~~~~~ P”,~~~~f”S’~~ “—“‘ ~~~~~~~“- ~ “‘- ~~ ‘ ~~ ‘~~~~ ‘~~ — - - l A BLE 4 2 7 • CAL)SFS 0,: RAMM I N ; S Nuin bei- of Causative Factor I n v o l v e d Ramm ing s Didn ’t keep informed of posi t ion al thoug h n a v i g a t i o n aids were av a i l a b l e . 1 M isiudge d set or drift in a maneuver. 2 Failed to maint ain proper lookout . 2 Failed t o main t ain proper lookou t when radar was no t usable due to wea ther. 1 TAB I.E 4 2 8 . CAU S:\TI\E FACTORS FOR RAMM I NGS Number ol’ Percent of Causative Factor involved Ramm i ngs Total F a i l u r e to maintain pr oper lookout , 3 50 Conning error - Poor maneuvering. 2 33 Naviga tion error - Poor navigation prac t ice. I 1 -; 4 - S 4 Limi ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The numbers of casual ties upon which the characteristics and causal analyses are based are too small to allow any reliable s tatistical anal y sis. However , i t is po s sible to use the results of the characte ristics study and the causal analysis to define a se t of requirements for sy stems. Sy stems to prevent casualties could then he proposed , designed , and assessed based upon t he degree t o which they would preven t groundings , c ol l i s i o n s , and r ammings wh ich are of the types described in Section 4 4 and wh ich have causes as desc ribed in Sec tions 4 .5 .l- 4 .5 • 3. However , t his approach has shor tcomi ngs. For example , although the anal y sis may show that 40 per cent of the groundings occur off the East Coast , 3 percen t oc c ur under day or twiligh t condi t ions , and 38 percen t involve poor naviga tio n practice , it canno t he concluded t ha t 4 0 percen t of all groundings include this specific combination of conditions /factors. Nor can it he concluded that t percent (the 4-4-7 - ‘ I ’- - - — —~~~ --——-- .—-*— - ~~~~~~~~~ ,.._ -:~~~~~~~ ~~~ : , ~- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - -~w . . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ product of the above three percentages) of all groundings include this specific combination . Clearly, the correlation is missing, I t is possible to perform an extensive anal y sis of the casualty da t a , and derive the perce nt ages of casu alt ies wi t h cer t ain combin a - - - t i o n s of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and causal f a c t o r s . 1-lowever , even in thi s approach there are p r o b l e m s . Not only is the number of c a s u a l t i e s small , hut grouping casual t ies into causal categories i gnores secondary factors that may he important in later anal y sis. Based upon t he above , each casual ty has been considered sepa- m’ate l ~’ ratn er t h a n using the overall results of the cha racteristics and causal anal y sis , The casualty circumstances are studied , and matched against each possible casualt y prevention (operational) feat ure to deter m ine how effective that particular feature would i-ce in preven ting this particular casualty. This method preserves the - ‘ uniqueness of each c a s u a l ty and the c o r r e l a t i o n s of i t s c h a r a c t e r - ist i c s and i t s c a u s a t i v e f a c t o r s, The ma tching is done for all c a s u a l t i e s and for a l l proposed operational fea tures. Then , those operational features that are found to be the most effective iii preven ting these casua lties are combined into total systems , which are evaluated on the basis of total system cost-effectiveness (see Sec tion 5 and Appendix I for a description of the evaluation technique). 4 6 ESTIMATION OF FOREIGN FLAG CASUA l TIES MISSING FROM THE OVTM DATA BASE Due to the l i m i t a t i o n s of the Coast Guard data base discussed i~~ Sec tion L3 , a me t hod has been so ught for es timating the number of m i s s i n g forei gn f l a g casualties. To this end , the Coast Guard * con trac ted wi th Lloyd’ s to sort through their casualt y reports for the years 1971- 1977 for groundings and c o l l i s i o n s in United States o f f s h o r e w a t e r s in v o l v ing t a n k v e s s e l s larger than 1 . 000 g r oss tolts . A t o t a l of (20 reports has been found . A in f o r m a t i o n and A n a l y s i s S t a f f , O f f i c e of Merchant M a r i n e S a f e ty . 4 - 4 8 ‘.-r .- ‘-‘c~~ ,.- — -‘ ~~~~~~~~- ~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - ~~~~~~~ -. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ ~ ~~‘-“ ~~~ - - l’he OV I’M Study team analyzed these 62(1 reports to f i n d cases which occurred in the areas of i n t e r e s t to t h i s study : U n i t e d States coast to - 200 m i l e s excluding harbors , rivers and channe ls (and waters of other c o u n t r i e s ) . In some cases the l o c a t i o n des- cript ion in the Lloyd ’s c a s u a l t y report is amb iguous , and a best gt e s s is necessary as t o whe ther the locat ion of the case is in or 4 out of the reg ion of i n t e r e s t - -\ t ot a l of 45 groundings and 14 c o l l i s i o n s have been found to he in “good” locations , as shown in l’ahle 4- 29 . Table 4-30 show s a breakdown of these cases by f l a g ( s ) and type of tank v e s s e l (s) involved. Note that the f l a g s of the n o n - t a n k vessels involved in coil is jolts must be cons idel’ed , sin ce i f any Un ited States I’lag ship is involved in an accident , it should report the inc ident under MVC R report ing regulations . F i r s t , looking at tank barge cases • it can he seen front Table 4.3( 1 t h a t at 1 tank barges involved are under United States flag. The OV l’M data base also shows that all tank barges involved in those i n c i d e n t s are under u nited States flag. This agrees w i t h the fact t h a t almost all tank barges in Iln ited States w a t e r s go from one U n i t e d S t a t e s port to another and so , under the Jones Act , mus t he tin i ted States flag. Thus , it may he as sumed tha t there are vir - tu~u l lv no tank barge cases of i n t e r e s t t h a t would not f a l l under th e MVCR report ing rules , and thus , except for v i o l a t i o n s of those rules , the OVT~t is not m i s s i n g an~- tank barge cases . Howev er , i t j s clear t h a t t a n k e r cases are m i s s i n g front the OVIM data base. Ihere is no regul at ion requiring ei ther foreign t anker groundings or c o l l i s i o n s i n v o l v i n g only forei gn v e s s e l s to be reported to the Coast Guard if they occur outside of three m i l e s from U n i t e d States shores, Suc c a s u a l t i e s w i l l n or mall~ - be m i s s i n g from the MVCR data base ~i consequently they w i l l he m i s s i n g front the OVTM d a t a ba se. ‘Fables 4-3 ! and 4- 3 2 show the f u r t h e r a n a ly s i s of the tanker cases from the Lloyd ’s sort to est imate the number of t a n k e r cases m i s s i n g from the OVTM data base. As shown , i n the Lloyd ’s sort of ‘6 percent of the groundings and 31 percent of the collisio n s involved f o r e i g n ships only , The OVTM data base has o n l y 45 percent f o r e i g n f l a g g r o u n d in g s and no f o r e i g n - o n l y c o l l i s i o n s . If it is 4-4 9 ____________________________________________ — - - .--- —‘- _______________________-- TABLE 4- 29. ANALYSIS OF LLOYD ’S SORT To tal in Lloyd ’s sort 620 Groundings in OVTM locations of interest 45 Collisions in OVTM locations of in terest 14 Total in OVTM locations of interest 59 TABLE 4-3 0. ANALYSIS OF LLOYD’S SORT - CASE TYPES Incident Type of Vessel(s) No. of Type Flag(s) Involved Involved Cases Uni ted States Tanker 10 Grounding Tank Barge 3 Foreign Tanker 32 Uni ted States Tanker and non-tank only vess e l 2 - Tanker and tank barge 1 Foreign only Tanker and non- tank 3 vess el Two tankers 1 Collision H United States United States tanker and Forei gn and foreign non-tank vessel 2 United States tank barge and forei gn non- tank vessel 1 Foreign tanker and United Sta tes non - tank vessel 3 Foreign tanker and Unites St a t es t ank barge 1 Foreign tanker and United States tanker 0 4-SO I - - - .—- — ---‘—--— -—- - --—--- - — - - --—— -~, - ç ~ - -- - - -— — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - - - TABLE 4-31, EST IMATION OF MISSING TANKER GROUNDING CASES Foreign U.S . Tanker Tanker Percen t Groundings Groundin gs To tal Forei gn In Lloyd ’s 10 32 42 76 In OVTM 2 3 19 42 45 Adjusted OVTM (To Lloyd ’s percentage) 23 74 97 76 Missing in OVT M 0 55 55 TABLE 4- 32 . ESTIMATION OF MISSING TANKER COLLISION CASES Tanker Collision Cases Tank cr Colli s ion Cases Per cent Involving at Least One Involving Foreign Flag For eign United States flag Ship Ships On ly Tpt ~~1 U n Iv In Lloyd’ s 9 4 l~ ~l Tn OVTM ‘ 0 - cc Ad ju s ted OVTt4 (To t I o ~-d’ s percentage) - 3 10 30 “ I t s s i n i ~n OVTM 0 3 3 - I ! ~~~~~~~~~~~~k 4-51 * ~~~~~~ — — —— - --—-‘-— — -- - - -- -~~-~~~~~~~- - -‘ —~~~~ -. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - assumed t h a t Lloyd ’ s reports are f l a g - i n d e p e n d e n t , then for the OVTM data base to he flag- independent it should have about the same percen tage of fo reign flag-only cases as Lloyd ’s data, By the MVCR repor ti ng rules , no United States flag cases should he m i s s i n g - from OVTM . Therefore , an estimate of the total number of foreign- only casualties in OVTM can be made h a dj u s t i n g the O VIM foreign casualti es such that the percentages of foreig n- onl \- gr ound ings and collisions in OVTM ar e t he sa me as in Lloyd ’s data. When t h i s is done , i t can he seen in Tables 4 - 3 1 and 4 - 32 , that an e s t i m a t e d 55 foreign grounding s a nd 3 foreign-onl~ - collisions are missing from the OVTM data base. Table 4-33 shows the estimated actual number of cases of interest to the OVTM study to he 121 , h3 cases in the OVTM data base and 58 cases est m a ted to he missing. In other words • if the MVCR were co mple te , the OVTM casualt y analysis would have found that approximately 121 casualties of interest actuall y occurred in Uni ted States offshore waters in the (FY ~2 - El 77 ) tim e period considered. TABLE 4 - 3 3 . ESTIMATED TOTAL OVTM CASUALTI ES OF INTERE ST Estimated In O h M M i s s i n g Cases Total Groundings 4” 55 102 Collisions 10 3 13 Rammings 6 0 6 TOTAL 63 58 121 4 - 5 2 “s—- — - -~~~ , - r - - - ~~~~~~~~ - ~~~ -- - - - 4.7 CASUALTY PROJECTIONS The cas ual ti es discussed in Sec tions 4 .3, 4. 4 and 4.5 are a ma tt er of his torical record , as doc umented in the Merchant Vessel Casual ty repor t s main tained by t he U.S. Coas t Guard . The potential effec tiveness of the various system alternatives (to be described in Sec t ion 5) is ba sed on an analysis of the cas ual t ies of interes t derived from this data base and identified earlier in Section 4.3. To es tim a te the effec tiveness of each of the recommended sys tem a l t erna t ives (see Sec tion 7) in preventing future incidents , a casualty scenario for the 1980s has been projected. The objec tive is to estimate the number of potentially prevent- able casualties (i.e., groundings , collisions and rammings) involv- ing tank vessels and/or offshore rigs that would occur if no new OV FM techniques are adopted .* The only changes assumed are the number of lo aded tank v essels and the numb er/ loca le of off shore ri gs in United States waters. The time frame chose for projecting casualties is the 10-year period from 1981 through 1990. Projections of tanker traffic in United States waters for 1982 and 198 7 have been ob tained from MIT (Devanney , 1978) . Table 4-34 shows the numbe r of loaded tankers per year es tim a ted to be in transit in United States coastal areas through 1990. Three percent annual grow th in the demand for oil in the United States and the introduc tion of deep draf t terminal facilit ies in the Gulf (LOOP) in 1980 are assumed. Two separate linear interpolations have been used; i.e. , from 1977 to 1982 , and front 1982 to 1990. Projec tions of the number of offshore ri gs that may exist in the 1981-1990 time frame is highly speculative . For example , deploymen t of rig s in the ou ter co nt inen tal shelf lease areas off the eastern seaboard of the United States is very much dependent *A number of actions taken by the Coast Guard during 19 7” will have an impac t on t he number of c as ual t ies occurrin g in future s-ears. Among the more significant are exten sion of LORAN-C coverage to the West Coa st and Gulf of Al ask a , incorporation of Navigation Safety Re g ti latio c~s into Title 33 of Code of Federal Regulations , and institution of the ‘ranker Board ing Progr am. Estimation of the individual casualty reduction poten ti al of these ~p~ cific actions has no t been addressed dur ing this s tud y, exc ept tha t ex tended LORAN-C coverage is included as part of the 8aseline System . 4-53 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~-,r ’ r ;r— ~~~~~~~ - ------- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- —.-.-- - -‘-“— ‘!‘ABLE 4-34. TRAFFIC PROJECTIONS - NUMBER OF LOADED TANKER TRIPS PER YEAR _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1,- -c~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I ~~~~ I’) ’ — — ‘I —~ I’ ‘ -I (‘1411 — (‘ ( $ 1 1 1 $ , 1 1 4 ’ ii- — I ‘ i s - ISl ‘15 - ‘ill S 1 150 I-I’ll) 4 — c c,c ~*? l,,,,’I~~n l O l l I- IS - I : ~ ‘, ,‘ c, - - I I - l~ -lii lilt, ‘ ‘ -I III - - SI - - 5 l c ~ % ‘1 1 ,1 II, ” . I ‘I II) 111111 1 11)1111 1111 111 10(111 11 11111 1111111 lOll; ) 111011 (1 11111 111111 1 11 11111 lIlt ) )) 01111 I .cc ’ u g n 2 4 ’ , - c - - 2 - S ~‘,,tl’I ~‘,,,,il 2 5 1 - I 11) 14 I I I), I Y’ , I - - I ) , S ( I ” , ‘ ‘ I’S ‘S~ :‘qc, 2 2 1 2 1 0 1 ‘ - ‘ 41 ) 01 4 1 ’ 5 5 2 4 c’ - ,- l O S ‘ ‘ ‘ II S I - I I c . - i g cc S;lil I’~ II - 1 , 1 1 1 4 lc ~ - - I _‘ ll S I IIl ’ l - I I ’ - I l l ‘ Sil I l s . II I4~ :‘Il 44 .’ -_ S’l ‘II ic _ s I :1111 III It,)- , IS’ ) ’ - - ~~l :cc - co .1 ) i , - ,k .i (I ’S II I I ’ ‘ ‘II I I S I II 5~~ 11 ° 111 1 1) 11112 I l ~~ ) I _ S I I’ ll Ill, ’ ‘i U II,, - :0 - - - -~~~ - — s c ‘ “i s ,- I -c - - i r u t i c c co :1. - c s : c( I’ ‘‘0 Ic, ‘ c i I’, 255% .’ on the success ach ieved in the exploratory drilling exercises which are cu rrently underway. For current purposes of casualty project- i ons , no increases in rig deployment have been assumed , y ie l d i n g what is probably a conservative estimate of ramming incidents. h oweve r , since rammings of offshore rigs constitute a relatively — small percen tage of the total number of casua lt ies , thi s assump ti on does not have a significant impact on the system effectiveness estimates. The following sections describe the methods used to estimate the number of ground ings , coll iFions , and ramming s in United States waters based on the foregoing traffic/offshore rig scenario. I . , 1 Projectio n_of Groundings The number of groundings is assumed to increase line arly with h numbe r of t inkers in transit in United States waters. Since ~~ ‘ps ’n~ i rv ~ ‘ I cr ground i ngs varies with coastal reg ion , the ~~~~~~~~~ •~ gt ‘ iicJ i ugs in each reg i onal area during the base year - - ~ u~~ d a~ the basis for proiection . As sh own i n Table - - - t~~~. ~ v~ , v t o ’ I (fl l’~ ’2 - FY 1977) number of groundings in - ~ i~~~ s t i ~~a~~~e i ~~ I . l~,i’s t’d on the anal vs i s of 1,1 ovd ‘ s casual tv - ,n $ ~~1 • ‘ ~~‘ ~ ~o , e i~~’ ti ~,lnk ’r g r o u n d i n g s ,cre estimated _ _ _ _ _ _ _ “cc—’-,-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~t Icc .~~~~~~‘i;_ ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - T~~ t’~~~~~~~ ~~~-t’ - ‘•~‘ ~ —-- ~~ — ~~ - “~~— -. F— ‘ --- — - - to be mis s i n g front the OVTM data base. These 55 gro u nd in gs have been ass umed to he dis tributed hr reg ion in the same proporti on :Is the ac tual rep or ted foreign t~ nkcr groundings. Un it ed S ta te s fla g tanker traff i c carry ing crude o i l fr om Alas ka to the West Coast and the Gu lf was p r a c t i c a l l y non-existent in 19~~~. Th e tanker fleet to he used for this purpose is prolected to consist of large , well-equipped United States flag vessels with special t r a f f i c r o u t i n g and high crew sta ndards. S ince no hi st ori- c~~l data e x i s t p e r t a i n i n g to g r o u n d in g s of a f l eet of t h i s n a t u r e operating in the Alaskan and West Coast reg ions , it is i n f e r r e d tha t the casualt y rate in terms of groundin gs ler tanker t r i p would he half tha t of the curren t ra te for fore i gn fl ag ta nkers go ing to the West Coa s t. W i th these assumpt ions , using the tra t’f ic project i OIlS 0 !’ l’abl e 4 - 4 , and the (o-ye a t ’ average as the base year number ol’ ground i ngs , the pro) ect ions shown in Tab Ic 4—35 arc obta I ned tot ’ the p e r io d l~~$l -19911 . ‘FABLE 4 - 55 . C.-\SU,\l,l’Y PRO .IECl’ I ONS —CURRLN ’I’ SYSTEM I I 1 ’ S I j ~~~~~~ :1 4. “ .2 l’rojection of’ Collisions The number of c ollisions are assumed to increase as the square of the me rchant vessel traffic in United States wa ters . HARM ) (MAR11), l9~~ l forecas ts a three percent annual growth rate in both pe t ro leum impor t s and total imports. Since tanker tr a ffic pro ject- ions (flevannev . l9” 81 were also based on a three percent annual 4 .55 I - , * - - ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~~ -~~ -,c,— ~~~~ -‘-‘~~- ~~—‘--~~~ ~~ — 4 -.-—,——- ~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ,~~- ~~w-’~~ r ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ grow th in demand for oil , it is assumed that the t o t a l merchant vessel traffic increases at the same ra t e as tank vessel tr affic. A s shown in Table 4-11 , the ~-vear total number ot ’ coil isjofls in the OVTM data base is ten. Based on the an a l y si s of Llo yd ’ s c asual ty repor ts (Sec ti on 4 .~~), three collisions involving only fore i:’n flag ships are est imated to be miss ing fro m the OV’I’M data base. tc ith these a ss u m p t i o n s , the tanker traft ’ ic pros cc t ions of ‘l’ab Ic 4—34 , and us ing tht ’ ~i - ye a t~ ave rage as the base numbe t’ of colli s ions , the projections shown in Table 4—3 5 are obtained . ‘t’ht’ increased number of c o l l i s i o n s with respect to the current average annual rate of 2 . 2 is due to the proi cc ted increase in tct ;i I t r a t’fi c from 19”’ to 1990 by a f a c t o r of 2 .5. H 4 . “V .3 P r oj e c t i o n of Ra mm ings The number ot ’ r amm in g s of offshore rigs is assumcd to inc tea se as the produc t of the numbe r of the merchan t ~‘es~~ is and the number of o f f s h o r e ri gs in Uni ted S t a t e s waters . As discussed in the case of collisions , merchant vessel traffic is assumed to increase at the same rate as tank vessel traff i c. The number of ri g s is assumed to rena in constant . The base annu al number of rammings oft’ the Gui I Co ast has been ob ta i ned h~’ a v e r a g i ng the (‘c y ear tot a I shown in ‘Fable 4 - i l . With these assunipt ions , and u s i n g the 1~u1 f Coast t r a f f i c p r o j ect ions of Table 4-34 , the pro l ect i oti s shown in Table 4 - 3 5 are obtained. 4 . 8 IMPAC1’ OF PROPOSED RLGULA’l’IONS The projec t ions of grounding s , coil is ions , and ramm ings presented in the preceding sect ion are based on the imp Ii c i t as su m p— t ion that the same pat tern o I causat i ye t’actoi’s vii ich prevai led d u r i n g the base years (19” 2 — 1 9 ” ” ) w I l l continue to occur , is it h the same percentage of tank vessel tri ps re sult ing in a casua l tv Ru 1 es have been proposed wh I cli t~’ott I c,l requ I re l ORAN — C on bo ard vessel s lar g er than l ,~i00 gross tons e n t e r i n g United S t a t e s port s (Federal Re gi s ter , 1 9”’c;i) , and dual radar on board a l l vess els - - . -. ~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~, -—‘-I, - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -~~~~~~~~ ‘~~ — -r -- ---~~~~~’W~~~ .---- -~-----— —— larger than 10 , 000 gross tons (Federal R e g i s t e r , 1978b) . The base- line system , to be described in Section 5 . 2 . 1 , assumes t h a t these regula t ions will be put into effec t , and that vessels will he equ ipped by 1985. The effectiveness attributed to the baseline system w i l l reduce the number of casualties projected for the 1981-1990 t ime period. As shown in Tables 5- 6 and 5-7 , the effectiveness estimates are 25 percent for groundings , 7 percen t for coll i sion s , and 4 5 percen t for ramm ings , wi th an availability of 95 percent . The proposed rule requiring LORAN-C equippage (F ederal Reg i s ter , 1977a) esti- ma tes 40 percent equippage in 1975. It is assumed that this will increase linearl y to 100 percent in 1985. Based on these assump t ions and es tima tes , the casualty projec- tions for the period 1981-1990 are reduced to the numbers shown in Table 4- 36. TABLE 4- 36. CASUALTY PROJECTIONS - BASELINE SYSTEM \cccccl c ~~ ~ ‘S l ~~~~ l ) I ~~T I .LL~i ~~~~ i I ~ , ,,f 1 ~ J f I ~~~ 5 I, ~ II II ~ 4- S ” /4-58 It - ‘ - - — “~~~••~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~ - - - ~~~~~~ — - -- -~~~~~- 5. SYSTEM ALTERNATIVES 5.1 INTRODUCTION The da ta base that was used in the study for assessing system al ternatives consists of the 78 casualties identified in Section 4 , which include several non - tanker incidents. This data base is too small to att ach high statistical certainties to conclusions based on the samples. No doub t there are other human errors , for example , that could cause accidents which are not covered by the human errors comm i tted in the 78 cases. Nevertheless , the assump- tion is made here that the casualties in the data base are repre- sentative of accidents that w i l l continue to occur if no changes are made in procedures or equipment . Furthermore , it is assumed tha t sys tem al terna tives tha t would have been effective in reduc - ing the accidents in the data base will likewise be effective in reducing future acciden ts. The small siz e of the da ta base has a definite advantage , on the other hand . It enabled the team to review each case thor- oughly , and to trea t combina t ions of sys t ems in a realis tic way . H That is , if system A could prevent 20% of the accidents , and sys tem B 30% , it doesn ’ t mean tha t the two sys tems to ge ther could preven t 50% - - the actua l number could be any percentage between 30% and 50% , depend ing on the individual cases. The data base was small enough that this problem could he readily handled . Early in the study about 30 systems were identified as hold- ing some promise fo r reducing groundings , collisions and ramnt ings. They were based on sugges tions in the literature , sugges ti ons passed on by Coast Guard personnel and shi pmasters , sugges tions from equipment manufac turers , and on exper ience with traffic managemen t and control systems in general. The ori ginal intent was to assess each casualty agains t the spectrum of systems to de termine which systems appeared most effective in preventing that casua l ty. However , this approach had the disadvantage that other systems not on the list might prove better; furthermore , the relationship of systems to the causes of the casualties was 5- 1 . 1 ---- -. - --- —.—- - -——-.‘- - -- ~~~~~, . - - ~~~~ - ---~~—--‘-- .‘: - ~1~~~~~~- — — - — ----- ~- — - .- - somewhat obscured . In order to overcome these o b j e c t i o n s , an ‘ - intermediate step was p erfo rmed : a l i s t of “operationa l features ” embodied in the group of systems was defined , and evaluated against the c a s u a l t i e s . For example , rather than ask , “would c o l l i s i o n avoidance radar sys tem have been effective?” t he que st ion was — posed , “would a warning signal that automaticall y sounded when a collision appeared likely have been effec tive?” This method was found to be more s a t i s f y ing; it had the f u r t h e r advantage of d istinguishing crucial features of different versions of the same equipmen t. In each case the assumption was made that the operationa l feature was “availah le ”~ i.e., tha t any equipment required to provide the operational feature was working , and ins talled in an appropria te loca tion on the bridge , in the wheelhouse , or in the char troom . Attempts were made to gauge whether the officer would have used it , based on the general discipline and wa tchs tand ing ac tivity of the ship. The number of fixes and course change en tries in the ship ’s log, license/c erti fica t ion of off icers , equipment on board , etc. all provided clues. Thus the ease of usage was au tomatically incorporated into the assessment . Avail- abil it y i s limi ted by reliabilit y considera tions , geographic covera ge , and cos t. These considera t ions ar e system-specific , and so are no t incorporated into tile operat ional feature as sessments. Once the opera t ional fea tures were assessed , a se t of asso- d a ted systems was defined. Table 5-1 shows the operational features and the section numbers of the sys tems wh ich incorpora te each feature . The operational features and their evaluations are described in detail in Section 1.2 of Appendix I . The systems are listed in Table 5-2 . The more promising systems are discussed in Sec tion 5.2 , and the less promising systems in Section 5.3. The systems themselves are evalua ted considering not only their usefulness as determined from the casualty analysis , hut consider- ing cos ts , geographic coverage , lim itations , user acceptance , rel iability, stage of development , etc . 5-2 _______________________________________________ - - - ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~ ,~~, -~~ “w 7”~~ —- t TABLE 5- 1 . OPERATIONAL FEATURES See t Ott Nu mh e r~ o t~ S v . t s’m’~ 01)1, ’ l i t I ona 1 I~i’a t u ri’s ti c lu g t he F ea t ui’ i- ‘t o l’s’ m t e n s lvi ’ and pci - I od i i’ 5. in lug 1. Rev i -~s’d Ru 1 es o t’ th i ’ Road 5. 3 . 5. Ch a r t l u g o f r e s t r i c t e d :ones 5. 3 . -~ • \et s t r a t ’ t i c s e p a t -at ion schemes S. 2 . 8 5. Im p r o v e d l I g h t : h u o ’ . sy s t em 5 . 1 . 2 , 5 . 2 . 9 I np t oy ed p i l o t t t a n s li-i ’ p i’ocedures S. . 2 , 5. . 10 I tap t o y e d equi pm ent ~ t a nda i’d s 5. 2 . 1 , S. 2 . 2 , 5. -~ 1 1 S . I ns’en t I vi’ to i-epa i t - ma I t u n e t ion — 5 . 2 . 2 , S . S . 3 ing ge a r 9. ~I aiid at o t v coin-se i’ecoi’de r 5. 5 . -i 1( 1 , 1 inpr oved posit ion accui ’acv Ovet ’ S. 3 . 5 l O R \ N — C 11 . \h i l i t v to l,)ht a i n 1 d e p e n d a b l e 5. 2 . p o s i t ion f i x - I . l)~ ~~) I ~~V 01 nay i I~ ;i t I O t t d i t a 5. 2 . 13. l i s p I av o t ’ dcv Ia t ion f r o m 5. 2 . 12 i n t e n d e d t r a c k I-I . . -\le I’t i n d i c a t i n g e x c e s s i v e 5 . 2 . 1 2 dcv i a t i o n l’ r om t r a c k I S . ~ianeu v e r I n g p o i n t a l e r t 5. 2. I I It ~. I np t o y e d dept Ii d e t e c t ion 5. 5 . 9 — . .-\1 er t I ud i c a t i ng s h a l l o t . dept Ii 5 . 2 . 13 IS . l~or t. , it ’d - l o o k i n g t a t h o m e t e t ’ 5 . 5 . 1 0 10 . Dep t h mapp ing w i t h a l e r t 5 . 2 . 1 - I 2 0 . R A C O N s a t fa i rway , t r a f f i c l a n e 5 . 2 . 2 , S . 2 . S , 5 . 2 , t ’ , 5 . 2 ° cut r an c e s 2 1 . ~b t l i t to obt t i n dep en dz &b Ic , 5 . 2 . IS i l l — tsea t h e r r a d a r i’e t urns 2 2 . \h i i i tv to ob t a in d et e rm i n a t ion of 5. 2 . 15 , 5. 5 , II non-moving radar tar gets 25 . R- \ CONs on o i l p l a t f o t - n l s , 5 . 2 . 9 2-1 . -\ I e r t t h a t a new v e ss e l has 5. 2 . It . , 5 . 2 . 1~ , 5. 3 . 12 3PI)cat’ed with i n a b ou t S ml it’s of own s h i p 25 . l~a r n i n g t h a t a r a d a r t a r g e t has 5 . 2 . t O , 5. 3 . 1 2 come W i t It in a sho i’t r a n g e of own ship 2 0 . A b i l i t y t o o b t a in r e l a t i v e p o s i - 5 . 2 . 1 5 , 5 . 2 . 1 8 , 5 . 3 . 1 2 t ion and course p r o j e c t ion of r a d ar t a r g e t s - - 2 . .-\ lert if c o n i l i c t pr e dicted b S.2.IS a u t o m a t ic equ ipnl ent ~~“ 28. At, i i i t v t o o b t a i n imm ed l a t e 5 . 2 . I — , 5 .1. I S r a d i o c o n t a c t w i t h a s e l e c te d vs’ssel 29. \h i l l t v to obta in m a n e u v e l - i n g 5 . 2 . I — , 5 . 2 . 1$ i n t e n t of o t h e r v e s s e l s 30. In c e nt i y e to eoinm iin i c a t e t. i th 5 . 2 . 1 othe r v e s s e l s to e f f e c t p as ’~ in g s 31 . (;ener a I idv so r v of c u r r e n t s , 5, 2 . 2 , 5 . 2 . 3 , 5. . t i d e s , t . e at h e r , outa gec 32 . V ov :ig e p l a n and ch e ckl i s t 5.2. 1 . 5 .2 . 3 . S.2.o siih mi ss ion 55. ~t an u a l m o n i t o r i n t ’ s t a t i on s 5 . 3 . 1 5 3 1 - An t ama t i c mon i t tt r i n g s t a t ions S , S. 2 . 5-3 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ - - ‘ ______ ________ - - - “~ - - ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - —‘ - ._ - -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ TABLE 5-2. PROMISING SYSTEMS Promising Systems Operational Features Used 1. Baseline system 7 , 11 , 12 2. Passport system 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 20 , 31 , 32 3. Auto-Monitoring 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 20 , 31 , 32 , 34 4. DF-Surveillance NA 5. Radar Surveillance NA 6. S a t e l l i t e Surveillance 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 20 , 31 , 32 , 34 7. Training 1 8. Traffic Separa t ion 4 9. A i d s - t o- N a v i g a t i o n 5 , 20 , 23 10. Pilotage 6 11. Equipment Standards 7 12. Navigation Alert 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 13. Depth Alert 17 14. Scanning Sounder 19 15. Collision Avoidance Aid 26 , 27 16. Radar Perimeter Det. 24 , 25 17. VHF/ Transponder 24 , 28 , 29 , 30 18. In terrogator/Transponder 26 , 28 , 29 Measures are presently under consideration by the U.S. Coast Guard and Congress which would reduce groundings , collisions , and rammings in the future (U.S. Senate Bill 682 , 1978; Federal Register , 1977c) . An electronic navigation instrument like LORAN-C will be required equipment on vessels of 1600 gross tons or more , and dual radars will be required on vessels of 10 ,000 gross tons or more . Since these measures would have prevented some of the casualties in the data base , they are incorporated into a “baseline system .” Thus , the effectiveness of each system must be assessed in terms of the extent to which that system ’s effective- ness exceeds that of the baselin e system , while incorporatin g the features both of the baseline system and the system under consid- eration . The method by which this is accomplished is discus~ed in the next section . 5-4 vi- _ _ _ - --‘~~ - - ‘ 41L — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - 5 .2 ASSESSMENT OF PROMISING SYSTEMS The 18 systems that were selected for detailed consideration (see Table 5-2) are described in this section. For each system , the following aspects are discussed: a. System Description - A technical and operational dis- cussion of the system , including the form of data presentation , communication requirements , and capabilities and limitations . b. Training/Workload Implications - A discussion of the equipment including the operational complexity, and the time needed to read and interpret data. c. Estimate of Availa b ili t~yi - An estimate o the percentage of time the equi pment would be available , considering factors like geographical coverage , equipment reliability , and cost limitations . d. Present State of Development - A discussion of the state- of-the-art , indicating whether the equipment is off-the-shelf , requiring modification of off-the-shelf equipment or conceptual only; includes development considerations . e . Estimate of Cost - Estimates of cost to shi powners and government: purchase , installation , maintenanc e , and development . f , Coast Guard Actions Required - A list of actions that the Coast Guard must take in order to make the system effective ; minimum equipment specifications , requirements on vessel equip- ment , allocation of frequencies , etc . Many of the alternatives may have liability implications which should be considered by the Coast Guard. g. Estimate of Effectiveness The potential effectiveness as obtained from the operational features requires some explana- tion . Where a system embodies only one operational feature , this effectiveness is the same as the probability of prevention of the operational feature . However , when two or more features are involved , a distinction must be made between “independent ” opera- tional features and “dependent” operational features. If two features are depende n t * (e.g., “Dis play of Navigation Data ” See footnote on p. 1- 12 2 for a list of dependent features. 5-5 - , _ ___I~ ~~~~~~~~ ~ - ‘ ~~~~— -‘ ~~~~~~~~ incorporates “Ability to Obtain a Dependable Position Fix”), the maximum of the two point scores is used; i.e., if one feature is assessed at 5 (i.e., 50% probability of prevention) and the other at 6 (i.e., 60% probability) , the system is assessed at 6 (i.e., 60% probability) . On the other hand , if the features are inde- pendent (e.g., “Training ” and “Display of Navigation Data”), the probabilities are “ORed” ; i.e., the total probability is 50% + 60% - 50% x 60% = 80% , for a system point score of 8. This says that even if one operational feature didn ’t help , the other mi ght have , The detailed scoring process is described in Section 1.3 of Appendix I for each of the 18 systems , and an example is worked out in Section 1.4. A summary of the costs and the measures of effec tiveness of each system is given in Section 5.4. 5.2.1 Baseline System a. System Description - The baseline system is included in order to provide a reference against which other systems can be assessed. It is based on the planned extension of LORAN-C cover- age and leg islation that is expected to be passed which requires certain equipment on board vessels , particularl y tank vessels. By 1980, the U.S. Coast Guard plans to complete i” network of LORAN-C stations which will provide coverage in the t,~ireat Lakes , and from Texas to Maine and beyond (Federal Register , l977b). Coverage already exists on the West Coast and Al~.’~ka. At present there are gaps in the Gulf of Mexico and up to South Carolina . It is assumed in this study that , even with unforeseen delays , coastal coverage will be complete by 1985. The U.S. Coast Guard recently published a notice of rule making (Federal Register , 1977a) entitled “Proposed Navigation Safety Requirements , LORAN-C on Vessels of 1600 Gross Tons or More .” The proposed rules would require LORAN-C on board all vessels entering U.S. ports . This was later amended to allow hybrid satellite systems to be used as well (Federal Register , l977c). The intent of the Coast Guard is to require such 5~6 - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~-, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ -- - - - — ~~~~~ - ~~~~‘ - -- - ~~~~~~~ ~ - -- - — —- - ‘ ~ — —-—. ~~~. -‘-~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 7~~~ ’ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — ~~~~- ~~-“ ~~ - - ‘- - ‘-- -- - -- equipment in the immediate future . It is assumed that by 1985 such equipment will be on board all vessels of ‘~600 gross tons or more; it is further assumed that either two LORAN-C time coordinates or latitude/longitude will, be prominently displayed on the bridge and near the charts , as the proposed rules require . These assumptions are cited in the guidelines of the study effort (see Section 3.3). Rules are also being considered which will require dual radars on board all vessels of 10,000 gross tons or more (Federal Regis- ter, 1978). Anticipating that such a rule will be passed , this requirement will also be assumed for the 1985 time frame . It is pointed out in Appendix I that LORAN-C coverage is not planned for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands , where 16 groundings occurred. Thus , the baseline system would have no effect on these casualties. (A recommendation to examine the extension of LORAN-C to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands is included in Section 1.3.) LORAN-C stations along the coast are grouped into “chains ,” each containing a Master and several secondary stations . Each transmits at 100 kHz, but the transmissions are staggered so that each chain has a recognizable pattern . The chains over 1ap in coverage , so that it is necessary on most equipments to manually choose the chain and the stations within the chains to be utilized. Some advanced configurations select the secondary stations with the strongest signal; these stations are usually, but not always , the best ones. With some less sophisticated receivers , coarse estimates of the chosen secondary time numbers are required to aid signal acquisition . Once this is done , modern receivers will track the LORAN-C signals and display the time delay numbers . The dis- play consists of two 6 or 7 digit numbers which can be used to provide a position fix on a standard chart . Hybrid satellite-tracking receiver systems obtain periodic , accurate position estimates when a satellite is in view . During the coverage gaps , which may span up to two hours , another system such as Omega or an inertial system is used. The satellite data 5-7 4 - -‘---* ~~~~~ p.-. — —‘- - -‘-‘ --,—— ~~~~~ ‘,‘-- - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ are used to calibrate the other system , taking advantage of the fact that the latter ’s overall errors are partially due to long- term changes; thus , periodic calibrations allow them to be used to a greater accuracy than the systems ’ ratings .* The display is usually presented in latitude/long itude coordinates. Beyond 1985 global positioning satellites may provide continuous , accurate coverage . However , in the time frame of 1980-1990 , satellite navigation will supplement , but not replace , LORAN-C. Under conditions of low signal levels and high interference , LORAN-C receivers can lock onto the wrong cycle , and introduce errors in multi ples of 10 microseconds with no warning . Hybrid satellite systems incur drift errors between satellite scans . LORAN-C is available almost continuously, with high accuracy; its coverage extends only a few hundred miles from the coast , while satellites provide global coverage . b. Training/Workload Implications - Once the initial operator settings hav e been en tered , signa l track is automatic , the display is continuously available , and little effort is required , significantly less than LORAN-A receivers and the older LORAN-C receivers . The initial settings are straightforward . Compared to a radar , it is quite simple to operate and interpret. For these reasons the training and workload implications are minimal. c. Estimate of Availability - The LORAN-C system has a 99% availability record , according to the “LORAN-C User Handbook” (USCG, 1974), including off-air maintenance . The U.S. Coast Guard predicts that it will be 99.7% in the future . The TRANSIT system has provided continuous service with a fix rate of once every one to two hours , but the system is a military one which can be modi - fied or discontinued at any time . Future satellite positioning systems such as GPS-NAVSTAR are projected to provide 99.7% avail- ability as well , but this remains to be demonstrated. It should be pointed out that available evidence indicates that the accuracy and availability of hybrid systems is inferior to LORAN-C. 5-8 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J 4 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ For the purpose of this study , the system availability is really dominated by the receiver availability. Based on conversa- tions with manufacturers and users , this is estimated to be 95%. d. Present State of Development - LORAN-C receivers and hybrid satellite receivers can be obtained off-the-shelf. While LORAN-C coverage is not yet available everywhere along the conti- nental coast , it is planned to be by mid-1980 (see Appendix F). e. Estimate of Costs - Since the baseline system equipment will be required on vessels , the costs from the point of view of this study are zero to both the vessel owners and to the govern- ment. That is , the costs relevant to this study are costs incurred over and above the baseline system. However , some cost figures are cited here for navigation receivers as a point of reference . LORAN-C receivers meeting proposed Coast Guard requirements are available today for $2 ,000-6 ,000 , plus installation . TRANSIT receiver costs are $lS ,000-25 ,000 , and Omega receivers , $5 ,000- 15 ,000. - Extending LORAN-C coverage to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands is expected to cost $25M over a 10-year period . f. Coast Guard Action Required - Only follow-through actions are required: complete the LORAN-C network installation , and pro- mulgate equipment standards and requirements for electronic naviga- tion gear and dua l radars . g. Estimate of EffeLtivencss - The potential effectiveness * of the baseline system is estimated to be 23% (see Appendix I , Table 1-7): 5.2.2 Vessel Passport System a. System Description - A vessel passport system is the simplest form of an active system , i.e., one involving shore-based Potential effectiveness and net effectiveness are defined and discussed in Section 5,4. 5 9 — j _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .~,-~iIwr, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — - - ~~~,. n~~. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I - personnel. Th is system is hig hly oriented toward reducing acci- den ts , especially groundings and rammings , by n ot allowing ships that are believed to be dangerous and bound for U.S. ports into internal wa ters , by placing cond itions on the entry into (or departure from) ports for ships lacking proper certification , proper charts , or having equipment defects or outages , by issuing helpful advisories on weather , currents , and special conditions , and by coord inating pilot transfe r procedures . This system would not continuously monitor ships ’ positions , and would provide little direct help in avoiding collisions . The mariner with a full con- tingent of operating instruments would still have to rely on him- self , his crew , and his vessel to navigate safely . When on-board equip ment experienced difficulties , aid would be rendered (e.g., in the form of escorts) or conditions placed on entry (e.g., en ter only during the day with good visib ili ty). This service would f irs t be l i m i t e d to tankers and vessels carrying hazardous cargo in bulk; i t could later be expanded to other vessels. It incorporates many of the features of the Canadian ECARE G system , wh ich i s described in Appendix E . This sys tem shall not be mandatorily applied to any fore i gn vessel no t destined for or departing from a port or place subject to the jurisdic tion of the United States - (1) tha t is in innocen t passa ge through the terri tor ial sea of the United States , or (2 ) that is in t r a n s i t through the navigable wa ters of the United Sta tes wh ich form a par t of an interna tional s tra it . Such vessels shall be encouraged to voluntarily participate in the system. The operation of the system centers around two check points (refer to Figure 5-1): vessels bound for a U.S. port would be required to check into the system at about 24 hours prior to entrance into territorial waters (within a latitude of about 6 hours , earlier or later), and again at another point approximatel y one hour prior to entry ; the location of the second check point 5- 10 r t - ~~~~~- — - - - ~~~~~~~ -“- ~~~ ----- - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ _ _ - _ _ _ — . — AD AUb O ‘Th TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS CENTER CAMBRIDI€ MASS F/G 13/10 OFFSHORE VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (OVTM) STLg)Y. VOLUMC II. TEC——ETCCU) AUG 76 R BLAND . R KALAFUS. R VISLEDER UNCLASSIFIED Tsc—USCG—78—11 V0t. 2 UScG—D—55—78—VO1 —2 NL .3r___ _ __fl ~~ _ _ _ni UOFiOTu ioo _ _ :ifl~~~~fl~Dr o L4flfl9~p’jlci 9flL1i:~l~i!! 1OOk~!I — —-- —~~ — -.~~~~‘~~__ .____~~~~~~~, s ~w-V F CG COMM NET RACON CHECKPOINT ~~ : ~~E~ 0ORDINATI0N - CROSS-CHECK INSTRUMENTS ) - TRAFFIC \\ ~44.L. \ ‘ RACON OR SATELUTL \~ FIR ST CHECKPOINT (24 HR) -PERMISSION TO ‘ ~ ENTER -WEATHER FIGURE 5-1 . VESSEL PASSPORT SYSTEM 5-11 would depend on the specific port of entry . At the first check point , permission to enter port would be granted or denied , and ¶ any special conditions placed on entry at that time . At the second check point , special bulletins could be issued to the vessel. The vessel master would be provided with a bench mark reading to calibrate his navigation gear , and any necessary pilot coordina- tion would be set up; if weather had become too rough , the vessel might be asked to ride out the storm in deep water. The hardware and software necessary to implement the system are largely in existence today . Communications at the 24-hour check point would be accomplished by present HF or MF communica- tions gear - radiotelephone , radiotelegrap h and teletype links . Since this communication can be performed without voice , there is no serious language problem at the first check point. At the one-hour check point , the ships are within VHF range of the shore , so that a designated VHF radiotelephone channel would be used. The language problem could be more significant here . It is discussed further later on in the report. It is assumed that the baseline system will be in effect , so that accurate navigation gear is on board . No other on-board equipment is required. The shore stations must tie into a shared communications net , much the way the AMVER (Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue) system does today (U.S. Coast Guard , 1975). Since permission to enter port is premised , among other things , on the previous history of the vessel , it is necessary for the Coast Guard to maintain a data base on vessels operating in U.S. waters , especially on tankers and vessels carry ing hazardous cargo . This will exist in large measure in the U.S.C.G. Marine Safety Information System (MSIS) , now being implemented . MS~S provides Captains of the Port and other authorized officials with access to a central data base containing histories of violations , pollution records , casualty records , certification information , and boarding and inspection history , all relevant to this application .* Finally, the system ~MSXS contains casualty records only on foreign flag vessels; it would need to be expanded to include U.S. flag vessel casualties as well. 5-12 — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ______ ~ L requires a network of about 40 RACONs to be placed near the location of each second check point , and at other locations along the coast and at fairway intersections (see Appendix G , Table G-3) . Now that the general features of the system have been outlined , the detailed system operation can be described , as it is presently conceived . At about 24 hours out from arriva l at the U.S. internal waters , the radio officer makes radio contact with the system on I-IF or MF , us ing existing radiotelephone , rad iotelegraph , or teletype channels . Latitude is provided in the 2 4 -h o u r time requirement to allow the rad io officer to perform this function during a normal watch period . The shore is then provided with the vessel ’s name , draft , call si gn , VHF stati on number , vessel mas ter ’s name , destination , choice of fa irway s or traffic lane , and a lis t of any inoperative navi ga- tion equipment , con trol/propul sion mach inery , other prima ry sys tem s , or missing charts or notices to mariners. Table G-2 of Appendix C shows a f orma t wh i ch could he used. Upon rece ipt of this informa- tion , system operators consult the vessel information file to review the past history of vessel and m a s t e r . Based on the find- ings , the vessel is either denied entrance , g i ven uncond iti onal perm iss ion to p roceed , or allowed to proceed und er specific conditions .* If the vessel is allowed to proceed , she is al so prov ided w it h informa ti on , such as: 1. Forecast of weather en route , and weather station call number; 2. Relevant information in recent notices to mariners ; 3. Buoy changes or other special conditions en route; 4. The location of the second check poin t , it s RACON Morse i d e n t i f i e r , and VHF c h a n n e l . If permiss ion is den ied , the vessel will be contacted and appropri- ate actions taken , which could include absolute refusal to enter port , diversion to another port , the requirement for boarding and inspection upon entering U.S. waters , or other special attention. ~ It is a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 95 percent of the vessels will he g iven u n c o n d i t i o n a l p e r m i s s i o n to proceed. 5-13 , ~~~. ,. — - If some equipment defects or missing charts are reported , conditional permission to proceed mig ht be granted. Reasons for conditional permission include : 1. Bad ship record 2. Lack of required instruments 3. Bad vesselmaster record * 4. Defect ive gyro or magnetic compass 5. Defective radar(s) 6. Defective collision avoidance aid 7. Defective depth-sounding instruments 8. Defective steering 9. Defective power train 10. Leaking oil 11. Loaded deep-draft tanker 12. Lack of proper charts 13 . Defective navigation gear 14. Defective communications gear. Condi tions which could be placed on such vessels include : 1. Enter only at high tide , or be tween cer tain hours 2. Enter only in daytime , in calm seas , and/or in good visibility 3. Enter only if agreement is obtained to meet pilot at a spec i f ied loca tion 4. Enter only if agreement is obtained to wait for , and follow escort 5. Enter only if agreement is obtained to wait for , and employ tugs 6. Enter only if specified repairs are made prior to entry into U.S. water 7 . Enter only after U.S. Coast Guard inspection at 3 miles , or beyond traffic lane entrance buoy . ~Currently no records exist on the performance or safety records of vessel masters . Changes would be required in MSIS and MVCR , so that vessel masters names could be accessed , in order to build this file. ti.- 5-14 — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ¶ I i Guidelines on the particular conditions to be placed on vessels having equipment problems should be established by U.S. Coast Guard officers and Captains of the Port , with participation by pilots , shlpmasters , and shipowners , and using the results of this study . Much of this is presently addressed by Coast Guard Commandant Instruction 16711.4. The control facility would then inform the local station , which probably would be in the Captain of the Port or VTS facility, of the vessel’ s impending arrival , the vessel data , expected time of arrival at the second check point , and conditions placed on entry (this step may be coordinated prior to contacting the vessel , if the Captain of the Port requests it) The discussion presented here assumed the existence of a central facility which receives the vessel transmission from the initial check point. The existence of a central facility raises an impor tant issue which is beyond the scope of th is study to resolve , namely: to what extent would the decision-making process reside with a central facility rather than with the officer of the Captains of the Port? As envisioned here , the central facility would grant permission/denial to proceed to those vessels whose condition clearly met the previously established guidelines and determine the port of destination ; however , marg inal cases would be coordinated with the affected Captain of the Port *. The vessel passport system is costed on these assumptions. However , before such a system is implemented , the U.S. Coast Guard would have to settle the issues of authority . The two extremes are , on the one hand , a completely decentralized system where each Captain of the Port office makes the initial contact and all subsequent contact with vessels headed for ports of call under his jurisdiction; on the other , a highly centralized system where the final decision- making rests with the central facility after consultation with the affected Captain of the Port on marg inal cases. This st ill postpones the issue of who has the final authority. 5,15 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~-~~~~~~~~~ - ~ --- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A decentralized system would have the following advantages: 1. No change required in the present authority structure 2. Elimination of the cost of a central facility 3. Maximum flexibility to incorporate consideration of local weather , local traffic , and local tank vessels. A centralized system , on the other hand , would have the following advantages : 1. Un iform application of standards . 2. Early action by staff dedicated to one task. 3. Elimination of the cost of 24 hour coverage at each port. 4. Elimination of the possibility of “pick and choose ” the port of destination by vessel captains . In addition to the centralized and decentralized options , there are several intermediate divisions of authority that could be workable. For example , one that would combine most of the advantages of the two extremes would be to have the central facility determine the port of call , but leave other decisions to the affected Captain of the Port. These issues need to be addressed before an implementation plan for the system could be defined . It is important for the acceptance of the system that experienced Coast Guard officers be involved in any decision-making that involves costly delays to a vessel. Once the vessel has proceeded to the second check point area , the conning officer would be required to check in with the local Station on the designated VHF channel. At this time the vessel should be within radar range of the RACON ; by performing a range! bearing measurement on the RACON , the vessel’ s position can be accurately fixed. This position would then be compared with the position measured by the on-board navigation gear. This step is important , because possible LORAN-C errors occurring due to cycle~ skipping , radar range errors , and gyro errors can be detected at this time .* In the Gulf of Mexico , add itional RACONs would be placed farther out , near fairway intersections , to serve a similar cross-checking and position-fixing purposes. *The in st rum ent da ta should he requ ired in the sh ip ’s log. 5.16 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - The ship- to-shore contact at the second check poin t wo uld communicate the following data: 1 . Vessel ID 2. Vessel position 3. Statement that the cross-check of ins trumen ts ha s been satisfactoril y completed , or readings could be relayed to shore 4. Statement that conditions placed on entry have been met 5. Statement that no defects have turned up since the first check .. Report of any difficulties. There is a potential problem of communication with vessel s whose masters do not speak English well. u sually at least one crew member has enough understanding of the language to communicate by teletvpe . Several measures could be taken to alleviate the problem . The requirements of the communications at the second check point could he standardized , and pr inted and distributed to vessels. The da ta could be teletyped or telegraphed if the language problem wa s severe; the central facilit y mi gh t act as a relay, if necessary . Canadian experien ce w it h user s of the i r ECARE~ system has indicated only minor d ifficulties arising from la nguage d i fferences. Wh i le the language problem ex i sts , it is not believed to he serious . As mar i ners become accus tomed to it , such diff iculties will probabl y subside. The local st atio n would acknowledge the call , and prov ide a weather/visibility descri ption , a report on currents , a no tifica- tion of any relevan t prob l ems l ike buoy d i sloc at ion or m i ssi ng li ghts , a traffic report , and possibly some LORAN-C corrections. The shore station operator would check for compliance with any condi tions placed on the vessel e n t ry . If tug assistance , Coast Guard hoarding, or pilot contact had not alread y been arranged , it would he arranged at this time . If conditions of entr were not met , permission to proceed to port could he revoked at this time . 5-17 _ _ _ Li ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ -~~~~~‘~ “c~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ —- ~~‘- ~~~~~ - Since p i l o t tran s fer procedures were ci ted so frequent lv in grounding c a s u a lt ies , thi s sy s t e m would require t h a t for loaded tankers a ~ i lot be i J~~~t i f i ed , contac ted , a n d a boarding point s e l e c t e d s a t i s f a c t o ry to the shore operator , prior to a r r i v a l at the 3 - m i l e territorial l i m i t . The guide! ines for the select ion of the p i l o t b o a r d i n g p o i n t would depend on the part i cu l ar c h a r a c t e r i s - ti c s of the area , and should he n e g o t i at e d w i t h the l o c a l p i l o t s ’ associations. They should he desi gned to provide the following assurances 1. The vessel would not proceed i n t o an area where c u r r e n t s and w i n d s could cause her to d r i f t i n t o a shoal or reef , — without the pilot on hoard and conning. 2 . In times of low v i s i b i l i t y , the hoarding p o i n t would be placed further out to prey ide an extra m a r g i n of safety. 3. In roug h weather , where th e pilot boarding process might endanger the p ilot ’s life , an escort into calmer wat ers would he provided to the tanker by the pilot boat. 4. tf the weather is so rough that the i i l o t boat is in danger even while underway , the vessel would be either escorted by Coast Guard c u t t e r to a safe p i l o t h o a r d i n g area or sent hack to deep waters to ride out the storm . Up to t h i s point in the d i s c u s s i o n . only tanker a r r i v a l s hav e been t rea ted . Departing tankers would he r e q u i r e d to check in at 24 hours as well (using VHF ) , and the vessel wou l d he asked to check out as she passed the one-hour check point . There would he no way of e n f o r c i n g t h i s , of course. The departure requi rement would not apply to tankers and tank barges in b a l l a s t . C o a s t a l traffic between United S t a te s ports would he treated h substi- t u t i n g the departure requirement , using two check points. The local station would he required to not i f v the ce n t r a l f a c i l i t y when an arriv i ng tank er checked i n at the second ch eck point , when a d e p a r t i n g loaded tanker called in 24 hours p r i o r to departure . and when a tanker l e f t por t head i ng for ano ther Un it ed States port. The central faci l it y would then enter the ar r i v a l ! depar ture into the data base , and notif y any affected local -it 5-1 8 — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - — - . ~~ -- — -- - — -~~ - ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ s t a t i o n s . C o a s t a l t a n k e r s and tank barges operating between Unit ed S t a t e s ports w ould he r e q u i r e d to check in again 24 hours p r i o r to a r r i v a l on j o u r n ey s tak lug more than one day The leg al iss u es are discussed in Section 7. S . Briefl y , imple- ment at ion is p r e s e n t lv w i t h i n the Coast Guard ‘ s c h a r t e r and the au t h o r i t y of the C a p t a i n s of the Port , w i t h the ex cept ion of the locat ions of th e second check p o i n t s , which are in international w at e rs . l ’hi s probl em can he c i r c u m v e n t e d by r e q u i r i n g a vessel hound for a U n i t e d St at es port to check in about one hour p r i o r to e n t ry into i n t e r n al w a t e r s . Ihat is , t i m e - r e l a t e d r e q u i r e m e n t s are more acceptable than geographic ones in i n t er n a t i ona I waters. -\nv ac’ ions taken in internati on a l waters are , in a sense , v o l u n t a r y . However • t he r i g h t of the’ Un i ted St ate s to r e f u s e ent rv can he’ used m d Ic i ens lv to en for ce c oinp i ianct ’ w i t h e x i s t ing laws to encourag e good equipment maint enance , to disc ourag e’ vessel — m a s t e r s from m i s r e p r e se n t lu g the s t a t u s of the vessel and equipment . and to force a c o n s e r v at i v t’ iud gement in cases where schedule s c o n f l i c t w i t h safe op erat ions. An i m p or t a n t f e a t u r e of the sy s t e m is th e ’ fact t h at vessel m a s t e r s ar e Fe’ I j ev ed of the respons ib iii tv of choos i ng bet w een t a k i n g r i s k s and meet i ng schedul e s the Coast Guard or i t s repr e ceflt .i t i ye’ would not a I low the r i s k - ta k I ng opt i o n . F I n e s would be’ .issessed where port b o a r d i n g s by the Coast Guard revealed discrep - anc le’s b etween the a c t u a l cond it ion of the s h i p and the r eports giv en at the check points . I I a shipper covert lv encouraged h i s sh ip captains to l i e ab out the ~es se’ L ’ s condi t ion , it could he used as groun d s to r e f u s e cut rv of the shi pper ’ s ~es Se’ ls in th e f u t u r e When a h o ar d i n g revea led a v i o l at ion , the records could he r ent m e ’ lv check ed a g a i n s t other v e s se l s in the shipper ’s f l e e t . It ’ a patt e rn of v i o l a t i o n s emerged , t h at shi pper ’ s v e s s e l s would he’ ass i gned a high p r i o r i t y for f u t u r e h e a r d i n g s u l t im ate ’lv detent ions or re’ fusa l~ of ent v’ to port could resu 1 t . It is tni l ke lv t h at t h i s extreme ’ would ev er he needed , However , the ex isten ce of its p o s s i b i l i t y should he q u i t e e’ f fec t I ye in removing the’ t e mp t at ion from the ship owners , thus t a k i n g the vessel masters “o f t ’ the hook. ” V S- 1 9 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —~~~ - .-- -~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ r~~~~’~~~~~-~~~~~’~~ - ‘~~~~~r’~ ~~~~~~~ --- -— — Geographical v a riat ions in the applic a ti on of such a s~’sten i depend on the ocean floor p r o f i l e , the existence or non-exist ence ’ of traffic lanes , th e dens i t v of popu lati on centers and Coast Gu ard stat i OTI S , the di st i n gui shah i i i tv 01’ the coas tal prof i le ~v i sua I and radar) • the’ weather p at t e r n s , and the ge’ograp h ic f e a t u re s ot the coast . Due to the ocean depth it may not a lwa~ s he poss ih Ic t o place R:\CONs at the cut rances to t r a f f i c lanes . For example , the N ew Y ork - to - N a n t u c k e t Shea is t r a f f i c lanes cont i nue for 281) nii I es a RACC ~N here should be placed c l o s e r in. The Gui f of Mex ice • w i t h I t s f o r e s t s of o i l product ion p 1 at forms and a g r a d u a l lv s l o p i n g she! I t h ’t e x t e n d s out to as much as 1(10 mi It ’s from shore • h a s a s p e c i a l set of prob lems . RAC~lNs should he’ p Laced near fa i r w a v i n t e r s e c t i o n s as a check s e v e r a l hours o u t . A v a l u a b l e ’ service ’ present iv prov ided by the Coast Guard in the G u l f of M e x i c o is th e ’ l i s t i n g of a l l o f f s h o r e o i l s t r u c t u r e s , updated annual lv . W ider di st r ihut ion of t h i s pub I I c’ .i t ion aIl~i per i eel i c issuance ot the’ coo r d i n a t e ’s of new p l a t forms s h e u l d he c o n s i d e r e d . The se’ should be’ ava i l ahl e anti d i s t r i b u t e d to a l l Ve’s sd s Opt ’ rat I ng in the area Incoming t a n k e r s should he che’ckeel individu a l lv to assure t h a t a l l o i l p l a t forms arc charte ’d a net th t ’i r 1~~R -\N-C t i me d e l a y s r e a d i l y .iva i i able. Ground i ngs a re’ less l i k e ’ lv to he se’vere’ in the ’ GuI f due’ to t he s o f t sand compo s it ion. No o i l sp i l l s in the d a t a base occurre d clue to groundings in the Gui I h • I r a m i nez -’ho r k l o a d l mj,l l i c a t ions — The work 1 clad imp i i cat ions for the vessel are’ m i n i m a l . i’he a c t ua l t i m e ’ spent in rout inc corn - nun i cat i (IfiS is 2 —3 ml flut e s at most the ’ cross — c hecks re’qu I red a i’e’ tho se a prudent mar i ncr should p e r f o r m anyway On shore • t h e l o c a l ~ t a t i OTIS w ou ld r e q u i r e’ a vu i lab l i l t ’ Of p ersonnel around tile c lock • s i n c e p er cent of tile ’ casua It ics occurred at night or t w i l i g h t . From the t r a f f i c prc ’i e’ct io ns d45 cussed in Devannev ( l9 8) . it appears that a tvpic a 1 w o r k l o a d is about 2-11 tjnke’rs per day pe r po r t . In add it ion to c onliflun i cat I ng with the t a n k e ’rs , a shore o p e r at o r would he respons i b l e ’ for ohta in- i ng weather r e p o r t s • and e’S tab i i sti lu g Wi nti s , curren ts • equipment ma t funct ion s , anti commun I cat ing w i t h p 1 l o t s . A t vp i cal sce’nar 10 —-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~. — ‘ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - —- -— - -—- - - -~~~.,,- ~-~~ -——— -~~~~~~~~r~’- - . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ -e~’-’~ - -- ‘ :~— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -‘ - - - - w i t h a light workload would involve an officer designated to periodi - — ca lix’ review teletype messages announcing the expected arrival of a tanker , or to ac cept similar telephone messages from the central fac ility. He would then arrange for an operator to man the local station some time before the expected arrival in order to prepare for the tanker arriva l . The operator would stay near the station until the pilot had hoarded and assumed the con. From Table 4-32 , the number of loaded tanker port calls per year is expected to he 19 ,600 in 1985 , increasing to 28 ,400 by H 1990 , an average of about 24 ,000. If the local stations spend 1.5 hours with each taaker , about 36 ,000 hours will be required , H equivalent to about 4 watch positions . Divided among 15 local stations , this amounts to about one-quarter of a watch position for each station , on the average . The central facilit y would require full-time staffing. Assuming a conservatively high average of twent~’ minute s of shore attention per vessel , the central facilit y would require about one wa tch position to handle 60 vessels per day. c. Estimate of Availabilit y - Since the marine radio and teletype communications network is hi ghly red undant , communications at the first check point is assumed to be 100 percent .* VHF shore equipment should be highly relia hle. ** The system might become non-available if the VHF unit on the brid ge is out . If this happens , the HF can be used as a backup : i.e., the sh ip has sev eral ways of contacting the shore. For the purposes of this analysis , the availabilit y is assumed to he 101) percent in those areas where coverage exists. d. Present State of Development - There are four areas to which this applies: the data base (establishment and maintenance ), *Sunspot activity can cause severe problems over the hand . There could he rare si tua ti ons where cont ac t could not he made unti l the vessel was closer in. ~~~~~~~~~ i s assumed that towers can be installed that are tall enough and can be placed judiciousl y enough that 20 miles of range can be reliably achieved at port entrance areas. 5.2 1 --- a ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ ‘ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘____~_ ‘4~__ ~~~~~~ _’1____,_ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ,Ipul the c o m m u n i c a t i o n and local s t a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s , RACON s , and the legal framework . l’hese subiec ts were covered in the system .le’scri p t ion . In summary 1. The M a r i n e S a f e t y I n f o r m a t i o n Sy stem (M SI S) forms the ba s i c data base. It is p r e s e n t l y heing imp le mented. It would need to be accessible from a central facilit y . The da ta base wo uld have to he expanded to include casualties of U n i t e d S t a t e s f l a g vessels and to include ocean going tugs. Access to f i les shou ld he keyed by owner ’ s a nd/or lessee ’ s n ame as w e l l as v e s s e l name . 1:on- s i der a t ion should he given to k ey i n g records by vessel master name as w e l l . Port arrivals as w e l l as b o a r d i n g/ i n s p e c t i o n f i n d i n g s should he entered as d a t a . 2 . The c o m m u n i c a t i o n facilities now e x i s t for the first check point . W h i l e ‘e’UF facilities pre sent lc- exist along the coast , a particular channel would need to be desi g n a t e d f or each loc a l st a t i o n . Local o f f i c e s of Capta ins of the Port , Marine Inspect ion O f f i c e s , and V i S facilities w i l l suffice for t h i s sy stem . 3. RACON5 are now used in the Great Lakes , in A l a s k a , and in Europ e . They are available using existing technology. It should he noted that IMCO is urg ing the use of fixed-frequency RACONs , wh i ch wo u ld provide the mariners w i t h a return on ever sweep , rather than every few sweeps as pr esent RACONS do. 4. L e g a l l y , the a u t h o r i ty no~ largely exists , and has been f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n e d by the recent IMCO Protocols (IM CO , 19t ~9) e. F st i m a t e of Cost - Vessel Costs - The only costs incurred would he those t h a t prudent vessel owners now pay out for proper m a i n t e n a n c e and repair. The additional workload is small. Delays caused by con- servative , safety-minded shore operators are e s s e n t i a l , and as such are not considered to he an extra cost to the vessel owner . *COMDTTNST 16711.4 , 46 USC 39la , and 33CFR 160.3’. 5- ,, - - - ~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~ -- • - — - “ ~~~~~~~~~~~ “ -~~~~~~~‘-—‘ - — ~ • ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘~~~~~ ‘~~‘~~~ ~~~~~~~ ‘ Governmen t Costs - Costs to the government include any new transmitting stations , commun i ca t ions fac iliti es , s taffin g cos ts , comp ut er fac ilit y leas i ng cos ts , and the purchase , installa- tion , and ma intenance of the RACON network. The following estimates are based on the assumption of one cen tral fac i li ty, 15 local sta tions , 6 of which would be incorpor- ated into VTSs (see Table G-4). Forty RACONs and ten new buoys are assumed. Staffing costs are based on five officers and enlisted men for each full-time watch station. One watch station is assumed to be adequate to handle the anticipated 24 ,000 port calls per year in 1985-1990. This amounts to 66 port calls per day at the central facility. An experienced officer would be available at all times to handle the unusual cases and coordinate actions with the affected Cap tains of the Port . Annual maintenance costs are estimated at 10 percent of the initial costs. Only a few local stations will require a full-t .me watch position - the others would he p a r t - t i m e , or shared w it h VTS duties . Ini t ial Cos ts Central Facility Land Line Communication $ 100 ,000 MSIS Te rm inal 20 ,000 Local S ta tions VHF Communications @ $600 ,000 (x9) 5 , 400 , 000 Land Line Link @ $20 ,000 (xiS) 300 ,000 RACONs H @ $15 , 000 ( x4 0) 600 , 000 Buoys @ $ 16 , 000 (x lO ) 160 , 000 Des ign and Demonstration 500 , 000 $7 , 080 , 000 1 5-23 ~~~~~~~~~~ - — ~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ ~~~~~~~ ‘ !%nnLIai Oj~etat i,t~ Costs Cent ra I I:ac i l l tv Mi; ; ut en anc e anti teas ing $ 12 ,000/v r St u f fi n g : (1 p os itio nl 3 ~ 15 ,00t) 45 ,000R’r M 28 , 000 56 ,000/ vt’ . IOI ’Ol S t a t l çlflS Ma inteni nce ~ 56(1 ,000 ( x 9) 540 ,000/y r . S t a f f i n g : i/4 po sition) 3 ~ 1 ~‘ ,000 (xi S x 1/4) 380 ,000/yr. 2 ~ 28 , 000 I x lS x 1/4) RACO Ns and ituoy Ma I nt ’nance - small - - 0 Total Annu n I (lperat lug Costs $l , 033 ,000/ r . It i ~ be’ 1 cvc~t t hOt the e’s t imu I es he’t’e arc celflscr v ;I t t ve t Y h git , espec .; I iv in titc a ;‘ea 01’ VHF contntutt I cat i o t t s Ofl el nut I Ut enouce I . 1.0:1St ~~lt:l tel ~~~ I O t t Rc q tt i — The’ 5t’ ha Vt’ 8 1 re ’adv ilce’tI cove red n the t c ~ t ot t h i s se’c I I d l — to 5tlflT fltO I’I :e’ , the act i OTI S t red are P u r ch a .e and in s t u i i at ion el RACO N s , Ole) ti te ’ new tIllers tot ’ 5t1fl~~ l o c a l totis 2. 1 ’~t oh i i shinent ot a cent ;‘a I Inc lilt v , with ceittinuit I t O ( i o n s t o sh I p’~ and t O e ’ 1% I s tO t ens , and access to t tic MS iS . 3 . 1 s t O h ) I ShtI%dIt t ol ji t’oe’celtt re’s Oflel t’eS))OnS I b I 1 it I ec at oat h I Ot ’it I ‘~ t a t i OU , 011th tie s i gn at ion et II \ iIl citonnt ’ I lot’ sh I ~ sit oto ~‘ommun I cat I on c ( c an be situ ;‘ed ) 1 . Pub i i CO t I Ott o the svst e’iTt tlcsc r i p t ion and est oh 1 t flte’ tt t 01 the e t t e ct iv e dotes liii’ ing and I ra in lu g ot ’ cent ra I shore Olle’ r at or . (~ . At ~och b c.; 1 s t a t Ion • tile e’st oh I t shment el gt; ide - I t i l t ’ s tn d c I ’l l or;:; to t’ cottel it lonu I CIt EV I I - 5-14 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~- - -— - _ , ~ .. — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — I g. F t’fect iV e ’ItesS - The e f fect iveness of’ t ill s S’d’stefli is e’st irnated by comb in in g the system let tui’ e’s of improved p11 ot t rait s — fe’ r pi’ocetiures I . 2 .6) , i mpr ov e ’d ccitt I pllit’tt t 5 t OIltiO i’d s (I . . ~ incent I ye’ to repa it’ ma 1 tune’ t ion ing gear (I . 2 .8) • the base’ line svste ’nl (1 .3. 11 , I~ACONs at f a i r w a y i n t e ’t’so ct ions and t r a f f i c lane ’ cut rances (I . 2. 20) , general ads’ I sot’ I t ’ s (1 . 2 .31 1 , a nd vo v :tgt ’ pla it and check List suhin iss ion (I . 2 . 32) . I n add it I ott to th i s , each case was rev i ew ed to see i f t he svs tern itt i g u t tog te a liv pros’ ide’ cI t tte ’t’ Se’ rv ice’s not :11 reads’ i e l e nt i l ie d . There ’ were I I Vt ’ ca ses wit It’ll met t h i s ci’ it e’r ion — they are ci iscusseci in Append I x I , Se’c t ion 1 . 3 Wii i be’ tile ’ pV itfla i’v eitph.ts I s of’ t itt’ Sr s tell; I s Oil )lt’e’V e’ttt ion ot ground ings , iinpr ove’eI pilot t r :tii st e ’t’ te’c iin i eiUes Onet Otit I s e r i es on c u r r e n t s proved h e l p t u 1 in sonic’ c O i l i~~ 10115 . Rarnrn t u gs wt’rc’ a lt’cc tee ) b the’ baseline svs t e’m • hut th e check sv stern prov Idet l l i t t l e ~deI I t iona I help, Fel t’ r easons a I ready not e’d in the ’ SV st e’in d e s c r i p t ion. The p Ot e ’it t i a l e f f e c t iv ene ’ss is e s t i m a t e d to he 54 % Ov e’ t o LI . ‘l ii i s is 31% h i g h e r than the ’ base’ I LI e’ svs tent . ye sse~~j~i~~ po rt S~~~t em Options It was Pot nteti out e~I t’l icr t h a t some’ co I i i S I on avoi dance Sc’ i’V icc’ could he iu’ov ide’d by a mod It ’ it’d \O5 so I Passport Svst e’n% i’he’ t’ i t s t a I t t ’ t’na t I Vt’ W O t I Id lIt’ t hat 0 t It gent’ I I I I IItI~ I 50 t ’V O V e’ 1’ t he’ ~‘tIi I ecu 1 st at ion channe ’ I • adv I s ing s h i p s in t he a rca t ha I a loaded t a n k er or ba t’go is i nhountl • anti to iiav i gat e w t t h e’a ut ion F to ave Id p1 :ic iitg the tanke ’t’ In a burdened pos it i Ott in a cross itig si twI t ton , anti te l cent act tttt ’ tanker be’fot’c overtakin g in ord er to coorci I nit tt’ S h e l l a pass iti g. it t I s message coti Id be t’e’pe’at e’ei eve’ t’ v t’ew in m itt t’s tel I tic rease ’ the protlah ii i t v ot the ’ tile s 51t5 t ’ ge’t t ing - • t h r o u g h ( t h e vessel rn it st e’r m i g ht be’ tune d to a d i f f e r en t ch a n n e ’l or t a I k ing at tIle t tnt’ of’ t ito I’ it ’ s t h t o:i~ic as t As a proc t lea! cOUS ide rat ion , sit I l l s OI le’ i’lt t ing in the a i’e’O COLI I tI he retlueste ’ et to m o n i t o r the l o c a l shot’ t’ c h a n n e l . S 111cc ’ the~ • are’ pI’ese’nt 1 y requ i red to non it or t he’ emergency channel 16 , t here ’ is a po t t’n t i ai problem w i t h nit 55e’ eI sh ot ’t’ bt ’oaticast s . While ’ rop e ’ t it ~Ofl 01 the tttc ~ ssagc , and an tlliIiOetlte ’Cttlt’ tl t eti the appi ’ox I mate — — --. —- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ •- 1 ~~~~~ 3 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ •~t’ 4 - ~~~~~~~“ ‘1IIlI~ pos it ion of the t anker w i l l go fit r t own i’ds reducing the r i sk of Cdlii IS ion , tbcr e ’ is s t i l l the ))055 ib i i i tv that a ves sel coul d m i s s the broadcast. ‘rhe second al terna t i ye’ would be’ to b r o a d c a s t in advance ’ the arriv a l of a loaded tanker or harge and ask ve’sse’Is w h i c h p i a n to be o p e r at i n g in the area to check in. The shore operator could then I n t e r r o g a t e the report ing vesse’l s to I I nd the I r i nt ene i eel courses and elete’r mi ne which , it ’ any , coult l pose a p r o b l e m . Those inv ~~lve’ei would he’ itlformec i • anti the ’ tanker would be informed , Its w e ll . If ’ the VIlIl radiotelephone is uSeti for tit is set’i’ ice , over - t a k i n g anti coos t a l cross - t t~a t’fi c woul d not come i n t o range ’ tint ii tile t an k er had p assed the second ch eck point . To cope with these ve’ssel s , h r o a d cn s t s would ne’e’eI to he repeated cvct ’v 15 m i n u t e s or so. ‘tite th i re) al ternat ive’ woul d be to re’qui I.e iii I ve’sse’ Is to check in 14 hours before art ’ i vii i at port alit) upon departure , g i v i n g the ’ ~‘esse’ I name , CI t Ii si gn , port of departure , port ot Jest m a t ion , and ‘st im ated time of arriva l ( l~TA ) at the ~)ort of Jest i not ion, l’he cent ra I fae’ i i i ty woulti then be’ t’eq ui t’~~ei to I nput anti kt’ep the’st ’ records . When a t anker art’ ived at the second check point , the c e n t r a l foc i l i t ~’ would prel~’iti e the locnl stat ion with a list of the vesse ’l s e’xpec ted to be in the area . Local traffic could check in w i t h the’ b ocu 1 stat ion , g i v i n g s hit i ba r information . il~ se’tI on the’se reports the local shore operator could then it lt er l ’ogat e ’ the ve’sse’is in d i v i d u a l iv a s k i n g for a p o s i t j omt f i x or any change’ of pi ous , antI make the necessary ltrec~tuti ona rv ~eIv i s o r i e s to tile at ’f’ec tcel ve ’ssel s anti the tanker. The alternatives iu st discussed are in order of incre a sing comp le ’xity antI cop n h ilitv . A s a p ractical m u t t e r of imp i ementa- t ion • the s imp les t ~ii ternat i ye’ could he’ emp loved j u l t Ia! lv • and tankers asked to report any neai’-m is ses to the local stat ion . R~ sed on the experience gained , st ron ger measures could he’ empiovt ’ d when deemed necessary . *1 t Is assumed that the VHF chann el would be shared w i t h other fitit e’ t I ott s S-li - — - — • • -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~ c— . -- - - - .--~~~ ~~~‘ ~ ~~~~~~~ ‘~~~ -‘~~~‘--— • ‘— -• ‘~~ —~~~~‘~~~~~~~~~ ““ ~ S . .‘ . 3 :‘u l t o m : t t i c M o n i t o r in ~ Sy ste m a . Sv~~ten Descri pt ion — The ’ a u t o m a t i c ttitlfll tori ng sv st t ’nt at tempts to p r o v i d e tankers with st’t’i’ I ct ’s O\’ e’t’ tine) above ’ th o se’ p ro — vide d b~’ a vessel p a s sp o r t sy s t e m , I t incorporates all the’ t’eo— t ures o t’ t he’ passport system , i ti c lu di ng the two check points. The’ addi t iona l servic e’s are’: I . Ira fI I c i n format i on p r o v iti I ng tankers w i tit ttti fllt’ S of ve’ssels like lv tel be encount t’i’e’tI : c ross in g , ove’r t :tk I ng • one) Wilt’ t’e’ t r a f f i c lanes don ’t e’x 1 st , meet in g e’nc ounte ’r s , A p p t ’o x i m a t t’ t inc’s of e’ncoun ter woul d also he pr~~’ i e~CtI . i’it 1 s se’rv ice ’ in i gltt or tn i git t not he extended to o ther ve ’sse ’l s. 2 . C o l l i s i o n a l e ’rts where’ re’p o rt c d pelsi t j olts and i e ’ l o — C i t i e s Suggest a c l o s e s t p o i n t of approach (CPA ) of ’ a t ul le’ or le’ ss , I’he shore st a t i oti wou ltl :tct as a e’ellflhtt un i cat ion re’ l;iv it ’ an shi ll/ ship commun I cat ion di f f i cu i ty we’re’ e ’nc ount e’re’d 3 . i’ound i ug :ul e’rt s wht’re ’ reporte’.i pos i t b u s and Vt’ I e~ — c i t ic s of part ic ipat lug v e s s e l s i n t i i c a t e d a i t r o i ecte ’d cout ’se’ tt lo close to shozt i s , ret’ is , or shall ow areas iii O rei t’i’ to p re y ide ’ these se rvice ’s, til e’ shore s t a t i elI must licqel I l’e 1 Ii conttllc’ rc i:i i yes so I s in the ’ a rca , not I tis t ta n k e r s . 11 t’cqueut ttpeI~ tt’s elI ’ ~O5 it ion • COtIi ’so and s~tct’d inns t he oi) t a i ne’d f’t’olfl each t’ e’ssc ’ I hr the’ sitere ’ stat ion. Tite shel i’e’ st t t t IOfl titl ist t heti keep t ~ac k of a II ves sel s , and p lot coui’s ’s and pt’o i cc ted pos i t t elus (Se’t’ F i gun’ S -2) I’he t ’e)u I pnten t t’t’qu i reel tIll boa i’d I s a do t i , ’ ‘0 i cc ’ e’ eliliulflI tl I c a t t ott s set wit ich i t t t er f a c e s w i t It tile’ e’ Icc t ron I e’ tllt \ I g a t ion i n s t l’ullte’tl t 5 t he’ g\’ l’o c omp a s s , a lit1 t itt ’ s)t lit ’ s l e g . li l t ’ shore s t a t I l~~ w o n it ) need the’ f’o i i dlt ~ I ng foe i i i tie’ s 24 hon t’ — pe’1’ — dlI \ s t a l l i 2 , fled lea tetl conuttun I cat ion channe ’ I s i 4 t’st i tilot e’d 3 . Fr :tnsin i t to l’s title1 l’e’Ct’ I V e ’l5 lo t’ d a t :i/vo t cc ’ ‘I . ( .0th i itg/eleco d trig dti t :1 e’OtHiflhlit IC 01 1 out t’e~ii j pme’tl t , te it it contpu t e’ I’ it t t 01’ III ces 5 , (,(lflqlU tel’ — di i t’e’l t elI ~~ I :tt s • - S~~2~ I - l _ ~~ ~ L ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - — • ~~ --—‘•-—.- -. ~~ ‘— ‘,‘.‘,,• - ——~~ •• - • ~r•—~ •- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ •,• — ~~~~~~~~ — - i,-- ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ \0 UI , l’-\ I It t -~~~~~~ C) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - st i ll’ ~ ~l l , L III I I ~R~~e \I l O U t , DAT A [ ~Ii~i i l ~~I I \ \ \ i li,’,— [ ~~~~~~ ~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ I CAt 1 (iNS I H f c i \ \ \I 1 ~l-\ \ [ (1R(1 LOcI 1. I i - C ~ CI~ — - ‘ —S’—’— -\c l~ Y e 1hl t~e I ‘11 \ I - • t ’, Il RRc 1c \ I I~1\ ( 0 _ ~~~~~~~ ~ u I ~ ’ l .~ — ( U el Nlt ~\l. EA CILI TY ~S(1 SIIOPE Ol’FRAT0~ VWS - 11551-I , WATCHS TAN ItI R I I ~tIRE 5— 1 . ALITOMA l I C MON I TOR I Nt’, Si STI~M 5-28 _ _ —- — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —— — ——---- - — _ _ _ _ _ 6. A data processing system to create new ship files , update positions , look for projected near-misses and possible groundiugs , alert the shore operator , drive the displays , control the interrogations , and perform cross-checks between reported data. Voyage plans might or might not be required of all vessels - if so , the computer would also match the planned course with the observed one . This service would be performed for tankers and barges carry- ing oil or hazardous cargo in bulk. The system would operate in the following manner: 1. Tankers would check in at the two check points , exactly as with the vessel passport system . 2. Other vessels would be required to carry the corn - C munications sets in the wheelhouse. They would be acquired by the sys tem when their unsolicited transmissions were received by the control center. 3. Once acquired by the system , the da ta update ra t e would be controlled by the control center by interrogations from the shore transmitter. 4. If voyage plans were required of other vessels besides tankers , newly acquired vessels no t having already filed a voyage plan would be contacted for that information . 5. The traffic control center would appropriately adjust the update rate for each vessel. Ships beyond 20 miles in light traffic mi ght be in terrogated every half-hour or so. If projec ted courses appeared to predict passings closer than five miles , the rate could be increased to pick up course changes. Near shore updates could be effec ted every five minutes or less if deemed desirable. 6. The shore sta tion would contact vesse ls standing into danger , e.g., if: 1) projected courses indicated a close passing be tween vessels or a close passing of a shoal or reef , or 2) an imminent close passing between vessels were detected , The shore would give each vessel the name of the other , and instruct them to communicate on a stated VHF channel. 5-29 ‘ : ~~~~~~‘~~~~~ - -‘ ~~~~‘-‘- : , - - ‘~~~~‘~~‘~r~’ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ i’he sh elve s t a t lout wt iu ltt ask n’s se’ Is leaving t ue area to t u r n o f t ’ the e’qu I pt tte’nt to reduce ’ unnece’ssa t’v d a t a t’ lie ’s ali t) ii ltet ’ fe’i’cnc~~. l’he means of c otutittuti I cat joit s j s an impot ’tant dcc i s ion in the i m p l e m e ’n t a t Ion of’ such a s v s t e ’ln . Sonic’ elf’ t he prot ) ie’ms and cons i tiera t t olls are di scus se’d il l Appe’nt ) ix (~ , Se’ct ion (~ .2 . I , For tite put’post’s of e~ t m a t ing svs tent c o st s and pre y itl i ng a colic’s ive tie’s ign , i t w i l t be’ a s su me ’tI here t h a t the’ al le l c a t l elit ~1f a se’t of’ frequenc ic ’s h ’twc e’it lclO0 KU: ti rtd 4000 KU: can he act~u I reel (~or~ OVTM its age . C round — wa n’ pro p oglt t jolt at th e s e ’ f’requencbes p r o v i d e ’s i’e’i t able ’ ‘~e ’rv tc e elut ttl l i t least 100 m i l e s , and n su a l l s t’iu’tht’r . One’ scheme wit ich app ears tel lIe t’casonah le , a l t ltouglt cet’t O il iv not the’ clii i V elIte ’ , I 5 te l h~~vt’ • appro x tun a t c i v fouii ad i acert t 25 K It : chann e ’ is one’ e’hanne 1 weu Itt be’ us e tl pure’ Iv tot ’ dat a t t’aitsnt i ss ion t rdlltt sit i~ l — t ø —s h ore’ itt t h e one part of the ’ pa ~ sba ttd , O u t 1 shore — to — s h i p nt e’ i’roga t I ell is II aulo t iict’ The othe ’r tht i’t’t’ W O1I 1 tI lIe \t l ice ’ chtu t iu t e’ Is , a l tet’nate’ti i l e tw e ’otl le ’clt 1 ‘.tat i ens til ong til e’ C eli St to C 11111 ItO tt ’ t it e’ C Ot t t u s I Ott ti tit) I nt ci’ f’e’re’nce’ t hit t t WOU it ) i’C SI I t if on Is’ (lute’ C iiti ttt t t’ 1 we ’ i’d’ It SO i i oh it’ , The’ l ORAN A st It t I e l l i s alt) t h e’ it ’ ft ’ eq ile’Iics ’ all el c at i Oil S c Oil itl be’ tlSe’ t) t i t e’ f r e ’ — q tue ’ttcv h~ flt I be’tw e’e’it 1900 KU : and 000 K it : ap p e a r s t el he as ve’t unc l o t med. * Wit l i e ‘och 1 ectl 1 s t a t I dlii Wel l Ic1 lI St’ t he satne’ dot a f’re’ — qtit ’ticV , i n tt’i’fe t’e’u ice’ Ile twe’e’n them con It ) he c l i m i ttote ’d Ilv 5\’ltchl’eltt - i ng t u e t t’an snu I SS b i t t lines such that tie t wel “ t a t t0ll s W i tii oVe’i’ — 1°PP tug ceve’t’ag es t ~~~~~~~ ~ a t thu e’ 5111 1k’ t Iiflt’ . (‘0~~ite ’ t \ woti Id St i l l he v i r t u a l l y u n l i t n i t e ’ d . i’ite equipment cout i’ i g u ra t i (lii is sh ow n in Fl gui’ e’ 5 - ~‘ . ‘l’he’ shi 1l - he ’ll I’ d C(iti 1 pme’il t WOl Ic ) he lee at ed in the whet ’ I h ou se’ ne:t r the \‘lil i unit . l’hte on Is’ respen s Ill I I l l s the ’ n’s set nut s tel ’ won Ith have ’ would he to turn the’ ‘~et oil whe’n le’ Itv ing port or when about 200 nti los or .~i hen i’s from pot’t of des t triti t I on. A f’tei’ thta I , t h e en t I u’e opera t ion would he h~ ttt i~ —o if ’, r e q u i r i n g no el fo t ’ t by t he tint vi net’ . A l amp would h e l i t once tu e’odc’tI i n t er r o g at i ott Wet’c i’e’ce i ~ e’d from • shore , i itd i e’:ut I ng t h tat the ye’s so 1 was now ‘‘on the s i s t em ,” The *Othtcr in f l u en t Ia I i lit Ot ’ c’~ I S it t’0 a l s o t’ t’qi Ie’’~ t I itg f i’equene’v iii lo — cOt I ens Itt this hand : bt ’ elt t c i c o s t i tug • am ateut rati te l , ;tttd l’t% tl j 0— loctu t iou int erest s - -~~~--~ - - S ’ - - • • - - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ • •~, - ‘ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ • - ~~~‘ - - ~~~~~~~~ ~e ’r ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — -. vesselmaster should , of course , check to see tha t the la mp was on before coming close to shore . Under normal operation , the ship transmitter would broadcast the da ta stream abou t once ever~’ half hour. The da ta stream , con- sisting of ship ’s ID (the VHF call si gn , for exampl e), LORAN-C coord i na tes , sp eed , and course , could use the SELCAL forma t at 1200 BAUD , wh ich would require about 20 milliseconds to transmit (25 characters at 10 bits per character) (U.S. Mar itime Administra - t ion , 19”3). Wh en the shore received its first transmission from the vessel , the contro l center would search the records for the ID code. If one were found , and a destination determined , the appro- p r i a t e local s t a t i o n would he informed and supplied w i t h the essen- tial data. If r ecords were m i s s i n g , the c o n t r o l c e n t e r would ask the local station to contact the vessel and d e t e r m i n e t h e voyage specifics first. If difficult were experienced in getting ship data , the voice link could he used to request manual transmissions (requiring the vessel watch stander to push a b u t t o n on the communi- cations console ), The shore stat ions would consist of l o c a l s t a t ions in contact with the n a t i o n a l contro l center. ‘rho control center would main- tain any voyag e plans and tlit ’ complete shi ll f i l e s , and would tra its- fey information as needed to the le eCli l stations. The c o n t r o l center would e st ah l i sh the ye ice channel to he used and i n f o r m the local station responsible for ships in t h a t area . The local station would interrogate the vessel at a i’ate c o n t t ’o l le d il\ t h e local stat ion computer. Ithen a vessel pass ed through one local area of respons iil i i i ty into another , she would he ‘‘handed ~l f f” line) the vessel w a t c h st a n d c r would he requested to change channels (tit t’ ship board equipm ent could he automated to eliminate the p au ’t i cipll - t ion of the vessel watchstander) . The local shore computer would track all ships and continuously examine courses for po ssihie con- flic ts or dangers. To sum up , the shore compu ter du tie s wou l d be the fol lowing: 1 . Receive ini tial shi p information from t he nat ional control center , and create a file. 5-31 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ • - - 2. Interrogate the vessel to put her “on the system ,” and check data for position and course. 3. Create new target on display and notify operator by prin ting ship information , 4. Not if~’ opera tor when to hand off shi p to adjacent local station. 5. Monitor positions and courses of all vessels , and calc ulate CPAs and TCPA5 * of vessels close t o each other. ~~. Calcula te prox imi ty of posi ti ons and pro jec ted positions of vessels to shoals , reefs and shallow areas (contour map of ocean floor could be stored and corrected for tides). 7 . Alert operator if a vessel is standing into danger , or is pa ssing close enough tha t a reminder is advi sabl e . 8. Drive the display and printer. 9. Accept keyboard data~ accep t data from decoder , 10. Time interrogations and issue interrogation c ommands to encoder. 11 . Alert shore operator to vessel deviation from intended course. 12. Alert shore operator to inconsistent or missing data. 13 . Elimi na te shi p files when vessel l eaves sy stem . The shore operator would issue general adv is or i es over the dedica t ed local channel , moni t or t ankers , etc., at the second check point , is sue aler ts to par ti cular vessels tha t appear to he i n some danger , ac t as a sh ip/shi p communications link if necessary , per- form emergency services , and perform the other duties identif ied in the vessel passport system. Automatic monitoring systems depend on the functioning and accuracy of the onboard navigation equipment. Some errors (e.g., gyrocompass errors) can be detected by self-consistency checks between successive positions and reported heading and speed. Others (e.g. , LORAN-C ma tching on wrong cycle ) would not be detected. Surveillance would be required to detect these errors . *TCPA: time to the closest point of approach. 5-32 iL~~ -•~~~• - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -_• _ -• “~~~~~~‘~~~~~~~~‘~~~~~~~~—• - _ ~~~J~~~d”W’~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ h . Tra ining/Workload Implications - The vessel onboard equipment should be simple to operate ’ and maintain. The workload is negligible except when equipment malfunctions - the vessel watch - stander would then be required to be in frequent contact with shore . The shore operators would have a training program similar in scope to that for the Vessel Traffi c Services. The system des- cribed here wo uld automaticall y track vessels , so that there would be li ttle keyboard entry work to be done . The shore operator would spend most of h is ti me wa tch ing tanker progress , and issuing alerts and warnings to vessels requiring them. - Each local station would require staffing around the clock. Most stations would require only one watch position , c. Estimate of Availability - The S stem would he constant 1 ’ a v a i l a b l e , except when the computers or c o m m u n i c a t i o n gear are down . Based on experience w i t h VTSs , availabi lity is e s t i m a t e d at 99 percent. d. Present State of Development - Comparable uni ts are now in use for testing purposes in San Francisco and Lake Pontcha rtrain und er Coast Guard spon sorsh ip. The equ ipmen t requ i remen ts , however , are well wi th in presen t da state-of-the-art for production units , e. Esti ma te of Cos t V e ssel Owner - The vesse l costs are estimated by consid- ering the components of tite postti l~tte~i communication svstent : 1 , 4-Channel Voice Transmit te r /R e ce iv eu ’ - Based on the cost of present SSB units , the purchase price is estimated at $1 ,500. 1. Encoder/Decoder , Moeiem - Based on a SELCAL unit this 11; e s t i m a t e d at $1 ,500. 3. An te nna - The unit can use tile present 21 8 1 KU: emergency channel antenna. 4 . I n t e r f a c e s - Based on si m i lar appl i ca ti ons and the assumption that, with each instrument the data are already in d e c i m a l form , this is estimated to cost about $1 ,000. 5-33 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - • -• •-~~~~~~~~- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ ‘ ~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ To tal Purchase Pr ice - $4 , 000. Installation - Low , if the present 2182 KHz antenna is used . Government Costs - Costs to the Government include new HF data and voice transmitting and receiving gear , computers , interfaces , and land line data communication links. The costs include the costs of the vessel passport system . Ins tead of only tankers , all ve ssels of s i gnificant size (e.g., greater than 1600 gross tons) must participate in the system . t~h i1e tankers can be acquired on the system at the 24 hour c h e c k - i n , others w i l l be acquired as they come within radio range. Ini ti al Cos ts Central Facility No additional facilities Local Stations (15) HF Communications i~ 700 ,000 $10 , 500 , 000 Computer - Terminals - Displays @ 500 , 000 7 , 500 , 000 Da ta In ter f a c e s @ 50 , 000 7 50 , 000 Vessel Passport System 6 , 580 , 000 Development Costs 3 ,000 ,000 Total I n i t i a l Costs $28 , 330 , 000 Annual Operating Costs Local Stations (15 ) Maintenance l , 875 , 000/ yr. Staffing: 2 watch posi tions (average) per station @ $101 ,000 3 ,030 ,000/vt . Passport System Operating Costs 1 ,033 ,000/yr. Total Annual Costs $ 5 ,938 ,000/yr. 5-34 - ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~“‘- —~~~~‘ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ -. ~- -~~‘-~~~“ ‘ — 1. Coast Guard Action Required 1. Develop an ilF d a t a/ v o i c e communications sy stem , c o n- sis ting of three voice channels and one data channel , preferabl y using present 2182 KU : or l,ORAN -A towers , 2. Generate minimum equi pment specifications for ship- board HF communications. 3. Conduct a sy ste m design , p i n p o i n t i n g requirements and develop modular computer architecture and software to accommo- date the variation of traffic at the various local stations . 4 . Implement and set a timetable for the automatic monitoring system. g . Est imate of Effectiveness - On the basis of the casualty anal y sis , automa tic monitoring systems have a potential effective- ness of 81% for collisions , 65% for rammings , and “4% for ground- ings , or “SI overall , assuming the equipment is working . This is 56% higher than the baseline system . — T h i s estimate should be qualified by the statement that w ith- ou t any form of surveillance , it is difficult to completely cross- check instrumen ts u n t i l the vessels j~ass near a RA CON chec k poin t or ether unique signpost . However , most acciden ts Le cur within these hounds , so lit tle effectiveness is lost. It should also he noted that delays will occur when i n s t r u m e n t s don ’t check , delay s t h a t could he minimized if surveillance were available to resolve a m b i g u i t i e s . 5 . 2 . 4 D i r e c t i o n - F i n d i n g (DF ) Surveillance System a. Sy ste m l) e scri lltion - This sy stem is not actu all y a separate system , hut a capahil itv which can be added to the Ves sel Passport System or an Automatic Monitor ing Sys tem, It is inexpen- si v e , and can be ~uccomp 1ished throu g h m i n o r modific ation of e x i s t - ing equipment. I t prov ide s a mean s whe reby shore s t a t i o n s can es tablish the position of a vessel operating within ~~ m i les of the port entrance. It is expected to he us ed I~ ’im a ri l ” as a backup at the second check point , It is primaril y a short-range instru- ment , not antic i pated for usage at sea , or along the coast. 5-35 - - • - - ~ - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~. • -• -- -~~~~~ -- ~ - - — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - — 1 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ Simply stated , the system involves two DF stations for each port , t y p i c a l ly 10-15 m i l e s apart near the water (see Figure 5-3 ). When a vessel turns on the VHF transmitter on a selected channel , the two DF stations establish a bearing on the transmitter. By plot ting the two bearings , a position can be manuall y charted by th e shore operator (this procedure could be au toma t ed) . While unca librated operation typicall y g ives 2 ° -5 ° hearing errors , the long-term drift errors and permanent errors can be calibrated out , so that correc tions can he made which allow the measurement to achieve accuracies of about 10 , or bet ter. This amoun ts to less than a mile at 20 miles range ,* good enough so that identification of a nearby buoy would be unique , and good enough to p ick up “cycle-misma tch” types of errors encountered in LORAN-C . The system would opera te as follows : if a mariner or shore opera tor had reason to suspect a problem in the assessment of vessel position , the shore operator would ask the vessel wa tchstander to key h i s VHF uni t , ei ther on the main channel , or on an alterna te. The resulting transmission would be used to establish a fix and resolve any ambiguities. While it is difficul t to attach am effectiveness number to such a capabili ty , it certainl y would reduce delays caused by the need to resolve posi tion amb i guities. DF techniques are being considered as an aid to identif ying radar targets in Vi’Ss using a single station hearing . Ship loca- t i o n , by use of cross-hearings as described here , is being con- sidered for Search and Rescue missions (Thompson and Reame , 1978). h. Training/Workload Implications - Minimal, c. Estimate of Availabilit y - Better than 95% normall y , con- sidered as a component. Some problems could be encountered if channel usage were excessive across the VHF band . As a s stem which incorporates the passport sy s t e m the availability is essen- tiallv 100%. *Thjs assumes the two stations are located favorably enough rela tive to the coverage area that the GDOP is not excessive . S-36 ~~~.— --—-—- — - —‘ - - - -~~- - - ~--- — - ~~~~~ - -~~~ .-~~~- - - -~~~~‘- ~~~r: ~ -• - ‘-~~~~~~~~~ -- -u ~ .AT ION l)1 BEA RIN G TRANSMISSION LH: B E ARING - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ FIGURE 5- 3. DF SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM r 5-37 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - --- ,.,—‘——- ,_—~~~, ~‘ ~~~~~~~~~~ -- - ~~ ~~~~~~~~~ . ‘: :-‘: ~ —- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -‘ ‘~.. .‘ ~‘! d. Present State of Dc ~~‘ I opinent - Now he i ng deve I oped for Vl ’S and SAR * a p p l i c a t i o n s . Can he di m’ e ct lv appi it’d to OV i M appl i - ~ lit i oit , hut may need mod iii cat ion to accommodate remote ch anue ’ 1 s,’lect le lit . e . 1s t _imate of Cost 2 I)F receiver/proce ssors 11 $30 ,000 $ti () , 00() I 150-foot tower and antenna inst a llatio n 20 ,000 l.a mci 1 i me c o nne c t i on 1 0 , 001) Total $90 , 000 I’hese could he added at ports where t rail i c is h eavy or where’ exller ience in d i c a t e s t h a t frequent a m b i g u i t i e s occur. 1 f a l l 15 s t a t ions used them , the cost would he $ 1 ,350 , 00() As a full-up system , the 1)1: sy stem costs would he added to the Ve ssel Passport system. This r e s u l t s in an i n i t i a l in v e st m e n t ~~ $ .930 ,000 , anti an annual opera t i ng cost ot about $1 , 168 , 000 . 1. Coast Gu ard A c t i o n Required 1 . Mod i fv 1)11 equ I prn~ ~. to accommodate remote c hanne I St’ le e t io n llfl d ~ 1’OV ide C 1’055 - ilt’~~ I’ ing dat II to local st Il t 1011 . 2 . inst I l 11 add it t o n a l towe t s w h e r e necessar and install D11 equi pment 3. Ca I I brat e svs tern with surv eY s near second check p o i n t s . g . E st inili t e of Et ’fec t I ven ess - Saint ’ 115 P a s s p o r t System. 5.2 . S Radar Stirve 1111111 c c a. ~isteln L)escljJ~tion — Ra~ia m’s ar e present I y i n use a t Cell st Guard Vesse I ira if ic Sc’ rv ice ’ s in San Franc i sco , Puget Sound , VII I d c ’ : , and Houston. They pi’o~ ide the shore opera t or w ith a p lan — po s ition—indicator (PPI ) d i spla y ot Sh i1l s , buoys , and ter~’n hi t e ’a t i i r e s w i t h i n the range of’ tite radIi !’. The radar IllI t CilitIl is , of ASAR - Search and Rescue m i s s i c ~n of t he United States toast Guard . 5-38 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ — ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ‘1 of course , located at the center of the sweep. * The range of the radar depends pr itnari ly on tite height of the antenna , hut al so on the height of the vessel’ s masts and her draft. A new p icture is p a i n t e d out t y p i c a l ly about once every four seconds. Much could he said about the subtleties of the use of radar , its capabilities and limitations . For the purpose of this study , a few si gnificant features are adequate to describe the functional usage of radar systems . It is assumed that readers are familiar with basic radar operation. H Th e ma in fe atu res of in tere st of th e rada r as an offsh or e s u r v e i l l anc e techn ique are : 1. A radar is expensive to install and maintain. 2 . It is l i m i t e d in range to line-of-sight , or abou t 20-40 miles. 3. It is not subject to “relative-position ” errors: when a ship target is shown on the radar display to he 2.5 miles from another radar t a r g e t (shi p, buoy , land), there is little doubt of the range between them. 4 . It requ ires no act ive onhoar d equipment (corner r e f l e c t o r s are f r e q u e n t ly mounted on small vessels to enhance the H radar echo , however) 5. A radar does not provide i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of radar targets - it mus t he i nferred from oth er inf orma t i on. ** 6. Radars can he connec~ ed to sophisticated processors which d istinguish target echoes and track them . Course pro Jections can he calcu lated by a computer and superimposed on the radar screen. 7. Shore/ship communication by Vt-IF would he compatible wi th radars , because thei r ranges are comparable. Due to the cost and limited range of the radar , it is not a viable candida te for a surveil lance system to provide wide cover- age. However , it can he used as an excellent backup t o a Vessel Passport System near ports that have special needs that justify A Th e sweep center may he placed at points other tha n the disp lay center on some models. **tIowever , if compa t ible t ransponders become required equipmen t in the future , they can provide ship identification . ~~~~ : ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘-~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ them . Therefore the costs , effec tiveness , and a v a i l a b i l i t y are assessed on a per -station basis , rather than as a nationwide surveillance system . h. Tr ainip ~ /W ork load Implic a tions - Non e , for t he vessel officers . Shore operators would have tasks identical to those of the radar-equi pped Vessel Traffic Services. Targe t iden t i f i c a t ion is always a difficult probl em , more so in this system , hec au se poin ts of reference - are obscure in open waters , c ompared to con- fined w aters. c . Estimate of Av a i la hi li t~ - S i n g l e s t a t i o n a v a i l a b i l i ty is very high , typically 99%. Rased on the data base , 80% of the ClI SLIlI it ies occur w i t h i n radar range ’ . Thus , the a v a i l ahi I it y of a s v st e ’ni of radars is 99% of 80% , or 79% . d . Present State of I)eve’l~~~jtt’iit - Equipment i s a v a i l ahle hut not as a shell ’ i t e m . E v e r ~’ new radar requires sonic ittoel i tica- t ion of exist ing des I gns , espec ial 1 y in the areas of process 1mg and di spla y . e. E s t i mitate of ’ Cost Vessel Owner - none. Gove i’iirneim t — Based on VIS expel’ i ence , each new i’ada i’ In stI l l lat ion costs about $1 ,300 , 000 , inc Itid ing install lit j olt . Maintenance is est imated at $100 , (100 per year. Sta ff1 ng would require one watch p o s i t ion to s t a f f the display, at an est im ated $100 ,000 per year. For IS s t a t ions , the a d d i t i o n a l cost wo u ld he $ 19 , 500 ,0(10 m t ta l iv , and $3 , 000 , 000 aflnwm I Upkeep. ‘I’)i IS W tltl l ei he over and above the ve ssel passport system costs . 1. Coast Guam’d Act ions Re~~~t~~~ I . Develop operat iona 1 requ i renient s fel l’ the part i cu lam ’ port or h a r b o r . 1. Procure the system and mon itor i t s development . 3. S t a f f the in s tallation , 4. M ain t lm i n the f a c il itv . t~ 5~ 40 ‘- - ~~~ ~~~~~~ - ‘ ~~—---~~-~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘~~- ‘ ~~~ ‘~‘~~~~‘ ~~~~~ “~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ,-—- ~~~. ‘ -- - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ g. Estimate of Effectiveness - On a per station basis , the potential effectiveness of radar surveillance u sed to hack up a passport system is estimated at 78% in the reg ion of its coverage. 5.2.6 Satellite Surveillance System a . Sy s t e m D e s c r i pt i o n - Satellite systems appear at first to offer a distinct advantage over other sy stems , s ince t hey pro- vide a l mos t global cover age , and hi gh accuracy everywhere . They are discus sed in d et ail in Appendix Ii and Sec t ion G. 3 .3 . 3 of Appendix G. A satellite system designed specifically for this app licat ion c ould he con f i g ured i n sever a l ways , hut a typ ical one is shown in Figure 5-4. With t h i s confi gur at i on a shore station sends an inter- rogation signal with a selective address code and a time identifier to a master satellite at about 6 Gil: , which repeats the interroga - tion at about 1.5 GHz. All shi ps in the’ sa tellite coverage area receive this si gnal , hut only the vessel with the correct address code acquires and decodes the si gnal. The selected vessel then adds the s h i p ’s identification , sh ip ’s data and time code to the received signal and transmits this composite si gnal hack to the shore station throug h two satel lites , the master and a secondary satellite. The shore station receives the same signal from the ship by two paths that differ in time of reception which corres- ponds to the length of the two signal paths. The shore station computer then uses the measurements of time differences in the transmitted and received si gnals toge ther w it h the satellite locations to accuratel y derive the shi p ’s position. Thus the shore stat ion can keel) an accurate track of a l l equipped vessels . Just as for the automatic monitoring system , the inter- rogation rate for elicit ship can he c o n t r o l l e d from shore. More- over , there are very few f a d i n g and propa gIl t ion d i s t u r b a n c e s on the s i g n a l s : the t r a n s m i s s i o n s ar c l i n e - o f - s i ght and are less a f f e c t e d by mul l ip at h - there is no “sky-wave/ground wave ” i n t e r f e r e n c e . ‘~~~~~‘ 5-41 — -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —-~:--~~~, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ ‘ ~~~~~ MASTLR A UXILIARY SATELLITE SATELLII’F VOICF5 4 ‘ ~k*3J ~&~~~~ ~~~ (~4.l l.Th:i Rh LAY EL) INTERROGATION 1e1 N T lNTERR0G~tTIoN (t~ Gil:) RELAYED (1, 5 GIl: I q V (4 .0 GIl :) REPLY (I .(~ Gil: VOl C i~1 (;URE S —4 . SA’i’ELl. I IL SURVE I LI.A NCE SYSTEM (AL l’ER MAR I SAT) 5-41 - — —.----,----~--.~~w- - ~~ --_~ — -—-- —-—- — i,—’-- —- __‘_l-- - ~~~~~ - ~ -— - ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —----- .— ---——— -‘- ‘—~~ - — Howe v er , the fliC t t h a t the shore s t at ion has pos it i ona I ~ind course i n t o r m at ion is of l i t t l e use unless jntnte di ate’ , re Ii :mh Ic commun i cat ion is poss ill l e vi th the a ft’cc ted V e’ 5 S e Is . Therefore’ th e shi p must not on l have ’ an I —band transponder , hut some form of communications on the’ brid ge. Conmntun lent ions from the shore to the sit i p via sat el 11 te pro — vi dCS the most rd iah i i i t v , q u a l i t y and range 0i&~i~ \ ‘iiI~ , tiP or HF . However , a sit iphoard termi ma 1 capall le o i ~‘el ice and data commun i cii — t ions is expensive because ot’ the nece’ss i tv for a h i g h g a i n , st a h i l - I :ed antenna • In cofltrast , a rang ing term inal on a ship uses a low ga in , low cost antenna . ‘l’he cost di ft’erence elf v o i c e ’ Ilnel dIl t Il communi cat ions vi th rang i ng ’nav I gIlt i on over ranging a lone is est i — mated as 2. to 1. Becaus e’ of the equi pment cost , it is I ik e ’lv that on1~’ the l a r g e r v e s se l s lover 10 ,000 gross tons l could afford a satellite ’ communications capah i i i t~’ . There tore , I t is as surne’d all shi ps b etween lt’OO and 10 ,1)1)1) gross ton s w ould use s a t e l l i t e ra ng ing together with ci them’ V hF , iLL or ML according to t lme i r di s t au c e fr om shore. If \‘i111 conimun i cat i on i s used , the advantage ot’ vi tie’ s a t e l l i t e cover age is lost i f II): celmmtln i cat ion is used , the svs tern inherits all the rell abi lit ” and i n t e r f e r e n c e problems oh t h a t hand , as we l l as the probl ems posed by the fact that the equipment is normal lv located in radio rooms dist a nt from the b r i d g e’, and t’cqut res the scr ~’ ices of the m’ad i o ofl ’i cot ’ • who i s net on watch ful l t inc ; or I f ML c o m m u n i c a t i o n is used as it is in the a u t o m a t ic non i t ot ’ i ng svs tern elf Sect ion S . 2 . 3 , the add it jolla 1 c o s t s of an ML commun i c~i - tions network must he added to the s v s t e’rn c o s t s . ‘l’hese problem s mu st he cons idered a long vi tit the advantag es 01’ su r v e i l l a n c e over a u t o m a t i c m o n i t o r i n g . From ‘I’ahle 1—7 , i t Ca n be’ seen that the potent 111 1 e f f e c t i vono ss l f sate il i Ic surve ’ ill ance is about 9% • as opposed to 5% for a u t o m a t i c mo n i t ol ’ing. h. ‘rrnin ingJWor k1o~td Implications - M i n i m a l - - t r a n sponder need only he turned on , I - -- - - ~~~ - - ~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ _ ,__.._ __. ‘,r-~~~w~~~~~~~~~ -r ~Zt ”\ ~I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~“.T” ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ mi~ - - - - c• Estimate of Availability - Availabili ty is es t ima t ed premised on the a ssump t ion tha t all larg e vessels grea ter than 10 ,000 gros s tons would be equi pped wi th full comm unica t ions (voice and high rate data) and ranging/navi ga t ion capabili t ies , and that all o ther vessels grea ter than 1 ,600 gross tons would be equipped w ith rang ing transponder and low r ate da ta capabil it y , bu t no satel- li te voice or high rate data link . Thus , immediate voice commun i- cation from shore beyond VHF range would not be available to the smaller ves sels. Since 85% of the casualties occurred within VHF range of the shore , availabili ty would be between 85% and 100%. A figure of 90% is therefore assumed for availability. d. Presen t State of Development - See Appendix H . e. Es timate of Cost Vessel Owner 1 . Ve ssels over 10,000 gross tons: - Sa tell it e Communica tions Terminal - $65 ,000~ - Ranging/Navigation Transponder - 12 ,400 2. Vessels 1,600 to 10 , 000 gross tons : - - Rang ing Transponder and Da ta Commun ica ti ons - 2 8,600 Governmen t - Assuming the use of planned satellites ,** the cost is estimated at $15 ,706 ,000 per year. f. Coas t Guard Action Required 1. Require L-band transponders on all vessels. 2. Require satellite communications on large vessels , 3. Design and install a shore-based satellite communi- ca tions facility to receive and decode ship data , and communica te wi th vessels. *Current cost of Mari sa t communications shi p terminal is $6 2 ,000.00 p lus approxima tely $3 ,000 installation costs. **Reference IMMARSAT Radio Determination Economic Assessment Study , March 1978 . 5-44 ~~~~~~~~~~ _:~~~~~ _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ V.— — — - —— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -‘ - ~~~~~-Ii ’ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - I 4 Establish data communications links between central I - f a c i l i t y and local stations . g. Estimate of Effectiveness - Based on the casual ties , the p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the sys tem is es ti ma ted to be 79% , or 56% more than the baseline system . 5 . 2 . 7 Intensive and Periodic Train4pj a. Sys tem Descrip tion - As a “system ” training would involve specific courses in the use of navi gation ins t rumen ts , rules of the road , proper navi gation and helm procedures , and s tric t licensing requiremen ts. The specific form of the training is beyond the scope of this study ; the c r i t i c a l j udgements involved in develop ing training requirements should be performed by experienced mariners , ra ther than a technical team . It should be mentioned , however , tha t simula tors offer a chance to experience “dangerous ” condi t ions wi thout the risk of accident . They are expensive to use , bu t are effec tive training aids for officers of large tankers .* b . Tra ining/Workload Implications - This is hi ghly subjec- tive , but a reasonable guess is an addi t ional week of tra ining per year on the average for each brid ge officer. This would include training in the use of instruments , relicensing , and in the use of simulators. Many shipping companies already require extensive officer training , and thus would not be affected . The main purpose is to increase training for officers who don ’t ge t enoug h now ,, c. Estimate of Availabili ty - Assuming that training affects all United States flag vessels and 50% of the foreign flag vessels , the availability is estimated at 41% , using Table 5~3,** *A req~iir ~ méiit for simulator training would be unrealistic at the present time ; there are very few simulators available for such usage - - each one is a multimillion dollar facility . **The text of a new treaty , the International Convention on Stand- ards of Training , Certification and Watchkeeping of Seafarers , 1978 , was agreed upon by an international conference in London in July of this year. The Annex to the Convention contains basic requirements on training , certification , and watchkeep ing for masters , officers , and crew of seagoing merchant ships . It will enter into force when 25 nations , with combined merchant fleets constituting 50% of the ~ross tonnage of the world’ s merchant shipp ing , have approved it. This would have the effect of increasing the availabili ty to 90-100%. 5-45 - - — ‘ ‘~~~~~“ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ç ç ~~~~ ’~ ’~ v~~~ ‘,-,‘-~~ ,, —- ~ t d. Presen t State of Development - Present licensing and train ing practices. e. E s t i m a t e of Cost Vessel Owner - Ba sed on one week of tr ai n ing per y ea r for three bridge officers per vessel , and assuming training and salary costs of $3 ,000 , the cos t per ve ssel would be $9 ,000 , Government - None , unless simulator facilities are constructed . f . Coast Guard Actions ReQuired 1. Establish strict licensing and training standards (se e re commenda ti ons of Sec tio n 7 .4). g. Esti ma te of Effec ti v ene ss - Tra in ing as a “system ” was rated by the TSC team as hav ing a po ten ti al effe cti veness of 35% , or 12% higher than the baseline system .* 5 . 2 . 8 Expanded T r a f f i c Separation System a. System Description - Traffic separation schemes have been in operation for several years at the approaches to New York H arbor , De l aware Bay , Por tland (M ai ne) , Boston , Chesapeake Bay , Los Ange le s/ Long Beach , in the Santa Barbara Channel , San Franc i sco , and recen tly i n the Strai ts of Juan de Fuca . These are believed to he qui te effective in reducing end-on (meeting) collisions . There were no such eases in the data base in a traffic lane . However , there are three areas where impr ovemen t can b e made : in fa irways , adjacen t to channels and tr aff ic la nes , and in narro w passageways where alternate routes are a v a i l a b l e . Fairways are not t r a f f i c separation schemes; rather , they are areas where no obs tructions such as oil platforms are allowed. They are administered by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. They are indicated on the chart , and only serve to demarcate zones free of fixed obstructions. Vessels are free to use them or not , at *Other reviewers rated t r a i n i n g hi gher than the TSC team ; refer to the discussion in Section 1-2 .1. 5-46 -~~~~~— -~~~~~~~ -~~~~ -~~~~ ~~~- - -~~~~~~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - — - ‘ “ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ “--— -~--—- --- -— — ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ____j;_ ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ -~~“ ‘ - r - ” ~ -~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n : the~’ may cross at any angle and navigate a l o n g the left boundary line if the~’ choose. Non ethel es s , vessel masters g e n e r a l l y t feat them as lanes , and tend to s t a y to the r igll t . A sy stem of required procedures p e r t a i n i n g to fairways which would have e l i m i n a t e d the two Gulf of Mc x i -o collisions would comis ist of the following three r u l e s : I . \‘essc Is shoul d s t ay to the r i g h t except when OVe ’f - t a k i n g , in order to e f f e c t port - to-port passing. 2 . Vessels should avoid na~’ i gIl t ing outs ide of , and pa i’a I Ic 1 to , fa irwavs w i thin one mile of the fa i rwav boundar y counter to the traffic flow , 3 . Vessel s should cross at ne ’a I’ ly right aug los The second t’ti Ic slltlu Id be ext ended to c’hanne is and t r a f t ’ ft l~mne s . When a shal l ow -ei m’a ft v e s se l is pro ce’oJ ing along a channel hounda m’ in the wrong di re~ t ion , she is set t ing up a st arh oard - to starboard passing situation , vh ic im can be’ quite ’ cent us I mtg and dangerous especial lv lit ni~’ ’ The other ~‘essol mas’ a t t e m p t a port — to —po r t passage , leave ’ t h e ’ c h a n n e l , and ground . This is CsjlC c 11111 V t rite iie~i 1’ t hi’ ent I’IIflCe’S and e x i t s tel ch a n n e l s . Sin I — la rlv W i t h t r a f t i c IaIle ’s , espcc I a [lv l i k e those in Oelawa re’ Bay where ’ s h a l l o w areas li e ne’li rll v , t his p r a c t ice i s dangei’ous l’here are narrow pass ageways I Ike ’ til e’ OflC d e s c r i b e d in Section 1 .2.4 where s at e pas sage elf tankers litlel tank -harge’s would he enhanced h a v o i d i n g the passage a l t o g e t h e r . In view of the im por tance elf env i ronmenta I preltect 1011 . Stlcll S i tLI8 t i 011 5 shou Id bt’ r ev i ewed , anti pa ssage p r o h i h i ted in one eli re’ct io n or the othe’i’ . h . TrIl in ingjlcorkload Imj~jica t_ions — None ’ . c , E s t i m a t e of A v a L l a b i l i t v - 95%, it is t’eeiuce’ti from l00~ b the chance tha t ves sel ma sters would i gnore tile r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . - I d. Present S t a t e ’ of flevelop~nent — N ot app i icllbl e. c. Fst m ate elf Cost — ere l , except for the s a l a r ie s of present go~’ernment employee s . ~-47 III _— - -~~-—-— - - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -— — - -~~~=-= ~—‘~~‘- --- - ~ —--— --~~~~~~~~~~ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — — - _ — -. --- w _ -~~ ~~~- - w~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~~~~~~~~ w--____ — -~~~~~ - - ---- -:~~-- — ~~~ -~ —‘ f. Coast Guard Actions Required 1. Work with the U .S. Army Corps of Engineers to set up recommendations for proceeding in fa i rways. 2 . Set up recommendations for limitations on passage p a r a l l e l to t r a f f i c lanes, 3. Work within IMCO to obtain international adoption of the recommendations , g. E s t i m a t e of Effectiveness - The p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s is e s t i m a t e d to he 2 % , or 4% above’ the baseline system . 5. 2.9 lmproved Aids-t o -Navi ga tion System a. System Descri p t i o n - A system of improved aids-to- navi g a t i o n would consist of the following measures being taken by Coas t Guard personne l : j 1. Buoy Identification Improvements - Means should he explored to improve buoy identification at ni ght by use of varying l i g h t s i g n a l s , to b e t t e r d i f f e r e n t i a t e between buoys , and to increase the range of visual identification . 2 . Buoy Relocations - Buoys marking shoals and reefs should he careful ly reviewed to ensure that under conditions where the buoy is at the point on its watch c i r c le closest to the shoal or reef it is m a r k i n g , the deepest d r a f t vessel that could he in thos e waters can safely pass with the huo alongside . 3. Buoy Moni t o r i n~ - Means shou ld he eNp lore ’ei t e l increase the e f f e c t iveness of buoy audit ing pu’ act ices , and to -; reduce the time between buoy dislocations and their detection and correct ion . 4 , RAC ONs at Fairwa y I n t e r s e c t ions and i’r a f f i e ’ Lane Entrances - RACONs should be strateg i c a l ly placed for p o s i t i o n fixing (Section 1 .2 . 2 . 3). These measures are d iscussed in Sec ti on ~.4.4. 5-48 - _ _ _ _ _ ,~~~~, ‘_ ~“ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ - ~~~ - - — - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — F~J . . — b. Tra ining/Workload Implica tions - M in imal f or the vessel’ s o f f i c e r s . The RACON symbol appears a u t o m a t i c a l l y ; a minimal amount of training might be required if new buoy identification techniques are introduced. More l i k e l y , this would take the form of a pub l ica t ion. The Coas t Guard workload would be increased somewha t in the follo wi ng areas : 1 . RACON installa tion 2. RACON ma in tenance These are believed to be m in imal req uiremen ts which ca n be H accommoda ted with present manpower. c. Es tima te of Ava ilab il ity - Th is ap pl ies pr imarily to RACONs and lig hted buoys . Based on present experience , ava il- ability of lighted buoys is estimated to be 95%. RACONs would probably have a similar a v a i l a b i l i t y . Experience in the Great Lakes and Alaska suggests a figure of 95%. d. Present State of Development - RACONs are special-order dev ices , no t presen tly a shelf item , bec ause of the lack of demand . The RACONs presently in use were purchased as a spec ia l ord er. Any new acquisition w i l l likewise be a sp ecial order. However , the technology is presently available , and new sol id-state transmitter techni ques are expec ted to improve reliability even further. The MTBF of present RACONs is about 20 , 000 hour s. The Coast Guard Aids-to-Navigation Division is presen tly embarking on a f u l l - s c a l e review of buoys - their shapes , colors , locations , markings , etc. This w i l l provide an excellent oppor- tunity to improve buoy identification and placement . e. Estimate of Cost Vessel Owners - None , unless IMCO phases out swept- fr equency RACONs ( IMCO , 1977). If this happens , all sh ipboard H radars will have to be r e t r o f i t t e d , and all new radar equ ipped w ith I ~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ ‘ : ~~~~~~ -- - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~‘ ~~~~ - t’ixed-fr celuencv receiving circuits . The estimated cost is about $600 per z’adai’. Government - Buoy techniques will be covered in existing j ’ograms , and do not represent an aeiditjona.l cost. It is e s t i m a t e d that about 40 RACONs would be re qui red to cover the port entrances , fair w a y s and to p r o v i d e other chec kpoi n ts along the coast (see Section G.3,l). The cost of 41) RACONs is estimated to be about $15 ,000 apiece , or about $t~00 , 00t 1 t o t a l . f. Coast Gu ard Act ion Requ i reel Review buoy ident if icat ion techniqu e s , buoy location cr it e r ia , and buoy surve ying techni ques and effect the necessary changes. 4 2 . Spec ifs’ and pr o cur e 40 swept - f req u e n c~’ RACONs plus spares and parts; i d e n t i fy buoys to be equipped and fit them with appropriate brackets. g. l~s t i m a t e of E f f e c t i ven e ss - The p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t iveness 0!’ a p r o g r a m of improved buoy techniques p l u s a system of RA ’ONs is e s t i m a t e d at 3-1 % , or 11% above the b a s e l i n e system. ~~. 2 . 1 0 P i l o t T r a n s f e r Procedure System a. System Description - The present system of piloting is a mixture of federal , state , and commerc ial enterprise. Pilots , all commercial , are licensed to operate in a specified zone . The l i c e n s e is issueel in a few areas by the federal government , and in the m a j o r i t y b y S t a t e s . Thus there is a ,i u r i s e l i ct ion a l issue in any new regulations establishing a ,li f fer en t pilot transfer pro- cedure system. Assuming the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l ohs t , Ic le’s can be overcome by i s s u i n g n a t i o n a l guidelines , ti le’ p i l o t transfer procedu re ss’stem Would consist of implementing the following requirement: “Loaded tankers of 10 .000 g r o s s t otis ~ r more shal I not be a l l o w e d to procede into (a specified reg ion ) without a p ilot on ho ard , a p i lot escort , or a Coast Guard esco r t . - ~~~~~~~~ 5-50 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~~~~ - -~~~~~~~~~ - - ~~~ -~ — - — —~~~~~~~~~~ W -~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ - --x : -- -r~~ ”- - - ‘ ‘ ~~~~~~~~“ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘t’h e “spec t I’ieei region ” would depen d on the locations. In Cuavani 1 la Bay, for ex amp l e , the t’or h I dden i~o1ie’ would pi’olla I) I y be w i thin two ni ii CS 01’ the ’ sout he’ rnrn ost p0 itt o I I line1 . In l)e 1 aware BIts’ , I outted tankers shou let not be a I lowed to approach on the 1 I ye lath orn Batik trat’ I Ic sepa i’a t i on I tine , hut rather the ’ I)e I liwa re lane there thes’ slioti Id not he’ Ii I I owed to proceed beyond buoy ‘‘l)C’’ w i t h — out m e e t i n g the ab ove comet it ions . ‘l’hei’c is present Iv a st r:it e’gv , wh i c h j s ‘‘f I rst one t o t h e’ p i lilt boarding area gets the p i lot l.oaded tanke n’s should be’ able ’ to II I’ 1’Iifl~~t’ lot’ p i lot en count en’ an hour ahead of t inc , or when wit it ill ~‘IIF rail i 0 range of ’ the p i l o t st at ion. ‘l ii i S W OU 1 ci enail 1 e them to t line t h e i r art ’ I ia I at t h e ’ eneoun te r pu i ni t in a depenellib Ic Fash ion , anti avo I ci the 1. 1 i’st — coitue — I it’ s t - se’rve ei - St rate gv . Depending on the dept Ii of t lie w;t t er • V CS 5(’ is cclii 1 ci wit i t at ancho i’ (in deep water l i k e New \o rk Il~i t’i)O 1’ a p p r o a c h or beyond the t i’a I I i c Ill nes ( in Dc’ I a wa z’e anti Che’ sa pea ke Bzi y S , It ) 1 example ) , i t ’ a s I gil i t’ i c a n t eiela v is encount ered in pilot boa i’ d l u g . lb i s system appears as an i ttdcpcn ek ’nt n’ccornrneu d~it ion in Sect io n 7 . 2 . An expanded discuss ion 1 5 presented the i’e h . Tr a ini n rkload Im p l ic at i on s - None . c . Fst i mate of ’ Ava I 11th I 1 i t v — ‘t he’ sy s t e m won t Itl become ‘‘unava i i ab l e ’’ in the case o I’ schedul i ng 11 roil I e’ms , I . e’ • , in cli ses Wile’ i’e the vessi’ I a i’ri ve’d at t lie ag i’e’e’d — upon e nc o u nt ci’ p oi li t , bit t due tel mi XU ilS the p i l o t bo ut was not there. the mu ster might choose to go further in , r~I th ’r t h a n turn a round or ancheu ’ n e x t to a t i’a fI Ic lane ’ . ‘l it is )‘e’qu lies a suh i ect i ye iuidgeiit eii t , hut a reason— all 1 e est m utt ’ i s t h a t this si tout ion wou id occur less t ban 10% of the tim e 1~st imu te of Ma i lab i i i tv : ci , Pi’ese ’nt St lI l t’ (1 t~ I)i’ve I (ip liR’lt t — Not ~Pl) I i c ;ihi I c . e . i~st i r n I l t e of C o s t s lo Vessel Owner — ‘the Idet It I(lflli I cost of lii i’ i ng a pi lot o holi nil fui rt her out , Ics S t 111111 $ 11)1)1)/tn i ~ I nilound . It does not r a~ c’n i t I e ’li I (lil tIloun tI (bused Ofl 011 1 V Oflt’ ou tbo u nd i’;Iswl I ts~ 5-51 ~~~ - ~~~— _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~‘T~~.~~” r’ . “~~ ‘ ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ “~~~‘-~~~~~ - - ~~~~ “ - ‘~~ C”~~ ’ ’~~~ in the data base ). Also , the aeidit tonal d e l a y we uniti t-~~’;t mouti ’” , it ’ the p i l o t encounter s were not arr angeti ah ead of ’ t i m e . Pilot t r a n s f e r s would be g r e a t ly f a c i l i t a t e d w i t h c o o r d i n a t i o n by a sh~lre -ilaset i sy stem (see Sect ion 5 . 2 . 1 ) Celst to Government - None. f . Coast Guard A cti2 Re uirc d - I ssuant’e of gui tie Ii aes for p i l o t t t’ansfer pre lcedures for loaded tankers . g . is t i rn a t e of E ffectivene ss - - The p ot e n t i;l 1 effect j venes’ for ground i ngs is est I ma ted at 44% . The ov era ll p oten t i a l e f l e e t i ~‘e - ness i s es t irn at eel at 38% , or 1 5% above the base 1 i me c~ st em S . I . I I li~pt o ‘_!*±ft° l t S~~t~~~~ iid ;i id ’; Ii . S~ ct em Desci’!pt i on - A sv stem t h at I ncot’po i’ ll t CS m ill t’o~ ed equipment 5 tltfl dli t’ds i % O I I ld ‘ssent lii lv adopt t lie p l u c I ice ’; ot ;i prudent sil l powit et’ attel try to en force them on a ll \es se 1 s btluntl for or de1,a i’t i ng II .S . port . These pl’ac t icec a t’e I . Purchase of equipment meet ing a i ’ccogni zcd st un~iard . I . Purchase an d mat ntenan ce 01 compi’ehens Ire sp are pat ’t s supply 3. Pr event i ye ma tnt enance and c~i re of cqn I pment 4. Requ iremen -t of at l ea s t one c rewman to be cap able of mak tu g ;it lt ’u ’;I simp le i’(’~’-ll it’ s , and a b l e to i n s t a l l sp a re p u t t s 5 . Requ i rerne nt of any ticecs s~i rv t’epa it’ s to be ma~ic’ Ii each docking. i’he I’ i i ’ ; t t w o can lIe l’t’lleh i l v est liI ’ l i shed h r eu e- e- u s l e u t t a l inspet’ t io n s . Ih e (ii i t’d litid I e )t I t t i i ul ’(’ eas i I ~ ’ a \ o le lCel Or ~ lt\’ ~h I p owner try i ng 1 o cut co ct c , The H t’th 1 s di I i i i’ll I t t o en fort-c , uti l e’— s a s ho ic — bit s t’d si ~t em cx u t h . T r a i n i_ng~~~~’k I oud I nip ~i c a tj ilti s Si nec Ii I t’a I ned i’ad I oft’j cer I s t’equi red on ever~’ sh ill , anti mo st ch i pc a I co h ave a t~tun ii ft eel el ~ct t’ i~’i a n • there i s no m c ’ i’ease in w eu rkli l lu ,i • ;;flel on Iv a sl I g u t Increase in t nit iut i ng , ma I ttl ~’ in the ch e c kout and 1 l i c t a lI:t — t lOll of spare parts. 5-51 - - - - - _ _, _ ‘ “~~~‘,~~~r! - - --- -‘.‘- —-‘---— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~‘ ~‘: : . F— -’ — - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — — — —,.-,----‘--•- .- .-~~~~•- —.‘,---- --—- -- — c. Estimate of Availability - In the context of t h i s sy stem , • ava ilab i lity is equival en t to enforceabilit y . In t he evalu a t ion of the associated system feature’ of Section 1 .2 .7 , an attempt was made to estimate the likelihood of compliance iii a r r i v i n g at the evaluation . Thus availabilit y is assumed to he 100%. d. Present State of Development - Backup radars will he required for tankers. This s h o u ld he extended to tugs towing large barges containing hazardous materi a ls , oil , and fuel, ‘l’he r e q u i r e m e n t for nay i gut ion gear independent of r a d a r Wi 11 s i gi~i ft - can t l v reduc e casun It ie’5 caused by radar and coinpiuss failures , by p r o v i d i n g another ret laMe means of’ determining positions. e. Estimate of Costs Costs to Vessel Owners — It is a ssume d that tile require- men t s here i n are only those ’ ab ov e the purcha se -’ and installation price , namel y for spare p a r t s and r n a in t t ’ na n c e . Cos ts to Government - None , except those a s s o c i a t e d w i t h iss uing equipment standards. f. Coast Guard Ac t ions R equir ed Issu e mit t imurn e q u i p m e n t standu i’ds on g\’ i’Ocelmp liss dep th sound e r , radii i’ , and tlll V i gut ion gea I’ 2 . I s su e’ a requiremen t for complete spare parts k i t on t he same in s tr u m t ’n t s . ~ - g. E s t i m a t e of E f f e c t i v e n e s s - The potent j u l e f f e c t i v e n e S s of i s s u i n g and e n f o r c i n g these s tan d ar d s is estim ated to be 25% , or 2 % abov e the baseline system. 5 . 2 . 1 2 Processor-Aided N a v i g a t i o n Ale rt ~,y steItt a. ,~t em Descri p t io n - W it h th e i mprov emen ts i n perform anc e , cost , and r eliability of microproc essors and other di g ita l cii’ — cu kt i ’t’ , i t is now possi)) ) t’ to automate and inte grate se’vt’i’al br idge funct ions ret i ab l and relat ivel inexpensivel y . l.ORAN—C r eceivers now automa t teal Iv perform cycle matching, and can even choose the St rongest stat ions , and compare the r e su l t s from di ffe ’ r ent c h a i n s ; on some uni t s t i m e c o o r d i n at ’s can he t r a n s f o r m e d te l 5-S3 F — — — — --—---— ~~—---—— — - —~~~ • - -~~~ -- - —~~~ . ~~~ —~~—— ~~ —---~~~~—— ~~~~ - - lIl t I tuete/ l o n g i t u d e and d i s p l a y e d in t h a t form. Inst cad of ’ d i s p l a y - ing every new rne ’asur enue nt • cont inuous smoothing can be’ per formed to reduce noise error s . Dcv iat ion from pn ’ e se l e c te ’d t r a c k s can be cont inuouslv d i s p l ay e d . Cont i n u o u s cross — c h e c k inig can t a k e place between independent nay i ga t ion i ni st i’umen t S : Omega vs . LORAN - C i’ada n’ vs . LORAN—C , and dead — reckoning vs . LORAN—C , can a 11 be accomplished • and an m d ica t ion pi’oi’ ide ’el if th e’ di ffe’rences tire excess i Vt’ and suggest a d c t e c t l y e’ i n s t rument . Ru i It — In cal i brat ion c i r c u i t s can automatically test most of the ’ o p e r a t i n g e’i r c u i t i ’ y without invo lv ing human e f f o r t . Set and Jr i ft can he c~i I c u l a t e d and d isp las’ed . Ira if ic lanes and event f at h o i n e t e r r’e’ttd I rigs d’IiIi be’ supeninipos ed on r a d ar eI isplas ’ s ; so can ss’nthet ic al Ii’ ge’nc’i’ated , processed radar target repli e s from ships , hui~s’s , and coast lille. To complete the automation loop , the dci atio n— from- inten ei t’ti course’ can he fed itito control c i r c u i t r v to cont i’e)l the rudder of the shi p. A u t o m a t i c helm c o n t r o l l e r s have seen some usage for se’veral years , hut it is now possible for the processor to c a l c u l a t e ’ control commands desi gned to re duce rudder wear and increase fu e l operating efficiencies , b ased Ofl the ind i v i dual sh i p ’s shape , w e i g h t , and handling characteristics . In the con text of this study , the important system features are safety-related , rather than control or convenience-related . The fea tures of in teg r at ed n a v i g a t ion gear of most intere ’st are : (1) the c a l c u l a t i o n and d i s p l a y of d e v i a t i o n - f r o m - t r a c k , (2) an alert for excessive deviation and (3) an alert prior to a r r i v a l at waypo ints , anti to a lesser extent , (4) cross-checking between instruments (see Section 1 .2.12-15 ) . Shipboard systems that e x h i b i t these features are a v a i l a b l e o f f - t h e - s h e l f . They are generally boug ht by the shi powners to reduce travel time and save fuel , r a t h e r than as an 11 1 (1 to s a f e t y . However , the information provided is v a l u a b l e : several a c c i den t s in the d a t a base could have been avoided had such a sy stem been on board and in cisc. In the proces s of a n a l s ’ :in g e’a st u a l t i e s , several cases were noted where ’ the yes se’ I was awa it I tig the ’ a yr I ia I of a p 11 ot , anti drifted onto a shoal or reef. It appeared that the ’ vessel master -- —, ~~~~~ -- ,~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — - - - ‘ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ , ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~“ wa s unaware of the eli stance the shill had c m i fted . i t w a s suggest ed that a use’ful capa b ility that could he ea s i l implemet ited into processor-augmented nay i gtl t ion etluipment is a comittat id key t h a t would establish a reference position (the position of the shi p u t the t inc the ke was presse d ) , itniti pr o v i d e a readout of the d i s - tance of the shi p from that re ference point (see Figure 5-5 ). ‘I ’his could also he arranged to sound an alert if the ship tin fteel more than a preselected distance from the reference p o i n t . Such a cal - cu l a t e d d i s tan c e wou l d hav e an accurac y (lit the order of a few hundred feet or less, 11 . ira un ingjWorkload Implication s - If poor ly de ’si~~ned , a sy stem of t h i s k i n d coulel he complicated to enter w ay p o i n t s : itow — even’ , there ’ are simi Ian ’ t i n i t s which have fa irl y simple keyboards w it h numbers and a few command hut tons , and i fly o ly c’ no let ten s other than N- F-S- h . Since LORAN- C c h a r t s are corrected for long-t erm propaga t ion en r’on ’ s , waypoi ii ts woul ci he’ en tereel in LORAN t i me cotnrd i — m ates , rather than l a titude/long i tude coordinates. Otherwise ’ , simple c o o r d i n a t e ’ conversion algorithms WOUld not cOiltai ll the ’ c o r r e c t i o n s ; tin s is e’spec jul Ii’ - prob iemutiat ica l neat’ the shore. Once tile wa s’po int s arc determin ed on the chart , and the coor d inates writ ten elowit , the a c t u a l ent rv of the ’ data t ot ’ 10 waypoints ittto the processor can be accomp In sh e d ill t t~ 0 nii ilutes It shon Id he ~ t) j ut ted out t h a t there is a da ng e r : I f tine nay i - g . it o r m a k e s ulu t’t’i’Oi’ in t’e’ctlI’ti in g ~ ooi ’ei in ate ’s , t i’otut the’ chart cli’ lit keying them i n t o the’ processor ( l e s s likel y , since the result is v i suit 1 1 v eli cii lai’etl ) , the sit iii coulei be ut cc ident a 1 iv t’elute’ ei i n t e l a shoal ut i’e~ i , l’o l i V O Id th I s 5 I tua t b i t it woul d be geiocl p r a c t ice’ t O have one’ oft ’ Icci’ etiter the wtts ’po hi t 5 , and ion ’ afltltht ’ t’ 0 f f 1 cci’ ttl take the eli ~~~ lt nved cOOt’tl I flat t’s and pl ot the ’ ll~ lint s out the’ citat’t to assure the i’e ’sul t ing waype lints utre correct. — Wit it these cout s t ram ts , the t rattling anti work I Oati iflip i i cat i OilS a i~e~ n u t ima I — the e’nt ire process would not need to be pei’foi’rneel more than once a cias’ . c . Est lunat e of ’ Ava i Lab i I I ti’ — Si itce t he’ ti ei d I t I oit :i I hardwa n’ e’ • rcqui red l’or an i n t e g r a t e d n a v i g a t i o n ss’st ’m (ov er attd ab ove t h e’ 5-5 5 _ _ _ _ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ , - —---- - - - r ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ DI SPLAY DEV I ATION FROM TRACK L o o o o o o oJ~ EYBoARn FIGURE 5-5 . PROCESSOR AIDE D NAVIGATION ALERT SYSTEM 5-5 6 — - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~W~~~*.—w’ ~~~~~~~~~ —-- - - -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ‘~~~‘~~~~~~~ ‘~ ~~‘ sen sors tha t input i t) i s digi tal , and since it will be i n a protec ted environmen t , the equi pmen t availabili t y will be high , on the ordei’ of 99%. The availabili ty of the system in practice will be limite d by reluc tance to use the equipment. There are probably a number of vesselmasters who will find it i n s u l t i n g , or too much trouble to use , or who w ill no t wan t to plo t their course in advance in rela tively confined waters. The fact that the economic benefit is ob tained in open wa ters , ra ther than close to shore , w ill re inforce this attitude , It can be expected that the acceptance and use of the system will increase with time . Any estimate here is greatly subjec tive . W ith the above caveats , the availability is estimated at 70% for 1985 , and 80% for 1990. d. Present State of Development - Equi pmen t exh ibi t ing the three sYstem features of a display of deviation-from-track , an aler t for excessive deviation , and a maneuver ing point alert , is a v a i l a b l e o f f - t h e - s h e l f . Some u n i t s do not include the l a t t e r two features; in all cases the display of deviation-from-track should be more prominen tly displayed . The -dis tance-from-re ference-point feature should be incorporated into the next generation of inte- gra ted navigation equipment. e. Estimate of Cost Vessel Owners Purchase Cos ts: Prese ntly $15 ,000 - $30 ,000. Even tually $2 ,000 - $4 ,000 above the cos t of a LORAN-C receiver .* Ins tallation Costs: Small - no antenna or other expensive ins tallation - all on brid ge. Government - None . *LORAN C sets with deviation-from - track display while navi ga t ing along a “LORAN line ” are available today for $4 ,000 - $6 ,000 . This Is a very limi ted version of the capability required for arb i trary tracks. 5-57 ~~~~~~~~ —~~ - - -~ ~~~~- ‘ - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- - : ~~~~— — —~~~~~~~~~~~~~_~~~~. ~~__ f . Coa~~t~ Gua~rd , Act iOn RC~U~Up~C~ 1. Est ahli Shrn,e~ t of Mi n imu ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ These speci ficat ions should in~ 1udC the requirement for prominent d isp lay of deviation from track , an alert for excessive deviat ion from track , an alert for an approaching waypOint , and a distance- from reference point presentation and alert. They should al so include bu ilt-i n test circuits and calibr ation , in order to ach ieve a high reliabilit y. 2. Even tual RcQ~~~~m~~-~ of ProccSS0~~~~~~~ N~~j1~!!0fl A ler~ Egu iptU~ fl t . if this system is selected to be i n s t i tu t e d , a rule w il l need to be d raf ted requ ir ing th is capabil it Y on tankers . g. Es tirna,te of E f fec es~ - There were two rammiflgs and 24 groundingS where a processor a~~~ d nav igation alert system (shown in Figure 5-5) would have provided some protection beyond the basel ine svstem this assumes the system features of a disp lay - • of deviatiofl f r 0 m-t r a ~~~, an alert for excessive deviation-fr om- track , and a ~aneuveriflg point alert (see Section 1 .2 .13-15) . Considering only rammings and grounditigs (collisionS would not usually be affec ted) , the baseline system is expected to reduce casualties by 23%. if a processor-aided navi gatiOll alert system had the three features listed above and were available on the br idge of every tanker , casualtii’5 could be reduced by 31% , i. e. 8% more than the baseline system. 5. 2. 13 ~~~~~~~le!~ a. S~ystern DescriP~ iofl - Depth sounders are standard equip- men t on vessels of all s i z es . They are hig hly r e l ia b l e from the po int of view of avail abil ity, and are simple to use . The key elemen t , the trans duce r , is u sually moun ted on the hul l , and requ ires p ierc ing of the pla te for in stal lati on . It must he ins talle d af t of the bow far enoug h to keep the t ran sducer itt undi s turbed wate r. The uni t transm its an acoust ic pul se pe riod i- cally downward in to the wate r throug h the transduc er. The puls e is transmitt ed in a beam a few degre es wide towa rd the ocean floor. - ————-----~~—-— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~- - ,~~~~~‘~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ “:-~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~“~~~‘ ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The refle ctions of the pulses off the bottom are received by a transducer ( u s u a l l y the same as the t r a n s m i t t e r ) and converted to e l e c t r i c a l s i g n a l s , w h i c h are a m p l i f i e d and d i s p l a y e d . The time difference be twe en tr ans mitt ed and re ce ived puls es pr ovide s a measure of the dis t ance fr om th e h ul l t o t he ocean f l o o r . The echoes are displayed in several ways: (1) a rotating light display shows a bright illumination on a circular scale read- out; (2) a digital display shows a number representing the depth below the h u l l ; and (3) a chart recorder will show the depth con- tour of the track recently traversed by the vessel. I t is fe asible to att ach an ala rm fea ture to a dep th sounder , which would sound if t he meas ured dep th b ec ame less th an a p r eset c r i t i c a l value (refer to Figure 5 -6) . Equi pment is available off the shelf which e x h i b i t s t h i s f e a t u r e . The main difficult y with a tt aching alarms is tha t wi thou t pr op er desi gn preca ut io ns , false alarms can becom e a nu isance. With repeated false alarms , the mar iner ’s conf idence in the ins trumen t can be reduced to the point where i t falls into disuse , False alarms can be caused by a school of f i s h , a shark , or even a single smaller f i s h , as well as noise spikes caused by turbulence , engine noise , and elec t rical dis tu rb- ances. Alarms set , adjusted or designed to reduce random noise and false echo a c t i v a t i o n are usually not sensitive enough to pro- vide rel iable opera ti on on all types of bo ttom. D ig ital type sounders only read the first echo. This is a disadvantage where mul tiple echoes might be encountered from fish , kelp , trash , etc. , Proper des ign is necessary to avo id th is cond iti on; one of the bes t methods is to integrate the returns over a number of pulses ( e . g . , over a 10 second period) . This reduces false alarms significantly. Proper usage of the depth alert system requires the mariner to selec t the cr iti cal dep th , based on the char ted dep ths along the intended track , the tides , and the vessel draft . Even if the crit- ical dep th is arb it rar i ly selec ted to be two or three fa thom s below the hull , i t could be invaluable . tJpon hearing an alarm , the watch s tander would watch the disp lay for a brief period or examine the chart reco rder to verify that the echoes causing the 5-59 F ~~~— - ~~~~ - - ~~ - -~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~—~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ‘—‘~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ •. ~ -~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - ~- — - - ‘~- -‘ - ~ — -~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — ‘—-----— ,---- .----.-. ‘ - ~ ‘~ ROTATING LIGHT DISPLAY REMOTE I I DIGITAL ALARM DISPLAY DIGITAL DISPLAY SOUNDER PROCESSOR _ _ _ _ _ _ _ A CRITICAL DEPTH I I I ~~~ ADJUSTMENT [RECORDEJ TRANSDUCER FIGURE S-b . DEPTH ALERT 5-60 , , . ~~~ — -~r__ • - —-.- —~~~~ —~~ - -—- . . -‘,- - —~~-- — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘~~~~~ - F --— - 4.--- - I - alarm were really caused by reflections from the ocean floor. If so , the Situation would be reviewed , a pos it ion e stablished , and appropria te action would be taken. b . Training/Workload Implications - The depth alert requires a c e r t a i n amount of s k i l l to be used p r o p e r l y , but the t h i n k i n g process of choos ing a cri tical dep th is the same as the ma r iner is trained to do in properly interpreting charts. The extent to which this training is part of a mariner ’s experience will de ter m ine his comfort w i t h using the instrument . The alert feature acts as a backup , which should a c t u a l ly reduce the workload of a conscien t ious naviga tor , becau se it- can red uce the amount of time he wou ld spend examining the depth sou nder. This assume s that the false alarm problem is solved , i.e. , tha t false alarms are infrequen t . c. Estimate of Availabilit y - The pres en t cos t ( $6 ,000 - $10 ,000) could be burd ensome to sma ller tanker s , and thus limit the ins trumen t’s ava ilabilit y . There were no cases in the data base where tug/barge comb inations would have benefited from this fea ture . However , the cost would be reduced substantiall y if the demand were there , because the processing is conducive to micro- processor techn iques. The cost could be reduced to about $2 ,000 in the fu tur e , which would not be burdensome . As for equi pmen t reliab il ity, i t is qui te hi gh , e s p e c i a l ly if good commercial practices are followed. Based on these considera t ions , availa bilit y is estimated at 95%. d. Presen t State of Development - Equipment is a v a i l a b l e off the shelf , bu t more work needs to be done in signal processing of acous tic echoes to achieve low false alarm rates. e. Es timate of Cost Vessel Owners Purchase Cos ts: $~~,O00 - $10 ,000 at present $1 , 500 - $2 ,500 pro~ ccted . 5- 61 _ _ _ _ — — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~- w r ~ ’- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - — - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I n s t a l l a t i o n Costs: None - use present i n s t a l l a t i o n . Gove rnment - Development costs , estimated at $1 ,000 ,000. f. Coast Guard Actions Required 1. Establish minimum equi pment specif ications. . Require the use of such systems by approximately 1983. 3. Minima l development is required - generating the market should provide adequate impetus for company-funded development. g. E s t i m a t e of E f f e c t i v e n e s s - The potential effectiveness is 32 % , or 9% above the baseline system . 5 .2 . 14 Scanning Sounder a. Sy stem Description - The scanning soundei’ is a d e v i c e which allows an area on the ocean floor forward and abeam of the vessel to be mapped out ( r e f e r to Fi gure S . - 7 ) . I d e a l l y a device such as t h i s would provide depth info rmation out to about 0.5 - I nile ahead , and a thousand feet or so to each side, Thus , coupled with an alarm , such a system would incorporate the capabilities of th e prev iou s sys tem (dep th aler t) and add iti onally would prov ide an i n d i c a t i o n of the presence of reefs being s k i r t e d b y the vessel. Scanning sonars are avai lable commercially; they are mounted on the forward part of the hull and protrude down into the w a t e r . When they are switched off , the h o i s t sy s t e m r e t ra c t s the tra it s- ducer into the h u l l . This feature enables a 360 degree scan c a p a b i l i t y . They are used p r i m a r i l y for l o c a t i n g schools of f i s h , hut they also show the d i s t a n c e from channel banks. SLde-sc anning sonars can also he used to detect reefs to the side , and to p o s i t i o n the vessel within channel banks . Th e di spl a y typical 1~’ look s like a radar scope , hut requires some In terpretation. Depending on the tilt of the transducer , the echoes pain t out different picture s . Fur thermore , the depth 5-62 _ _ - —--~~~~--- ~----— . -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ : .~~~_ , — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .-- - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - ~~~~~~~~ ~~ DEPTU SOIINI 1ER _ _ _ _ _ _ A LARM I PROCESS OR SCA NN E R PPI 1)ISP1.AY ELECTRONICS 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ Oo oO CONFRO1. PAN t ! SHIP’ S GYR O S _ _ ~1 ~~l I ‘ ~~ I HO I ST AND SC AN N ER HULL TRANSDUCER ~~~ F I GURE 5— . SCANN I ~~ 5-63 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ - ‘ — - ~~~-. - ~~‘ 1- of the surface causing the echoes varies with range. The tilt of the transd ucer can b e adjus ted , which is a valuable feature , but f ur ther compl ica tes it s usa ge . Installation and maintenance of the transducer/hoist combina- tio n would be expens ive , since they would require dry-docking . b . Training/Workload Implications - This instrument is even more complicated than a radar to use effectively, because of the dependence of the echo depth on the tilt angle. To achieve a reason abl e aler t sys tem , a processor must input tilt angle into a computation . It would take a considerable amount of training. The workload is likewise high when the instrument is being used. Tha t is , wh ile it would not normally be used at all (except as a de pth aler t) , it would require the watchstander ’s ded ica ted a t t e n t i o n when it was in use. c. Es timate of Ava ilab ili ty - The cos t is h igh enoug h that only large vessels could afford the equipment; it is estimated to be $14 ,000 - $24 , 000 for a system with an alert feature. This cuts the a v a i l a b i l i t y as a system to 32% , if only large tankers are affec ted. Th e fac t tha t drydock ing is necessary for repa irs means tha t when a breakdown invo lving the hoist or transducer occurs , a con- s iderable per iod of time can elapse before the equ ipmen t is on li ne again. It is d i f f i c u l t to place a sol id number on th is , but the a v a i l a b i l i t y w ill probably no t exceed 80% under these cond iti ons. Therefore , availabili ty is estimated to be 80% of 32% , or 26%. d. Present State of Development - Side-looking sonars and scann ing sonars are available off the shelf , altho ugh from only a few vendors. To add an alert feature requires the development of a processor to accoun t for range , t il t angle , and azimu th an g le. 5-64 ~ ~~~~ I Liiir— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . .,j.’—,- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ - — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ e. Estimate of Cost Ve ss el Owner Purchase Cost (basic unit): $12 ,000 - 20 ,000 Additional Cost (processor): 2 ,000 - 4,000 To ta l $14 ,000 - 24 ,000 I n s t a l l a t i o n Cost: Very high , due to necessit y for drydocking . Maintenance Cost: Very high , due to necessit y for drydocking . Government - 1)evelopment costs for signal processing techniques. This is e s t i m a t e d to be $1 ,500 ,000. f. Coast Guard A c t i o n s Requ ir ed I . Establish minimum equi pment specifications. 2. Require such equipment on board large t a n k e r s ( e . g . greater than 10 ,000 gross tons). g. Estimate of Effectiveness - In order to properl y e v a l u a t e t h i s sy s t e m , i t is necessar y to e l i m i n a t e the cases from cons ider a - t i o n wherein the operational feature -of depth-mapping with alert achieved a score by virtue of its forward-looking capability. In doing t h i s , the depth a l e r t f e a t u re was r e t a i n e d . Under these condi t ions , there were 11 cases id ent I fied where the side-scanning capability of a scanning sonar would have helped. Seven involved skirting too close to known reefs , three involved drifting sidewa ys into reefs while awa it I ng a pilot , and t h e o t h e r in Ived anchoring in an area of reefs . Adding these to the depth a l e r t cases , the p o t e n t i a l effectiveness for groundings is estimated at 49% , and 39% overall; this is 16% higher than the baseline system. 5.2 .15 C ol lis ion Avoidance Aids a. System Descrjj~t i ~~_ - The term “Collision Avoi d ance Aid” I s used to denote what is normal I v c a l l e d a ‘‘Co lii s ion -\vo i dance Sys t em ,” in order to emp hasize the fact that such an i n s t r u m e n t does no t prevent c o l l i s i o n s direct l y , but rather aids the conning 5 -65 _ _ _ _ _ _ - ~~~~~~~~~~ -- ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ -- — -~~ z.’___ •_ ~~~ _ ’ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ officer in his decision-makin g in a conflict situation involving one or more other ships. A coll i s ion avoida nce aid processes the raw radar signals , iden tifies cer ta in r adar echoes as tar gets , and tracks their posi- tions ; i t also projec ts the fu ture posi tion of each radar targe t and cal culates the CPA (closest point of approach) and TCPA (time to CPA) for each one (refer to Figure 5-8). The projected positions are calculated based on strai ght-line extensions of the ob serv ed course; if the targe t vessel changes course , the projec- tions will be incorrect , and a pe ri od of time w i ll elap se af ter the maneuver has been completed (10-60 seconds) before the projec- tions are correct again. The CPA (which is displayed di gitally on some equ ipmen t) prov ides a mea sure of the dan ger of the confl i c t , e.g. , a CPA of less th an 0.5 mi le s is a ser ious s itu a ti on for a tanker in open waters. The projected tracks also indicate the type of passing, i.e., whether the other ship will pas s as tern or across the bow . This information is also helpful in establishing wh ich rules of the road apply to the situati on. The TCPA provides a measure of the time available for deci- s ions , and whether the situation is “in extremis. ” If several m inu tes are ava i lab le ti mely ac ti on can increase the CPA and reduce the danger. The new Rules of the Road (U.S. Coast Guard , 19 77 ) allow t imely acti on to be taken by the privileged vessel before an “in extremis ” situation has developed without implying blame on the part of the privileged vessel. * A coll ision avoid- ance aid provides a be tter , quantitative measure of the appropriate time of action through the TCPA calculations . Early ac tion is desirable , bu t of it self do es no t guaran tee effec tive action . This is evidenced by the five meeting , or end - on collisions in the data base. The classic end-on situation is one where one vessel assesses the situation as a no-conflict , star- board- to-starboard passing , and ei ther main tains course , or turns A prior to the recent changes , a vessel lost her privileged status if she maneuv ered prior to being “in extremis. ” 5-66 —— ~ _~ _ 1~ -_ — -- -- ,,-. - — ,_—_- --- ,.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -— ,—, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - --~~ ~ ;— _~~_;‘~ _ - _ _ -~~~ .- - --, ~~~ ‘-‘•,~ ,-,-- ,i — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ RA~~~~ $PIJ ALARM VIDEO SY NC h C/A PP 1 ALARM AND 1)15 p LAY PROCESSOR CONTRO l, C/ A VIDE o DWFECT I ON , PROCESSOR TRACKING FIGURE S— 8 . CO LL IS iON AV O IDANC E AID — — - - . - ~~ - TT ~ - - - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _______ to port slightly to further increase the passing distance; the other vessel judges the situation as a conflict , and maneuv er s to starboard to effect a port-to-port passing. Thus they turn toward each ot her ’s path , each making further adjustments in the same d irection as before . Several authors have commented on this (Kemp , 1973; Barratt , 1976; Cockroft , 1976; and Devanney , 1978). A colli- sion avoidance aid helps to make a proper initial assessment based on the initial CPA , and also h e l p s i d e n t i f y the nature of the respective maneuvers as the scenario unfolds. Watc hstanders on bo th vessels having only radar would see a graduall y opening hea r- ing on the o ther ves sel , which they are trained to interpret as a n o n c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n (if both ships are maintaining their courses , a graduall y opening hearing does mean a no-conflict situation ) . Only 7 of 17 c ollisions (41%) in the data base were in the end- on presentation . The reason why the percen tage is lower than th e perc entage observed in other studies is attributed to the existence of traffic lanes at major U.S. ports. Two of these collisions occurred in the Straits of Juan de Fuca prior to the establishment of traffic lanes. Studies and s i m u l a t i o n s performed by the U.S. Maritime Admin- i stration (Pollack , 1 977) indicate that collision avoidance aids can be effective in reducing collisions . The s i m u l a t i o n s compared visual , radar , and colli sion avoidance-aided situations. It was found that effective evasive action was taken earlier with col li - sion avoidance equipment than with visual si ghtings of the other vessels involved . Wi t h radar , on the o t her hand , evasive a c t i o n ac t u a l l y to ok place la t er t ha n i t did v i s u a l l y . This was a t t r i b u t e d to the fac t tha t maneuvering chan ges th e r a d a r p i c t u r e so r a d i c a l l that it is difficult to assess the new situation; also , any p lots are in t e r r u p t e d . A p p a r e n t l y , the t endency wi t h radar is to wai t a s long as possible before c o m m i t t i n g oneself to a course of a c t i o n . The early ac ti on w it h coll i s i on avo i dance equ i pmen t wa s reflec ted i n larger CPA’ s , which demonstrated the additional safet margins. Ac tually , collision avoidance aid advoca tes claim that the equip- I ment merely provides an early assessm ent of a conflict situation ; that it buys 3-5 minutes of valuable time ; it also reassesses the - 5-68 — -‘—-~‘ ~~~~~ -~~~~-.-.- ,-~~--,-‘-- - -- ‘— —- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -——.- - -. - ~~~~~~~~~ - - 1IU~ si tuation to assure that the early action is effective . Trial maneuvers can be postula ted and evaluated. Some equipments project fu ture positions by 1-minute line segments on a true motion dis- play - trial maneuvers can be entered and the resulting radar pic ture will be shown as it would occur. Other equipments show PADs (Projec ted Areas of Danger) , which are ellipses on t h e radar screen , to be avoided (the size of the ell ipse is de term ined by selec t ing the desired minimum CPA) ; safe maneuvers are found by inspection to be those which avoid the PADs of other ships. C o l l i s i o n avoidance equipment is discussed in more d e t a i l in company brochures and in the l i t e r a t u r e (M erz and Karmarka s , 1976; Luse , 1972 ; Wylie , 1970; Pollack , 1976) . One fea ture tha t would have been crucial in the da t a base casual t ies was au toma t ic acquisi t ion . In four rammings and in H five collisions , the oil p l a t f o r m or vessels were not detected by H at least one vessel until too late. In several collisions , each — vessel had no ted the exis tence of the other bu t didn ’t maintain radar plots , making it doubtful that the mar iners would have bo thered to manually acquire targets. Au tomatic alarms are likewise crucial. Collision avoidance equipments have tr ue mot ion display c a p a b i l i t y , and show f ixed targets as stationary. To sum up the characteristics of a good collision avoidance aid: i t should have automatic acquisition of targets , an alarm that sounds if the projected CPA of a target vessel is less than about 0.5 miles (adjustable), and a true motion capability that show s oil pla t forms , buoy s , and anchored ve ssels as being station- ary . These as sumptions are used to evaluate a collision avoidance aid as a candida te sys t em in para graph (g). h. T r ai ni t - g /Workload Implications - With automatic acquisi- t ion , the largest workload factor is removed . It is noteworthy that for usage inland and close to the coast , where land echoes predomina te , manual ac q ui s i t ion may be necessary to keep t hem from sa turating the sy stem. However , for ocean usage , au tomatic acqui- si t ion is important. Even with this feature , the training w i ll 5-69 —. — — UI~ L ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ “~~~ —~I~~~w~~~~~~.- — — ii. take 1-2 days. Once learned , the controls are fairl y obvious , and are geared toward a mariner ’s thinking processes , so tha t i t prob- ab ly doesn ’t require re training , the way radar usage might . The workload is moderate , but the system ’s greatest u t i l i t y would be in limi ted visibility and a t nigh t , condi ti ons where the radar is in frequen t u se anyway. c. E s t i m a t e of A v a i l a b i l i t y - Coll isio n avoidance aids do not require cooperative equipment the way an interrogator/trans- ponder sy st em would , but s u f f e r from the same cost problem. They are even more expensive than interrogator/transponder systems and thus could not reasonably be required as standard equipment on tugs or small tankers . Assuming that only tankers of 10 ,000 gross tons or more would be required to have much equipment , the a v a i l a b i l i t y w i l l be abou t 22% for c o l l i s i o n s (see Appendix I , Table l - 7 a ) . It would not hel p s m a l l tankers and tug-barge c o m b i n a t i o n s avoid each o t her. I t would , how ever , be eff ective for rammings , whereas a transponder-type system would not . The avai lability for rammin gs would be the f r a c t i o n of tank vessels on the water t h a t are g re a t e r than 10 ,000 gross tons ; this is estimated at 32% from Section 5.4 . - & Reliability is very good - primaril y limited by the availabilit y of the radar , taken here to h e 80 % for each radar , or 96% for a dual radar installation. Availability is thus 96%x22%= 21% for collisions , - ~ and 32 % for ram m ing s . d. Pres ent State of Development - A v a i l a b l e off the shelf. However , some units do not have automatic acquisition. e. Es timate of Cost Vessel Owners Purchase costs: $7 5,000 - $150 ,000 Average : $ 100 ,000 Ins tallation costs: Low to moderate. Government - None . f. Cost Guard Actions Required 1. Establish minimum equi pmen t s t andards for c o l l i s i o n avoidance equipment. 5-7 0 r - — - - - ~~~~~~~~~-: ~~~~~~~ •~~J~1-~~ -‘ •4•_ ~~~~~~~~ —~~~~ r~~’C “WT I a f l fl -_ .w. — — — — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ — 2 . Require colli sion avoidance equipment on all tankers of 10 ,000 gross tons or more. The 1978 Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention Conference deferred ac tion on collision avoidance aids (CAAs). instead it reques ted tha t IMCO “... develop performance standards for collision avoidance aid s a s a ma tt er of urgency and no t l at er t ha n Jul y 1 , 1979. ” The Conference fur t her req ues t ed LMC O to prepare require- me nt s for the carriage of CAA s and to develop a t r a i n i n g program for ins t ruc t ion in the use of the a id s . In view of the responses to t he no t ice of proposed rul emaking concer n in g CAAs and action of the Conference , on 24 July 1978 the Coast Guard withdrew the pro- llosal concern ing CAAs. The need for U.S . rulemaking will he reeval- ua t ed wh en IMCO ha s comple t ed i t s work . g. Es timate of Effectiveness - If all vessels were equip ped with collision avoidance aids , the fea tur e would have helped i n 1 4 of 17 c o l l i s i o n s , and 4 of 6 r ammings . The potential effectiveness numbers are 63% for collisions and 65% for rammings . The overall p otential effectiveness is estimated at 37% , or 14% above the base- line sys tem . 5.2.16 Radar Perime t er De tection Device a. Sy st em Descr ip t ion - This system is an a d j u n c t to a standard shi phorne rad ar. it is desi gned to be a low-cost , limited capability, collision-avoidance aid. It is based on the concept of guard zones: if a radar target appears with in a guard zone , an alar m sound s , alert ing the vessel watch officer of the presence of an echo (refer to Figure 5-9). This discussion w i l l assume the e x i s t e n c e of an outer and an inner guard zone , ind ependentl y defined , and each bein g adjustable within reasonable limits . Wh i le a z i m u t h limits can be set in some embod iments of the device , it w i l l he assumed here t h a t the guard zone is a c i r c l e w i t h an adju stable outer limit. Typical range limits would be 1-2 miles for the i nn e r zone , and 5- m ile s for the outer; these can be adjusted to the situation: radar clutter , shi p speed , the pre se nce of land and buoy echo s , and traffic densit y , all may call 5-71 1: ,, - -. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ..=—~~~~~~r — - --.-- - ~---- — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — RADAR PPI RADAR RADAR A , RECEIVER PROCESSOR I EXISTING ALARM PERIMETER (~) DEVICE __________ PERIMETER I PROCESSOR I RANGE , AZ I SETTINGS FIGURE 5-9. RADAR PERIMETER DETE CTION DEVIC E 5-72 ‘ III -.,. —~~~~~~~~ —~ .- . - — - - — — - - - - -- - - - ~ _~~~~~; _ - -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - — _~~~~~~~~ W ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ‘ ~~ - ~ --- ~~ - - -- ..- • I - ~~ i•~~~ for a d j u st m e n t s for the s i t u a t i o n . With outer and inner s e t t i n g s , the sy s t e m incorporates the operational features of Sections 1.2.2 4 and 1. 2 .25 , bo t h in v o lv i ng a larms if echoes are de tec ted w it h i n a gi ven range . The cvs tern would operate in the f o l l o w i n g manner. The vessel watchstander would set the outer and inner limits to some initial value , e.g., 12 m i les and 2 ~ii ie s . If an al er t sou nded , indicating another vessel (or oil platform) in the area , he would read ju st the ou ter zone to about 4 mi leA , after estahi ishing the position of the vessel and the approximate course. If the vessel closed to w ithin 4 m i l e s , the a l e r t wou ld sound again. At this point the vessel watch o f f i c e r would reassess the s i t u a t i o n and might or m i ght not decide t o maneuver. In e i t h e r case the 2 mile warning would sound if t he o t her sh i p con ti nu ed to come too close. Another maneuver would he in order , as well as a readjustment of the inner zon e limited to one mile. At some point continuous watchstanding would he required to assess the situation. In prac t ic e t h ere are sev eral fac tors which reduce the e ffec- tiveness of the instrument (estimated q u a n t i t a t i v e l y under (c) - Av a ilabilit y ): 1. Rad a r c lu tte r can cause f a l s e a l ar m s and obscure t a r g e ts in roug h seas at c l o s e r a ng e . I f the radar gain adjust- ment is turned down to reduce the clutter , the target can he lost , p e r m a n e n t l y or i n t e r m i t t e n t l y . 2. Frequent attention is required to use it properly. Ga in a dj u s t m e n t s , and resett ing of guard l i m i t s must take P l ac e frequent lv t o strik e a favorable balance between false at arms and missed t a r g e t s . F a i l u r e e- reset a f t e r an encounter can cause a false sense of securit y . 3. Frequent false alarms can he i r r i t a t i n g . False aLi t-ms are caused hr clutter from wa v es , huovs , and land echoes. If t he vessel is oper at ing clo se to land , the d e v i c e loses u t i l i t y , because the range limits must he set for values so low that poten- tial conflict situations can he missed . 4. It is of no v a l u e when the ra dar is down . I _ s-~ 3 . 1 _ - ~H: .- - — — — — -~~~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ j~~~ X$~~ ~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~ —- --— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ h . Train ing/Workload Implications - An officer well-trained in radar w ill have little difficulty comprehending and using this devic e . Howeve r , it was evident from the casualtie s and from the fre q u en t lack of cer t i f i cat ion and lic ens i ng of o f f i c e r s t ha t t hi s i s frequently not the case . These people will he the first ones to turn the device off when false alarms begin to occur . The workload is modera te. The actual setting ad justments are not time-consuming or difficult , but the device requires frequent attention. c. Estimate of Availability - The ava il ab il it y of the radar peri meter detection device is limited by the radar a v a i l a b i l i t y , clu tt er , ease of usage , and the percentage of vessels equip ped with the device. The radar a v a i l a b i l i t y is e s t i m a t e d at 80%. C l u t t e r can be a problem in roug h and moderate seas , which occurred in 25% of the collisions and rammings; since clutter would affect the inner zone more th an the ou te r zon e , the a v a i l a b i l i ty is e s t i m a t e d to he reduced by somewha t less than 25% , or 1 7%. The human fac tors were considered in deriving the pote ntial effectiveness , and so do no t appear as a separate factor. It is assumed that all small vessels and large non-tankers will have them , i.e., 78% of the vessels (see Appendix 1 , Tabl e 1-86). The overall avail abilit y is thus es timated to he: 80% x (100%-l7%) x 78% = 52% d. Presen t State of Development - These devices are avail- able o f f the shelf , hu t they are not s t a n d a r d i z e d . e. Estimate of Cost Ve ssel Owner Purchase Cost: $2 ,000 - $3 ,000 Ins tall a tion Cost: Low - must be mated to the r a d a r . Government - None . 1. Coast Guard Action Required 1. E s t a b l i s h minimum equipment s p e c i f ic a t i o n s . 2 . Re q uir e all ve ssels to have ei ther t his sys t em or a coll isi on av oi dance a i d . 5-74 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — —~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~ ~~— ~~~~~~ ~~— ~~~ —~~- — _ _ _ _ _ g. E s t i m a t e of E f f e c t i v e n e s s - The p o t en t i a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s is estimated at 45% for c o l l i s i o n s and rammings. Ove ra l l , the potential effectiveness is estimated to be 32% , or 9% above the baseline . 5.2 .17 VHF/Transponde r System a. System Description - This concept was developed at TSC to provide an inexpensive a l t e r n a t i v e to the transponder system of Section 5.2.18 , one which tugs and small tankers could afford. Its chief advantage o p e r a t i o n a l ir is that it facilitates brid ge- to- brid ge contact w i t h a selected radar t a r g e t . When a new vess el appears within 5-7 miles of own s h i p , a bell aler ts the br idge o f f i c ers ~refer to Fi gure 5-10). The hell is activated by a short VHF data transmission sent out every S-i t ) minutes from the new ve ssel , providing her identification code , e . g . , the VI lE call si gn. Ry this time the vessel’ s radar return should show up as a target. A small displa y would contain the ID code . If the watchstander wanted to identify that vessel on the radar , the press of a button beside the display (mounted close to the radar) would result in a RACON-type trail extending from the rad ar targe t ou tward toward s the rim of the d isplay , thus identif y- ing the correct radar blip. The connin g officer could then selec- tive lv call the other shi p ’s master on channel 13 (again by press- ing a button) to coordinate the pass ing, i f it appeared there was a problem . As a valuable option , th e equ ipmen t could be conf igured w it h a set of “tura si gnal s” to indicate when course changes are imm i - nent; the next V IlE transmission , wh ich would immediatel y follow the “turn signal ’’ activation , would contain the maneuver i n t e n t . The radar tag would he c aused by an X- ha nd radar t r anspond er having performanc e pa rame ter s si m i lar to a RACON (Henr y . 1 9 3) . The t ransponder would he off , except when VHF transmissions occurred , or wh en a radar tag was requested by the other shi p ’s interrogat ion . When one of t hese cond i t ions occurred , the t r an s - ponder would be enabled for about three seconds , long enough t h at - - -.. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~-z~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ - _,_; —- VHF ANTENNA RADIO VHF TELEPHONE RECEIVER VHF SWITCH - _ _ _ _ _ EXISTING TRANSMITTER — _ _ _ _ _ VHF /TRANSPONDER .4 ALARM ii] DECODER I ‘-~~~‘° _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ PROCESSOR J-.uui “{SHIP ID :1 j ENCODER ‘ ~~~~ ENA 8LE~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ EUVER ~~~~I x- BAND _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ TRANSPONDER FIGURE 5-1 0. VHF/TRANSPONDER SYSTEM 5-76 — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — - ~~~~~ - ~~~-- ~ -- —- ~~ ~ — - - ~~~ - -.- - —-— ~ -- ~~~~~~~ — - . - ~ .—--- ~ ----- - --_- -- ~~~ ---- -- - ------ ~~~~~~~~~~ the most slowly rotating radar antenna would point at the trans- — ponde r shi p once durin g a rotation. (This feature keeps down in t erferenc e .) There are severa l possible embodimen ts of t h e display: 1. A screen could simultaneously display the ll)’s of all the vessels heard from in the last 20 minutes (plus maneuver intent , length of time elapsed since first acquired , and time elapsed since last transmission ). 2. A simple displa y could flash one ID at a time with a provision for circulating through the ID’ s i n memory. 3. The simple displa y above plus a printer could provide a hard c opy of the vessel codes. The sy stem as conceived here does not prov ide the course and speed of the other vessel , althoug h th is could he p rov ided i f vesselmasters found it useful - it would appear as a number dis - play (e.g., “WEX5043 MC 15 @ 230” would mean that the shi p w i t h VHF call sign WEX5043 plans to Maintain Course at 15 knots on a heading of 2300). The transponder is simpler than that of the i n t e r r o g a t o r/ t r a n s - ponder system to be described in Section 5.2.18 , since there i s no data transmitted at X-hand , only a fixed , hardw ired format. The transponder transmission is swept in fre q uency so tha t regardless of the frequency drift of the other ship ’ s radar • a r e p l y is r e ceived , looking like a series of bars on the radar face directly beyond the radar b l i p of the transponder shi p. This service is provided to any ship wi t h a rad a r , withou t the need for an~ - additional equipm ent. The ~;y stem incorporat es the operational features of an alert of a new vessel at S miles (Section 1.2 .241, abilit y to obtain immediate contact with a selected vessel (Section 1.2 .28) , and abil itv t o o b t a i n maneuvering i n t e n t . Once such a syst em had b een successfull y tested and used , the admonition to use the radio- telep hone could he strengthened. Future training would incorporate this means of establishing contact with other ships . 5- - - -~i._~~.- _ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘l’he system has several advantages. One is t h a t tugs and small tankers could a f f o r d the full capahi Ii t v (estimated at $4 , 000) . One of the drawbacks of collision avoidance systems cite d in the ORI report (ORI , 1975) was t h a t most of the time the fault in a large/ medium ship c o l l i s i o n was due to the lack of t h r e a t assessment by the smaller , unequipped v e s s e l . The VHF s y s t e m would make the same i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e to the smaller vessel by immediate r a d i o t e l e - phone contact. The l i m i t a t i o n s of the system are p r i m a r i l y in the areas of c a p a c i t Y and frequency allocation . Th e VH F transmissions of 11) and man euver i n t e n t are expected to be v ery s h o r t : about hO b i t s o f da ta a re requ i I’~~.I , which would take 0. 2 seco n ds a t 300 BAUD (low data rate) or 0.05 seconds at 1200 BAUD ( h i g h data r a t e ) . The c a p a c i t y of the VILE channel is virtuall y unlimited (t h e o r e t - — i ca ll v ahout 1500 v e s s e l s at the low d a t a rate). At X-hand , if transpond ers we r e en a b led about every f i v e m i n u t e s for t h r e e seconds , i n t e r t er ence could become a problem with more than 10 (1 ships nearby , because then the prohabil ity o f ha~’ ing two trans - ponder repi ies on the radar screen would be hi gh , and confusion of I D would occur. Ho wev er , this is still a comfortably large number. The practical capacity is limited , rather , by the numher of VHF codes that can he comfortably handled at once by the watchstander; 10 is a reasonable estimate , but this would need to he established by testing. The other limitation is the problem that exists wi th any r a d i o communication requirement: the fact that bridge officers of differ- ent nationalities with different native languages many time s have to speak slowly a nd careful 1~ - choose their words in order to he clearl y under stood . This problem is ma gnified when two ships are approach- ing a hazardous passing situation . Furthermore the respective off icers are under pressure and may not wish to reveal this to the world b y use of the radio. Perhaps a set of IS-20 standardi:ed statements could he issued with each unit , wh ich would cover mos t s i t u a t i o n s and overcome this limitation. S - 8 - , - - - ~~~~~~~~~~~ - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ,~ •~~ -‘-. ~---,-- — ~~~~~~~~~ ‘~~~-~~~~~~~~~~‘~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ••~~~~,-I~ _--.~ -p•~~~ ’ — -- -t - - ~ There are severa l opt ions in the method of sending the coded I D. Th e coded s i gn a l s could be superimposed on the VHF c h a n n e l in use , u su a l l y channel 13. If tones in the a u d i b l e range were used , the coded transmi ss ions would be heard as a short “bleep. ” If t h is proved irritating, suha udi hle (i.e. frequencies below the audible r ang e) could he used , hut at a data rate of about 60 BAUD , so that eac h transmission would he about one second long. h. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - The system is somewhat more complicated to use than a vul rod i ote I ephone , but is quite s i m p l e compared to the i n t e r r o g a t o r / t r a n s p o n d e r sy s t e m , w h i c h x .equi yes sett i ng ~ inge and angl e sector i i in it s a round a spec if ic target. h ere the wa tchs t ande r presses a b u t t oii to get a r a d ar t ~~ on a g iven code t h a t i 5 present on t h e d i s p l a y The workload is mm irna I : the instrument is on lv used when needed. The des i red in format ion would he tvp i ca l lv obt :i i ned within hal I a minute. Si gnalling intent ions (Ma i lit a in Course , Port Turn , Sta rhoard l’urn , Rei-ersc Eng ines , Slow Speed , Inc re:i se Speed ) would requ I re some effort and get t i n g u sed to , hut i s s imp Ic to do. ( I I no i n t e n t ions were s I gna l i e d , there would be a blank in the oth er shi p ’ s di sp I av — th i s a v o i d s ace i denta 11 y si g n a l l i n g the .Lmg i n t e n t i o n s . ) c . Hs tim o t e oI A v a i 1 a b i f l t~ — The ova i toh i lit v ol the tran s ponder repl ie .~ on the radar won id be I in i ted pr i mar i lv hr the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the radar itself. The VHF s e r v i c e , w h i c h pr o\ - ides a I er t s ot new vessels , I I) codes , and m a n e u v e r i n g i n t e n t s • wo u l d s t i l l he a~ a I l ab Ii ’ in the event of a radar ía i lure. The ove ra II ava i lab i 1 I tv of the VIl E s e r v i c e Is expected to be comparabl e to a good VHF se t , or abo ut 9S~ The cost is low enough that a ll ve ssels and tugs p u l l i n g barges of I hOO ( T or more could reo soiiah lv be requ i red to have t h iis e q u i p m e n t . Based on the above cons ide rat ions , the overall ova H oh i i i t ~ is est i m ated to be 90% . Tb is is l~ I gher than radar , icli i ch I s I ims t i - f I ed because of t he important commun I cat I on se rv ices per formed by the VI lE t ransm i ss ion , ev en when the rad ,l r is down . S - 79 - - --~~~~~~ - - - - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ v—- ~~~ - ~~~~~-r-~ -, d. Presen t State of Development - Conceptual only. However , transponder requirements are similar to the requirements of RACONs , which are presen tly available commercially. Dig ital callin g units l ike SELCAL (U.S. Maritime Administration , 1973) have been demon- strated. Thus the technology required for such a system is avail- able now , and poses little risk. The system parameters should he op tim ized , however , by field testing of an engineering model. e. Estimate of Cost Vessel Owner - Purchase Cost of a VHF/Tran sponder sy stem is estimated to be between $4 ,000 - $7 ,000. The I)rice would be increased by about $600 in radar modifications if IMCO would not all ow transpond ers to use the normal radar ba nd , and limited the frequency to a fixed band such as 9480-9500 NIl:. If a ded icated separ ate channel were requi red in the VHF ba nd , another $200 - $ 600 would probably be required. For costing purposes , $5 ,500 i s assumed . I n s t a l l a t i o n Costs - Installation costs are expected to be low to moderate - bridge installation is prim aril y involved , but a microwave omni antenna must be installed . Governmen t Costs - Development Costs , estimated at $1 ,000 ,000. f. Coas t Guard Actions Required 1. Establi~~ frequenc ies and modulation suhfrequencie s to be used by the equipment . Obtain FCC and IMCO approval and work toward an in te rna t ion a l standard . 2. Establish minimum equipment standards. 3. Outfit Coast Guard aircraft and cutters with this equi pmen t to aid in Search and Rescue , Enforcemen t of Laws and Trea ti es , and Mar ine Environmental Protection missions. g. Es tima te of Effec ti veness - The sys tem inc orpora tes the opera tional features of a 5-mile alert (Section 1 .2.24), a b i l i t y to obtain immediate radio contact (Section 1.2.28), and maneuver intent (Section 1.2.29) . The potential effectiveness is estimated at 56% for collisions , based on the casual ties in the da ta ba se , or 49% above the baseline system. If maneuvering intent were not 5-80 - .•___*~~_. ~~~~1~~~~ .— ..— - . —— W ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ P- .’. - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — —— —- — ~~~~ i:’-~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ -~~ i ncluded ( i . e. , no “turn si gnal s” on b o a r d ) , the I)Otentia l effec- tiveness would he reduced to about 50%. The operational feature of “incent ive to communicate ” (Section 1.2.30) was postulated to find how of ten bridge-to-bridge communication would have helped . If this were inc luded , the po ten ti al effec ti ve ness would he 69%. Thu s , the VIL E/trans p onder system would provide 56% of a possibl e 69% , consider- ing only collisions . It also means that as the radiotelephone is use~I more frequently to coordinate pas sings , the effectiveness of th e system would approach the hi gher number. The overall effective- ness is estimated at 34% , or 11% above the baseline system. S. 2. 18 lnterroj~ator/Transponder System a. System I)escription — An interrogator/transponder system p1~oV ides a clutter— free radar— type di sp I av of any v e s sel in the area which are transponder-equipped , complete with ident I tv ing code s wh ic h can be d isplayed a nd us ed to help estah l i sh verbal rod iot e lephone contact (re icr to El gure S - 11) . I t a lso a I lo w s the vessel wat c h s t an d cr to s e l e c t a t a r g e t (by d e f i n i n g a sector seg- ment ) and i n t e r r o g a t e the vessel to ask her intended maneuv ers It thus incorporat es the operational features o f dependable a l l — weather returns (Sect ion I . 2 . 2 1 ) , oh 11 it v to obta in m mcd iate con- tact w ith a selected vessel (Sect ion I . 2. 28 ) and m a n e u v er i n g i n t e n t (Sect ion I . 2 . 29) , and can he cas II v mod i f l e d to provide alarms i I s h i p s appear within a set range (Section s 1 . 2 . 2 4 and 1.2 .2S). The U.S. Mar it ime Admn in 1 s t r ot ion has deve loped such a svst em , cal led MR I T (Marine Radar Interrogator—Transponder ) . it is des- c r i bed i n several p u b l i c a t i o n s , two of which are referenced hem - c (Mathews , et al , 197h , and Fee , et al , 197O1 The sy stem works simi I a r l v to a radar. When the operator wishes to obtain i n f o r m a t i o n on a vessel , lie selects the all - c a l I mode. The interrogator transmitter then sends a coded p u l s e stream , slight i in advance of the ma in radar puls e , into the rad ar a n t en n a . When the radar a n t e n n a ma in beam is point i ng at a transponder—equipped vesse 1 , the t rans p onder receives the pul se stream and replies with its own pulsed data stream , i ncluding th e 5- 81 fl - —.~~. ~~--- --~~~ i i ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :1~~ ” j —~~— I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • _ I i I i u criu ~~ I \ \~ \I1 I l I R I P IXI __________________________ I’RO~ I ~~~~ ( I I I \ i R 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ El GURE S - II . I NTERR OGATOR/TRANSPONI)I:R S\’STEM - ‘ 5-82 ~~ - - , - ~~~~- - , - -— - -----“ — - —. ~ .--.-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 2 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - _U•II •~u~~~ ship ’s ID. Other ship dat a such as course , speed , siz e of vessel , draft , etc. can also he sent if the interrogator transmits the proper code. Maneuver in tent can b e learn ed by interrogating with a third code which alerts the interrogated vessel that a reply is desired . Th e in terr oga te d ves selmas te r replies h pushin g an appropri ate button which si gnals his intentions . The 11) code received can he used by the watchstand er to a t t r a c t the a t t e n t i o n of h i s counterpart on a selected vessel , by calling on VHF for a reply from the vessel with that code. The transponder replies paint a bri ght echo on the radar- scope , super imposed on the norma l radar echo. The MR I T embodiment of t h i s type of system is manual in several respects: 1. Target acquisition is manual. 2. Target track is manual , and ceases when the watch- stander stops tracking. 3. Target selection involves setting switches. These limitations are not inherent in the technique , hut in the part i c ul a r confi g u r a t i o n emp loyed . In t h i s case care was taken to severely l i m i t the number of i n t e r r o g a t i o n s and r e p l i e s in order to keep i n t e r f e r e n c e between u n i t s at a low level. These f u n c t i o n s could he automated with no worsening of s y s t e m i n t e r - ference. In so doing, it would he relatively simple to add alerts i n d i c a t i n g tha t a vessel has conic within a preselected di stance of own ship. This requires additional di g i t a l c i r c u i t r y to store ship 11)’ s and other data and software to contro l interrogat ions In its automated configuration , occasional (e.g., once every five minutes) interrogations would detect new vessels. Once acqui red the would be t racked 1w more frequent , discrete address interrogations , (e.g. once per minute ). II a vessel came within abo ut five miles , an a lert would sound . If a vessel came within about one nil le , a warn i tig WOll Id sound . At any time the operator could learn the intent ions of a specific transponder-equipped v esse l hr selec t lug t h e part icu lar to r get sector segment on the radar display and press ing an a p p r o p r i a t e h ut t on . 5-83 ——~~~~ - - --—- - -~~~~ — — - - :—r ~~~~~~~” — ~~~ - ..~ - . ~~ -. . , - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ‘“ ~~~~ b. Trainin g/Workload Implications - This instrument would no t be as complica ted to use as a radar , but does requ ire some interaction and familiarity with the controls. It would be some- wha t easier to use than a collision avoidance instrument. W ithout the automatic features that are discussed in the sys tem d e scrip t ion above , it becomes more complica ted to use , and requires considerably more ac tion on the part of the watchstander. He mus t manually in terroga te wi th sec tor trans mis sions in the all- call mode , keep t rack of codes , and set switches when he wants more data. With the automatic features , new targets are acquired and tracked a u t o m a ti c a l l y . There is no need to set switches , nor is there the same opp or tuni ty to make mis takes. c. Es ti mate of Availab il ity - The equ ipm en t ava ilab ili ty i s roughly tha t of the r adar , especially of the magnetron transmitter , wh ich appears to be the single most failure-prone component. The equipmen t no t common to the radar is largely low power dig ital and IF cIrcui try , wh ich has good l ife time charac teris tics if good com- mercial manufac turing techni ques are used . Radar a v a i l a b i l it y is estimated at 96% for large tankers *, and 80% for other vessels. The bi ggest factor in the availability of this system is the fac t that transponders (at least) must be on board all vessels if the system is to work effectively. The cos t of a comple te in ter- ro gator-transponder system presently would be $30 ,000-$50 ,000 , which is prohibi tive on most vessels of less than 10 ,000 gross tons. Cer- tainly tugs and small tankers could not afford them. The alterna- tive is to require all vessels of 10 ,000 gross tons or more to have comple te sys tems , and require transponders on board all o ther com- mercial vessels. Transponders at X-band frequencies will cost $4 ,000-$8 ,000 , so that tugs and vessels of 1000 gross tons or more probably can afford i t , but would be d i f f i c u l t to j u s t i f y , because it provides protection only from larger , fully-equ i pped vessels. *Large tankers are assumed to have dual radars ; the probability of a t least one being available is thus 100% - 20% x 20% , or 96%. 5- 84 “- ~~~~~ -•~~~~~~ .: _,. — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~_ 7~ _ _ •’____ ’____ ____ _ ~~~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~ -— - - — - - r The ava ilabilit y assuming a working radar is shown in Table I- 8c to be 22%. Coupled with the radar availabili ty, the estimated availability is 18%. d. Present State of Development - The MRIT is at a proto- type stage. If the demand were there , un its could be produced within a year. The addition of the au toma tic fea tures would require a developmen t cycle of des ign , fabrica tion , test , and prototype fabrication . e. Estimate of Cost Vessel Owners - Purchase cos t of an au toma ted un it is estimated to be $30 ,000-$S0 ,000 , but wi th increased demand , the cos t could probably be closer to $l5 ,000- $25 ,000. An average f igure of $2 0,000 is assumed for costing purposes; the transponde r • is assumed to cost $5 ,000. I n s t a l l a t i o n costs would be moderate , because the omn i antenna would require mast installation , and radar would be modified. Governmen t - None . f. Coast Guard Action Required 1. Requ ire all sh ips of 10 ,000 gross tons or mo re to be equ ipped with a full interrogator-transponder system . 2. Require all ships of 1 ,000 gross tons or more , and all tugs pulling or pushing barges of 1 ,000 gross tons or more to be equi pped wi th transponders. 3. Establish minimum equipment specifications for com- ple te in te rroga tor- transponder sys tems , and for transponder-only equipmen t. g. Estimate of E f f e c t i v e n e s s - If all sh ip s were equ ipped wi th the full capabili ty, the potential effectiveness would be 64% for collisions and 3 5% overall , or 12 % above the ba selin e . 5- 85 - ~ -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~ - --—~~ -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - ~~~~~~~~~ •~~~~~~~~~‘ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ I . 5.3 LESS PROMISING SYSTEMS The following sys tems were not considered for detailed evalu- ation. In general , the sys tems were ei ther no t found to be effec- tive , or there were serious feasibility and implementation problems . These sys tems are~ a. Rev ised P.~les of the Road b. Charting of Restricted Zones c. Penal ty Sys tem for Opera ting w ith Malfunc tion ing Gear d. Mandatory Course Recorder e. Navi gation System with Accuracy Superior to LORAN-C f . MF Radiobeacon System g. Satellite Navi ga tion Sys tem h. Au top ilot System F i. Improved Depth Sounder j. Forward-Looking Sounder k. True-Mo tion Radar Display 1. LORAN-C Proximity Indicator m. Manual Mon itoring System 5.3.1 Revised Rules of the Road On the basis of the data base casualties no revisions in the Rules of the Road were identified as needed for reducing casualties. There were onl y two casualties in the data base that mi gh t have benefited from some revisions , and one of these probably would not have occurred unde r the 1972 COLREGS (see Section 1.2 .2) . The other involved a grounding by a ship which left the traffic lane to avoid a crossing vessel. While this situation warrants some at ten t ion , a sys tem of revised Rules of the Road does not appear needed. 5.3.2 Charting of Restricted Zones One sys tem that appeared to have merit in reducing groundings was a se t of demarcated zones of no entry to vessels , or a t leas t to vessels of a specified draft. However , very few s i t ua t ions were 5-8 6 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~ - ~~ ~~~ - ~~. ---~~~ - . ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -.‘—-•~~ - ‘ ~~~~~ encountered where such prohibited zones would have s i g n i f i c a n t l y discouraged a vessel mas ter from proceeding into danger. Further discussion is provided in Section 1.2 .3 . Therefore , char ting of res tr icted zones does no t appear to be a prom is ing sys tem . 5.3.3 Penalty Sys tem f or Opera ting wi th Malfunc tion ing Gear A sys tem for impos ing f ines and other penal ties to owners of vessels fo und to have inopera tive equ ipmen t could be developed. I t would involve increased Co ast Guard inspec tions , a ser ies of regulations and penalties , and condi tions for appr oach ing (or departing) port with known equi pmen t defects. It would be com- plicated to administer , pr imar i ly becau se.it is difficult to pol ice , and r equ ir es volun tary compl iance w it hout a tang ible • benef it to the vess el mas ters: e . g . , a vessel mas ter , requ ired by regulation to delay arrival in port until the following morning because of a radar outag e , would have a difficult time justifying such a delay to h is employer purely on the bas is tha t by so do ing - : he had reduced the r isk of a casual ty fro m “ex tremely unl ikely ” to “even more ex tremely unl ikely ”. Th is dilemma is resolved , at leas t par tia l l y , by shore-based sys tems . Th is is d iscuss ed fur ther in Section 7 .1. Due to the proble ms described above , and the relative ineffec- tiven ess of the opera ti onal fea tures in reduc ing casual ties (see Section 1.2.8), this system does not appear to be promising. 5 .3. 4 Mandatory Course Recorder The operat ional feature of a mandatory course recorder was not jud ged very effect ive in preventing casualties. For post-casualty analysi s , on the other hand , it can be useful . Several vessels in the data base had some form of course recorder on board. As a pre- ~rention device , it does no t appear promising. 5 .3.5 Navigation System Having Accuracy Superior to LORAN-C The gu idelines of the study excluded casualties occurring in narrow chann els less than 1000 feet wide (see Section 3.3). Narrow 5- 87 c ~~ eL~~ - -- - ~- — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ channels and inland wa terways are the areas where high precision nav igation systems are most valuable. For example , the St . Mary ’s River between Lake Superior and Lake Huron is equipped with a pre- c ision mini-chain of LORAN-C transmitters undergoing RDThE. Acous- tic systems employing coded sound transmission (e.g., Cobb , 1972 , and Damon , 1972) have been proposed for similar usage . In the offshore area , however , there does no t appear to be a strong need for accuracies better than the quarter-mile accuracy of the LORAN-C system . The probability of prevention of the asso- cia ted operational feature of improved position accuracy was only 2%. Prec ision navigation systems may prove to be justified for inland and nar row channel nav iga tion , but it is concluded that for general offshore nav igation such systems are not required. 5.3.6 MF Radiobeacon System The frequency band 285-325 kHz is allocated to the Maritime Radiobeacon Service. This service provides CW si gnals t r a n s m i t t e d from char ted points along the shore and on towers and lightships wh ich can be rec eived by a sh ip board direction-finding system (DF). Opera tion of the DF equipment yields a hearing of the station referenced to the ship ’s head ing. By obtaining two or more bear ing s to char ted sta tion s , and know in g the ve ssel head ing , sh ip pos ition can he calculated . The accuracy of each bearing measure- men t is 20~ 50, so th at posi tional accuracy a t 10 m ile s from shore i s about 1/2-1 mile. This is quite inferior to the baseline system accuracy of 1/4 m ile. I t can be used as a backup , but the serv ice is primarily intended for smaller vessels which may not have LORAN-C. Since i t offers no advantages in accuracy, coverage , or con- venience of usage over the baseline system , it will not be con- sidered further. - , - ~~~~~~~~ 5.3.7 Satelli te Navigation System Satellite navigation systems offer the advantages over terres- trial systems of improved accuracy and generally global coverage . Several such sys tems are described in Appendix H. In terms of the study , however , the advan tages of satellite systems do not appear to offer improvements over and above the base- Lin e system that would have prevented any of the accidents in the da ta base. The reg ion of concern in the study is from the coast to 200 NM , which w ill be adequately covered by the LORAN-C network. The promised higher accuracy of a s a t e l l i t e system is not an important factor except near shore , as evidenced by the relatively few cases where LORAN-C accuracy (1/4 mile) was not adequa te. Even i n those four cases , the probability that perfect accuracy would have preven ted the accident was estimated at 37% (see Section 1.2.10) . One excep tion to the conclusions stated above is the coverage tha t would be ob ta ined in Puer to Rico and the Virgi n Isla nds , where 16 groundings occurred . Assuming performance equivalent to the - ~ baseline sys tem , if all the tankers involved had on board satellite naviga tion receivers ~or if LORAN-C coverage were available), nine of these cases would have been affected , and the ca sual ti es would have been reduced by 22%. If improved p ilot transfer techniques were employed in Guayanilla and Tallaboa Bays in Puerto Rico six of these would have been avo ided leaving only three cases which would be affec ted by having working electronic navi gation gear on board . The attractiveness of global coverage has convinced a few shipowners to install satellite receivers (TRANSIT) on board large tankers and other large vessels. Used to correct long-term errors in the Omega system the hybrid provides adequate navigation service . Th is possibility is incorporated into the baseline system . It may well be that by 1990 a satellite system may he opera- tional which provides equivalent world-wide service at a user cost which is compe titive with present LORAN-C receivers . If this occurs , and if the effective operating costs to the government are 5-89 j ~ j ~ Ii ~i ~L j T ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘ ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ _ _ _ _ _ -- ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~- - ~~~~~~~w’ ~~~~~— ’ - — ~~~~ - ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ lower than maintaining the ground stations for LORAN-C , it would • evolve as a reasonable alternative . However , fo r the purpose of this stud y, the ques ti on is a narrower one : na mely , whe ther satellite navigation systems offer a sufficient advantage in effec tiveness over the baseline system to warrant replacing it. The curren t answer to this is in the negative . 5. 3.8 Au top i lo t Sys tem The autopilot s stem is an extension of the previous inte- grated navi gation system , wherein a si gnal proportional to the deviation from track is fed into a rudder control system. Kalman filtering techniques can be employed which minimize rudder wear and impr ove fuel ec onomy , accounting for the shi p ’s weight , trim , draft , and handling characteristics. Changes in course can he effec ted much more gradually than a helmsman could accomplish , savin g fuel and maintaining speed. However , while this system can be effective for economy purpo ses , there were no casualties in the data base that could be traced to helmsman errors. Therefore , there is no reason to believe that such an automated system would reduce collisions , rammings , or groundings , nor is there any reason to believe that a fully automatic sys tem , which would pilot the ship along a pre- scribed rou te ( techn ically fea sible) , would reduc e accidents. - ~ 5. 3.9 Improved Dep th Sounde r Due to the subjective nature of the evaluation of the opera- tional feature of improved depth detection (Section I .2 .li ) and the re sul ti ng low scores , this will not be evaluated as a separate system . Improvements in depth sounders are needed , how ev er , and are incorporated into the acoustic sounder systems of Sections 5.2.13 and 5.2.14. 5-90 - è L1~ - - - ~~~~ - ~~- - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ -- T~~~-~~~ —~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 5.3.10 Forward-Looking Sounder Sonars with this capability are presently available , but are used primaril y for special applications such as submarine detec- tion , charting of wrecks , location of fish , and on research vessels. Th e system operates s i m i l a r l y to a dep th sounder , but as con- c ei v ed here , may have some scanning capability . The transducer is moun ted f orward on the hull , allowing a narrow beam to be trans- mitted strai ght ahead . Echoes will be received from any object or from sudden rises in the ocean floor that appear in the beam . The rec eived echoes are timed to provide range , wh ile the direction of the beam prov ides the angle. A d isplay would provide range and an estimate of depth; the equi pment could be equipped with an alert which would sound if an object were detected within a preselected distance. By having a scan capabilit y , even a man ual on e, the watchstander could search lef t and r i ght to determine the extent of the object and help identif y the echo as a reef. This procedure could also identify o b s t a c l e - f r e e areas that could be safely navigated. The forward-looking sounder feature was thoug ht to provide useful data in 45 of 50 ground ings. Thus a device such as this could be v ery ben ef ic ial fo r prev en ting ground ings , if it could opera te succe ssful ly. However , there are ser ious technical diff icul ti es tha t mus t be addressed before th is techn ique could be ser iously con si dered . The ch ief problem is that of resolution as a function of range . Present equipment uses a beam typically 60~ l20 wide . At a range of one n auti cal m ile , the resolution is about 1 ,000 feet for a 9° beam. If this device were turned on in water depths less than about 500 feet , the beam would in ter sec t the ocean floor (and/ or the water surface , dependin g on the tilt of the beam) . The res ul t would be a clus ter of echoe s beg inn ing at about a half-mile range which would obsc ure echoes from any object at one mile. In most of the ground ings stud ied , the depths within a mile of ground- ing were generally less than 500 feet , and frequen tly less than 5-91 — ~~-. - - z : - r r ~~~~~ ~~ -~~~-~~- 100 fee t . In pr inc iple , the problem can be overcome using a narrow beam: a 0.60 bea m , for example , wo uld theore tically enable the detection of a rise in the ocean floor a mile ahead where the depth changed from 120 feet to 60 feet. This is the kind of per- formance that was assumed in the evaluation . If the range were reduced to a half-mile (which would be traversed in two minutes at 15 kno ts , or in six minutes at five knots), it would still require approximately a one-degree beamwidth. To achieve a desired beam- width , both the operating f requency and the physical size of the transducer must be considered. Typical operating f requenc ies fo r sonars are 30 kHz to 160 kHz ; the lower frequencies propagate through water with less attenuation than higher frequencies , but require larger apertures . At 30 kHz , a transducer about 10 feet in diame ter would be requi red , clearly an unreasonable requirement. Even at 160 kHz , a two-foot aperture is required , which is still unreasonably large. Whether higher frequencies could be employed has no t been assessed . In conclus ion , the serious technical uncertainties rule out this system from consideration as a recommended system. 5.3.11 True-Motion Radar Display It is pointed out in Section 1.2.22 that the ability to dis- tinguish moving targets from stationary or anchored targets was ide nti f ied as a d irec t fac tor in only one collis ion and in no rammings . It is concluded that requiring true-motion radars would not , by itself , sign if ican tly reduce coll is ions and ramm ings . At the same time , there are , of course , no ava ilable data on the numbe r of acc idents that wer e p reven ted for sh ips a lready hav in g this radar feature . Sinc e only a small percentage of vessels have them , the conclusion is justified . True motion displays are still desirable , however. They provide an important measure of confi- dence to the wa tchs tander , reduce worry and effor t expended in distinguishing buoys from small boats and oil platforms from ships , and thus have an important indirect effect on accidents. 5- 92 - - ~~~~~ - ~~~~ —• - ~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~. ~~~~~~~ — ; ~~~ -.-- ~~~~—-— — .- - ~ -. - ~~~~~ •aJw ~—f;~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -—. - _ - ..~~~ L - - 5.3 .12 LORAN-C Proximity Indicator This system is currently in the conceptua l p hase. It would use the positions of vessels as measured by LORAN-C to estimate the range and bearing to another shi p. Each shi p would transmit her ID and LORAN-C coordinates (and possibly course and speed). By receiv- ing the other shi p ’s transmissions , a shipboard processor could compare the LORAN-C coordinates w i t h those of own shi p and derive the others ’ ranges and bearings. The range and bearing could either be displayed di g itally or superimposed on a radar-t ype synthetic display. Such a system would have the advantages of obtaining an identifying code from other ships an d n ot bei n g a f f e c t e d by clutter . It could h e configured to sound an alert i f another vessel appeared in a particular sector within a given range. However , such a sy stem would provide no services beyond those provided by transponder at a comparable cost. A reduced vers ion , providing perimeter detection , would be more expensive than the radar perimeter detection device of Section 5.2 .16 , and perform the same function. It would also e n t a i l o b t a i n i n g a d e d i c a t e d VHF or tIP channel for data t r a n s m i s s i o n purposes. It a s o s u f fer s from an accuracy problem ; while the relative potential accuracy is good (100-300 feet estim ated ) for two ships having LORAN-C , i t would not function well with mixed systems. That is , if a satellit e navigation system was on one ship, and LORAN-C on the other , the relative accuracy would he approximately 1 ,500 feet. This is due to the fact that the better accuracy of 100-300 feet is only ~ ii ieved by the cancel I at ion of m u t u a l l o n g - term d r i f t terms common o on.- ~.vste m . ‘.lixed system s would y i e l d only the geodetic u r i~ i e~~. i~’e~ n t ippea r that this system is promi s i ng at u,~~~ ’% e r . i I iii autom atic monitoring system of til e type - .. ion . 2 . i mp I eme n ted , t h e I requ en cv a II oc at ion I ~ ea • -a iad t he s~ heme would become no re at t rac — - i ~~. ‘ v ~‘~l i & t r e t t o y i n srn it the ii - p05 it ions and • -c, - il • t ~ u i pmen would be due oni to • * - ‘ ~~c n~t in enn.i w o u l d he ~ I ready L --- —— — - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — -- - — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -.~-—~~~ -——- ~~~~‘ — ~~ - ~~‘ ~~~~~~ ‘. - — - - — - ~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — •~~~~~,.. -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —..~~~ - - - If an a u t o m a t i c m o n i t o r i n g sy stem is implemented , t h i s sy stem should he reconsidered . i~ith a c o r r e c t i o n term hroadcast from shore every hour or so , the equipment could accommod ate mixed navi gation systems . However , as a stand-a l one system , it is not attract ive enough to he cons idered f u r t h e r . 5 . 3 . 13 Manua l_ M o n i t o r i i ~~~S v s t e m What at first appears to he a logical step in comp leN I tv and performance is a manual monitoring sy s t e m , p at t e r n e d a f t e r the present Vessel Traffic Services (VIS) (see Appendix H) . Since the Vessel Passport sy stem is primaril y a m e d at p r e v e n t i ng ground ings a Vt ’s— i ike sy stem would seem to o f f e r the poss ib i I i tv of pr event - i ng some col i i s ions and ramm ings . as w et 1 as providi n g warnings to tankers that navigate too close to shoals or reefs. By obtaining • frequent updates on the positions of all vessels in the area , c lo s e pas s ings coti Id he detected , and the shore coit 1 d he 1 p en force vessel—to—ve s sel communication , which is shown in Sect ion 1 . 2 . 5 0 to be q u i t e e f f e c t I ye in prevent i ng coil i si OUS . Ramm i ngs could likewise he prevented by shore Jet ect ion of a c o n f l i c t , since the shore station wou1 d keep an act i ye , up - to — date l i s t of o i l p1 at — form locations . It turns out upon ci oser exam i nat i or. that the system techniqu e is unwie Ld~ , for tile following reasons: a. System capac i tv i s severel y 1 im I ted : in order to he u~ e — ful , updates should be ohta i ned every 1 5 m i n u t e s or so , and e’4•~sry time a course is a l t e r e d . For verbal report lug systems , the ch annel c a p a c i t y for a sy stem ope rat ing out to 20 ml les 1 m i t s the numbe r of vessels to less than 10 per c o m m u n i c a t i o n channel , and to less than if the same channel is used to e s t a b l i s h i n i t i a l vo~ ag e p lan data. This allows I i t t Ic time for cross che ckin g of reported pos I — t ions. Th e sh ore wa tchs t ande r ‘ s t i me w ou ld he spent p r i m a r i Iv key ing in new pos I t ions and commun I eat i rig . Fven at I hi s low capacit y , there would not he enough system slack to al l ow for in i s read met ers • communica tio n er ror s , keying errors , report jug errors • et c . (See Appendix G , Sec tion G . 2 . 4 . ) 5-9-I U _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — ~ - ~~~~~ - .~ --. ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ “T~- ~~~~~~ h. R e q u i r i n g up dates every 15 m i n u t e s would he a burden on the vessel watchst anders , and might cause problems 1w taking atten- tion away from other tasks , especially when several vessels mi gh t he competing for the shore operator ’s attention. c. The language problem is Iarti cularl ~’ severe in view of the large number of foreign tankers. d . Much of the same funct ion can be accomplished in a simpler way . ‘l’he Vessel P a ssport ssteni can be modi fled to pro— v ide a limited coil is ion avoidance ser v ice b~ - a genera 1 announce— - - ment of the arrival of a t a n k e r , and 1w obta in i ng the planned courses of vessels who w i l l he operat l u g in the area. Thus I t is cone luded that manual monitor i ng , us ing verbal i’ep~~~’t5 , is not a viable opt ion. The alternative discussed in item d above is propo sed as a series of o p t i o n s to be added to the vessel passport system , and is d i scussed in Sect ion 5. 2 . 2 . On tile other han d , automat ic mon i tor ing does not i nv ol v e spec i Ii c act ions on th e pa r t of the deck officers , and is not capac i tv - limited. Ithi le cost ly , it offers some real i niprove ment s in se r v i c e . I t is discussed in Section 5.2 .3 . s. 4 SUMMARY OF SYSTEM COSTS AND EF1:EC’l’ IVENESS 5.1.1 System_Costs Costs have been cited in Section 5. 2 in terms 01’ v e s sel owner and government costs . In order to compare the t o t a l costs of ’ svs tems , it is assumed that the publ i c w i l l eventua 11 pay the costs , either as consumers or as t a x p a y e r s . To pro v ide a reason - able framework , a 10- yea r Ii fe cvc le is assumed - I . e . , vessel equi pment is assumed to last abou t 10 ears he fore requiring r e p l a c e m e n t , and government in st ~1 1 lat ion costs are assumed to be a m o r t i z e d over a 1(1 veat ’ p e r i o d . Vessel equipment purchas e costs are s impl y found 1w tile produc t of the ave rage equipment 1r ice and the number of sh i p s t o he outfitted . The number of ships to he outfitted varies with the equipment: all vessels over I ,(~00 gross tons will have LORAN—C (the number of sate l lit e nav i g a tor s is n e g l i g ib le) , wh i Ic oni 5 - 9 5 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- - ~~~~~— - -f’ - ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — — ~~.w ~~~~~~~~ “ ~ ‘r’ - ‘ . , , - ~~ t ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - ~~~- ----~- _ _ _ _ _ _ those over 10 ,000 gross tons could reasonably be expected to pur- chase collision avoidance equipment . The ship populations assumed are shown in Table 5- 3. It is assumed that equipment exceeding $10 ,000 in cos t would only be required on the larger vessels. Vessel ma intenance costs are assumed to be 10% of the pur- chase cos t each year , so that over a 10 year period , the mainte- nance costs equal the purchase costs. Table 5-4 shows the vessel costs for each system . Governmen t costs are the initial purchase and installation costs , plus 10 year s of annual opera ti ng and ma in tenanc e cos ts. They are tallied in Table 5-5 . 5.4.2 System Effectiveness • Simply stated , the bas ic measur e of a sys tem ’s effectiveness is the probability that it would prevent an accident . It is de si rable to have a s ingle measure of each sys tem ’s effectiveness , but in the process many important considerations are lost. For ex ample , collision avoidance aids would not often be helpful in avoiding groundings , and depth sounders would not often prevent collis ions; thus , one overall effec tiveness number does not register this distinction. TABLE 5- 3. VESSEL POPULATIONS USED FOR COST ESTIMATES Vessel Type Number All Vessels > 1 ,600 GT 6,1001 All Vessels > 10 ,000 GT 2 ,5002 Tank Vessels > 1 ,600 GT 2 ,670’s Tank Vessels > 10 , 000 GT l ,600~ 1Federa l Regis ter , 1977c. 2Approximate ly 40% of the vessels calling at U.S. ports are assumed to be larger than 10 ,000 gross tons. This is an esti- mate based on worldwide fleet projections (U.S. Maritime Adminis tration , 1975) 3Approxi mate ly 60% of the tank vessels calling at U .S . ports are r assumed to be larger than 10 ,000 gross tons . This is an estimate based on a satelli te nav iga tion study (INMARSAT , 1978) . 4Federal Reg ister , 1977d. 5-96 —-— .-- - —-.---- - - ‘-- . - ,-~,,-——— ——,-—- ———---— - -- - -- -- -- - ~ - ~ - - ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --- - ~~~ ~~~~ - - TABLE 5-4. VESSEL OWNER COSTS FOR EAC h SYSTEM Purchase Cos t To tal Vessel per Sh ip Number Purchas e Cos ts System ($000) of Ships ($000) 1 . Baseline 0 0 0 IA . Ex tended Basel ine’ 0 0 0 2 . Passport System 0 2 ,670 2 0 3. Auto-Monitoring 4.0 ô ,i~ o3 24 ,400 4. DF-Surveillanc e 0 ô ,iø~ 3 a 5. Radar Surveillance 0 6 ,l00~ 0 6 . S a t e l l i t e Surveil- 12 , 500k 4 296 , 710 lance k2 8.6i 13,6001 7. Tra ining 9.0 6,100 54 ,900 8. Traffic Separation 0 0 0 9. Aids-to-Navigation 0 0 0 10. Pilotage 0 0 0 11. Equipment Standards 0 0 0 12 . Navig ati on Aler t 3. 0 6,1003 18 ,300 13. Depth Alert 2.0 2 ,6702 5,340 14. Scanning Sounder 20.0 l ,600~ 32 ,000 15 . Coll is ion Avo idance Aid 100.0 2 , 5006 250 , 000 16. Radar Perimeter Det. 2.5 3,6006 9,000 17. VHF/Transponder 5.5 6,1003 33 ,550 18. Interrogator! 120 .0k 12 , 500k 4 68 , 000 Transpond er 1 5.01 13 ,6001 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1Ex tended Basel ine Sys tem cons is ts of extending LORAN -C coverage in to Puer to R ico and th e V irg i n I slands. 2lns talled on tank vessels only. 3ln s t a l le d on all vessels. 4More expens ive equip men t ins talled on all lar ge vessel s ; less expens ive eq uipmen t ins talled on sma ller ves sels. 5lns tal led on large tankers only. b C o l l i s i o n Avo i dance A id ins talled on all large vessel s; Radar Per imeter Detection device installed on smaller vessels. 5- 97 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - — — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ..-- - ~~~~ ‘ ; - TABLE 5-5 . GOVERNMENT COSTS FOR EACh SYSTEM Shore Opera tir.g To tal Co st Shore In iti al (Av erage Cos ts Shore Cos ts Annual) (1 0 Years) System ($000) ($000) ($000) 1. Baseline 0 0 0 1A. Extended Baseline * 15 ,000 1 ,000 25 ,000 2 . Passpor t System 7 ,080 1 ,033 17 ,410 3. A u t o - M o n i t o r i n g 28 , 330 5 , 938 87 , 710 4. D F - Su r v ej l l a n ce 7 , 930 1, 168 19 ,610 5. Radar Sruveillance 26 ,080 4,033 66 ,410 6. Satellite Surveil- lance 89,750 6,731 157 ,062 Training 0 0 0 8. Traffic Separa ti on 0 0 0 9. Aids-to-Navigation 600 0 600 10. Pilotage 0 (1 0 1 1. Equipment Standards 0 0 0 12 . N a v i g a t i o n Alert 0 0 0 13. Dep th Aler t 1,000 0 1 ,000 14. Scanning Sounder 1 , 500 0 1, 500 15 . C o l l i s i o n Avoidance Aid 1) 0 0 16 . Radar Perimeter Det. 0 0 0 17. VHF/Transponder 1 ,000 0 1 ,000 18. ln terroga tor/ Tran sponder 0 0 0 *Ext en ded Baseline System Consists of extending LORAN-C coverag e ~ 4 into Puer to Rico and the Virg in Islands . 5-98 ‘S -.—--—--—_ ~~~~ - _ _~~~~~, _, ~~~ ~ _ Y ~r _ ~~ - ’ _ —h-- - - - - fr— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ i — — - — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~ ‘ ~~~~ “ - - - Wi th this cau ti on , the definition of a single measure of effec tiveness should have the following properties : a. Each sys tem ’s effec tiveness should be based on the com- bined effectiveness of the system and the baseline system . b. Since the study is geared toward improvements over and above the baseline system , the basel ine sys tem should register zero effec tiveness. c. The e f f e c t i v e n e s s measure should incorporate the avail- abili ty of the system . d. Obviously, a system that prevented all accidents should have an effectiveness measure of 100%. An effectiveness measure meeting these requ iremen ts , called the Net Effectiveness , is defined by the following formula: A x (PE - P11 ) NE = S BL s l - P E BL where NE~ is the Net Effectiveness of the system . A5 is the Availability of the system . P11 is the Potential Effectiveness of the s\’stem . PE BL is the Potential Effectiveness of the Baseline System . Ava ilability is estimated in paragraph (c) of each system descrip- t ion in Section 5 . 2 . The Potential E f f e c t i v e n e s s is the measure of effectiveness used in Table I-b of Appendix I for the systems combined w i t h the baseline system . The potential e f f e c t i v e n e s s , avi~ilahility, and net effec- tiveness of each of the systems is shown in Table 5-6. 5-99 J — - — —-——-—-_ — ————— — — . - — —— -—--—-- - - - - - i’’, - - - -~~ -~~~ ~~---~~- - - -- —— ~ - ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . ~~~r ~~~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~‘~~r’i; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - U) U) V 4.1> we we we ~. we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we V ‘.4 0 ‘0 0 t” 0 1’- in ~0 ifl ~~‘ CO Il) 00 — if) in ‘0 t~) If) Z +~ ~~‘ ~Q in ‘0 -4 .-4 ‘-4 — 0 C, te.1 ‘44 ‘U >5 4.) - --4 “-4 ..4 we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we — .0 if) if) 0 0’. 0 .-4 U’) if) 0 0 in if) ‘0 in 0 00 0) 0) 0 0 0 P- 0) ~~ 0’. 0’. 0) 0 F’-. 0) F’.) e-i in 0’. .4 — — .-4 — — ‘.4 (I) (I, ‘Uz — - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ‘U 4-4 —(C we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we $.. ,~~ 0’. ~~ in ~~ C’. 0) i n i— ~~‘ 00 in .-i F’.) 0) r— ~‘—~ ~~. in V (‘-1 (‘--I LI) F’- i n F’- F’- if) F’J tf) tI) F’) If) if) if) If) If) lf) tf) ‘U 0 ‘U — U) U) U ) 0 C ‘U V ~~. ~~ .. ~ we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we E in in F’—) in F”-) LI) LI) CO i l l C’s) LI) LI) tf) LI) in in in LI’. in > E ~~‘ ~~‘ tn ~0 LI) ‘0 ~D LI) ~~‘ LI) ~~‘ ~~‘ in ~~‘ ~~. ‘0 ID ~~ (C 1.L.o >- ,u o ‘-4 — u’. we we we we we we we we w we we we we we we we we we ~e (C ...4 F’ N- 0’. ,-4 0’. — ,-I LI) NJ N- in F’- N- N- F’- CI) .-.4 ‘0 ~~‘ — ‘.4 4 ~~ ,..4 00 00 NJ NJ .4 ‘0 (C~ if) 0 5 4 . ,- ~ 0 V U 0 0. U) ‘.0 00 i-I) ‘.4 we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we we e in if) in LI) LI) 0) a-. ‘o ‘0 0 ~ 0’. ‘.0 0’. 00 LI) it) in in ‘U ~ r-~ ‘I) ID r— ‘0 N. ‘- ~f) ~ ~~. ~‘. C~I -a a 2 U) I) 4.) 0) • (C (C ‘~~ U V U — i 0 0 I.. (C (C (C •_4 ...4 ..4 ( C e . ) ~ (C ‘.4 E 0 0 0 ) ( C C ) 44~~~~’ “~~ I.. 0)~~~~ I.. I.. — V (C 0 > ’ (C (C (C .1) ‘O -..i C) C) 0 )4.).,-.) (C ,--4 a-. I-. 00 (C~~~~4 ( C O .~~~~ ( C -.. ~~ ~ a—. ( C — ’ a CC~~~-4 “ < a > - ~ a-. (C >.,~~~ ) U ) ~~. > U) 4.) 0 < E 0 01.. C) (C (C l-. CJ) ‘.4 ~~~~ 4 J dJ 0) 4.) 0 a~ (C I. j~~ (C C) ( C s .) 00 ‘ 0 ) ( C - . .4 .-4 0 00 0) (C V a--. 0 > U ) . . - i (C U 0 0 0 V 4 . J < (C -.’ 0. ( C O O -— ‘e O X 1. — .,.4 .,.4 4.) (C F (C . 4 U) a-.~ 1,- n. — m. • a a-. .-~ 0) (C 94 4.’ 0. 00 (C (C 1. I-. I-. U) C) C) U) 0 (/) (C 0 ) U .~ 4 I44 U) 0 ..4 ’-4 4.) ( C ,~~ (C~~~ ... C ) ( C U) 4.) U) 4.’ , ‘~~ 4.) (C (C ( C ’~ . 4 ( C > Q.. CC i~~~~~~~~~~~IL. 4 . ) ( C C C X (C ( C I~ CC (C(C 1. l.. -.4 .4 ‘ ( C C) U 0— 4 (C~~~~ < F ’ J ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ L f ) ’ 0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — — — — — — — .-4 _4 _• 5-100 ~~.. —z . . . -~=~~ ~~~~~.. ~~~~~.~‘T”~ ’ - ~~~ 6. BENEFITS ANALYSIS 6.1 INTRODUCTiON Ideally , a rigorous cost/benefi ts analysis projects the costs and environmen tal impact of oil spills in offshore wa ters of the United States to assess the value of future corrective measures . Due to the very small number of spills attributable to groundings , collisions , and rammings in U.S. o~ F’shore wa ters (ei ght in six years) , no quantitative trend analysis can be performed to make such a projec tion. Also , due to the dependency of spill impac t on a complex combina tion of fac tors such as size and ra te of sp ill , type of oil/oil product , loca tion w ith respec t to shoreline and fishing grounds , and direc tion of w ind and curren ts at the time of occurrence , no adequate analytical modeling technique is avail- able for assessing the benefits of spill prevention . For these reasons , the recommended system alternatives described in Section 7 are assessed on a cost-effectiveness basis , w ith effectiveness measured in terms of the number of groundings , coll isions and rammings prevented based on the casualty projection s of Section 4.7. The follow ing sections characterize the spills that have occurred in offshore waters , describe the trends in some of the variables that affect spill incidence , and provide some insigh t into spill cost considerations . 6.2 SPILL CHARACTERISTICS IN OFFSHORE WATERS OF TIlE U.S. The seriousness of offshore s p i l l s depends on factors such as siz e and ra te of the sp i l l , type of o i l/ o i l produc t , loca t ion w it h - - respect to shoreline and f is h i n g grounds , d i r e c t i o n of w i nd and curren ts , and the effec tivenes s/availability of oil sp i l l c l eanup equi pmen t . Spill s i zes are d i f f i c u l t to c la ssi f y w ith respect to severi ty since any discharge that poses a substantial threat to the public health or welfare , or resul ts in critical public concern 6-1 --— - - . - - ,- -- — ~~~~ — 2’~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~ C -~~~‘~~‘~~~ is considered a major discharge. However , offshore spills greater than 100 ,000 ~~1lons are considered of s u f f i c i e n t magnitude to warrant alerting of the National Response Team. “U eav ” o i ls such as crude and No. 6 are of much greater concern than the lighter — oil products such as g a s o l i n e , jet fuel , nap htha , etc., which are highl y volatile. Oil spill cleanup equipment currently available - - tends to be less effective in offshore waters , particularl y with wave heights in excess of two feet. Section 4.3.4 summarizes the number of casualties identified as bein g of interest to the stud y. Of the 78 incidents dep icted in Table 4-6 , only casualties involving loaded tank vessels and off- shore r i g s are pertinent to characteri:ation of oil sp ills. The index of selected cases presented in Appendix C contains data pertaining to tank vessel cargo and the amount spilled as a - - result of the c a s u a l t y . Table 6-1 summarizes the number of spil l incidents due to groundings , collisions , and rammings which have occurred in U.S. offshore waters during the period FY 1972-1977. As d iscussed in Sec tion 4.2. 3, pollution incidents in U.S. waters are recorded in a Pollution Incident Reporting System (PIRS) main- tam ed by the U.S. Coast Guard and based cl reports from its dis- trict offices . The National Response Center (NRC) , located at U.S.C.G. Headquarters , also ma intains records of pollution m ci- dents which are reported by official ‘and unofficial observers. PIRS data for the period 1973-1977 , are used to identify actual sp ills greater than 50 ,000 gallons which are pertinent to this study. It is highly probable that these files contain all spill incidents during this period that have posed a substantial threat to the environment , or were of great public concern . F ive of the eight oil spills indicated in Table 6-1 are larger than 100 ,000 gallons . These spills occurred during the period 1973-1977. The other three spills , all smalle r than 100 ,000 gallons , occurred in 1972. Spills of heavy oil have a great potential for causing env ironment damage and posing a threat to the public welfare . Three 6-2 - - —--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --~~~~~~~~ - - 11) U 0 — o (/) o n. -a - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ N. -• N- 0. 0’. ~~ •-1 0 0 U.. .-~ - ‘-I • o n. NJ — N. C—, — NJ 0z LL. I— ( 1 ) 0 a-.. CI) CI) ‘U < ~ U 0 ‘U _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ U -a I-. Z ‘U — ~~ “ +J IL. ~f) 00 _ _ NJ ‘.0 ~~‘ 0 0 1). 0~~ a-. IL. _ _ _ _ 44.4 0 — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 41) Z ..a~~~~v — ‘U~~~ ’U Cl) — -.4 (/) ‘U f -. ~~~ ‘U~~~~ .-) U) -~ ~~~~~ 4— 0 ‘.0 ‘-.4 0 0. ~~ U)V) Cl) zu. < _________________ a-. — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ U) C) ‘.0 U) CC ‘ U a-—’ -i .—~ - ~‘ E0 a-— (1) ~.4 ..4 00 4.) — C) ‘~~ .~~ .~~ ‘U -I g O n . 0 .-‘ F a--. 0 CC a---. L~ U CX 6-3 - ,‘~~~~~ ‘- - - — — — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ __ • ~~~~~~•L _ ~~ _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .—---- I of the five heavy oil spills are greater than 100 ,000 gallons. The spill caus ing the grea tes t concern was the Argo Merchan t , wi th over 7 ,500 ,000 gallons discharged in to the wa ters be tween Nan tucke t Island /Cape Cod and the Georges Bank fish ing grounds. The o ther two heavy oil spills were of much lesser concern ; one of approxi- ma tely 800 , 000 gallons (Globtik Sun ) occurred 90 miles off the -~ Lou is iana coas t , the other of approximately 370 , 000 gallons (Michael Lemos) occurred off Limetree Bay, St. Croix , VI . 6.2 .1 Spills Due to Groundings Referring to Table 6-I , it is seen that approximately one out of f ive groundi ngs of tank vessels loaded w it h o il resul ted in a spill. All of these spills have occurred when the tank vessel struck a hard or rocky sea bottom . Referring to Figure 6-1 , two spills have occurred off the New England coast , two in Long Island Sound , two off the coas t of Alaska , and one off St. Croix VI. None of the groundings off Delaware Bay , off Chesapeake Bay , in Guayanilla/Tallaboa Bays (Puer to Rico) , or in the Gulf of Mexico have resulted in oil spills. It is also seen from Table 6-1 that an average of approxi- mately 1 spill per year due to groundings has occurred in U.S. offshore waters during the 6-year period from FY 1972-FY1977. Data presented in Devanney , 1978 indicates that an average of 10 spills per year due to groundings occurred in offshore waters worldwide during the 8-year period from 1969 through 1976. The size of spills due to groundings in U.S. offshore waters during a 6-year period is shown in Table 6-2. Figure 6-2 gives the spill size distribution for massive spills greater than 1 ,000 ,000 gallons that occurred due to groundings , worldwide , over an 11- year period . Six of these spills , most total losses , have exceeded the 7,500 ,000 gallons discharged by the Argo Merchant. The largest worldwide spill to date is the recent Amoco Cadiz grounding , with 60,000,000 gallons discharged off the coast of France. The larg- est tankers currently entering U.S. waters have the potential to discharge a similar amount of oil. The average maximu m potential discharge from tankers in U.S. waters is approximately 12 ,000 ,000 6-4 - - ~~~ --- - ~ - - ~~~~~~~ ‘ _ _ _ -. -, ~~~~~~~~~~ -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — — ~~~~~~- - ~~~~~~~---_ --- —~~--~~--~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ — - — — - — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 6-5 I ~~_ *~~~~~~ ,~, - -- -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - ,- -----— —,—..--‘--- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~—,- -~~~~r~~~~~~~ - - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11’. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 — 0 0 0 0 0 LI) LI) — 0 ‘0 ‘.0 ~~ 0’. N- CC (C ‘.0 CI) II) —4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LI) LI) (1) z Cl) -4 0z C) C) ‘.4 ~~ — Q 0 0) - 0 C) 0 ~ ~z’ ‘0 0) - ‘.0 NJ ‘.0 N. 00’. . I ~~~~~ 0 0 a--. a. 0) 0 a 0 00 Z U ~~ ~) Z ~ Z a-.. (C _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0 U):~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.40) 0 0 0 0 0 CD CD a. ‘0 0’. ~~~ LI) ‘.4 CD CD (1) >-. N- CI) NJ 00 NJ NJ ~ ‘. NJ .4 00 0’—’ — a-U _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4-4 (I) — — C X ‘0 LI) NJ NJ NJ N- N- ‘.0 CI) N. C— N- NJ C) ~-.. s-.. N- N- —~. -.. -.. S a-ia 4-I LI) NJ ~~ -~ NJ -~ ‘.0 ~~ (C . 4 4--) LI) N- NJ NJ NJ 0 —j. a-U X NJ ~ 4 0 CI) N- CI) NJ <a-i-. F-0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ U -I o 4-I 4)) 14.4 (C F ~~ 0 --~ ~~ (C CC E u 0 Z -(C C) (C a-.. U) o .-~ a. 00 ~) U — 4.. >s •.4 C) 4) .-4 4-’ a-. (C 4-I U) C) ~.4 C) 0 ~ U U) CC - >-. m C) 0) 0 .(C — —. CC • (C 00 U CC ‘—4 F -.) (C a-- --4 C) -~~~ CC • 0 ~~ Cl) = a-- U. U ( - 1 -6 - - — - - -.~~~~~~~ — - -~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -— _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ AD AUDO 47t, TRANSPORTAT ION SYSTLMS CENTER CAMBRIDGE MASS FIG 13/10 OFFSHORE VESSEl. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (OVTM ) STLCT. VOLUME I • TEC——ETC (U) AUG 78 R BL.AM)P R KALAFUS. R WISIIDER UNCLASSIF lID TSC—USCG—78—1 IVOt 2 USCG—O—5 5—78—VO L—2 Pal. ~ifl~~EQ9flD1aJ~J p - — __________________________ _________________________ __________________________ ____________ - .w —.-~--- - ~~~~~ - . . . •1~~ t 0 0 I) ‘U U U) o .4 .4 U) C ~ 0 U) 0 (~ ~~ r 0 ~~~ F—. — a.~ . — I ~ z ~~ A Z U I ’ F..’ a ~~ ci~ 4-’ ~~ 0 ~. C V ‘-, ‘U A -~ ..l -4 x U) .-. Lf~ 0. .4 -4 1~ ~~ s~ utpuno1D o~ QflQ stttdS ;o 1~ qwn~ 6-7 -- - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ g a l l o n s . Although the Argo Merchant is the l a r g e s t s p i l l , and the only total loss of oil cargo to date in U,S. offshore waters , It is clear that the potential for still larger spills exists , and will persist if corrective measures for the prevention of ground- Ings are not instituted . 6.2.2 Spills Due to Collisions From Table 6-1 it is seen that none of the loaded tanker col- lisions in the data base have resulted in an oil spill. Figure 6-3 shows the location of these six collisions. All of these incident s occurred in semi-restricted waterways , vi:., Long Isl and So und and within fairways or at an anchorage in the G u l f of Mexico. • Although there have been no spills due to collisions in U.S. offshore waters during the six-year period from FY 1972-FY 1977 , data presented in Devanney , 1978 indicate that an average of 11 spills per year due to collisions have occurred in offshore waters worldwide during the 8-year period from 1969 through 1976. The Tanker Advisory Center lists four spi fls greater t han 1 ,000 ,000 gallons due to collisions , worldwide , during the 11 year period 1967 through l9~8. Two of these spills equalled or exceeded the amount discharged by the Argo Merchant , the largt’st (30,000 ,000 gallons) resulting from the Sea Star collision in the Gulf of Oman. Prom these data , it may be surmised that most collisions do not result in massive spills. However , as indica t ed in Section 6.4 , spill size is not necessarily the controlling factor in d e t e r m i n i n g impact on the public and the ciiv i ronment , and consequent c t eanup c ost s . 6 .2 . 3 S p i l l s Due~~~~~~~m~I n s The only spill due to an offshore ramming, as shown in F ab l e 6-1 , has resulted from the sing le ramming incident in the data base 6-8 ~~ir. - — •--. . . —-----——--—- —•-- - .— -—-—.-——•-.--—-—--- — ~~~~~~~~~~ 1~~ — 6-9 involving a tanker and an offshore rig. None of the rammings of offshore rigs have resulted in an oil spill from the rig itself . It is to be expected that rammings of offshore ri gs are a rarer event than g r o u n d i n g s or c o l l i s i o n s since these ri gs are a visible , non -maneuvering object w i t h a very high concentratio n in o n l y one segment of the U .S. coastline. The designation of fair- ways in the Gulf of Mexico is for the purpose of establishing hazard-free shipp ing lanes. However , this does not obviate the need for improved vessel traffic management techniques to preclude the occ u r rence of ramming incidents in the future . 6 . 3 PROJ1~CT1~U TRE N D S In attempting to determine the future impact of offshore oil p o l l u t i o n , it is necessary to c o n s i d e r pro j ected trends in the variabl es tha t affect spill incidence. The number and size of loaded tank vessels in transit in U.S. waters , and currently pro- posed changes in requirements for vessels navi gating these waters , are signific ant factors. Devanney , 1978 , contains projections of major interregional oil flows and large tank vess el traffic in U.S. w a t e r s in 1982 and I98~’. Assuming a three percent annua I growth in o i l demand and deep dra ft t e r m i n a l f a c i l i t i e s ( LOOP ) operat ing in the Gui f , the tank vessel t r a f f i c and size projections shown in Table 6-3 have been obtained . The s i g n i f i c a n t points to be observed are (a) the projected increases in the number of loaded tank vessels arriving in East Coast and Gulf ports and in transit along the West Coast from Alaska , and (b) the large average size of tank vessels using LOOP facilities in the Gulf. Increases of this magnitude without corn - pensating traffic management improvements would inevitably result in an increased number of oil sp ill incidents , and , in the case of LOOP traffic , the potential for a spill of massive proportions. As discussed in Section S , the adopt ion of the baseline system requiring a l l vessels l a r ge r than 1600 gross tons entering U .S. • ports to he equipped with improved position-fixing capability b - t O -- TABLE 6-3. PROJECTED TRENDS IN TANK VE SSEL TRA FFIC AND S I D E IN U.S. WATERS ( R a t i o : 1987 to 197 7) Foreign A l a s k a n O i l Oil to Landed in Passing East Coast Gulf Ports LOOP West Coast • Number of Loaded Tank Vessels 1.6 2 . 0 NA 9.0 Average Si:e of Tank Vessels 1.0 1.0 6.0 0.7 (LORAN-C or e q u i v a l e n t l w o u l d he 25 percent effective in reducing the p r o b a b i l i t y of a grounding and 45 percent e f f e c t i v e in reducing the p r o b a b i l i t y of a ramming. This would reduce the p o t e n t i a l impact of increased tank vessel t r a f f i c and si z e . 6.4 SPILL COST C U N SIDE R A1I ONS When an oil sp ill occurs in U.S. waters , various Governmental a genc ie s and private organizations commit resources to aid in clean-up operations in accordance with the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingenc y Plan (part 1510 , Chapter V of Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations). In addition to these clean-up costs and the value of the unrecovered oil , damage claims may be inst ituted based on the cost of restoration or replacement of propert y or wildlife destro yed by the polluting substance. Table 6-4 is a summary of total costs , ac tual and est m ated , associated with the Argo Merchant sp ill of December iS , 19 T h (Comptroller General. 6/77). Since the oil drifted awa’ from coastal areas due to prevailing winds and currents , there were virtually no actual clean-up operations. k 6-li — •.— •,= ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ TABLE 6-4. SUMMARY OF ARGO MERCHANT OIL SPILL COSTS Amount Cos t incurred by: Coas t Guard $ 1 ,755 ,273 Military service 130 ,262 Other Federal agencies 635 ,248 State agencies 63 ,018 Universities 160 ,551 Scientific organizations 28 ,893 Priva te or ganiza t ions 19 ,382 Total 2 ,792 ,627 E sti ma ted value of wa terfowl k illed by the oil spill 5,535 New To tal $ 2 ,798 ,162 Es t ima ted value of oil spilled 2 ,362 ,500 Grand Total ~5,l60 ,662 The estimated costs incurred by the various Governmental agencies and pr ivate organizations totalling 2.8 million dollars were for: a. Potential salvage and clean-up opera tions $1.80 million b . Surveillance and mon itoring of the sp ill $0.03 million c. Waterfowl rehab ilitation , clean-up and coun ting $0.06 million d. Sc ientific research and analysis $0.78 million and e. A irl ift of personnel and equipmen t $ 0. 13 mil lion No mone tary value has been determined for the effects or potential effec ts of this spill on var ious species of fish and o ther fo rms of seal ife. However , a coal iti on of Cape Cod f ishermen has sued the owners of the vessel for more than $60 mi llion for shoreline , fisheries , and personal damages. 6- 12 • “~~~~: r — — —•———•.~‘,. w •— --— — — -• -~~~————• ———-- —•.— —~~~~ — •-—— — — —•-—- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —— --—-• — In another spill incident cited in Comptroller General , 6/77 , • a majority of costs were for shoreline clean — up and the estimated value of the b i r d s k i l l e d by the o i l . In t h i s case , 27 mil e s of shorelin e were contaminated and app r ox ima y 30 • OUt) water low 1 killed ( v s . SOt) in the Argo Merchant incident). A l t h o u g h the amount of oil sp illed was 3 percent of the amount attributed to the Argo Merch ant , the total co st , excluding the value of the o il • was appr ox m a te lv 4 S p or cent of the Arg o Merchant cost . l t is ther e tore appar ent that the cost per gal Ion of o i l sp i l l e d w i i I h a v e a w ide I luc t uat ion , being high lv dependent on the loc a Ic and env i ron — mental circumstances at the t inc of the sp i l l . I’he Pollution Inc id ent Report lu g Sv st cm (I’ IR S) • r e f e r r e d to in Sec t ions 4 . 2 . 3 and 6. 2 , records the t ota I cost of ci can - up expended by a 1 1 part ~~ , Federa I ,state , and pi’ i v a t e , althoug h these cost data may o f te n he incomplete. For the per iod I 9 3 t hr ough mi d — 19’ • I l l sp i l l s greater than 10, 0th) ga I Ions have cost in forma t ion ent cred into th e P I RS data base. Sevent v—fo u r perc ent of the sp i 1 is in thi s sample have clean-up costs recorded as less than 100 ,000 d o l l a r s ; 18 percent are between 100 , 000 and 500 , 000 d o l l a r s ; 3.5 percent are between 500 ,000 and 1 million dollars; and 4.5 percent greater than 1 million dollars . Cost data for 65 of the largest spills that have occurred worldwide in the last 10 years , based on various sources of information available to the public , show an average clean-up cost of 1 million dollars per sp ill , with 6 sp ills exceeding 3 million dollars. Note that clean-up , fisheries , and waterfowl costs are only part of the potential costs of an unfortunately located maJor sp ill. Others Include damage to shore industries (e.g., tourism ) . disruption of local economies (possibly permanentl y), Inconvenience and disruption of local citizens , permanent environment damage , etc. Some of these factors are being seen in connection with the Amoco Cadiz spill in France. For many of these costs of a spill , it is very difficult to estimate a dollar amount. (~- l 3 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ - •-• ~~~~~~~~~~~ - - • • - - — — ~ - ~~~~ - — •— —--———-- --- ~~~ -- ~~~ --- - - From the above , It is seen that the preponderence of spills incur clean-up Costs of less than 100 ,000 dollars; however , a much greater expend it ure of funds , often In excess of I million dollars , has been incurred in individual spill Incidents . II - 6-1 4 --~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ • ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ • TI 7. RECOMMENDED SYSTEM ALTERNAT I VE S ‘.1 INTRODUCTION In the previous sect ions eig hteen systems have been e va l u a t e d using the casualties in the data base. The casualties in the data base are believed to he representative; i.e ., it is assumed that future accidents will occur for similar reasons. The data base is too small to conduct a statistical analysis with tight confidence limits; therefore , judgments must he made on the basis of a few accidents , aided h~ comparable studies in other geograp hic areas , for different periods of time , and under other conditions. In addition to the limits posed by the size of the data base there are a number of l ess tang i bl e fac tors wh i ch have not vet been full taken i n t o account: user acceptability, tradition , implementahil- its’ , and s tat e of development of the equi pment . Wh~~le some of these have been m entioned , the effect iveness est m ates of Sect ion S have not tak en them i n t o account . The recommendations presented below a t t e m p t to take the se f a c t o r s i n t o account. 7 . 1 . 1 S~ stem Imp i i - i t ions The B a s e l i n e Sy stem assumes that by 1985 , all vessels of 1600 gross tons or more wi 11 have a LORAN-C navig at ion instrument with direct readout of coordinates , or a na~ igat ion system of comparable acc u racy. Howev er , the planned coverage of LORAN -C does not i n c l u d e Pu erto Rico and the Virgin Islands , wher e 16 of the 55 ground i ngs occurred , so that in these locat ions an on-board LORAN -C set is useless. The p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the b a se l i n e system would he 2S% h i g her if LORAN-C coverage were extended into that area. The r e s u l t i n g extended B a s e l i n e S stem would have a p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s of 2 4 % . 6% h i g h e r than the Baseline System. Vessels w i t h s a t e l l i t e n a v i g a t i o n (assumed to be a ne g l i g ible fraction of the f l e e t) could , of course , operate there with limited capability. ‘ 1 ~~~~~~~~~~~ — • -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The vessel pa ssport sy stem is the simplest form of an act ly e sy stem . The user accept ance should be high , because i t requires no addi t ion al on - hoard equ i pment . and makes minima l demands on the mariner ’s t line , excep t when unusual situ ations occur . Its main st rength s are in deterrence and improved ship disc ipl m e : tankers wi 11 he r e lu c t ant to depart a forei gn I o r t in substandard condi - t ions , knowing t h at to do so would r i s k delay s or I ines . T h e c h e c k p o i n t s force a l l t ankers to perform duties the w e l l — trained , prudent offic er would rout m clv p e r f or m . It. provides a means of cntorc ing equ ipm ent s t a n d a r d s Jild appr opriate pilot transfe r i~roce~tures . and of a l er t i ng ships t o unusual condi t i o n s . Autom atic m o n i t o r i n g sy stems are p o t e n t i a l l y ver y effectiv e , hut requ I re a s i gti i f icant inc rease in co sts to the government for both i n s t a l l a t ion and operat ion. S u r v e i l l a n c e s stems are a I so expensive , but are sli ght l v more depen dable than automat ic monitorin g, since the~ - rely less on shipboa rd equipment. Both sur ve i I lance and monitoring systems in c or p o r at e the des t rable features of the passport system . °i~ in ions on the effect ivene ss of t r a i n i n g are h igh lv sub - icc tire • so t h a t it is d i fficult to qu ant i fy its usefulness or make spec i f i c rec ommen da t i on s . Poor br i dge d i s c i p i i n c played some part in mo st of th e c.;~ ua it es • hut the quest ion of how he’ I r fu I t ra in I ug would have been is subject to w i dclv d if fe rent e s t i m a t e s . Members of the Boston M a r i n e Soc i c t v scored tra ini ng higher than the TSC team . but als o indic ated the d i f f i c u l ty and expense of develop ing and enforc ing t ra in ing requirements on fore ign f l a g vessel officers . tug operators • and smal l vessel opt’ i t o r ~~. Traffic sep.ira t ion schemes are in use at severa l major ports new and appear t o he qu it e e t fec t ire . Ther e were no end — on co 111 s ions and onl one c r o s s i n g col Ii s ion in any t ra f f i c lanes There does not appear to he an~ reason , based on the dat a base , to recommend the e s t ab l i s h m e n t of lanes at other p o r t s . S p e c i f i c rccommend at ions are given in Sec t ion .4 for improv ing the ir effectiveness. ~ - - • ~~ -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I~~~~~~~~.~~~~~~~~~ IT _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~—— ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - T A i d s - t o - N a v i g a t i o n equi pment and procedures are constan tly undergo ing review by the Coast Guard , bo th at local and head- quar ter s level s . There is a nat ural res i s t ance to add in g mo re buoy s to a national system of buoys that boasts a density far abeve the global average. Such recommendations were avoided , and don ’t appear in the evaluation , even thoug h additional buoys could have been help ful in some cases. However , buoy identification , the exp anded use of RACONS , and buoy maintainan ce and reporting procedures are areas tha t could be impr oved . Recommenda ti on s for changing p i lo t t ra ns f er proc edur es are complicated by the jurisdictional split. Wh ile some pilots have federa l l icen ses , most are state-licensed . (License requirements are generally more stringent for state pilots.) Also , p ilots are commerciall y employed , and have unions which would be involved with any changes. Thus the effectiveness of unilateral action by the Coast Guard is difficult to assess. There are two “hot spo ts ,” namely Guayanilla/Tallaboa Bars in Puerto Rico and Delaware Bay, where mos t of the groundings caused by improper pilot transfer pro- cedures occurred. The passport S stem alleviates these problems by involving the Coast Guard in a coordinating role. Improv ed equipment standards , including preventive maintenance and h i g her rel iabilit y requirements , are difficult to enforce . Merely issuing a set of gu idelines and minimum equ ipment specifi- ca ti on s does no t ensure the ir adherenc e . The enforcemen t pr oble m is best handled by some coordinated Coast Guard efforts in inspec- ti on and hoard ing , features incorporated into the active systems . The naviga tion alert system is hardly used at all today , even though there are equipments available commercially. The concept of deviation from track is not as familiar to most mariners as deviation from course. However , this is expected to change in the near fu ture i ndependen t I~ of Coas t Guard actions. The reason is that once a mariner has a LORAN-C receiver , the additional hardware needed to implement a navi gation alert system is small. Th is is just one manifestation of the revolutionar y changes taking place in instrumentation , occasioned pr imarily by the advent of ~~i~LJl~ ~~~ - • - • ~~ • • ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ J • —-—-- - ‘- I microprocessors. These highly complex devices have become avail- able at such low prices and hig h reliabilities that tasks such as coordinate conversion ( e . g . , c o n v e r t i n g LORAN time delay numbers to l a t i t u d e / l o n g i t u d e ) and d e v i a t i o n - f r o m - t r a c k are q u i t e simply implemented. It can reasonably be a n t i c i pated t h a t as m a r i n e r s become accustomed to the direct readout c a p a b i l i t y of modern LORAN-C sets , gain c o n f i d e n c e in the instruments , and be g in to incorporate the continuous readout into their navi gation pro- cedures (e.g., by follow ing a track defined by a LORAN-C chart line ) , the advantages of the use ot~ deviation-from-track will become apparent , and usage will increase. Minimum equipment standards r e q u i r i n g d e v i a t i o n and m a n e u v e r i n g - p o i n t a l e r t s would increase the s a f e t y p o t e n t i a l of the device . The comments above on the impact of microprocessors on instru- mentation apply as well to depth alert and scanning sounder sys- t ents . As “smart” instruments become a v a i l a b l e at reasonable costs , it can be a n t i c i p a t e d that they w i l l become w i d e l y used , especially when t h e i r b e n e f i t s become apparent . C o l l i s i o n avoidance equ ipment is a v a i l a b l e off the shelf and does not require cooperative equipment on other vessels. Units are being i n s t a l l e d r o u t i n e ly on new VLCC S , and many other tankers and large vessels are being retrofitted with them . While the effectiveness of collision avoidance aids was not judged to be h igh , they instill considerable confidence in the mariner because of the manner in which they interpret and display the situation , and thus provide b e n e f i t s d i f f i c u l t to q u a n t i f y . Radar perimeter detection devices are not as effective as other techniques , but do provide some c o l l i s i o n and ramming pro- tection at a low cos t . Wh ile false a l arms may reduce the ir effectivenss within 5 miles of shore , they could be q u i t e useful for smalle r vessels. They would be especially useful in the Gulf of Mex ico fo r maneuver ing among o il pla tforms. M inimum equ ipment spec ifications by the Coast Guard would be helpful. The VHF/ transponder sy stem is only a concep tual de si gn a t presen t. It requires an X-band transponder , bu t provides collision — - . z_ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .-____- -_-- .. . .• -~~——.—-——-----— avo idance service to the smaller vessels , which the interrogator/ transponder system does not. Its overall effectiveness for colli- sion preven tion is reduced only by radar outages. Since it has not been demonstrated , it must undergo a development cycle before its feasibil ity and uni t cos ts can ~e established. There is the risk , as w ith any new item , that the practical implementation would reveal limi tations now unapparent ; this risk is believed to be small. Obtaining a frequency allocation at VHF is probably a more serious problem . • Wh ile interrogator/transponder systems have a hig h potential effec tiveness , the high uni t cost for large vessels and the require- men t for smaller vessels to be eqi.~~pped with transponders that pro- vide li ttle service to the user make the overall effectiveness low . If X-band transponders become standard equipment for other Coast Guard missions (e.g. , Search and Rescue , Enforcemen t of Laws and Trea ti es) , they migh t be configured to be compa tible wi th this system . This system would then become attractive in the future . In summary : a. The shore-based , active systems provide enforcement of rule s and provide a redundancy of function which reduces the chance tha t human errors will result in a casual ty (Vessel Passpor t , Au toma tic Moni toring , and Surveillance) . b. Some systems only achieve a reasonable effectiveness in prac tice when enforcemen t measures , or other shore-based actions , are taken (Aids-to-Navi ga tion , Pilot Transfer , and Equi pmen t Standards) . • c. Some of the existing systems and procedures should be continually reviewed and improved by the Coast Guard (Training, Traffic Separa tion , Aids- to-Navi ga tion , and Pilot Transfer) . d. Some systems will probably be installed on ships in the future as their usefulness becomes apparent. They can become required equipmen t as experience demonstrates their usefulness (Naviga tion Alert , Scanning Sounder , Radar Perimeter Detection , and Collision Avo idance). 4 7~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~• • ~~~- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ e . Some sv stems require ¼ tev el opment and hack ing h~’ the (‘o.ts I Guard (Depth Alert and VHF/Transponder) • ~‘ . 1 . 2 Cost Aiial vs is iota 1 10 vent- system cost s have’ been used in Sect ion S w i t hout regard to the schedule of exp end iture s by t he’ government and ve ssel owners. In order to p r op e r ly compare ’ the c o s t s of the ’ v a r i o u s svste ’ms , and to take ’ I n t o account f a c t o r s such as st a t e ’ of develop mt’fl t , Imp ! e9fle’flt at ion SC hedu Ic , and ra te 0 I use’i’ equ I ppagt’ , a present value a n a l y s i s in w h i c h t h e (lows of expen ditures for the various system at ternat I yes are eli scount eel hack to th e ’ present , was p ’ t ’ - formed. The net effect iveness of each system versus the ’ net present value of systems cost throug h 199(1 Is shown In Itgure ‘-l . The a ssump t ions and met hoetol ogv used in tlC~ iv Lu g these cost II gures are d e sc rib e d below . a. Cost n~~ Ass~~~!j ions - The’ ten year syst em costs taken f ro m tab l es S -4 and 5 - S , were used as the has is tor t h i s .inalvs is. Costs were ’ d i s t r i b u t e d b etween government and vessel depending upon the ’ system a I te m a t i Vt’ ana lv ~ed and cons 1st e’et o operat ions and mat nt enanc e ’ , implement at ion or equIpm ent and rcse’iI mc it and development . Costs were determined on an annua l ha s is based on constant 1 9”8 dot tat - s and accumulated through 1990 Present valu e ’ c o s t s were eleterm I ned using a 10 percent discount rate. No I n f l a t i o n rate was used . In add it I on I o the above , he to It ow ing as sumj i t tons we t-e used in the anal y sis: • (;overninont RIID cost s were nit t fomm l v it 1s t m ibuted through - Out the R$I ) per Lod lot- the I net l v i dun ) equ I pme ’nt or sv s — tem to be used. • industr y Rl1 l1 costs associated with the development of equipment to he’ Instal led on hoard the v e ss e l s were’ assumed to he ref 1 Vc ted In the equ I pnle’nt pm ices It_l~ - —-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~ —‘--~~~~~~~: -c’-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ •~~~ -••-- -- - ~~ - -. • • • (2u~~ 1Gd) SS3N~ AI1D~tdd~ .LaN I 7.. 7 • -~~~---~~-~~~~ ~~- — • __ ._____•;• _ • • • During the i m p l e m en t a t i o n period annual O~ M costs for the Governmen t ins tallat ion were p~orated on a yearl y basis , e.g. for a five year implementation period , the O~M cos t s would incr ease by 2 0 percen t each year until the system was fully operational. • Annual O~M co sts for vess el eq ui pmen t were assumed to be 10 percent of the cumulative equipment costs. • For un iformity in the comparison of alternatives , 1990 was used as the termination date for the analysis. • Equipment will last 10 years before requiring replace- men t. • All vessel and government costs are passed onto the consum er/taxpayer. h. Implem entation Assumptions - After completion of the R~D period , implementation was assumed to e n t a i l a five year period . W i t h i n t h i s time frame , the f i r s t year c o n s i s t s of hearings and n o t i c e s of rule making relevant to the implementation and intro- duction of the system. The remaining four year s included the ac tual ins talla ti on , training and check out of the system . h ow- ev er , for purposes of th is analys is , implemen tation costs were assumed to be equally distributed over the 5 year period . The ves sel or user implementation was assumed to follow a two phase pattern. During the first year when the notices of rule making and hear ings are being conduc ted , no user purchases of equipmen t would be made. In the second and third years of the implemen tation period only 10 percent of the users would purchase the system in each year. During the fourth and fifth years of the implemen ta ti on per iod , the balance of the users would ac quire the system. This two step user implem entation reflects current exper ience with the implementation of the LORAN-C System and is indica tive of the desire of the users to delay system acquisition un til the latter portion of the implementation period . The above implementation assumptions appl y to all of the system alternatives except the satellite surveillance alternative 7-8 ~~~ IL_I’ ~ • •--- - • — --- • -z- —- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — - - . ~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ *‘T~ _________ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ r~~~~~~~ - • (System 6). Because of the international implications and the ex tended period of time required for treaties and rule making agreemen t s , the implementation period for this alternative was assumed to be six years. The first two years of this six year per iod consist of the policy and rule making period , the remain- ing four years would include installation , training and system acceptance. Government implementation costs were assumed to be spread un ifomm ilv throughout the entire six years. Vessel imple- men tation costs were assumed to beg i n d u r i n g years thr ee and four , with 10 percent of the vessels equipping each year. The remaining vessels (40 percent each year) would implem ent in years five and s i x . “ .1.3 Possible Strateg ies There are several po ss i ble s tr ateg ies tha t can be employed to determine th e “best” sy stem or combination of systems , based on different balances between i nv e s t m e n t in vessel equ i pment and investment in government facilities. Seven such possibilities are: a. lurth er Action - This is the Baseline System described in Sec ti on S. By imp l emen t ing the planned requirement of LORAN-C or equi valent i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n on a l l v e s s e l s greater than 16(1(1 gross tons , and requ i r i ng a backup rad ar on vessels greater tha n 10 , 000 gross tons , it can be a n t i c i p a t e d that c a s u a l t i e s w i l l he reduced by about 2 3%. The net e f f e c t iv e n e s s is d e f i n e d to he zero for the Base ! inc Sy stem in order to provi de a point of r e f e r e n c e . b . Ihi ~~h Vessel / Low Government __Investment Thi s extreme would re qu i re vessels to he o u t f i t t e d w i t h severa l d e v i c e s ; e . g . , collision avoid ance equipment on all large vessels , navig ation a l e r t and VHF/transponder equipments on a l l vessels , s c a n n i n g sound er s on a l l large tankers , and depth alerts on a l l tank vessels. The government’ s participation would he to issue minimum equipment spec i fi c a t ions , and pos si b l y to suppl~’ development funds for equip- ment not yet a v a i l a b l e . This is not considered a v i a b l e option , because of the f i n a n c i a l burden , espec ia l l y to s m a l l e r v e s s e l s . It also would have severe p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , because it would • t- ~~~, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --— ~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ affec t U.S. flag vessels first , and mi ght cause in ternational reper- cussions when its enforcement was extended to foreign flag vessels. c. Modera te Vessel/Low Government Investment - A less expen- sive , but less effective strategy would be to require an anti- coll ision aid (such as the VHF/transponder and a navigation alert system on all vessels. d. No Vessel/Mod erate Government Investment - This strategy is rep resen ted by the vessel passport system . It requires no further on-board equ ipmen t , and requ ires moderate government expen- ditures. e. No Vessel/Hig h Government Investment - This strategy requires surveillance without ship-board transponders in addition to the vessel passport system. It would require extensive radar installations . There would still be a problem with identifying • ships . Th e geograp hic coverage would be lim ited to abou t 25 mil es from por t and harbor en trances , so that significan t gaps in cover- age would occur . This strategy is actually less effective than the au toma tic mon itor ing sys tem because of the red uced covera ge . f. Low Vessel/High Government Investment - This strategy describes the automatic monitoring concept. It would require vessels to have special radio data encoding and decoding equipment , possibly at 1900-2000 kHz. Likewise , the U.S. Coast Guard would share some old LORAN-A and 2182 kHz emergency antennas and require new da ta encoding and decoding equi pmen t. Also , compu ter tech- niques would be required to collect the information from the various rece ivers and perform the requ ired mo nitor ing func ti ons. g. High Vessel/High Government Investment - This could take a varie ty of forms , the most reliable of which could be a satellite surveillance system . It would require a ship hoard trans- ponder (probably at L-band , abou t 1600 MHz) which could be interro- gated via sa tell ite , a set of satellites , and a shore s tati on to establish the position of each interrogated vessel. The advantage of this system over the automatic monitoring system is that the pos itional measurements would not depend on ship-hoard measurements. 7- 10 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~ ~~~~‘ - U The complexity of the data processing for p o s i t i o n e s t a b l i s h m e n t , and the costs of operating such a system are quite high . The c o s t/ e f f e c t i v e n e s s e s t i m a t e s of the s tr a t e g ies discussed above are shown in Table 7-1 and FIgure 7-2 . The costs presented in Table 7-1 are net present value , and are der i ved using the assumptions and methodology described in Section 7 . 1 . 2 . The vessel d i s t r i b u t i o n used to obtain the costs is the same as that of Section 5.4; the vessel population numbers are taken from Table 5-3. Strateg ies B and C in Table 7- 1 are subdivided to show the cont ribution of each item of equipment to the cost and effective - ne ss of the strategy . The net effectiveness of strategy C was found by add ing the two net effectiveness numbers; this is reason- able because of the fac t tha t the nav iga tion alert is primaril y ai med at preven t ing g rou nd ing s and ramm ings , wh ile the VHF/trans- ponder system is aimed at preventing collisions. The High Vessel ! Low Government strategy can not be so simply treated . The anti- coll isio n sys tems (coll isi on avo idance , radar per imeter detection dev ice and VHF/transponder) overlap in function and provide a comb ined net effectiveness of between 13% (the largest) and 24% (the total ) of the three. A median figure of 19% is assumed for the combined effectiveness. The other three equipment items in this strategy (navigation alert , scann ing sounder , depth alert) are d i fferen t in func ti on , since they are ai med a t ground ings , ra ther than coll i sions. The y overlap each o ther in func tio n an d p rov ide a comb ined net effectiveness of between 11% (the largest ) and 24% (the total). Again a median f i gure is assumed , in this case 18% . Adding 19% and 18% gives 37% for an estimate of combined net effec tiveness. In F i gure ‘-2 , the vessel owner and government costs (present value) of each strategy , taken from Table 7 - 1 , are plotted against the casualties prevented by that strategy . Consistent with the implementatio n assumptions made in Section ~‘.l . 2 , the casualties preven ted take into account partial system effectiveness during the five year implementation period . For strateg ies requiring add i- ti onal equi pmen t on board the vessels (Strateg ies B , C , F , and C), 7- il — .—,---——- —~~-- • - • ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I—. ; . —. ~ • •• . • -~~ . - -~~- •~~ •~: U ~~~~~ • 1 - • - - . -, 4) — - - •‘~~~~~~ ‘. ~-.- .-i - •‘- I— c ~~- •.- ‘~ ,-‘ — I’ — — ‘— .-_. -. i - - ‘ ‘ — ‘- ‘ t—. •‘- — ~‘ —. ‘ 4’ LI.. -~ • 4 , . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - ______ • C z -. .4 I 4-. — F 4, •~‘ ~ - 0 0 • ~~- ~~- ,~, - - — —. — - - 0 C 0 C C’ I 0 C Cf • - -~ - • 4) -C - e r I . . ’t - - J f ’ -I--” ~~ o U ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ • - • (I .,, -~~ ~ Cl. I- ~ ~~ 4 4 ~‘ N - •~ 44 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 4 4 4 ~~~ •-.~~•— • -.~~~ -I - .4 II~ -. • - •I’ -~~ . ~ ‘— ~— •. ‘— • N 4’ . -.- 4’ - — • f C ” 4’ - . . . - . . C’ 4.. 7-12 - - - —•-- - — • —“—- ~~~~—,~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~ -:- ~~~ ‘-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — I ~~~ ~~ •~~~~~~ ~~- &, — C- C) 9- C C ) ‘~ U — .-. 4 , 4 , 44 - ~~~o ~~- ~4) C * - ’ ~~ — -~ — LI.. 4) .4) —~~~~ .- C O LU cc [ - ~4) .~~~~~ ~_) -~ .-..O 0 ‘- ‘0 If) ~~~C 4 ). — 4) — CI 4) C C ) ~~‘ ~ LU C) Cf. )1~ ) 9-. )4 . C-LI 44 4)) — C 4. 4) 14 ‘C C I 4) UI____ ~~~~~~ •- 0 ~~~~~ .~~ U -~~~~ -I 4, 4-I ~~ 4, 4 4 4 ) 44 ~~_C U 0 “ C — 0~ I - ~~ C-. ~4~O 0 - ‘ 0 :-~~C) 4. ~~. N ~~~~~ CI LU I I I I I I I “s c- N 0 C- 0 0 0 C- 0 C- 41. 1)-I C 0 4,) C- — — (sill I ~~~~ JO SU O ! j j i w ) (IfllV\ 1N15 Ill,I) ISO.) 1V .1,o.1 7-13 -- .• - ~~ — ~~~~~~ -‘~~~~~~~~~~~ • ,— ~_i~ -~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — - . • - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -...~~~~ -•- :ero e f f e c t iveness is assumed d u r i n g the f i r st two years , ten , twenty , and thirty percent of the net effectiveness is assumed dur- ing years three through five , respec tively, and 100% of the net effec tiveness is assumed thereafter. In strategies P and E which require only government action , zero effectiveness is assumed dur- ing the first year , and an increase of twen ty percent each year thereaf ter , w ith 100% of the net effectiveness beyond the sixth yea r in addition to the basic strategies , an orderly evolutionar y implementation schedule is crucial: the first steps should have a maximum return in effectiveness , w it h as l itt le d evelopmen t r i sk as po ssible. I~1ex ibi 1ity should be built in to allow for local factors to be given full consideration . It should be possible to add capa h i1it~ - w ithout requiring wholesale reorientation of the s\’st em. There are clearly several approaches which could he taken. In the next section a plan is presented which appears to best meet the criteria above , w ith a maximum of user acceptabilit y . It may well happe n t h a t the initial system implementation will prove more effec- tive than predicted by the methods used here. This could come about by voluntar y purchase of on-hoard equipment , hei ghtened pub l i c and crew c on sciousnes s of t he o i l spill pr oblem , h igher standards of shipboard instrumentation , and by better training and certification. If this hi ghly desirable state of affairs comes about , there should he no need to imp l ement a more comprehensive sstem . - .2 MAJOR RECO~~tENDAT 1 ONS The major recommendations center around immediate implementa- tion of the vessel passport system (including the first option) de scribed in detail in Section S. 2 . . Th is is the No Vessel/ Moderate Government Investment strategy . It has the dis tinct ad- vantages of requiring a minimum of vessel and shore station costs , being largely within the present authorit y of the Coast Guard , ~nd mak ing maximum use of presen t lv available facilities. lt also serves as a base fro m wh i ch to expand c ap a b i 1 it ~ - as i t is needed. :4 •-~~~~--~-..~~.-• ~~~_ • w’~~ . ~~~~~~~ - w —- -z CrI~~~~~~~ -,~~ _ -~ _ ~~~~~ • • - rhe s s t e m would be i n i t i a l l y appl ied to loaded t a n k e r s , t a n k - barges , and ships c a r r y i n g ha :ardous cargo bound for a United S t a t e s port . i’hev would he re qui red to check in about 24 hours before arr iv ing in interna I voters , an d ag o in at ahou t one hou r Out • and perform an instrument c r o s s - c h e c k with a RACON reference. Once the pilot has assumed the con , the v e s se l would he off the sy s t e m , it is expected that 90-95% of the ’ port cal is would be rout inc - the’ en t i r e communications exchange’ would take 5-10 m i n u t e s of the b r i d g e o f f i c e r ’s t i m e . Severa l s e r v i c e s would be provided , services w h i c h other vessels might like to have as well. At the outer check-in call , sh i ps would be given wea ther f orecas ts , traffic information , and not ice of any unusual outages or condi t ions. At the inner check- in . they would be g iven i n f o r m a t i o n on c u r r e n t s , t i d e s , wind , and wea t her , LORAN-C correct ions , notice of buoy changes or other un usual cond it ions , and traffic conditions. The’ local shore sta- t ion would a l s o ensure that a pilot had been contacted , and an a p p r o p r i a t e meeting place agreed upon . These and other considera- t i o n s are discussed in d e t a i l in Section 5.2 .2. These servic es could be extended to other large vessels such as bulk c argo c a r ri e r s and container ships on a v o l u n t a r y b a s i s . In a s m a l l percentage of the cases , la c k 01’ charts , ma l func- t i o n i n g gear , or a had h i s t o ry of violations would r e s u l t in restrictions being placed on the vessel’ s entry . Tankers leaving U.S. refineries , or o t herwise leaving a (I. S. port , pa r t i a I lv or ful lv loaded , would a l s o ho requi red to check in 24 hours ahead. Somo c o l l i s i o n p r o t e c t i o n would be provided by a broa dcast on VHF h the local shore operator , w a r n i n g vessels that a t a n k e r was approaching or depart ing and gi v ing expected t i m e s (opt ion one . S e c t i o n 5 . 2 . 2 ) . The presence of the RACONS would also reduce collision risk 1w helping to ensure that any vessel , not Just tankers , can get a radar fix on a known point . The general infor- m at ion provided to the large vessel s can be p i cked up by o ther v e s s e l s as w e l l , who can b e n e f i t 1w i t . 7-15 4 .. . - . - - -)~~~~~~~~~~ . 14.. •‘ -• -~~ The vessel passport system has flexibility in its application. While major ports w i l l have local watchstanders , no t all por t s need them . Ports w i t h low casualty histories and infrequent port calls by tankers may not; for t a n k e r s destined for those p orts no second check- in would be necessary . Perm ission would he granted at the ini tial check in to proceed into port. Where Vessel Traffic Serv i ce s (VT S) are loca ted , one of the VTS watchstanders could incorporate the local offshore function into his duties. Guide- l ines governing pilot boarding stations and procedures , the treat- men t of deep-draft vessels , and the treatment of equipment defects can be oriented to local conditions; pilots , sh ip mas ters , Captain s of the por t , and shipp ing companies should be consulted in establish- ing realistic guidelines. RACONS are important in cross-checking onhoard navigation instruments and providing an unambiguous reference point. They are presen tl y used in Alaska ; two are in the Straits of Juan de Fuca , two in the Gulf of Mexico , and one in Por tland , Maine. A l ist of recommended locations for other RACONS is given in Table G-3 , Append ix G. Their usage is crucial to the success of the system : 80% of the casualties took place at ni ght or in v isi h ili - ties of less than two miles. These are the conditions under which radar is routi nel y used for nav igat ion , and where RACONS would he mos t helpful. The vessel passport sys tem can be implemented in stages: a, Establish a central facility: provide data terminal access to the Marine Safety Information System (IsISIS); tie into the Coast Guard communications network precisel y like the AMVER system does. h . Purchase and install RACONS at the a p p r o p r i a t e b eat ions. j c . Establish local stations at major ports: provide ac cess to and from the central control facilit y ; where VTS ’s don ’t exist , establish a VHF channe l ( e .g . , channel 12) as the s h o r e/ s h i p ire- I I- ’ - - - . . - _ ~‘w.’ ..___ _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ..— .--—- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~‘“ ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - quency (this does not need to be exclus keiy d e d i c a t e d ) , and pro- vide shore—based communication gear; establish local guidelines for pilo t transfer , and for res tr i c t ions to he impo sed in case of equipment detects. d. The e f f e c t i v e n e s s of usin g the vessel passport system to reduce c a s ua l t i e s is e s t i m a t e d to he about 4 0 %. It is similarl y expected to reduce the number of major o i l s p i l l s b y 40% . If the frequency of massive spills (e.g. , g r e a t e r than I ,000 ,000 gal ions , e~r about 4000 tons) is assumed to he once ever” 10 “ears , this system is expected to i-educe the frequenc y to once every I — veai’s Howev er , there is good reason to believe the effectiveness w i l l he hi gher , because it w i l l discourag e “rogue ” sh i ps fr om setting out for U.S. ports in the f i r s t p l a c e . The Argo Merchant was kep t out of Ca nad ian w a t e r s b y e d i c t of t h e i r l~C:\REG system , which is also a check- in sy stem (See Appendix F ) . It ’s l i k e l y that the capta in of the Amoco Cadi would have radioed the Coast Guard of her p l i g ht , if she had lost powe r near the U.S. coast. In certain c i r c u m s t an c e s , the’ C a p t a i n of the Port may d i r e c t the use of tugs to prevent imminent t h r e a t of danger to the U.S. shoi-el inc . However , on the Hig h Seas the c o n s t r a in t s imposed by the i n t e r - vent ion Convent ion ( INCO , 1 9~~9) w i l l have to he met . W h i l e the invest i gat io n of the Amoco Cadi : disaster is not comp l e t e , the accounts ava ii able suggest that seve ra I hours elapsed between the t i m e the t a n k e r lost power and the t inc the tug assistance wa s rendered. Th is kind cf dela y mi ght have been avoided , and t irne’lv ass is tance adm in is tei-ed us i ng a vessel i~as sport svs tern . Once the vessel passport system is set up in its i n i t i a l c o n— I igurat ion , a limited form of survei I lance can be added in some b eat ions. The D•i rect i o n — F i n d i n g (1W ) techn i que can he used , upon request from a vessel , to provide a position fix from shore hv m o n i t o r i n g the v e s s e l ’ s VHF t r a n s m i s s i o n . Bearing inform ation from two s t a t ions on shore can provide f i x e s w i t h an accuracy of about 0.5 m i l e if p r o p e r l y s i t e d and c a l i b r a t e d . T h i s would be a u s e f ul addi t iona I inst rumen t where RACONS can ’t he p laced 15— 20 m i l e s from shore; it also could he helpfu l where smaller ve ssels are like l~’ to s t r ay i n t o t r a f f i c l a n e s . ~- 1 — ________ - -~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - “ “ ~~~~~~~ - ~~~‘~~: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~- A f t e r the system has been in operation for two ye ars or so , it should be evaluated to assess the e f f e c t s on c a s u a l t i e s - their frequency and l o c a t i o n . If the r e s u l t s are s a t i s fa c t o r y near the major p o r t s , but not near the minor ones , the sy stem could he expanded in i t s local s t a t i o n coverage. Gui del i nes fo r each l ocal area should be reviewed and m o d i f i e d . A suggested i m p l e m e n t a t i o n schedule is shown in Figures 7-3 and 7~~4~ - . 3 HIGH EFFECTIVENESS OPT I ON If the U.S. Cca st Guard decides to attemp t to achieve the h igher effectiveness of the more sophisticated strategies (e, f , and g), the automatic monitoring system (e.g., Low Vesse1/}ligh Government Investment) is the recommended approach of three strate- gies. Satellite systems place a heavy financial burden on smaller v essel s . Radar systems don ’t provide vessel identity. $ It is conventional wisdom that radar surveillance or its equivalent is necessary to establish ships ’ positions accuratel y . The argument is premised on the usually unstated assumptions that: (1) shi pboard equipment is not reliable in determining position , and (2) disaster is hig hly likely if a ship either fails to report information because of an equi pment outage or communication problem , o r repor ts erroneo us info rma ti on (e.g. , LORAN-C cycle slips). Neither assumption is , in fact , correct. Shipboard equipment is q u i t e r e l i a b l e , and the accuracy is quite adequate. If a loss of n a v i g a t i o n data from a particular vessel occurred , the oil spill risk of that vesse l w ould be reduced to the r i sk of the ves sel passport system , which is still quite safe . Cycle slips are the most likely source of error in LORAN-C: they occur abruptly and for l im ited periods of t ime . If a cy cl e sl ip occurr ed , the shore computer would immediately detect the change , which w ould be seen as a 10 microsecond jump of one of the reported time coordinates; thus the system can accommodate these errors. Radar would he justified only where traffic density is so heavy that traffic flow (i.e., con tr ol arr ival ti mes and spac ings) is bei ng managed from shore. For these reasons and for reasons of cost , the automatic monitoring system is the recommended approach. 7-18 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - —.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - — —~~~----- .-‘-- . - - ‘- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -TT L~~~~~_ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ “~~~~ - ~~v- -~~~ ~~~~— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ 0’. — I- I—’ 00 C’ ‘-4 00 0’~ x C)) L1~ 00 Cl) “—. C~ >. — 0 0.. ‘a) 00 Cl) -4 C~ Cl) -4 _______________________________ 0. ‘a) — U ~ 0 ~l) C’ -4 — 00 0~ -4 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ —‘~I~ ! hb 4-’ C/) ~ ‘a) bO~~ O~-4 0~~E ~~~~~~ ...$~~~~~Q . Cl) ~~~~~~~~~ I U ) s-i 0 ~~~~~~ I I ~~~C~~ 0 C ~ ~~~ ‘a) 4-4 ~ “-4 U ~ U) .,-I 4J ‘,-4 ‘-4 c~ , — ~~~— — ‘ . bO 4-’ -l CL. ~~ 0 ~~~ Cl) ‘-4 tfl 5-1 ~~~ 4,’ 1-4 0 4-1 ‘a) 4 0 0 4-’ ‘a) ‘a) 44 >.. ~ C’a 0 bI) ‘4-1 C~~ ~~ U 4-I .-4 (‘a ‘l E ~~~~ O”~ o~~ U ~~~ 5 ‘a) ~~-4 O ’ UC’i ~~ C) ~~ O U~~~~’~4 ’-I~~ 4 - ’- O - - 4 ~~~~~~ 4-) ,-4 E ~< 0 Q~’.4~~ ~~ 4-5 4J ‘a) 1 .I~ C) C ) .4 4.~~~ .,.4 4.$ • C’a C/ )C ’a ~. 4-’ GJ 4-’ U ~ ~ ~~4-’ ~~ ~fl E0~~~ n.E~~-4 CC rM 4-’~~~~~,-l el) ‘a) ~ 0 u~~~~~Ch ’ ~ 4 0 O $-~~~~~ ( ~ ~‘ p-.. ~~. C) ~~. U U i-’ .-$ CC ~~ * U ~~ 0 ~~~$ ~~ ~~~ ~~ ., ~~~~~~ E C) 5-~ . 4 C/) O .-i~~ 0 CC ’-4~~ cC~~ ’4 0~~~~~u 0 4-’ ’-I ‘a) 04-4 0 4-’ 4-’44EL ) CL. 4-’ ~~~~~~~~. Z p - 4 I~, ~~~Q) ~~ ,-4 ~~ ‘a~ ~~~~~~~ ~s. 0 0 0 0 CC CC 0 U ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~E ~~~~~~ .~~~~~~~~~4 (’a C) 4 4-’ l-. I l ) U . C) ~~O~~~~W > - 4 E C )~~ E U)~~~~ CC~~ ~~~~4- 4-~ 3~~~~~ .Cl) C)C) E —4 C)”-4 D~~~~~C) CC ~~~~~~ s-i ‘~~~Cj ’i~ UC ) &) ,-4 U) ’afl—4 .~~4 ~~~~4.~~iLa 1-. 0~~~.’-I U) • —$ CC 4~5 0 0 4 -’ i-.~-’ > * I IJ.. 0 0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CC ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 4~5 I S C.) U ‘a, C) . . . . .~~ . • . . 0 • . • 0 CC .0 U ~~~ CC .0 U ~~~ CC .0 U _ _ .4 C~-.; 7- 19 - - _ _ —- _ —‘~~~~-,—--- - - ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ 7-~~~~’~~ — — - —- .‘— ~~ —— — - ‘-‘ ‘- — F F- --- I I C’ I I ~~ —4 I I C) ..-4 4 i-’ ’- ’ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - ~~ VS CC C) 4-’ 0 CC ‘ ~~ 4-’ E C C U~ 4~1 ~ 0 ‘a~ x C) m C)~~~~~- - 4 - ’. ~~ ~. ‘a) C) CC 4-’ -”+’I -’ C) CC C) 0. 4-’ E ~) V S ” 4 ~~~ E I’-. E 0 ‘ 0, 4,’ . . 0 Q, 4-I >-.~~~ U C ) 0, 4-’ O 0. 1- - ~~~ “ ~~~~~-I O C/) 0 C )E ~~~‘~~4 5/) 0 - ,-. ~~ 0 o 0 ’& K 0~~~ E Q . 0. O~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~ (4,4 4) ~‘a .—‘, ~ +~ 1-. C) s/ ~ 0 o~ 0 4,5 ~~ CC C) “ ‘ ~~ (4.4 U ~~ bO C) ~ C) ~~~ —4 00 C) E CC 5L~ ~~ C) LL-i 0,~ ”4 0, ~ ci) ~~ ~~ C) ~ 0) 0) U 0 “4 “ 0 4~4~~~ ‘~4~~~ ~~0 ‘ C ~~~~~~ ‘.‘4~~~ U ~) ‘.-4 ‘+~ o ’~i CC 4.’ ~ — ‘ ~~~ C) 0 .0 CC CC C) .~~~ ~1) CC ‘4-~ 0 “ CC ‘—l .0 ‘.-$ 0 C ) U~~~ C C I . . 00.04 ~~ cd $-. CC i-’ -~-s 4~~~ ’a) 0 -s ~a. C) .,( ~~ --4 ,-‘4 sis ,-I .‘ E -4 r-~ CC U ‘a) CC ~~ LI /5 LI) C) 0.U C)~~~ C) C C L I S C C C C ‘a)~~~ r-,4 4 ) 4 ) Cl) “4 “i 4.’ -- -4 ~~ (/5 ‘— , 4 C~~ ~. CC 4) 0 0 ‘-‘4 C ‘-4 0. • CC -4 -4 0 U ‘—I ~~4) C)~~~~~~--’ ’~-4 ~~ C) C) 0.&) .—i .o C C C C .i —4 I-. ~~~ I—’ ~— 4-’ 4-’ 0~ I-. ~s. --1 ci) U ~-‘ CC “4 0 - ~~~ 1-. ~~~~~ 1-. 5/5 0 o - - ~~~ —‘ -‘ CC C) ~ ~ ‘-I ~~ .-4 C”-1 U)~~ U C C~~~~0 . ’-~ #” CC . . IL, . . ~‘ U .0 . 0 0 5/’ ..~~~~C) • . LI) - —~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~----~-i~~. -—--s - - ,‘ - - - . ~~~~~~~~~~~ -.- - ~---—--- ~ -- ,— ~~-- — ~~-,,,-i - “ e ‘‘ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~— -.:-— ~~~~~ ; ‘ ~ Fach p art I c I p~ t I ng vessel would be requ i red to have a (ommun cat ions u n i t on the b r i d g e , c o n s i s t lug of IIF—S SB commun l e a t ions , encoder/decoder module , and i n t e r t’acos to the LORAN C (or Sd tel l i t el n a v i g a t i o n Inst rument , the m a st er gvi ’o , and the shi p ’ s log . In the conceptual des I gu (Sect I on ~ .2 . 3 and Append i x C) • tout’ c h a n n e l s are used: one for dat a t ~..n isni I cs Ofl -111 (1 %~ (~~~~~ sp~~ iou , and th r e e f o r voice comunun i cat ton . At th e in it I a I check — in th e ve~~se I mas t er would he asked to turn t hi s equ I pment on , and t o l d w h i c h voice channe l t o tune to. Since the range o t the 2000 kIl~ cemnuin icat ions svs tern vat ’ es Item 100 — 00 in l ies ci- more , I would enc orn ~~~~ the o t t shore r egi ens where a ll ct the dat a b ase ca cu a It te ’- oc~’turres j . hut it won ld not u su a l lv be sut ’ fic - l e nt to reach an incoming t an k e r (and ce rt a in lv not a f a s t c ent a i tier sh Ip ) a I I he .~4 hour check — i n . i’he shi p won I ~l t m n sm it hem dat a st ream about $ evet ’v ha It ’ hour tint i I she came w it ii in range o t the shore s’ st (sill . At’ter t h at t h e shore sy s t e m w ould cent rd sh ip I r ausmi ss tens by tnt errog at ions . (No te hat the wet - k load on the wa t chs t a n d er s I s minim a l .1 In most cases these ¼’ommun tea t ion ch an n e l s woul d be used inste ad ct’ VHF. Thus the \‘IIF channel s won Id he freed up as the new stat tons are in’~tal led. Aga in • a I in I ted su i’ve I l l a n e sei. v ice can be i n st i tut ed t’oi’ serv ice on request . u s i n g shoi’ e based di t’ee t ion I I nd in g on \‘IIF t t- ansm i ~~~~ ions . 1’here appeai- s to be no need icr such serv ice be ond li me et s g u t ranges (I S— 30 in l i e s ) , so th at 1W— lug on t he VHF t i-an~~m ss tons i s adequ ate . Th i s I s va I nab l e t’or I cat in g v e s s el ~ ci thei ’ unequipp ed w i t Ii the men i t or lug gear or e \1e r i enc tug out age’~ the imp I ern en t a t itsil of th i s s’ st em shoti Id b e g i n w I t It the imp IC ’ ment at ion of the vessel p8s$poi ’ t svst em. At the same t line • deve I °p - men t should beg In en the de t a I ted d~ s I g1 and t’abr I c at ton o t the c oinmun Ic at i on~ and dat a t mau sm I ss ion and i’ecept ion equipment . ‘l’he des i gn el t he computer equ i pinelt I I s more st ma I gh t fo i’wa md and it 1~~~~~~~~~ - - ~~~- - - The measured speed t rem the ship ’s log i s n o t o r i o u s l\ ln a cc uu ’at e and wou ld no t be ve i led en for p r e d i c t i n g t uttn ’ e sh ps p o s it i oil s - - ~~~~ - S ~— 1l I -- S ‘4 .‘~. a~~~~~ . - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~-~~~- ~- _ , ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — - ‘~‘—~~- — - - -—-~~~~ - - - can use the same archi t ec t ure as is employed in VTS ; one signifi- can t difference here is the requirement for real-time interfacing w ith the data transmission and reception equipment. Maximum use should be made of present 2182 kHz emergency communications antennas and decomm issioned LORAN-A antenna facilities. To provide adequa te collision avoidance service and adequate oil Pollu tion prevention in general , a large popula tion of vessels should he required to have the equipment : vessels of 1600 gross tons or more and ocean-going tugs which pull barges should all be covered under the rule making which accompanies the system. A sugge sted implementation schedule is shown in Figure 7-5 . .4 OTHER RECOt~QVIENDEI) ACT IONS 7 .4 . 1 introduction Training , T r a f f i c Separa t ion , A i d s - t o - N a v i g a t i o n , and Pilot- age are areas wi thin the aegis of the Coast Guard that should , and do , undergo cons tant rev i ew . In the course of reviewing the 78 c a sua l t ies , a number of issues became apparen t where present prac- tices can be improved. They are discussed below , and in Sub- sec t ions 1, 4, 5 , 6, 20, and 23 of Sec t ion s 5.2 and Appendix 1.2 and Subsections 2 , 5, 6 and 7 of S e c t i o n 5.3. These actions should he taken even if the major recommenda- tion s are not followed. “ .4.2 Training and Licen sin & a. L icensing examinations and requ i rements should include demonstrated p r o f i c i e n c y w i t h radars , depth sounders , LORAN- C , and other navi gation aids. h , R e l i c e n s i n g should require at least a course in , and p r e f e r a b l y demonstrated p r o f i c i e n c y w i t h , the above instruments and procedures. c. All tug p i l o t s operating w i t h ocean-going barges c a r ry i n g oil , fuel or hazardous cargo should have s t r i n g e n t t r a i n i n g require- ments comparable to those that apply to o f f i c e r s of sma U tankers . 7-22 - ‘ -~~~~ .M* L - - ] - ~~-.~~—-—- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (-..~_ _~_ -~~~‘ _ -_ _ - — ~~~~‘ 00 00 0”. -I 4’- 00 04 -4 00 15,1 04 — ‘U GO U -~~~o-. CI) >‘ - 4 __________________ Z0 -4 4 ) 0 0 F-. .“1 0 4 1 I F-’ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ i z 4) 4.’ 0, ~ 4 ~~~ LI ‘~~ .CC 0 I-U 4.’ 0’.-’ CC ‘-4 0 ~ ‘ CC 41) -~ --4 US I-U (~ ‘1) U) ‘-4~~~ t~~”— 0 . 4 .’ CC 4) 04 ) • ~~4 C~ 4~’ U “( ~ 4 (~ 0 I-’ 0,~~-4 US 4-4 ~~CC.CC o-.4 O ’.-~ ~~o 0 0 4) 4) ‘-4 0 4) 0441’) .4 4-’ ‘~~ — ..4 , ~~ • •“— .-~ 4j ’.4 ~~~~ .-4 4)0 0 C C ‘5. ~ 0. uC IIS ’~~ .0~~. 4) ). - 4) i-s O ( I ’) ’ s O~~~’~ >-. V C C ~6 e-’ -.4 4 ) 0 . P”) ‘ 4 4) 4) 41) ~~ CC IA, VS IL, ~ 5 41) 0. 4-’ 4) .-’ .-’ ~ i’ t’— 4J )., - .-4 . . ~~4) Ci (/’)~~ CC .0 U ’ ~ 4) I, ’. —4 11. Ifl J ‘ - “ 4 -’ 1- ~ ‘.- - ‘-‘r- ~ -p4..- .~~ - - -- ‘ ~~ ‘ ~r : . * •~~~~~~~~~~ — - -‘ ——~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — -- - — ,- --~ - -—~‘- — ‘ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ T ’ )1’~ -sA*’-~’ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — ~~ T jj~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ d. The requiremen ts for obtaining a pilot’ s li cense should be standardized in all U.S. states and territories. e. The U.S. Coa st Guard should continue to lobby in IMCO for s t r i c t and uniform global s tandards of t ra ini ng and lic en si ng for o f f i c e r s of all ocean going tank vessels. 7 .4.3 Traffic Separation Traff ic separation schemes are known to he effective in reduc- ing collisions , especially in meeting or end-on situations. There are fur ther ac ti ons wh ich can be taken , wh ich would increase the ir e f f e c t i v e n e s s , and provide some of t h e i r benefits in fa i rways. Fairways are not t r a f f i c separation schemes (See Section 5 . 2 . 5 ) , but can provide some of the same protection . Procedures i n v o l v i n g Gulf fa irways will require coordination with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The following rules are re commended: a. In fairways and t r a f f i c separation schemes , vessels ou t - side of them but w i t h i n one m i l e should avoid courses p a r a l l e l to the boundaries but counter to prevailing traffic flow (this avoids dilemmas posed by s t a r b o a r d — t o - s t a r b o a r d p a s s i n g s ) . b. In fairways in the Gulf of Mexico , vessels should stay to the ri g ht except when overtaking (this also helps avoid star- board - to-starboard passing) . c. Vessels should cross fa i rways at nearly right angles ( thi s avo ids confusion of intended ship course) To the extent that these go beyond COLREGS and IMCO resolutions , further IMCO action would be appropriate. In addit ion , i t is recommended that in confined areas like bays and Long Island Sound , a study should be made of narrow passageways to see if one-way traffic can be instituted without caus ing undue delays to vessels navi ga ti ng in the oppos ite d irec t ion. - 7 - 2 4 - —‘II., 7.4.4 A ids-to-Navi ga tion The U.S. Coast Guard system of a i d s - t o - n a v i gation is one of the mos t comprehens ive in the world . In spite of t h i s , there are a few areas where improvements can be made (see Section 5.3.6) . They were i d e n t i f i e d in the analysis of the c a s u a l t i e s . a. Buoy i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . There are several places where buoys w i t h i n two miles of each other have the same l i g ht s i g n a l s and genera l visual appearance from a d i s t a n c e . Means should be explored to remove these a m b i g u i t i e s, b. Buoy locations. E s p e c i a l l y in areas where deep d r a ft vessels operate , buoy placements should be reviewed to ensure that in the worst possible p o s i t i o n of a buoy in its watch c i r c l e , the deepest draft vessel can safely s k i r t a reef or shoal while passing close abeam of the buoy. c. The use of RACONs should be expanded. This theme was noted repeatedly in conversations w i t h vesselmasters . RACON s pro- vide a uniqueness of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n that can be established at 8- 20 miles range . They should be located at entrances to traffic separa ti on lanes , on lig htships , near . fairway i n t e r s e c t i o n s , and on selected oil p latforms bordering fa i rways . d. Oil platforms. The Coast Guard should explore means with oil compan ies to get latitude and longitude displayed on oil plat- forms , preferably on all four s ides . This would es tabl ish their pos itions on the charts and provide invaluable fixes for smaller vessels not equipped with an electronic navigation instrument , and would provide cross-reference points for those which are so equipped. * 7 . 4 . 5 Pilot Transfer Fully one t h i r d of all tanker groundings occurred in prepara- tion for p i l o t boarding. None resulted in oil s p i l l s , probably due to the low impact energ ies involved at slow speeds and the soft This suggestion was profferred by Captain Arthur M. Knight of the Boston Marine Society. 7-25 t _ _ _ _ _ _ —- • • ~~-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - ‘ -W~~~- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ bot tom in some of the areas where they occurred , plus good luck (ma jor sp ills do occur at slow speeds). While casualties of this type are less likely to cause spills , the situation is still serious. The following recommenda tions are erfered : a. Deep-draf t tank vessels approaching Delaware and Chesa- peake Bays should be met by pilots before they enter the precau- tionary areas . Procedures should be reviewed with the local pilots ’ associa tion to develop guidelines which accomplish this without endangering the pilots. b. The pilot board ing point in Guayanilla and Tallaboa Bays in Puerto Rico should be moved out beyond the sea buoy to provide greater margins of safety . c. Pilo t standards and training requirements should be s trengthened in general (see recommenda ti on d , Sec tion 7 .4 . 2 ) , and should apply in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. d. Coordination in some form by the Coast Guard should be pursued. This is provided in the recommended Vessel Passport Sys- tem (see Section 7.2). 7.4.6 Anti-Collision Aids The Coast Guard should pursue a modes t program to reduce the probabili ty of collisions. While collisions have been rare in U.S. offshore waters , there are still improvements that can be made: a. The U.S. Coast Guard should lobby at IMCO for a brid ge- to-br idge frequency to be moni tored by vessels at all times for encounter coordina tion . b. Min imum equipment standards for sophisticated collision avoidance aids should be issued , and should require automa ti c target acquisition for use in offshore coastal waters. Such equip- men t should eventually be required on large tankers bound for U.S. ports. c. Minimum equipmen t standards should be issued for radar perimeter detection devices for use by smaller vessels. This 7-26 - ~~~~~~~~~ - _ _~~~~~~~~. -~~~~ _____ “_~~~~:_‘• ~~~~~ _ •~~~~~~~~~‘ _ ~~~‘- ~~~‘ . - ~~~~~~~~~~ _ -‘ ‘ ~~~~~~ _ _ ‘~~~~~~ -.----• ~ - - ‘-- ~ - ---:- -- - - - should eventually be required on all tank vessels bound for U.S. ports which are not equipped with the more sophisticated collision avoidance aids. d. Transponder system concepts should be developed and tested. If successful , such systems should eventually become required equipment on all commercial vessels (e.g., those greater than 1,000 gross tons). 7.5 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS This section reviews United States jurisdiction under inter- national law to carry out the “vessel passport” sys tem described in this chapter , and the authority of the U.S. Department of Trans- por tation, the department in which the Coast Guard is located , to implemen t this system . Because it is well established that a soverei gn state has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate vessels of its registry or flying its flag wherever they may be on the high seas ,’ this analysis will focus primarily on United States juris- dic tion over foreign flag vessels. The vessel passport system described in Section 7.2 would establish vessel reporting and equipment requirements and port entry conditions applicable to tank vessels en route to U.S. ports. Jur isdiction to establish such requirements and conditions lies within the broad authority of a port state to set conditions for the entry of vessels into its ports.2 The United States has previously asserted this type of jurisdiction in promulgating vessel conduc t and equipment-related requirements applicable to vessels entering its ports in order to promote vessel safety and avoidance of ocean pollu tion . For example , U.S. Coast Guard regulations govern ing the design , equipment , and operat ions of tank vessels of 1Myres McDougal and Will iam Burke , The Public Order of the Oceans, Ch. 8, esp. pp. 1011-12 (1962) (hereafter referred to as McDougal and Burke); see , ar ticles 5 and 6, 1958 Geneva Convention on the Aigh Seas, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 11962] 13 IJ.S.T. 2312 (entered in force for the United States Sept. 30 , 1962). 2McDou~al and Burke ,supra note 1 , at 107- 108 and references cited therein at notes 48-53. 7-27 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — -— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ —- ‘-‘----- ~ - ---- ~--- -——------—--- - - - 150 gross tons or more are a p p l i c a b l e to U.S. - reg istered tank vessels and to forei gn tank vessels which “en ter the navi gable waters of the U n i t e d States to engage in commercial service. ”3 Vessels which call at U.S. ports must give at least 24 hours advance notice of t h e i r port a r r i v a l to the c o g n i z a n t Captain of the Port. 4 The Coast Guard has recently proposed that vessels of 1600 gross tons or more c a l l i n g at U. S. ports be equipped w it h and required to use LORAN-C or equivalent electronic p o s i t i o n fixing devices meeting c e r t a i n performance s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . 5 The scope of U.S. port state a u t h o r i t y under customary i n t e r - national law was discussed in detail in connection w i t h Senate action on S. 682 , the proposed “Tanker and Vessel Safety Act of 197;’ .” This b i l l would amend the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 , 33 U . S . C . ~~~l 2 2 l - l 2 2 7 (1972 S u p p .) , to improve Federal - • regulation of navigation and vessel safety in order to better pro ’ tect the marine environment. In Senate committee hearings on this measure , the U.S. Department of State endorsed reliance upon port state j u r i s d i c t i o n as a basis for the r e g u l a t i o n of forei gn vessels. Ambassador E l l i o t Richardson stated: “It is of great importance to d i s t i n g ui s h here between assertions of j u r i s d i c t i o n over v essels tha t are not v i s i t i n g our ports , and the application of our unquestioned a u t h o r i t y to e s t a b l i s h conditions for use of American ports which can and w i l l provide considerable protection even before vessels arrive in our ports and a f t e r they leave . “The former impl ies similar control over American ships by coastal countries they may never vis it or even wish to visit , con trol tha t can inevitably be abused. The latter simply leaves up to each country the question of how 333 C.F.R. par t 157 and § 157 .01(a), promulgated pursuant to 46 U .S.C. § 391a (“Tank Vessel Act ”). 433 C.F.R. part 124 , promul gated pursuant to SO U.S.C. § 191. Depend ing on ve ssel speed , appl i ca tion of this requ i remen t could require tha t no tice be g iven when a vessel is several hundred miles offshore . 4 ~42 F . R . S9012 (Nov. 14 , 1 977). • - — ~~~~~~~~~-c~ -~~~~~ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - — wr~~~~~~~~~~~r. to e x er c i s e i t s e x i s t i n g rig ht to decide wh en it wishes to p e r m i t ships to v i s i t i t s p o r t s . “Ou r concern in t h i s r e g a r d i s s u f f i c i e n t l y weighty that we have decided a g a i n s t any reference to s p e c i f i c zones along our coast , even if the e f f e c t is l i m i t e d to v e s s e l s ent ering or 1ea~’ ing our p o r t s . “~~ The b i l l w h i c h the Senate Commerce , Science and Transport at ion Comm i ttee reported adopted this approach: Several b i l l s introduced d u r i n g this session of Congress 1, inc hiding S. i82) cal led for the unilateral estahi ishm ent of a 2 0 0 — m i l e poihi — t i o n control :one . The zone would have ex- tended U .S. ju r i sd tc t i on over vessel safety and pol l Ut IOfl control out beyond its current 12 m i l e l i m i t a t i o n (the so-c alled contiguous zone). The ju t-i sdict ion would have included the ri ght to set des i gn and construct ion s t a n d a r d s foi- a l l p a s s j a g s h i ps , to l i m i t d i s c h a r g e s f r o m any ship s , and to cont vol ship m o v e men t s and op e r a t i o n s . Howeve r , repr esen : ,it ives of the AWn in ~ St rat ion argued st ronglv a g a i n s t u n i l a t e r a l ex t e n s ion of such j u r i s d i c t i o n as being contrary to U.S. pot icy and pos sibly damaging to U . S . inter ests. It was also po uited out that perhaps $0 to 90 percent of a l l tr a ffic passing w ithin .00 nautical miles enters U.S. ports. The r e m a i n d e r are enroute to points in Mex ice or Canada . There fore , an approach using regulator ’- authority based on the Nation ’s nearly p l e n ar y ju ris d ict ion over any vessel e n t e r i n g a U.S . pot~t was adopted by the Committee. -- b~~t atem ent of Ambassador U 11 iot Richardson , Spec ia 1 Repr esentat ive of the Pres ident for the Law o I the Sea Con fer ence , in hear i ncs “Recent Tanker A c c i d e n t s : Le gi s lat ion for Inipi -oved Tank er Si let v Senate Comm it tee on Commerce , Sc ience , and t r a n s p o r t at ion • )S t h Co n g . , 1st sess. , p . 851 (Serial 95—4 . part 2 , M . i i . 18 , ~~~~ - See al s o , State Department comments on a staff w orking paper ver- sion of S. ts82 contained in a l et t e r from Doug las. 1~~ l~ennet Jr., A s s i s t a n t Secretary of State for C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , t t ’4 Senator Warren G. Magnuson , Cha i rman , Senate Committee on Commerce , Science and Transpor ta ti on , Apr il 1 , 19~~ (reprinted in hearings , supra , at 924). - S. Rep . No. 9 5 — 1 Th , 95 . ~ong. , 1st Sess . . at 11 (1 9~~ ) - - ~~- . - ~~~_ —— ~~~~~~ .k- ~-- — __~r -- ~~ -- - - The specific elements ot~ the vessel passport sy stem--th at is , adv anc e not ice pr ior to vessel a r r iv a l in IL S. wat ers en rou t e to a U. S. por t , maintenance of sa fet v records on a 11 vessel s e n t e r i n g U.S. ports , n av i g a t i o n - r e l at e d ve s se l equ i pment 1-equire - ment s ap p l i c ab l e to v e s s e l s hound for U .S. p or t s , vessel m a s t er ’ s assurance o t~ propt’r equipment operat ion . and i m p o s i t i o n of spec i ii c cond it ions on port e n t r y as n e c e s s a ry - - a p p e a r to const i t u t e cond i - t ions on vessel ent rv as comprehended in the above—quoted d i s c u s s i o n of S. c~S2 . Al though call-in requ i rements at 2$ hours and one hour pr i o r to entry i n t o i n t e r n a l w a t e r s can he distinguished from advance not ic e o f arr ival at the poit I t so 1 f , t h i s d (St inc t ion does not seem s i g n i f i c a n t , it would seem to m at t er l i t t l e t o a vessel bound for port whether advance n o t i c e of i t s a r r i v a l must he given 24 hours p r i o r to its port entry or 24 h ours p r i o r to ent rv in t o i n t e r n a l w a t er s - - the not ice to be gi s- en is the same in either case . (An arriving vessel ma i~r ef e r in some situati ons to r e l a t e i t s advance not ice to enter into interna l waters because t h a t bound is more prec isely d e f i n e d th ai~ the hounds of a part icul ar port. ) The use of t hue- related not ice requirements and the i n t e rn a l w a t er s boundary as the measuring hound a l so elimin a tes the need to e s t ab l i s h new fixed-di stance offshore demarcation lines at w h i c h vessels must comply w i t h n o t i c e r e q u i r e m e n t s . The pre cise d istanc e from the U.S • coast I inc at which a vessel must report under the vessel passport sy stem would vary with its s1~eed and trajector y .~~ R e q u i r i n g not i f i c at ion of vessel arrival at the en trance to a port -bound traffic lane would likewis e a v o i d the need for new fix ed—distance offshore zones. requ i remen t that arr i v ing v e s s e l s g i v e advance no ti~ e of arr ival as a c o n d i t i o n of port e n t ry a s p e c i f i c number of hour s rather than a p r e s c r i b e d d i s t a n c e out from shore meets the S t a t e Depar t men t concern tha t no new o f f s h o r e p o l l u t i o n control zones he established because of the possible precedenti al effect of such ac tion s . See Renne t lette i- , supra note t~ . r e p r i n t e d in h e a r in g s . supra note t’, at 9 2 4 - 9 1 5 . — -- 30 _._~ir -~~~~ - ~~~~~~ —- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ——- — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ill - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~_-..,.• - .— — •• -~ ~~~~~~~ , , ~. S t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i ty beyond t h a t contained in e x i s t i n g legis- la tion (principally the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 , 33 U.S.C. §~ 122 1-122 71 is needed to authorize full implementation of the vessel passport system . For example , the Secretary of Trans- por ta ti on now lacks expl i c it author~ ty to estab lish vessel traffic serv ices outside the territorial waters of the United States.9 Al though both foreign and U .S. -reg istered vessels must now give at leas t 24 hours advance notice prior to arrival at U.S. ports ,10 the authorit y for this requirement is derived from the Magnuson Act , which by its terms is appl i cable in t ime of na ti onal emerg ency.~~ In recogn it ion of the need for add iti onal s t atutor~ - author it , the Senate has passed and the House is now considering S. t82 , “The Tanker and Vessel Safety Act ef l9~~~ ”~~ Sec ti on 3 of S. t~82 , as passed by the Sena te , would direc t the Secretary of Transportation to establish “adv isory vessel traffic services in appropriate areas of the high seas.”~~ Al though deemed “advisory, ” no vessel carry- 1m g oil or hazardous materials in bulk would he permitted to operate in nav igable wa ters of the Uni ted States ’4 or to transfer cargo in U.S. ports if It failed to comply with such a vessel traffic I 9See 33 U.S.C. § 1221; Senate Commerce , Sc ience and Transportation Comm i ttee Report No. 95-176 on S. t~82 , supra no te - ‘ at 21. 1033 C.F.R. § 124.10. 11 50 U.S.C. § 191; see Senate Commerce , Sc ience and Tra nspor ta ti on Commi ttee Report No. 95-197 on S. p82 , supra no te - ‘ at 21 . ~~S. 682 passed the Senate May 26, l9~’ (leg islative day May 18 , l9~~’). In the House , the bill has been referred jo intl~ - to the commi ttees on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and on International Rela tions. 13~ 682 . § 3 , to amend § 101 (c) of the Ports and Waterwa ys Safety Act of l 9 2 , 33 U.S.C. § 1221. 14”Navigahle waters of the United States” is defined to i nclude the territorial seas of the United States. 33 C.F.R. § 2 .05-25 . - 31 — ----~~- ~L2 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~~ —‘-.-•,--~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ -~~z~z~ ~-~~r - ~~~~ ~~~“ Z a ~~~ service. 15 The proposed legislation would further authorize the Secre tary to exclude from U.S. ports or navigable waters any vessel w ith a his tory of acc idents , pollu tion inciden ts , or ser ious repa ir problems if there were reason to believe the vessel unsafe or a threa t to the marine env ironmen t .’6 Unde r the bill the Secretary could also order a vessel to anchor or ope rate as he direc ts if he reasonably bel ieved the vessel did no t comply w it h appl icable law or regulation , if weather or sea conditions or the condition of the vessel justified such action in the interest of safety, or if the vessel did not sa ti sfy cond iti ons for po rt entry .1 And , the bill would require es tabl ishment of a da ta bank con ta ining vessel owner ship, acc ident , repair and inspection data , and other infor- ma ti on on vessels carry ing o il or haz ardous cargo which enter or 15Seve ral prov is ions of S. 682 , as pas sed by the Sen ate , includ ing the one just described in the text , could by their terms be inter- pre ted to apply to vessels not bound for U.S. ports which tray- ersed the U.S. territorial seas in innocent passage . Implemen- tation of these provisions may violate foreign vessels ’ ri ght of innocent passage through the territorial sea. In view of the vessel passpor t system ’s focu s on U.S. port-bound vessels , how- ever , implementation of the system would not involve exercise of jurisd ic tion over fore ign vessels engaged in innocent passage. l6~ 682 , § 3, to amend § 106 of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 , 33 U.S.C . § 1226. See note 15 , supr a . 17 1d . at § 3, to amend § 101(h) of the Ports and Waterways Safety ~~t of 1972 , 33 U.S.C. § 1221. Section 4 of S.682 would amend the Tank Vessel Ac t , 46 U.S.C. ~ 391a , to grant the Secretary of Transpor tation general authority to set standards for the desi gn , cons truc tion , repair , opera tion , mann ing and ma intenance of vessels which operate in U.S. navigable waters or transfer cargo in U.S. ports and to which the section otherwise applies. Speci- f i c a l l y , this section would mandate certain minimum equipment for oil tankers of more than 2 0,000 deadweight tons , includ ing a dual radar sys tem , coll ision avoidance system , long-range navigation aid , adequa te comm unica ti ons equipment , fa thome ter , gyrocompass and up- to-date charts. - 3 2 — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- - - - -- _ - — - ~~~~~~ transfer cargo wi thin the jurisdiction of the United States .18 Passage of this (or similar) leg islation would thus provide suffi- cient authority to permit full implementation of the vessel pass- port system . at § 3 to amend § 107 of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act - - 61’ 1972 , 33 U.S.C. § 1227. The U.S. Coast Guard has recently proposed establishmen t of a “Marine Safety Information System ” applicable to tank vessels over 20,1100 deadweight tons carrying oil in bulk within U.S. navigable waters. As proposed , the regulation would requ ire each vessel subjec t to it to report to the Captain of the Port 24 hours prior to port entry stating its beneficial owners , past registered vessel names , and country of registry . 43 F.R. 15586 (Apr. 13 , 1978). 7- 33/7-34 H - - — .- ,.—‘ ~~ - - - ~ ii -~ — - -~ - --- - ----- —- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - 8. BIBLIOGRAPHY Armacos t , R.L. , 1977: “A Queuing Sy st em Approach for the Des ign of Coast Guard Vessel T r a f f i c Services Communications ,” 11i 1313 T r an s . Vol. Tech , Vo l . VT— IS , No. 4 , August 19’7 , p. 2 39- 2 4 6 . Barra tt , M. -I .,, 197 6: “Collision Avoidance Maneuvers in Res tricted V i s i b i l i t y , ” 3. Nay ., Vol. 29. No. 4. Brown , 3.11., Kim , M .C ., McGregor , D . N . , and P a t t o n , I .D ., 1973.: “Vessel Tr a f l ic Sy stems Commun icat ions Study, ” ORl Report — C G — l ) — 2 0 — 7~4 Cobb , A . D . , 1972: “Hy draways - ~\ Development in Marine Acous tic Naviga- tion ,” 3. Inst. Navigation , Vol . 19, No. 1 , p. ft6— 0. Cockroft , A .N., 1976: “StatIstics of Collisions at Sea ,” 3. Nay . Vol. 29 , No. 3, p. 215. Comptroller General , 1977: “Total Costs Resulting from Two Major Oil Spills ,” Repor t of the Comptroller General of the U.S., CED-77-71 , June . Corps of Engineers , Waterborne Commerce of the United States , 19’~~, U.S. Department of the Army , New Orleans , LA. Damon , M .H., 1972: “SANS , Ship Acoustic Nav igation System ,” 3. Inst. Navigation , Vol. 19 , No. 1 , p. 11-17. Denman , M .,et al , 1978: “INMARSAT Radio lietermination lconomi c Assess- ment ,” two volumes , Computer Sciences Corp., Contract 5-0041 , for U.S. Dept. of Commerce , Maritime Administration , March. t~evanney, 3., 1978: “Tanker Spills , Coll isions anti Groundings ,” MIT , Cambridge , MA , MIT Contract: DOT -TSC-148l , May . t 8-i - , - i,— - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ - ~~~~~~~ - - - - - ‘~~~ “ - _ - Federal Register , 1975: “National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Cont ingency Plan ,” FR4O-28 , Feb . 10 , 1975 , (CFR Ti tle 40 , Chapter V , Part 1510). Federal Regis ter , 1977a: “Proposed Navigation Safety Requirements , LORAN-C or Vessels of 1600 Gross Tons or More ,” FR 42-Jan 31 , 1977. Federal Regis ter , 1977b: “National Plan for Naviga tion , Imple- mentation of LORAN-C Radio Nav igation System ,” FR42-47 , March 10 , p. 13372-13 375. Federal Register , 1977c : “Additional Equipmen t for Vessels of 10 ,000 Gross Tons or More ,” FR42-94 , May 16, p. 24871-24874. Feder al Re gi s ter , 1977d: “Proposed I~lectronic Navigation Equi p- men t , Vessels of 1600 Gross Tons or More ,” FR4I- 219 , Nov. 14 , p. 590 12—5 90 14. Federal Register , 1978a : “U.S. Marine Safe ty Informa tion Sys tem ,” FR43-72 , April 13 , p. 15586-15587. Fee , J.J., Maive , R. I ., and Stewar t , C.W., 1976: “Experimen tal Evaluation of the Marine Radar Interrogation /Transponder (MRIT),” 1976 Na tional Marine Meeting , RTCM , p. 1. Henry, W.O., 197 1: “Racous ,” Coas t Guard Engineers Digest , CG-133 , No. 17 2 , p. 36-41 , Summer. IMCO , 1969: “In ternational Convention on Intervention on the High Sea s in Cas es of Oil Pollu tion Casual ti es ,” TIAS 8068. IMCO , 19 77: “Naviga tion Aids and Equi pment - Radar Beacons and Transponders ,” IMCO NAV XI X , WP.7. 8-2 ~~~~~ _ _ _ _ _ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Kemp , J.F., 1973: “Behavior Patterns in Encounters Between Ships ,: J. Navigation , Vol. 26 , No . 4, October. Luse , J.P., 1972: “Collision Avoidance Systems and the Pubs of the Road ,” J. Inst. Nay ., Vol. 19 , No. 1 , p. 80, Spring . MAR.AD , 1976: “Maritime Administrat ion , A Statistical Analysis of the World ’s Merchant Flee ts ,” U.S . Department of Commerce , Washington , D.C., December. MARAD , 1977: “A Long-Term Forecast of U .S . Waterborne Foreign Trade ,” U.S. Dept. of Commerce , Maritime Administra tion , Washing ton , D.C., November. Matthews , C.S .,, Isbister , E .J., and Fee , J.J., 1976. “Mar ine Radar Interrogator-Transponder (MRIT),” Oceans ‘76 , MTS-IEEE , Paper SA. Meiz , A.W. and Karwarkas , J.S., 1976. ”Colljsion Avoidance Systems and Optional Turn Maneuvers ,” J. Nay., Vol. 29 , No. 2 , p. 160. NTSB , 1968: “Study of Collisions of Radar-Equipped Merchant Ships and Preventive Recommendations .” National Transportation Safety Board , 78-20038 , December. Operations Research , Inc., 1975 “Spill-Risk Analysis Program - Method- ology Development and Demonstration , Vol. 1 ,” Contract DOT-CG- 31571-A. Po]lack , M., 1975 : “An Experimental Investigation of Collision Avoidance Sys tem Benefi ts ,” Proc . 1st CAORF Symp., p. 1-12. Publ ic Law 92-63 , 1971. 8.3 • -. - ~~~~ - - -- ~~-~~~- - - - -~~~~~~~~~-=- ~~~~- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -~ -~ri~~ u— — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ Thompson , P.M., and Renne , J.C., 197 8: “Identifica tion of Vessels on a Radar PPI by VHF Direc tion F i n d i n g s ,” 1978 RICM Assembly M t g , Paper 48. U.S . Coast Guard , 1974: “LORAN -C U ser Handbook ,” CC-4 62 , August. U.S. Coas t Guard , 1977: “Nav igation Rules , In ternationa l-Inland ,” CC- 169. U.S. Coast Guard , 1975: “ANVER - Automated Mutual Assistanc e Vessel and Rescue Sys tem , AMVER-l t~ AMVER-2 ,” (do Commander , A t l a n t i c Area , U.S. Coast Guard , Governor ’s is land , New York 10004 , or Commander Pac I f i c Area , Ii . S. Coast Guard , 630 Sansome St . , San Pranc i sco , CA 9412 6) . U .S. House of R e p r e s e nt a t i v e s , 1977: S.682 - An Act to Amend the Ports and Waterways S a f e ty Act of 1972 , D i i i 682 , 9 5th Congress , 1st Session , 41 pages. U.S. Maritime Administration , 1973: “Mar itime Mobil Digita l Calling U nits ,” U.S. Dep t. of Commerce Contract 3-36II~0. W i j l i e , F.J., 1970: “An Examina tion of Some Ships ’ Radars w i th Au t omatic Compu ta t ion ,” July. 8-4 L ~~~~~~‘- - ~~~~~~. . ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ 9, GLOSSARY OF TERMS Ac tive Systems - those in which a shore station monitors vessel movement on a real time basis with frequent interaction and corn- mun ications with the vessel. Adjusted Potential Effectiveness - the potential effectiveness of a sys tem , adjusted downward to reflect the fact that some unpre- ventable accidents did not appear in the data base. A id to Navigation - a device or system external to a vessel intended to help opera tors de termine the ir posi tion or warn them of danger. AMVER (Automated Mutual-assistance Vessel Rescue System) - an • international program operated by the U.S. Coast Guard designed to assis t the safety of merchant vessels on the high seas . Merchant vessels of all nations are encouraged to participate in this voluntary program by sending sail plans and periodic posi tion reports to cooperating radio stations for forwarding to the ANVER Center on Governors Island , New York . The ANVER Center can then provide a computer-predicted listing of ships in the vicinity of an emergency at sea . Vessel locations are disclosed only for reasons related to mari time safety. Availabili ty - the percentage of time that a system service is expec ted to be available , accoun ting for equipment malfunctions , lack of coverage , and lack of onboard equipmen t. Coastal and Confluence Zone (CCZ) - the reg ion from the coastline or harbor entrance to 50 NM offshore or the edge of the con tinental shelf (100 fathom curve) whichever is greater. Collision - the colliding of two vessels where one or both are underway. .. ~ _M__ _ ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - • • ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ----.--- - — - COLREGS 1972 - The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea , 1972 , an international convention developed under the auspices of IMCO . These naviga tion rules came into force July 15 , 1977 , and superseded exis ting U.S. statutory navigation provisions (33 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.). COLREGS ‘72 are set forth in U.S. Coast Guard Publication CG~ l69 , “Navigation Rules ,” (May 1, 1977). See 42 Federal Register 35782 (July 11 , 1977). Conning Officer - the person on the bridge of a ship, at any given time , who is responsible for commanding the ship ’s crew and course at that time . Contiguous Zone - waters between 3 and 12 miles from U.S. shores. CPA (Closest Point of Approach ) - the passing distance between two vessels , predic ted by projection of their present courses. Dead Reckoning - calcula tion of pos it ion by advanc ing a p rev iou s , known position in accordance with the vessel’ s course and speed. Deep Wa ter Route - a rout e in a des ignated area within definite limits which has been accurately surveyed for clearance of sea bo ttom and submerged obs tacles to a minimum indica ted depth of water for passage of deep draft vessels. Direction Finder - a radio receiver used on a vessel to determine the bearing of the ship in relation to a land-based radio trans- mitter at a known location. A vessel may determine its position by finding its bearing to two land based transmitters. DRMS - the distance root mean squared is a measure of error. It assumes that the statistical distribution of errors is normal (gaussian). On this basis , an error expressed as (drms) refers to the probability that a circle (or a circle equivalent to an ellipse) of radius shown will contain 63.2 percen t of all da ta points. 2-drms is a 2 times drms , and refers to the circle con- tam ing 95 percent of the probable readings. 9-2 -— pn_____ __n,_n__ __ _ ----.— - .-- - - - ~~~~~~~~~~~ . ~~ -.- ~~~~~~~~~~ ~ -.~~‘r ~~ - - ‘~~~~ — - - — ~~ — - - . External Referenced - applies to a position established with refer- ence to one or more external points whose locations are known or can be calculated accurately. Fa irway - (Shipp ing Safety Fairway) - a desi gnated area of the sea wi thin which the erection of structures is controlled or prohibited . These are established by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers , and per- tain only to the erection of structures. In practice , as in the Gulf of Mexico , their es tablishmen t crea tes a “fa irway ” for ocean traffic. F ix - a relatively accurate measure of vessel position at a given time , determined without reference to any former position , and ob tained by establishing the location of a vessel with respect to one or more external poin ts. Grounding - any situation in which a vessel come s in contact with the ocean bottom . A stranding is included as a grounding . Hazardous Cargo Carriers - shi ps and barges tha t carry chem icals and other substances hazardous to the environment . Homing - navigating toward a point by keeping constant some navi- gational coordina te , usually a bearing . IMCO - (Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization) - A specialized agency of the United Nations established in 1958 to promo te international cooperation on technical matters affecting mar it ime shipping, safety of life at sea , eff icient navigation , and the exchange of maritime information among nations. Inshore Traffic Zone - a designated area between the landward boundary of a Traffic Separa tion Scheme and the adjacent coast intended for coastal traffic. Internal Waters - see “wa ters ” Location Identification - the location of a point on the earth’s surface expressed in terms of the coordinates of some grid. Major Oil Spill - spill greater than 100 ,000 gallons when in the offshore , ref. Federal Register Vol. 40, No. 28, Feb. 10 , 1975., 9-3 a -- - ‘“ ‘—~~~~~~‘-~~~ - - - ___ •___ __k ~~~~~~~~~~ — — —•——- --- .-•~—-- ~~~~~~~ . — ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ MTBF - Mean time between failures Monitoring - See “Surveillance/Mon itoring ” Nautical Miles (NM) - 1852 U.S. standard meters (meters defined by Department of Commerce as standard) . NAVAID - a device or system on-board a vessel which operators use to determine their position or determine their proximity to dangerous objec ts. Navigable Waters - see “wa ters ” Navigation System - a system capable of being used to navigate. It includes the transmission receiving equipment , its opera tors , the rules and procedures governing their actions and , to some extent , the environmen t which affects the whole vessel. Net Effec tiveness - The measure of system effectiveness over and above the baseline system , incorpora ting any lack of availability. Offshore Vessel Traffic Management (OVTM) - organizing and coordi- nating the movement of vessels in the offshore waters for the purpose of improving the safety of the vessel and her crew . Passive Systems - regulations , rules , procedures , equipment requirements , and vessel routing schemes which do not require a dedica ted shore station ’s real- time interaction with vessels. Position Accuracy - a measure of the error between the point desired and the point achieved , or between the position indica ted by measuremen t and the true position . Accurate determination of posi tion is dependent upon the capability of the navigation sys- tem to provide precise information , the user ’s ability to inter- pre t this informa tion , correc t geodetic coordinates , and proper cartography (when required) . There are many ways of express ing posi tion accuracy . In general , the error is statis tical in character and can only be expressed in terms of a distance that will not be exceeded in some percentage of cases. a. System Accuracy - is the expected accuracy of the sys- tem expressed in drms units ,, not including errors which may be introduced by the user , or geodetic or carto- graphic errors . 9-4 -- - 4 - : - - ~~~~ -•- - — •~~~- • -~~~ - ~~~. - -•— •_ - -~~~~~~~.—-•— - - - - - — b. Predic table Accuracy - is the accuracy of predicting pos iti on w ith respec t to precise space and surface coordina te s . c. Rela tive Accuracy - is the accuracy with which users can measure their position relative to that of another user of the same navigation system at the same time . d. Re_pea table Accuracy - is the accuracy with which a user can return to a position whose coordinates have been measured at a previous time with the same navigation ~vstem. Po tentia l Effectiveness - a measure of the effectiveness of a system to prevent casualties , assuming that all ships are fully equ ipped , that the system service is everywhere and niways avail- able , and that the baseline system is in effect. Probab ility of Prevention - a measure of the effectiveness of a sys tem to prevent casualtIes , a ssuming tha t all ships are fully equipped , and that the system service is everywhere and always ava ilable. RACON - transponder type Radar Beacon which responds to Interro - gations from a radar and replies with a unique identity code that appears on the screen of the Interrogating radar. Radiode term ina t ion - the de termina tion of posi t ion , or the obtain- ing of informa t ion rela ting to posi tion , b means of the propaga- tion properties of radio waves. Radioloc ation - radiodeterm ination used for purposes other than naviga t ion . Radionav igation - radiodetermination used for the purposes of naviga t ion , including obstruction warning . Ramml,pg - the accidental collision of a vessel with a fixed object. Rou tini (or Routeinji - a complex of measures concerning routes aimed at reducing the risk of casualties . It includes traffic separation schemes , two-way routes , tracks , areas to he avoided , inshore traffic zones and deep water routes. 9-5 IL —~-~~~~~~~~~~~ _ ~ 1 _ _ —- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 4~ -:. ~~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘—br - - Sealane - a broad and vague term referring to routes normally traveled by ships. Although in common use , it is no t geographi- cally specific . Surveillance/Monitoring, - the practice of a shore facility track- ing and observing the movement of vessels in order to provide information and guidance to assist in preventing collisions , groundings and rammings , and otherwise facilitate the safe move- ment of a vessel or group of vessels . a. Surveillance - the shore facility determines the vessel’s posi tion and estimates its course and speed . b. Monitoring - the ship determines its position and relays this to the shore facility where estimates of course and speed are made . The relay may be made automatically (Automatic Monitoring) or involve the crew of the ship (Manual Monitoring) . Study Region - the geographical area of interest in this study ; i.e. , the Uni ted States waters from the coastline out to 200 NM , excluding ports , harbors and channels less than 1000 feet wide . System - a term used in this report in a broad sense to mean a group of rules , regulations , laws , treaties , national and indus try organiza tions , and equipment which work together to serve a common purpose. Tank Vessel - includes all tankers , tank ships , bulk cargo carriers and barges used to transport crude oil or petroleum products. As used in this report , tankers, tank ships , and tank barges carry only oil or petroleum products. Territorial Sea - see “waters.” TCPA (Time to the CPA) - the time interval from the present time until the time that two vessels will pass each other , based on the projection of their present courses . Time Differences - the difference in the time of reception of synchronized signals emanating from different sources. 9-6 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ “ ~~~ w ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - Track ~or Track Line) - the recommended route to be followed when proceeding between predetermined positions. Traffic Lane - an area within definite limits inside which one- way traffic is established . Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) - a scheme which separates vessel traffic proceeding in opposite or nearly opposite directions by the use of a separation zone or line , traffic lanes , natural obstacles , or other means . All TSS ’s are submitted to IMCO for approval to comply with international agreements . Two-way Route - a route in an area within definite limits inside which two-way traffic is established . The “fairways” in the Gulf of Mexico are effectively two-way routes. (See the definition of Fairway.) U.S. Waters - see “waters” Vessel - any ship, barge or boat of any size and carrying any cargo . Vessel Traffic Service - an integrated system including the tech- niques , equipments , and personnel to coordinate vessel movements and provide advisory information to vessels in or approaching a port or inland waterway for the purpose of improving the safety of all vessels and their crew . Waters - - a. Navig,able Waters of the United States - means tern- ton al seas of the United States , internal waters of the United States subject to tidal influence , and certain internal waters not subject to tidal influence. Ref. 33 C.’F.R. § 2.05-25(a). b. Territorial Seas - (a) with respect to the United States , territorial seas means the waters within the belt , 3 nautical miles wide , that is adjacent to its coast and seaward of the territorial sea baseline . (b) with respect to any foreign country, territorial 9-7 I .- -- — — — . - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ --- ~ .--.- - - -- ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ •• -- seas means the waters within the belt that is adjacent to its coast and whose breadth and baseline are recognized by the United States. Ref. 33 C.F.R. § 2 .0 5 - 5 c. Territorial Sea Baseline - the delimitation of the shoreward extent of the territorial seas of the United States drawn in accordance with principles , as recog- nized by the United States , of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone , 15 U.S.T. 1606. Ref. 33 C.F.R. § 2.05-10 d. Inland Waters - generally equivalent to Interna l Waters . Ref. 33 C.F.R. § 2.05-20(b). e. Internal _Waters - with respect to the United States , the waters shoneward of the territorial sea baseline . Ref. 33 C.F.R. § 2.05-20 Weight of Oil - the estimated average weight of oil transported by tank vessels , as used in this report , is 7.5 pounds per gallon . 500 copies. 9-8